Freedom For Everyone Research Articles

The Civil Rights Movement and the Future of the National Park System in a Racially Diverse America

The U.S. National Park System contains places of world-renowned beauty and tremendous historical significance that represent some of the central values and experiences in American culture, democracy, and freedom for everyone, for all time. However, the vast majority of visitors to these parks are white, which has increasingly been seen as a problem as it suggests a lack of full participation by all members of society. While there are several perspectives on low minority visitation, it is possible that park policies or interpretation may not appeal to, or may unintentionally exclude minority visitors. This study examines how efforts to expand the inclusiveness and representativeness of the park system may affect its geography. Recent National Park Service plans to commemorate the Civil Rights movement are examined with the goal of understanding how the geography and purpose of the park system may be changed over time. The expansion of the park system into cultural themes will likely necessitate a continual expansion of the number and kinds of park units.

“We Never Could Understand Why the Black Man Did Not Come to Us”:

“We Never Could Understand Why the Black Man Did Not Come to Us”:

“We Never Could Understand Why the Black Man Did Not Come to Us”:

“We Never Could Understand Why the Black Man Did Not Come to Us”:

Original Acquisition and Unilateralism: Kant, Hegel, and Corrective Justice

Contemporary Kantians suggest that the original acquisition of property is problematic for Kant’s theory of private law. Kant requires that private law obligations be consistent with the equal freedom of everyone. However, a rule of original acquisition seems to favor the acquirer’s freedom over others’: the acquirer originally obtains property in an unowned object simply by taking control of it, and thus seems to impose obligations on everyone else (to respect the property right) through her own “unilateral” action or choice. This article first addresses proposed Kantian solutions to the supposed “unilateralism” problem, which involve the creation of a “civil condition” of public legal institutions to determine property rights. Such solutions make property rights a matter of distributive justice rather than corrective justice. Moreover, they cannot actually solve the unilateralism problem. But in any event, the supposed “unilateralism” problem is in fact no problem at all for Kant. This is because one person’s original acquisition does not limit others’ “freedom” in the Kantian sense of that term. In this respect Kant’s account of property is equivalent to Hegel’s, which contemporary Kantians have criticized for denying any problem of unilateralism. And both Kant and Hegel’s accounts are fully consistent with a theory that explains property as a matter of corrective, rather than distributive, justice.

Is social justice for or against liberty? The philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty

By comparing the philosophical foundations of Mill and Hayek’s theory of liberty, this paper shows that some similarities in the economic theories of Mill and Hayek are actually based on different rationales. It follows that any attempt to find a common thread in Mill and Hayek to provide reasonable guidance for social policy can be promising only if we can find the common ground from their social philosophy. While analyzing the rationales behind their opinions regarding the role of government and taxation policies, this paper will focus on exploring the role of two philosophical ideas, liberty, and justice. This will clarify the relationship between social justice and liberty as well as their status in relation to the ultimate principle of rules in the philosophy of Mill and Hayek. This paper will offer an explanation why, in Mill’s utilitarian philosophy, the pursuit of social justice aligns with the real freedom of everyone, but in Hayek’s philosophy, it is a hindrance.

Nochmals zum Tanz-Quodlibet im ersten Akt-Finale des Don Giovanni

The famous dance scene in Mozart’s Don Giovanni, incorporating three different ensembles and three different dances to which the guests simultaneously dance, is in the manner of a quodlibet-a form of folk music that in the eighteenth century used a mixture of disassociated songs to portray scenes of chaotic merry-making. The term quodlibet also semantically coincides with the central exposition of the opera, in which the protagonist is a libertine who speaks of “freedom for everyone” while actually seeking it only for himself. The main focus of this analysis is devoted to compositional aspects of Mozart’s unique score. Using three different time signatures (3/4, 2/4, 3/8), Mozart proceeds to subtly manipulate the inherent rhythmic and metric conflict even further. Newly proven is the fact that Mozart planted harmonic mistakes in the score and simultaneously hid them by way of rests. These mistakes function as intentional breaking points which cause the musical structure to collapse like a house of cards, as in Zerlina’s cry that interrupts the feast. In conclusion the tavern scene from Berg’s Wozzeck is compared to Mozart’s dance quodlibet. Not only does Mozart’s menuet-including the individual instrumental lines that Berg quotes verbatim-but primarily Mozart’s idea of planned chaos stimulate Berg to compose such an operatic scene, one mirroring the characteristics of a catastrophic twentieth century.

Rights and recognition

ABST RACT Many contemporary liberals increasingly accept that plural societies must aspire to far more expansive and inclusive ideals of justice and citizenship than liberal doctrine would suggest. The dominant perception is that extending the set of rights is the most effective way to implement a just and stable multicultural society. In fact, this is not a very plausible description of what people seek in demanding greater respect for diversity. Nor does it offer a compelling vision of how things ought to be. First, social expectations regarding recognition are not uniquely linked to rights; they encompass intractable struggles over values, as well as ways of living and evaluating. For example, a central feature of feminist, black and multicultural politics is the attempt to change social culture into a medium through which personal integrity and self-esteem may be acquired. Second, liberalism cannot easily accommodate this type of struggle, since it takes for granted a narrowly constricted conception of politics that is based on instituting public laws that harmonize the freedom of everyone. Anyone who takes seriously the idea that recognition surpasses legal relations of respect will then surely wish to consider whether liberalism must not be corrected and extended to reveal the political significance of the social conditions that enable individuals to experience themselves as both autonomous and individuated.

Civility and Hospitality: Justice and Social Grace in Trying Times

‘[S]o act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law’ (MM 6: 231). This is Immanuel Kant's first principle of justice, stated in the imperative form appropriate for human beings, beings who can comply with it but who might not do so. For Kant it is a principle that applies not only to relations among citizens within a state, but to those among states themselves and among citizens of varying nationality. As Kant's Rechtslehre makes clear, the universal law of justice, as he terms it, lies at the foundation of a set of standards that together form his theory of justice. Subsidiary standards follow from this most fundamental one by argument and together form a system, or metaphysics, of related principles. The system is hierarchical, that is, we can argue from the universal law of justice to increasingly concrete standards that help us apply it to various questions and in varying contexts.

Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant

In his Doctrine of Right Kant set out to formulate theory of property that would be based on purely rational argumentation, that would abstract all spatial and temporal conditions, and that would be applicable to any person, merely because and insofar as he is free and has practical reason. But from the time when the work first appeared Kant scholars have found many difficulties in the teaching that he presented. Many of them relate to the idea of permissive natural law that Kant introduced at key point to his argument. In previous, complementary article I discussed in detail various apparent aporias that arose in Kant's treatment of this concept and suggested that we might understand his problems better by setting them in broader historical context than those considered in standard works like those of Reinhard Brandt and Wolfgang Kersting.1 This is the theme that I want to explore further in the present paper. To sum up briefly some of the difficulties in the Doctrine ofRight: A central problem for Kant was to explain how rightful possession of individual property could emerge from hypothetical state of nature where everything was common to all, where everyone had right to everything. His argument was grounded on concept of freedom understood as a pure rational concept. Kant maintained that every person had an innate right to freedom and from this he deduced universal law of Right: [S]o act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone.2 But the person who first seized for himself what had been common to all evidently did encroach on the freedom of others (their freedom to use the property that had been taken).

Execution and the Human

r Intertcxa, Vol. 3. No. 1,1999 E x e c u t i o n a n d t h e H u m a n Allan Stoekl P e n n s y l v a n i a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y I People who favor the death penalty often argue that their opinion is based precisely on their respect for human life. Because murder is the most serious crime, it must be punished in the only way that corresponds to its seriousness: durough execution. But if human life is so sacred, why must we end it? The death penalty is seemingly paradoxical in that it is justified by the very thing it contradicts. Its proponents would argue that life is the most sacred, the most serious, the highest thing there is: to take it is there¬ fore the most serious crime. For that very reason the most serious, the most incontrovertible sentence is necessary: death. Executing acriminal is radi¬ cally different from murdering an innocent person, death penalty propo¬ nentswouldargue;itisnomoremurderthanisself-defense.Nevertheless, death is what was seen as the most terrible in the first place. Indeed this seofdeath (andtheconsequentparadoxofthedeathpenalty)has only been underlined in recent years, with the elimination of virtually all crimespunishablebydeathexceptformurder.Asthefocusofthedeath penaltyhasbeennarrowed,asitpxmishesonlymurderandnothingelse,so tooitsparadoxbecomesmoreevident:ifkillingistheworstcrimeimagin¬ able, how does it justify more killing? There is, of course, an answer to this paradox, one provided by Im¬ manuelKantinhisMetaphysicalElementsofJustice.Andthesolutiontmns aroundthecategoryofthehuman.Herewemightbesurprised:humanism wouldseemtobe,andismostoftenused,asthebasic^gumentagainstthe deathpenalty.Ifallhumanlifeissacred,howcanwekillforjustice?But,as any reader of Foucault knows, humanism is aprotean thing, capable of twistingandturningtosuitagivenargumentorlineofthought.Capital punishmentandhumanismcanbeveryeasilyreconciled^indeedthehu¬ man can be seen to be afunction of execution. Kantbaseshisjustificationforpunishmentingeneral,andoncapital punishment in particular, on the affirmation ofhuman freedom. He writes: Freedom(independencefromtheconstraintofanother’swill),insofaras it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law, is the one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity. {Metaphysical Elements n o u s n e s s 3 4 I N T E R T E X T S But what is freedom? Simply put, it is the right not to be coerced—in other words, to be in oneself not ameans (to someone else’s end) but sim¬ ply an end. Interestingly enough, this status of man as end and not means is inseparable from honor. Kant cites the Roman jurist Ulpian, who held that one must “be an honorable man,” and goes on to state: Juridical honor consists in asserting one’s own worth as ahuman being in relation to others, and this duty is expressed in the proposition: “Do not make yourself into amere means for others, but be at the same time an end for them.” {Metaphysical Elements \1) This is, as Kant puts it, a“right of humanity in our own person {lex justi).” So honor is tied to human worth, and the latter is associated with freedom. If this is the case, however, how can we justify any sort of punish¬ ment, which obviously will restrain or eliminate the guilty person’s free¬ dom? The answer lies in the fact that the guilty will have used his or her freedom in such away that the freedom of others is violated; in other words, the other will have been made use of as ameans, rather than ac¬ cepted as an end. Coercion—imprisonment, execution—will then be justi¬ fied if it counteracts another coercion. Coercion, however, is ahindrance or opposition to freedom. Consequently, if a certain use of freedom is itselfa hindrance to freedom according to universal laws (that is, is unjust), then the use of coercion to counteract it, inasmuch as it is the prevention of ahindrance to freedom, is consistent with freedom according to universal laws; in other words,thisuseofcoercionisjust.{MetaphysicalElements36) Coercion is therefore an activity that is an expression of freedom, but itsexpressioncancithergoagainstsomeoneelse’sfreedom,oritcanaffirm the latter freedom by counteracting the pernicious, coercive freedom. The only way to confront and end coercion, it would seem, is through coercion itself. And the only way to end the use of persons as means—rather than their recognition as ends...