Rights and recognition

Abstract

ABST RACT Many contemporary liberals increasingly accept that plural societies must aspire to far more expansive and inclusive ideals of justice and citizenship than liberal doctrine would suggest. The dominant perception is that extending the set of rights is the most effective way to implement a just and stable multicultural society. In fact, this is not a very plausible description of what people seek in demanding greater respect for diversity. Nor does it offer a compelling vision of how things ought to be. First, social expectations regarding recognition are not uniquely linked to rights; they encompass intractable struggles over values, as well as ways of living and evaluating. For example, a central feature of feminist, black and multicultural politics is the attempt to change social culture into a medium through which personal integrity and self-esteem may be acquired. Second, liberalism cannot easily accommodate this type of struggle, since it takes for granted a narrowly constricted conception of politics that is based on instituting public laws that harmonize the freedom of everyone. Anyone who takes seriously the idea that recognition surpasses legal relations of respect will then surely wish to consider whether liberalism must not be corrected and extended to reveal the political significance of the social conditions that enable individuals to experience themselves as both autonomous and individuated.