Free Riding Research Articles

Battery recycling and coordination in information leakage prevention under blockchain technology in a new energy vehicles supply chain

Retired battery recycling and information leakage prevention under blockchain introduction intertwine in the new energy vehicle (NEVs) supply chain, but rare literature has jointly investigated them. Therefore, we characterize the vehicle goodwill under recycling and marketing efforts as well as the automobile demand function with and without blockchain introduction, identify the long-run discounted profits of the manufacturer and retailers in the supply chain, and investigate the Stackelberg differential game equilibrium under four scenarios: no blockchain introduction, manufacturer introduction, manufacturer-retailer cooperative introduction, and cooperative introduction plus wholesale price discounts for preventing information leakage. The results show that the manufacturer can introduce blockchain when costs are below a certain threshold, which increases the recycling rate of decommissioned batteries and improves goodwill, consumer demand, and marginal profits for the manufacturer and retailer; the retailer participation in the introduction of blockchain solves the free-rider problem and reduces the thresholds introduced, but does not affect battery recycling, goodwill, consumer demand, and wholesale and retail prices; wholesale price discounts effectively discourage the retailer from leaking information about the manufacturer and lead to improved profits for the retailer, but results in higher earnings for the manufacturer only when discounts are below a certain threshold.

BENELUX COUNTRIES’ SECURITY STRATEGIES: BETWEEN EUROPEANISM AND ATLANTICISM

In the article, transformation of the foreign policy and security strategies of the Benelux countries – Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg – is analyzed against the exacerbating conflict in Ukraine. Using the comparative historical method, we outline the evolution of strategic trends of Europeanism – seeking deeper integration within the European institutional framework – and Atlanticism – pursuing a general strategic orientation towards the United States – in the three countries. As smaller-sized countries, they initially combined Europeanism and «moderate» Atlanticism, which left them some space for foreign policy maneuver. Since the 1990s, the Dutch foreign policy more closely follows the Atlanticist paradigm, while those of Belgium and Luxembourg are characterized more by Europeanism. The analysis of the EU strategic autonomy debate as a case study has shown that Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg seek the greatest possible economic benefits from the autonomy initiatives. Besides, the balance between the strategic trends remains; Belgium and Luxembourg positively view deeper EU defense cooperation, while the Netherlands mostly sees security guarantees in Euro-Atlantic cooperation. The current state in European security has thus not fundamentally changed the Benelux countries’ approaches to balancing Europeanism and Atlanticism that have been characteristic for them since the 1990s. Besides, for Belgium, support for deeper integration has become a key identity feature, while the Netherlands relies on special relations with the United States and ad hoc coalitions in the EU; Luxembourg’s foreign policy can be described to follow a free rider strategy.

Free-rider or contributor: A dilemma in spatial threshold public goods games

Late movers refer to individuals who adjust their strategies after observing the choices of others in a public goods game, can significantly impact the likelihood of public goods provision. This creates a social dilemma: late movers act as free-riders to rely on others to contribute, yet they also risk the public good not being provided if contributions fall short. To address this dilemma, we utilize a spatial threshold public goods game model to examine how the behaviors of late movers influence overall cooperative levels within a population. We propose a probabilistic rule for late movers that captures the dilemma between cooperating to enhance the collective good and free-riding to maximize individual benefits. Our findings indicate that strategic late movers can significantly enhance cooperation by adapting to local cooperation levels. However, an excessively high proportion of late movers may reduce the overall level of cooperation. Additionally, the formation of clusters by late movers results in higher cooperative levels compared to random distribution. Our study provides novel insights into the dynamics of cooperation within the framework of spatial threshold public goods games. By incorporating the role of late movers, we highlight how adaptive strategies can mitigate the free-rider problem and promote cooperative behaviors.

Simulation of policies to promote pro‐environmental behavior in a dynamic learning model of social networks: Cases of Brazil, the United States, Japan, Germany, China, and India

AbstractPro‐environmental behavior does not seem to diffuse sufficiently in Brazil, China, Germany, Japan, India, or the United States. Based on the current distribution of carbon footprints and learning patterns (DeGroot learning, best practice, and free riding) in social networks in the six countries, what will happen to the diffusion of pro‐environmental behaviors in each country? What policy measures will be most effective? This study aims to simulate the diffusion of pro‐environmental behavior and to test the effectiveness of various policy measures in a dynamic social network model in the six countries. The distribution of pro‐environmental behaviors is generated by global gridded carbon footprint data. The distribution of learning patterns in social networks is estimated in each country, using data from the World Values Survey. This study considers three policy measures: increasing the number of people pursuing best pro‐environmental behavior practices (best practice promotion, [BPP]), decreasing the number of free riders (free‐riding reduction, [FRR]), and converting the learning patterns of people with high degrees of centrality into best practice (centrality‐based best practice promotion, [CBPP]). Interesting findings were threefold. First, there are large differences in the estimated degrees of individual pro‐environmental behavior and the proportions of learning patterns in the six countries. Second, FRR and BPP are effective in promoting pro‐environmental behavior, but the choice of FRR or BPP depends on the initial proportion of free riders. Third, CBPP is the most effective policy of the three in all countries. Centrality in social networks must be considered when implementing intervention.

Security in Neutrality: Chinese Engagement In the Middle East and the Red Sea Crisis

AbstractChina's interests have expanded rapidly in the Middle East since the turn of the century, and it is now the leading trade partner for many states in the region. The unrest sparked by the war between Israel and Hamas, including the Red Sea shipping crisis that imperils global trade, threatens those interests. The perceived absence of deep Chinese participation in trying to resolve these emergencies contrasts with previous peacekeeping efforts and raises questions about Beijing's willingness to take part in global‐security initiatives. This article analyzes variations in Chinese decision making on the use of force and diplomacy in the Middle East. Based on publicly available data, an examination of sources in English and Chinese, and interviews previously conducted in China, we develop a three‐pronged typology that explains Chinese strategic behavior in the region: military engagement, perceived free riding, and diplomacy. The article contributes to the literatures of security studies, Chinese foreign and military policy, and the security of the Middle East.

Why Firms Need to Manage Their Innovation Partners Based on Their Motivation

OVERVIEW: Firms are increasingly conducting innovation jointly with external partners so they can achieve innovations they could not achieve alone. This approach reduces investments and opens up novel opportunities, but it also highlights the importance of managing and selecting the proper partners. We identified three partner types: Free Riders, Passengers, and Copilots. According to our research, these partners have distinct behaviors and need to be managed differently based on their motivation. We introduce each partner type, distinguish them according to their motivation, and present strategies on how to manage them effectively.

Addressing Impacts from Climate Change Within International Legal System: More Precise Distribution of Responsibilities

As the international challenges resulting from climate change become emergent, how to reform international law and institutions to reduce the effects of climate change has become a crucial issue. This paper carries out surveys on regulating and restructuring the present international law system about current issues and provides suggestions for further practice. We can also consider building a climate club. The existing climate regulation mechanism needs to improve, leading to problems such as carbon leakage and free riding. Climate clubs can urge countries to fulfill their obligations by rewarding member states that fulfill their obligations and cracking down on non-member states. Apart from efforts in environmental governance, the international law system should also attach attention to the issue of climate refugees as a reaction to climate change. The last article argues that international society should provide legal protection for climate refugees, and it is reasonable for them to acquire a formally defined legal status for future humanitarian care. This thesis also explores the potential role of regional bodies in addressing climate change outside of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the legitimacy of their responsibilities based on constitutional treaties, their role in regulating the international commons, and their relationship to the UNFCCC. Based on this, this thesis suggests that regional institutions take on more responsibility in regulating state obligations and propose possible solutions to the climate change crisis. CBDR is an essential principle in the cooperation among countries to solve the problem of global climate change. It makes global cooperation fairer and more effective but also generates some problems. The main problem is that there is no clear division of responsibilities between countries, and policies must be implemented. This paper proposes three ways to divide responsibilities and argues that companies must actively participate in global emission reduction activities.

The free riding in hospitality corporate giving: Theoretical explanation and implications

Previous research has demonstrated the positive influence of corporate giving (CG) on hospitality firm performance through the lens of value enhancement theory. Interestingly, empirical evidence indicates that this influence extends to all sampled hospitality firms, irrespective of their direct engagement in charitable giving. This phenomenon, termed the 'free rider problem' or 'free riding' in hospitality CG, highlights a scenario where firms refraining from CG benefit from the contributions of others. This study aims to provide a theoretical framework to elucidate the existence of this intriguing phenomenon and its critical implications for the hospitality industry. By addressing the free rider problem in hospitality CG, this research makes a significant contribution to the theoretical development in the hospitality CG literature and offers valuable insights for both scholars and practitioners in understanding and managing CG practices in the hospitality sector.

The Impact of Cognitive Load on Cooperation and Antisocial Punishment: Insights from a Public Goods Game Experiment.

This paper investigates the impact of cognitive load on the formation and maintenance of cooperation within a public goods game experiment featuring a punishment option. By integrating the experimental designs of prior studies and manipulating cognitive load through the memorization of numbers with varying digits, we reveal that high cognitive load accelerates the breakdown of cooperation, irrespective of the presence of a punishment system. Furthermore, under high cognitive load, participants are more likely to engage in antisocial punishment, while the punishment of free riders remains unaffected. These findings suggest that increased cognitive load depletes the cognitive resources needed for deliberative decision-making, leading to a higher propensity for antisocial punishment. Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the significant influence of cognitive load on cooperative behavior and providing new insights into the causes of antisocial punishment.

Can Leading by Example Alone Improve Cooperation?

Cooperation is essential for the survival of human society. Understanding the nature of cooperation and its underlying mechanisms is crucial for studying human behavior. This paper investigates the impact of leadership on public cooperation by employing repeated sequential public goods games, as well as by examining whether leading by example (through rewards and punishments) can promote cooperation and organizational success. The leaders were assigned randomly and were given the authority to reward or punish. As a result, (1) the leaders showed a strong tendency toward reciprocity by punishing free riders and rewarding cooperators at their own expense, which enhanced the intrinsic motivation for others to follow their example; and (2) both rewards and punishments were effective in promoting cooperation, but punishment was more effective in sustaining a high level of collaboration. Additionally, leaders preferred using rewards and were more reluctant to use punishments. These findings are crucial for creating organizational structures that foster cooperation.

Three Pillars of Support for Orphan Drug Programs: Individual Valuations, Societal Valuations, and Anonymous Altruism

ObjectivesTo identify and describe potential societal and individual sources of support for orphan drug programs. MethodsThe Generalized Risk-Adjusted Cost-Effectiveness method shows that acute illness and disability severity increase individuals’ willingness to pay for health gains. We develop a social welfare function (SWF) that incorporates individuals’ own values, combined with politically or ethically determined weights. We introduce the concept of horizontal equity—that individuals in similar situations should be treated similarly—into the SWF. Finally, we introduce anonymous altruism into individuals’ utility functions—the desire to help others, without knowing their identity. ResultsCombined with the empirical link between disease severity and rarity, the Generalized Risk-Adjusted Cost-Effectiveness method demonstrates heightened willingness to pay for health gains for people with rare diseases, leading rational individuals to support orphan drug programs, our first pillar of support. Adding horizontal equity to the SWF further increases societal support for orphan drug programs. Anonymous altruism, focusing most strongly on those in the most-dire circumstances, leads to altruistic support for those with severe disorders. Because innovators’ economic incentives lead them to focus on larger markets, anonymous altruistic individuals will increasingly prefer public investments into rare diseases over time, as private markets systematically produce gains for common diseases. ConclusionsWe identified 3 supporting pillars for orphan drug programs: (1) individuals’ propensity to prefer treatments for severe diseases; (2) the preference for horizontal equity in our social welfare; (3) anonymous altruism, the desire to help strangers, coupled with market incentives that underserve strangers with rare diseases.

Managing coopetition dynamics: A longitudinal study of a multiparty alliance formation in a large utilities project

AbstractMultiparty alliances (MPAs) are increasingly used to deliver large utilities infrastructure projects on‐time, on‐budget, and to specified quality. In theory, MPAs should help buyers to coordinate suppliers, enable concurrent scheduling, and create process innovations. On the other hand, these governance structures are inherently less stable than dyadic relationships due to their additional complexity and greater opportunities for free riding. We conduct a multi‐source, longitudinal study, investigating how a buyer actively manages the dynamics between competition and cooperation during the formation of an MPA consisting of a lead organization and directional relationships between all partners. We contribute to MPA and coopetition literature by exploring cooperation and competition dynamics that are associated with the MPA structure that would largely be absent in dyads, and unpack the process by which a buyer orchestrates these dynamics by sequentially introducing new initiatives that seek to balance coopetition. MPAs have been recommended by governments and industry bodies as one solution for time and cost overruns in the utilities infrastructure sector, our study also provides guidance to buyers on the management of the alliance during the critical formation stage of the relationship lifecycle.

From Formation to Evaluation: Optimising groupwork in STEM Degree Apprenticeships

Engineering degree apprenticeships provide three to six years of job opportunities and training that lead to university qualifications up to and equivalent of a postgraduate degree. Within an apprentice’s time in higher education (HE), many are required to complete groupwork projects which bring several benefits and some challenges. This paper explores the effects and limitations of group work in the context of degree apprenticeships whilst discussing a plethora of group selection and assessment method solutions. This includes student self-selection methods in comparison to teacher-selected and randomisation for group selection; a suitable method of selection should be unbiased and optimise advantages of collaborative working. Through understanding the most effective form of assessment for apprentices, an academic policy can be adapted and influenced – acknowledging the learning differences between undergraduate students and degree apprentices. As part of this work, a comprehensive literature review was carried and a survey was conducted and completed by the Bsc Digital and Technology Solutions students, BEng Applied Professional Engineering Programme students among others at the University of Warwick. The results of the survey provided quantitative and qualitative data surrounding group work. Furthermore, the paper suggests appropriate solutions to group work issues surrounding the effectiveness of group work for degree apprentices, optimal group selection-methods, group performance, ensuring equal contributions and assessment and grading methods. The paper addresses some of the problems encountered by apprentices during their studies such as the free-rider problem and unequal division of work - providing solutions towards minimising such problems, including the integration of web-based tools such as MS Planner.

Megastudy shows that reminders boost vaccination but adding free rides does not

Encouraging routine COVID-19 vaccinations is likely to be a crucial policy challenge for decades to come. To avert hundreds of thousands of unnecessary hospitalizations and deaths, adoption will need to be higher than it was in the autumn of 2022 or 2023, when less than one-fifth of Americans received booster vaccines1,2. One approach to encouraging vaccination is to eliminate the friction of transportation hurdles. Previous research has shown that friction can hinder follow-through3 and that individuals who live farther from COVID-19 vaccination sites are less likely to get vaccinated4. However, the value of providing free round-trip transportation to vaccination sites is unknown. Here we show that offering people free round-trip Lyft rides to pharmacies has no benefit over and above sending them behaviourally informed text messages reminding them to get vaccinated. We determined this by running a megastudy with millions of CVS Pharmacy patients in the United States testing the effects of (1) free round-trip Lyft rides to CVS Pharmacies for vaccination appointments and (2) seven different sets of behaviourally informed vaccine reminder messages. Our results suggest that offering previously vaccinated individuals free rides to vaccination sites is not a good investment in the United States, contrary to the high expectations of both expert and lay forecasters. Instead, people in the United States should be sent behaviourally informed COVID-19 vaccination reminders, which increased the 30-day COVID-19 booster uptake by 21% (1.05 percentage points) and spilled over to increase 30-day influenza vaccinations by 8% (0.34 percentage points) in our megastudy. More rigorous testing of interventions to promote vaccination is needed to ensure that evidence-based solutions are deployed widely and that ineffective but intuitively appealing tools are discontinued.

Blockchain-based crowdsourcing for human intelligence tasks with dual fairness

Human intelligence tasks (HITs), such as labeling images for machine learning, are widely utilized for crowdsourcing human knowledge. Centralized crowdsourcing platforms face challenges of a single point of failure and a lack of service transparency. Existing blockchain-based crowdsourcing approaches overlook the low scalability problem of permissionless blockchains or inconveniently rely on existing ground-truth data as the root of trust in evaluating the quality of workers' answers. We propose a blockchain-based crowdsourcing scheme for ensuring dual fairness (i.e., preventing false reporting and free riding) and improving on-chain efficiency concerning on-chain storage and smart contract computation. The proposed scheme does not rely on trusted authorities but rather depends on a public blockchain to guarantee dual fairness. An efficient and publicly verifiable truth discovery scheme is designed based on majority voting and cryptographic accumulators. This truth discovery scheme aims at inferring ground truth from workers' answers. The ground truth is further utilized to estimate the quality of workers' answers. Additionally, a novel blockchain-based protocol is designed to further reduce on-chain costs while ensuring truthfulness. The scheme has O(n) complexity for both on-chain storage and smart contract computation, regardless of the number of questions, where n denotes the number of workers. Formal security analysis is provided, and extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate its effectiveness and performance.

Evolutionary dynamics of any multiplayer game on regular graphs

Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an arbitrary number of strategies on graphs is still missing. Here, we solve this by drawing an analogy with the Balls-and-Boxes problem, based on which we show that the local configuration of multiplayer games on graphs is equivalent to distributing k identical co-players among n distinct strategies. We use this to derive the replicator equation for any n-strategy multiplayer game under weak selection, which can be solved in polynomial time. As an example, we revisit the second-order free-riding problem, where costly punishment cannot truly resolve social dilemmas in a well-mixed population. Yet, in structured populations, we derive an accurate threshold for the punishment strength, beyond which punishment can either lead to the extinction of defection or transform the system into a rock-paper-scissors-like cycle. The analytical solution also qualitatively agrees with the phase diagrams that were previously obtained for non-marginal selection strengths. Our framework thus allows an exploration of any multi-strategy multiplayer game on regular graphs.

Effect of distribution of fines on evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game

Abstract In the realm of public goods game, punishment, as a potent tool, stands out for fostering cooperation. While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem, the associated costs can be substantial. Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions, while defectors face fines. Unfortunately, these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air, representing a loss to the system itself. However, by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers, not only can we mitigate this loss, but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced. Based upon this premise, this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model. Under identical parameter settings, by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model, the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game. And the experimental results clearly demonstrate that, in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high, the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse. However, the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies, thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation, even in the face of substantial punishment cost.

Supply-Chain Antitrust and Being Too Big in the Context of AT&T’s 1984 Breakup

In 1984, due to a US Department of Justice antitrust lawsuit, AT&T, the U.S. telecommunications monopoly, split into eight entities, including long-distance and local service providers known as Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs). Vertical integration of suppliers typically benefits consumers by avoiding the issues associated with successive monopolies, where prices may be excessively high. The separation of long-distance and local services by the Department of Justice may seem counterintuitive, potentially driven by concerns over AT&T's size rather than economic rationale. This paper suggests that integrated monopolies have more willingness to build demand rigidity due to an absence of the free-riding problem, leading to higher prices. The implications extend to regulated firms and social media, highlighting the complexity of antitrust actions and their economic consequences on market dynamics and consumer welfare.

Using the Amount of Plastic Packaging Placed on the Market to Determine the Annual Amount of Plastic Packaging Waste Generated in Poland to Enable Sustainable Waste Management

A new category of own resources based on national contributions, which are calculated on the basis of the amount of non-recycled plastic packaging waste (PPW) (EUR 0.80 per kilogram), was introduced in 2021 by the decision of the EU Council (EU, Euratom, 2020/2053). In accordance with the European strategy for plastics, the Union budget can contribute to reducing pollution from PPW, which is consistent with sustainable waste management. To calculate the own resource of plastics, it is necessary to determine the amount of non-recycled PPW by taking the difference between the amounts of generated and recycled PPW. Data on the amount of recycled PPW can be obtained from recycling facilities. The challenge, however, is to determine the actual amount of PPW generated in a given year. For this reason, the present study was undertaken to determine the amount of PPW generated annually, based on the amount of plastic packaging placed on the market (PPM) (i.e., with the use of the placed-on-the-market approach). To perform the calculations, the Polish entities that place products in plastic packaging on the market were identified. It was assumed that the amount of PPM was the sum of the amounts of packaging stated by producer responsibility organizations (PRO), as well as self-compliers (SC), private imports (I), and free-riders (FR), minus the amount of packaging privately exported (E). To obtain the relevant data from the records linked to the amounts of plastic packaging imported to and exported from Poland, a detailed methodology was developed. A complementary analysis was concurrently conducted to estimate the amount of plastic PPM by free-riders. The results of these analyses indicate that the amount of packaging transparently reported by the PRO accounted for almost 97% of the total amount of PPM. The analysis found 19,728 SC who placed 2.22% of the total plastic packaging on the market. The total amount of privately imported plastic packaging was 17,304,666 kg (1.37%). Plastic packaging placed on the market by FR is 24,788,196 kg (1.97%). However, the amount of plastic packaging privately exported was 30,571,691 kg (2.43%). Thus, in 2021, the amount of plastic packaging placed on the Polish market was 1,259,345,296 kg; this figure constitutes the basis for determining the own resources based on non-recycled PPW. It also indicates the potential of PPW to serve as a resource for the production of new products, which is in accordance with the principles of a circular economy.

Strategic trading equilibria in local community considering co-existence of pool-based and peer-to-peer energy markets with free-rider problem in network usage cost

The peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading market is considered a promising method for allocating prosumers’ locally produced power in smart buildings. However, the existing literature overlooks the coexistence of P2P and pool-based energy markets. Therefore, this paper establishes a bi-level energy market model that incorporates both P2P and pool-based markets. The prosumers’ individual profit maximization model considering their network usage costs in the P2P energy trading network at the upper level is first developed. A hybrid market-clearing framework determining the optimal trading amounts with the prosumers’ strategic offers at the lower level is then exploited. The distribution network power flow model in the market clearing framework is then convexified. The lower-level problem is replaced with its strong duality conditions. This bi-level problem can be reformulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). This EPEC is then solved after being transformed into an equivalent mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model. Finally, a fifteen-bus system is employed to illustrate the characteristics of the hybrid market equilibrium depicted by this EPEC model. The influences of the prosumers’ strategic offers on the distribution locational marginal prices (DLMPs) and network usage costs are highlighted. Since the prosumers can choose to transmit their energy in the pool-based or P2P markets, the emission and pollution costs caused by power transmission can be minimized. A cleaner energy production is thus guaranteed. The free-rider problem is verified by comparing the network usage charges in the strategic and perfect competition scenarios.