The nature of liberal' civilization: a discussion between Sidney Hook and Bertrand Russell The British Broadcasting Corporation presents a conversation on the nature of liberal civilization between Dr. Sidney Hook, well-known educator and philosopher and Chairman ofNew York University's Graduate Division of Philosophy and Psychology, and the eminent British philosopher Bertrand Russell. Hook: Our theme, Russell, is the nature ofliberal civilization, and the problems which it confronts today. All sorts of definitions of liberal civilization have been offered, and I suppose we don't want to take too much time exploring definitions. Well, I want to propose a definition of liberal civilization as one in which there is a free market of ideas and in which there is a belief that the play of intelligence will lead to equitable solutions of problems more readily than by the use offorce, tradition, or similar instruments. Now, from the belief in the free market of ideas, it seems to me that, as liberals, we are committed to a defence ofthe right of heresy, because one never knows when a heretical idea may turn out to be a valid idea. We cannot make the assumption of absolute truth, and so I've very often tended to identify a liberal civilization with a belief in the right to heresy. But now, unfortunately, our modern society differs from the society of fifty or seventy-five years ago in that on various occasions we have encountered movements designed to destroy free society and with that the right to heresy. And these movements distinguish themselves from the revolutionary movements of old in not being outspoken and honest in their declaration that they wish to substitute a different kind ofsociety, but they have taken a conspiratorial form. The heretic is a man who honestly defends unpopular ideas and prepares to take the 5 6 Russell summer 1985 consequences for it. The conspirator is one who works by stealth, who works outside the rules of the game and today, as in the Fascist and the Communist movements, works on behalf of a foreign power which has declared its purpose as being the destruction ofliberal civilization, which it regards as decadent. And I maintain that our moral obligation in political life is to the toleration ofdissent, no matter how heretical, not to the toleration of conspiracy, no matter how disguised; and our practical problem is to find ways of implementing that distinction. But I would like to know whether you accept this distinction between heresy, to which I say yes, and conspiracy, to which I say no. Russell: Yes, up to a point I accept it. I'm not quite sure but what I should go even further than you do in the way of things not to be tolerated. I should say, for example, that ifthere were a political doctrine of which the chief tenet was the assassination of the heads ofstates, that you would have a certain right to suppress that doctrine, in so far as it went in for assassination. Hook: Only in so far as there was a clear and present danger that some would carry out the assassination. Russell: Quite. So that I don't think that it's altogether the distinction between a conspiracy and a doctrine. And I should go further and say this, that even supposing that a man is a heretic and a conspirator, you ought to be able to distinguish his conspiratorial activities from his other activities, and allow him his other activities, and only catch him up when you find him being a conspirator. Hook: I agree with you. That is to say, that if a man professes Fascist ideas, or if he professes Communist ideas, I think that he should be treated as a heretic, and be given an opportunity to present them in the market-place of opinion. But if he joins an organization with a declared objective of infiltrating into strategic posts In the government, if he assumes a Party name and then professes to be something different, then I should say that he is a conspirator-not necessarily a political conspirator , but that he is playing outside the rules of the game in the...
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