Fragmented Opposition Research Articles

The Discursive Construction of the 1978–1979 Iranian Revolution in the Speeches of Ayatollah Khomeini

ABSTRACTThis article examines the discursive construction of the 1978–1979 social movement that ultimately became the Iranian Revolution, as constructed through the discourse of the charismatic leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This article illustrates that Khomeini was able to strategically co‐opt the Shiite symbolism of the Battle of Karbala to bring together the most unlikely of bedfellows to unite in one common opposition movement. We first provide a summary of the socio‐political events that contextualised Khomeini's discourse and then examine two commemorative declarations given by Khomeini in the key months before the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime. We will illustrate, via a discourse‐historical analysis, that the two primary narratives prominent in Khomeini's discourse are as follows: (i) the continuation of the Battle of Karbala and (ii) the idea of a foreign conspiracy and a dangerous foreign other. We will also describe various discursive strategies that rendered Khomeini's discourse purposefully vague enough to appeal to Iran's fragmented opposition. Although the conspiratorial appeal of Khomeini's speeches has been discussed in the literature, we seek to show that it is the co‐opting of a national myth in an all‐encompassing language that drives the mass appeal of the discourse. The methods described in this study can be utilised by social and community psychologists seeking to understand how political actors discursively construct history in such a way as to serve their political ends. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

What a Little Democracy Can Do: Comparing Trajectories of Reform in Malaysia and Indonesia

Economic crisis sparked political mobilization in both Malaysia and Indonesia in the late 1990s, but with very different results. Reformism in competitive electoral authoritarian Malaysia took a largely electoral route, yielding marginal, top-down institutional change and the enhancement of democratic norms. The hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime in neighbouring Indonesia, on the other hand, was toppled by a sudden upsurge of grass-roots protest, encouraged by elite factionalism. Changes to Indonesian political institutions and personnel since then have disappointed many reformers, and mounting cynicism endangers the entrenchment of democratic political culture. The article argues that a relatively more democratic system grants more space for autonomous challengers to organize and mobilize over the long term than a less open system does. Specifically, civil society agents in the former may accumulate both social capital and its organizational-level counterpart, coalitional capital, facilitating mobilization. Such a regime, though, is better able to contain or otherwise defuse protest than is a more autocratic variant. The latter is thus more vulnerable to dramatic collapse, despite its fragmented political opposition, and faces serious hurdles in subsequent democratic consolidation.

Party Politics and Different Paths to Democratic Transitions

Benin and Senegal represent two successful cases of democratic transition in Africa. They also represent two different paths to that end. This article explores the role of political parties in facilitating these different and successful paths to democratic transitions. In Benin, political parties and political leaders relied on the prevailing patterns of ethno-regional cleavages to structure their strategic interactions, mobilize electoral support and organize competition in legislative and presidential elections. In Senegal, an incremental pattern of institutional reform helped the ruling party retain power while enabling fragmented opposition groups to participate in competitive elections. In the long run, this helped opposition groups develop an effective electoral coalition to defeat the ruling party in presidential and legislative elections and bring about a turnover in government.

THE STRUCTURAL CRISIS IN GUINEA-BISSAU'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Guinea-Bissau's transition toward democracy has been violent and disruptive. Despite holding elections and attempts to promote economic and social development, the latest government, under President Yala, is not equipped to bring stability or even a more democratic state. A politicised military, inexperienced opposition and corrupt government officials have contributed to the current poverty and instability. Although unlikely to be deposed by the fragmented opposition, Yala is not secure within his own party and is likely to use his position to weaken his opponents. As a Catholic, Yala has been careful to avoid religious conflict by reassuring Muslim citizens that they will not be marginalised. The economy is precarious and poverty has not been addressed. Guinea-Bissau is dependent on foreign donors for its financial needs. Guinea-Bissau has begun military operations against rebels opposing the Senegalese government and the battles seem likely to continue to cause regional instability. Without external intervention political and economic development looks remote.

The Sudan: Contested National Identities

Part 1 Background and context: the problem of national identity and historical legacies the contradictory policies of Numairi 1969-1985. Part 2 Democratic period 1985-1989: the transition to democracy polarization during the parliamentary period efforts to resolve the civil war. Part 3 Polarization under the Islamist government: the evolving political system indoctrination and control fragmented opposition the impasse in negotiations emerging consensus within the opposition movement. Appendix: the changing composition of governments.

Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana (review)

Reviewed by: Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana Todd J. Moss Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana. Paul Nugent. New York: Pinter, 1995. 306 pp. $ 75.00/Cloth. For the past half century, Ghana has, for better or worse, led Africa into the future. It has continually been the continent’s laboratory for the latest ideas about political and economic progress. In 1957, Ghana became the first black African nation to gain independence and under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, it adopted a statist economic strategy in the name of African socialism. The economic decline, social breakdown, and military coups in Ghana that followed over the next two decades foreshadowed wider developmental failure and political crises across Africa. It was against this background that, on December 31, 1981, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings seized power in Ghana for the second time in less than three years. Pledging to crush corrupt practices and create structures for popular participation, Rawlings installed a “radical revolutionary” government determined to break the grip of parasitic “big men” and reverse the tide of economic and social decline. Yet what turned out to be truly radical about the Rawlings regime was its 1983 economic reform program. Once again Ghana was leading Africa into a new era. Because of Ghana’s stature as “poster child” for first the anti-imperialists, then the Pan-Africanists, and eventually international donors, the literature on the country is extensive. One of the most recent and insightful contributions is Paul Nugent’s Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana . Nugent, a lecturer in African History at the University of Edinburgh, attempts to piece together the players and events that shaped Ghanaian politics in the crucial period from 1982–1994. In sum, he shows how Rawlings and his allies were successful in restoring Ghana’s social contract through political creativity in grafting together seemingly paradoxical strands of revolutionary fervor and shrewd pragmatism, liberalism, and traditionalism. Nugent argues that during the 1960s and 1970s, the legitimacy of personal accumulation eroded under the pressure of decaying social conditions and endemic kalabule (corruption). Store shelves [End Page 186] went bare, the roads emptied, and markets grew silent. The “big men” had failed to keep up their end of the social contract—thus precipitating the rise of Rawlings and his coterie of young idealists and junior military officers, the “small boys” who were shunned and denigrated by the old elite and professional classes. Through a mixture of moral preaching, intimidation, and liberalization, Rawlings was able to upright the economy, restore the legitimacy of accumulation, and rebuild the social contract. Nugent examines the rise and maturation of this peculiar revolution and the ensuing power struggles that continue up until today. While outmaneuvering challenges from urban elites, unions, students, and a badly fragmented opposition, Rawlings has been able to adapt his movement, continue the course of necessary reform, and most remarkably, hold on to power. One of the most interesting characteristics of Rawlings and his circle is their balancing of inherent contradictions, or what Nugent calls the regime’s “schizophrenia.” Simultaneously, they are revolutionaries and neo-classical technocrats, cozy with both the World Bank and the regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua. They are populists but reluctant about multipartyism, radical idealists yet dour realists. Rawlings and his allies’ dual personality is much more nuanced than a simple public versus private or domestic versus international facade. On the one hand, it is similar to all African regimes which balance multiple images, ideologies, and factional interests. However, in Ghana, there is the added uniqueness of Rawlings’ charismatic and fiery personality. Indeed, Rawlings is one of the most fascinating and complex characters in contemporary politics. He commands so much respect for his integrity and leadership that his followers often refer to him as “Junior Jesus” (a play on Jerry John). At the same time, he also elicits such virulent contempt from his detractors that they frequently call him “Junior Judas.” Clearly, his charisma and political skills—what Kevin Shillington has dubbed “the Rawlings factor”— played a central role in shaping the recent course of events in Ghana. It seems that in many ways, Rawlings himself is the single biggest...

The democratic ‘rectification’ in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso was the first francophone African state to initiate political and economic reforms. These arose from a combination of domestic and external pressures. Widespread disenchantment with the failures and privations of the Sanakara regime forced the Front populaire of Blaise Compaore to promote a ‘democratic opening’. Compaore's commitment to democracy remains in doubt: he first used reform to legitimize his regime, which murdered its way to power in October 1987, and has subsequently sought to strengthen his personal hold over the country by creating a new political party, the ODP‐MT, and winning the presidential election of December 1991, boycotted by the opposition. Although there has been a retreat from ‘state capitalism’ and a switch to the private sector, government violence towards its opponents, a fragmented opposition, and the doubts about continued French pressure for reform make for an ‘uncertain democracy’ in Burkina Faso. On the positive side, the country has a vigorous history of oppo...