Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana Todd J. Moss Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana. Paul Nugent. New York: Pinter, 1995. 306 pp. $ 75.00/Cloth. For the past half century, Ghana has, for better or worse, led Africa into the future. It has continually been the continent’s laboratory for the latest ideas about political and economic progress. In 1957, Ghana became the first black African nation to gain independence and under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, it adopted a statist economic strategy in the name of African socialism. The economic decline, social breakdown, and military coups in Ghana that followed over the next two decades foreshadowed wider developmental failure and political crises across Africa. It was against this background that, on December 31, 1981, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings seized power in Ghana for the second time in less than three years. Pledging to crush corrupt practices and create structures for popular participation, Rawlings installed a “radical revolutionary” government determined to break the grip of parasitic “big men” and reverse the tide of economic and social decline. Yet what turned out to be truly radical about the Rawlings regime was its 1983 economic reform program. Once again Ghana was leading Africa into a new era. Because of Ghana’s stature as “poster child” for first the anti-imperialists, then the Pan-Africanists, and eventually international donors, the literature on the country is extensive. One of the most recent and insightful contributions is Paul Nugent’s Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana . Nugent, a lecturer in African History at the University of Edinburgh, attempts to piece together the players and events that shaped Ghanaian politics in the crucial period from 1982–1994. In sum, he shows how Rawlings and his allies were successful in restoring Ghana’s social contract through political creativity in grafting together seemingly paradoxical strands of revolutionary fervor and shrewd pragmatism, liberalism, and traditionalism. Nugent argues that during the 1960s and 1970s, the legitimacy of personal accumulation eroded under the pressure of decaying social conditions and endemic kalabule (corruption). Store shelves [End Page 186] went bare, the roads emptied, and markets grew silent. The “big men” had failed to keep up their end of the social contract—thus precipitating the rise of Rawlings and his coterie of young idealists and junior military officers, the “small boys” who were shunned and denigrated by the old elite and professional classes. Through a mixture of moral preaching, intimidation, and liberalization, Rawlings was able to upright the economy, restore the legitimacy of accumulation, and rebuild the social contract. Nugent examines the rise and maturation of this peculiar revolution and the ensuing power struggles that continue up until today. While outmaneuvering challenges from urban elites, unions, students, and a badly fragmented opposition, Rawlings has been able to adapt his movement, continue the course of necessary reform, and most remarkably, hold on to power. One of the most interesting characteristics of Rawlings and his circle is their balancing of inherent contradictions, or what Nugent calls the regime’s “schizophrenia.” Simultaneously, they are revolutionaries and neo-classical technocrats, cozy with both the World Bank and the regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua. They are populists but reluctant about multipartyism, radical idealists yet dour realists. Rawlings and his allies’ dual personality is much more nuanced than a simple public versus private or domestic versus international facade. On the one hand, it is similar to all African regimes which balance multiple images, ideologies, and factional interests. However, in Ghana, there is the added uniqueness of Rawlings’ charismatic and fiery personality. Indeed, Rawlings is one of the most fascinating and complex characters in contemporary politics. He commands so much respect for his integrity and leadership that his followers often refer to him as “Junior Jesus” (a play on Jerry John). At the same time, he also elicits such virulent contempt from his detractors that they frequently call him “Junior Judas.” Clearly, his charisma and political skills—what Kevin Shillington has dubbed “the Rawlings factor”— played a central role in shaping the recent course of events in Ghana. It seems that in many ways, Rawlings himself is the single biggest...