Form Of Irrationality Research Articles

O Método de Racionalização de Weber e a Não Institucionalização de Dumont: Uma Visão sobre o Hinduísmo e o Vedanta

Weber descreve que o “racionalismo” concerne à rejeição de todas as formas irracionais de busca do sagrado e que o ascetismo indiano foi o “mais racionalmente desenvolvido no mundo”. O ponto que Weber defende é que o “laicismo culto” da Índia antiga desenvolveu uma “soteriologia livre de padres”, parcialmente entregue a um ceticismo religioso. Essa parece ter sido a pista de Weber da qual partiu Dumont a fim de desenvolvê-la em “homo hierarchicus”, e é com esta intenção que desenvolvo o pensamento deste último autor sobre o poder nas sociedades tradicionais de castas e a consequente desinstitucionalização do Hinduísmo. Busco compreender em que sentido Dumont afirma existir uma democratização da instituição e o significado do renunciante como dotado de uma individualidade

Learning from Stock Prices and Economic Growth

A competitive stock market is embedded into a neoclassical growth economy to analyze the interplay between the acquisition of information about firms, its partial revelation through stock prices, capital allocation, and income. The stock market allows investors to share their costly private signals in a cost-effective incentive-compatible way. It contributes to economic growth by raising total factor productivity (TFP). A calibration indicates the effect on TFP to be large but that on income to be modest. Several predictions on the evolution of real and financial variables are derived. Finally, the growth impact of two common forms of investor irrationality, overconfidence and inattention, are analyzed.

Bulgarian banking: looking for sustainability

In this work, we trace and analyze the emergence of the crisis in the Bulgarian banking system as well as the behavior of the central bank and other macroeconomic institutions. The average annual rate of growth in the net profits of the commercial banks for the period 2002-2008 amounted to 31.6%, which encouraged and accounted for the increase in credits. After 2008, the pendulum began to swing back as the difficulties in collecting loan repayments increased, the strain in financial balances tightened and assistance and support from the regulators were requested. The level of the financial and operating income was maintained primarily because of the high interest rates on the loans, but the structure of their distribution shifted substantially. Administrative costs and depreciation were nearly frozen up, and impairment and provisions grew at the expense of profit. This work shows that macroeconomic policies allowed the expansion of the lending boom and encouraged its irrational development. Poor operation and poor quality of the institutions not only allowed but also enabled direction of investments to financing of inefficient production structures. Underestimating the negative consequences shoring up a dysfunctional institutional environment is deemed a form of irrationality; however, not one of the immediate economic players acted to override the economic and political environment. The financial and economic crisis currently affecting the country has its roots in the deficiencies of the domestic macroeconomic policies, and therefore, the efforts toward overcoming these failures should be directed at improved domestic macroeconomic management.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Various parameterizations of “latitude” equation – Cartesian to geodetic coordinates transformation

Abstract The paper presents a solution to one of the basic problems of computational geodesy - conversion between Cartesian and geodetic coordinates on a biaxial ellipsoid. The solution is based on what is known in the literature as “latitude equation”. The equation is presented in three different parameterizations commonly used in geodesy - geodetic, parametric (reduced) and geocentric latitudes. Although the resulting equations may be derived in many ways, here, we present a very elegant one based on vectors orthogonality. As the “original latitude equations” are trigonometric ones, their representation has been changed into an irrational form after Fukushima (1999, 2006). Furthermore, in order to avoid division operations we have followed Fukushima’s strategy again and rewritten the equations in a fractional form (a pair of iterative formulas). The resulting formulas involving parametric latitude are essentially the same as those introduced by Fukushima (2006) (considered the most efficient today). All the resulting variants are solved with Newton’s second-order and Halley’s third-order formulas. It turns out that all parameterizations of the “latitude equation” show a comparable level of performance.

A Spirituality of the Commons: Where Religion and Marxism Meet

A Spirituality of the Commons: Where Religion and Marxism Meet

Moore’s paradox and the priority of belief thesis

Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such as Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailand are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. This assumption gives explanatory priority to belief over assertion. I show that the translation involved is much trickier than might at first appear. It is simplistic to think that Moorean absurdity in assertion is always a subsidiary product of the absurdity in belief, even when the absurdity is conceived as irrationality. Instead we should aim for explanations of Moorean absurdity in assertion and in belief that are independent even if related, while bearing in mind that some forms of irrationality may be forms of absurdity even if not conversely.

Irrationality and beliefs in a laboratory asset market: Is it me or is it you?

This paper reports on an experiment designed to examine individual and market outcomes with a mixture of rational and non-rational traders. Using values elicited via auctions, we measure a specific form of irrationality: the tendency to overweight high payoff, low probability events, or probability judgment error. Subjects are classified by their tendency to exhibit errors, as well as their beliefs regarding whether others will make errors. Subjects then participate in a series of double auction markets. The results indicate that both probability judgment error and beliefs about other subjects’ susceptibility to probability judgment error have significant impact on individual and market outcomes.

Die kognitive Struktur von Hoffnung. Zwei mittelalterliche Erklärungsmodelle

Abstract Medieval philosophers took hope to be an emotion with a cognitive content. It is precisely this content, they argued, that makes it an intentional phenomenon. But how is its specific content to be characterized? How is it to be distinguished from the content of other emotions? And what kind of cognitive activities are required to produce it? This paper discusses these questions, focusing on Thomas Aquinas’ and William of Ockham’s explanatory models. It pays particular attention to the role these authors ascribed to intellect and will, the two rational faculties. While Aquinas defended an intellectualist view, claiming that it is the intellect alone that fixes the cognitive content and brings about hope, Ockham subscribed to a voluntarist view, affirming that the will always needs to give its assent to the content presented by the intellect. Given this disagreement, they gave different accounts of the responsibility we have for rational as well as irrational forms of hope.

The completeness of the pragmatic solution to Moore’s paradox in belief: a reply to Chan

Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘p and I do not believe that p’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. Chan, who also takes the absurdity to be a form of irrationality, objects to this solution by arguing that it is circular and thus incomplete. This is because it must explain why Moorean beliefs are irrational yet, according to Chan, their grammatical third-person transpositions are not, even though the same proposition is believed. But the solution can only explain this asymmetry by relying on a formulation of the ground of the irrationality of Moorean beliefs that presupposes precisely such asymmetry. I reply that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the irrationality that the contents of Moorean beliefs be restricted to the grammatical first-person. What has to be explained is rather that such grammatical non-first-person transpositions sometimes, but not always, result in the disappearance of irrationality. Describing this phenomenon requires the grammatical first-person/non-first person distinction. The pragmatic solution explains the phenomenon once it is formulated in de se terms. But the grammatical first-person/non-first-person distinction is independent of, and a fortiori, different from, the de se/non-de se distinction presupposed by pragmatic solution, although both involve the first person broadly construed. Therefore the pragmatic solution is not circular. Building on the work of Green and Williams I also distinguish between the irrationality of Moorean beliefs and their absurdity. I argue that while all irrational Moorean beliefs are absurd, some Moorean beliefs are absurd but not irrational. I explain this absurdity in a way that is not circular either.

What Is the Brain Basis of Intelligence?

Developing civilization arguably would be impossible without human intelligence, as would be our proudest achievements: Shakespeare’s plays, Mozart’s piano concertos, Darwin’s theory of evolution, and Einstein’s relativity. What is it about the human brain that endows us with the intelligence that provides the basis of such achievements? John Duncan sets out to answer this question in his new book How Intelligence Happens. Duncan, Assistant Director of the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit in Cambridge (United Kingdom), has brought together material from psychology, neuropsychology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, brain imaging, and single-cell recording studies to develop a theory of human intelligence. The book is intended for a lay audience—and thus is written in nontechnical language with relaxed, anecdotal sections and personal stories interspersed with descriptions of experimental results—but it will be enjoyed by professionals who want to learn about frontal lobe function and modern ideas of human intelligence. Briefly, Duncan’s main argument is that our frontal lobes contain circuits that break complex problems down into manageable subproblems, and then oversee the solution of these subproblems in the proper order. This argument is developed in five chapters, the first of which introduces the idea of general (or fluid) intelligence in a historical context by focusing on Spearman’s research, which gave rise to his notion of g (general) and s (special) factors. Each kind of task, such as remembering the words in a list or figuring out a puzzle, depends on special factors (s) needed to make you good at that task and a general factor (g) that helps you to be good at any task. After presenting basic neuroanatomy and describing some methods for studying brain function (for example, functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI), Duncan recounts how he had the insight that fluid intelligence resides mostly in the frontal lobes. When he was a postdoctoral fellow, one of Duncan’s jobs was to do psychological testing on candidate bus drivers to try to predict which ones were more likely to have accidents. During this testing, he noticed that drivers with low g scores knew the rules they were supposed to follow in performing the tests, but somehow could not manage to apply these rules effectively. Their behavior reminded Duncan of Luria’s descriptions of disorganized behavior exhibited by patients with frontal lobe lesions, an observation that set Duncan’s future career path. Drawing on observations from artificial intelligence, a field whose goal is to give computers human-like intelligence, Duncan argues that, although brains and digital computers have quite different architectures and use different methods to carry out their computations, problem solving by computers offers a good model for how people do it: you have to break down the entire problem into small subproblems, and solve them in sequence. Being able to execute this strategy is at the heart of fluid intelligence, and its neuronal substrate should therefore be found in the frontal lobes. But how do the neurons in the frontal lobes do it? Duncan reviews recent research showing that circuits in the frontal lobes have the flexibility to encode, in the firing rate of resident neurons, just about anything being held in mind. The firing of a particular neuron might record a location that is to be held in short-term memory at one time, or be a cat-versusdog classifier at another time. One of the things that makes it hard for artificial intelligence to mimic human intelligence is that we can be, but often are not, rational beings. Capturing our special forms of irrationality poses a special problem for computer programmers. In the final chapter, Duncan describes some ongoing and incomplete research to give an impression of the direction intelligence studies is heading. For example, he outlines some experiments that permit us to ‘‘read a person’s mind’’ by examining the pattern of brain activity revealed by fMRI. The experimental findings relating to human intelligence often are unexpected and arresting—for example, people prefer a medical treatment when they are told it saves the lives of 90% of the patients over the same treatment when told that 10% of the patients die. The opportunity to learn about these discoveries will make this book

Understanding fear of cancer recurrence in terms of damage to ‘everyday health competence’

Advances in clinical treatments are resulting in cancer patients living longer, but with the threat of the disease returning at some later date. Anxiety associated with this fear of recurrence, which seems widespread among patients, can lead to an enhanced bodily awareness and a pronounced tendency to interpret mundane sensations as symptoms of pathology. Relatively little sociological work has been done to systematically document, understand, and find ways of addressing, this syndrome and its impact on the quality of patients' lives. It is argued that this syndrome is best understood not in cognitive terms, as a form of irrationality, but rather as resulting from damage to certain aspects of social competence, namely one's 'everyday health competence'. In investigating this issue, the author draws upon his personal experience of breast cancer diagnosis, surgery and adjuvant therapy; and on a broadly phenomenological approach to examining the relationship between bodily sensations and practical reasoning about experience. The implications for clinical practice are considered briefly.

The Rationality of Grief

Donald Gustafson has argued that grief centres on a combination of belief and desire: 1. The belief that the subject has suffered an irreparable loss. 2. The desire that this should not be the case. And yet, as Gustafson points out, if the belief is true, the desire cannot be satisfied. Gustafson takes this to show that grief inevitably implies an irrational conflict between belief and desire. I offer a partial defence of grief against Gustafson's charge of irrationality. My defence rests on two elements. First, I offer an alternative model of emotion, which presents emotions as complex episodes, initiated by emotional appraisals. Secondly, I appeal to John Bowlby's account of grief to argue that grief involves two forms of sadness (anguish and desolation) which Gustafson's analysis runs together. I concede that anguish does characteristically involve an element of irrationality. But the irrationality of anguish does not arise from an apparently gratuitous clash between belief and desire, but from a conflict between emotion and belief—a form of irrationality that is both familiar and easily explained. Moreover, desolation need not involve any irrationality.

On the value distribution of positive definite quadratic forms

Denote by 0 = λ0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ . . . the infinite sequence given by the values of a positive definite irrational quadratic form in k variables at integer points. For l ≥ 2 and an (l −1)-dimensional interval I = I2×. . .×Il we consider the l-level correlation function \({K^{(l)}_I(R)}\) which counts the number of tuples (i1, . . . , il) such that \({\lambda_{i_1},\ldots,\lambda_{i_l}\leq R^2}\) and \({\lambda_{i_{j}}-\lambda_{i_{1}}\in I_j}\) for 2 ≤ j ≤ l. We study the asymptotic behavior of \({K^{(l)}_I(R)}\) as R tends to infinity. If k ≥ 4 we prove \({K^{(l)}_I(R)\sim c_l(Q)\,{\rm vol}(I)R^{lk-2(l-1)}}\) for arbitrary l, where cl (Q) is an explicitly determined constant. This remains true for k = 3 under the restriction l ≤ 3.

Racionalidade epistêmica e o Paradoxo de Moore

G. E. Moore identificou uma forma surpreendente de irracionalidade epistêmica. Wittgenstein a chamou “o Paradoxo de Moore”. Nenhum deles sabia, exatamente, do que estava falando. Mas, a vasta literatura sobre o problema se encarregou de mostrar sua importância. O que, no entanto, ainda não se havia notado, com suficiente clareza, é que o paradoxo está fortemente conectado a alguns dos debates mais fundamentais da agenda epistemológica contemporânea. Este artigo propõe uma resolução epistemológica ao problema e busca mostrar que o paradoxo ameaça, de forma contundente, as teses de fecho dedutivo da racionalidade epistêmica e do conhecimento, inutilizando as manobras contextualistas pró-fecho.

Probability Judgment Error and Speculation in Laboratory Asset Market Bubbles

AbstractIn 12 sessions conducted in a typical bubble-generating experimental environment, we design a pair of assets that can detect both irrationality and speculative behavior. The specific form of irrationality we investigate is the probability judgment error associated with low-probability, high-payoff outcomes. Independently, we test for speculation by comparing prices of identically paying assets in multiperiod versus single-period markets. We establish that aggregate irrationality measured in one dimension (probability judgment error) is associated with aggregate irrationality measured in another (bubble formation).

Trials Against Animals: A Contribution to the Developmental Theory of Mind and Rationality

Many irrational forms of behavior and thinking prevailed in pre-modern societies from the stone age to recent times, which have been disappearing in modern societies during the past centuries or generations. The criminal prosecution and punishment of animals is one of the many absurd and incredible forms of thinking and behavior we can discover in the cultural heritage of pre-modern man. This phenomenon is attributed to elementary and pre-formal modes of psyche, personality, cognition and culture in pre-modern man. It is not a phenomenon remote from the centre of pre-modern culture and society, a just-for-fun fact of folklore and a strange kind of leisure time activity; it is a real indicator of the developmental level of pre-modern populations, their thinking and their cultures. If we want to understand mind, cognition, mentality, psyche and worldview of pre-modern populations, an in-depth, careful and serious enquiry of the criminal prosecution of animals can provide us one of the most intriguing insights. This cultural phenomenon illuminates important aspects of the history of culture and mankind, and it touches basic questions of the humanities and social sciences.

THE INTELLIGIBLE GODS IN THE PLATONIC THEOLOGY OF PROCLUS

The Platonic Theology is culminating work of Proclus' long career and one of defining works of late antiquity, but it has had few modern philosophical admirers. The exception, and an important one, is Hegel, who clearly drew inspiration from Platonic Theology for his Science of Logic, and who draws his admiring account of Proclus in his Lectures on History of Philosophy largely from his reading of this work. Nevertheless, Platonic Theology has received far less attention from philosophers than it might have. A key reason for this neglect, I suggest, has been inability to perceive in procession of divine orders as presented in Platonic Theology a unifying logic akin to that in Science of Logic. Such is judgment of Hegel himself, who, despite his overall high praise of Proclus in Lectures, characterizes dialectic of Platonic Theology as external. If procession recounted in Platonic Theology is, fundamentally, simply multiplication of an hypostatized then Hegel would be correct, and Proclus' system lacks an inner logic. Moreover, on such an interpretation, causality in Proclus' system as a whole would be mystified, which would contribute to perception of this grand edifice of Neoplatonic thought as little more than a highly developed form of irrationalism. The present essay, however, offers an interpretation of Proclus' system in which procession of Being begins not from an hypostatized but in manifold of individual, supra-essential henads, treating this procession not as a simple passage from unity to multiplicity, but as a transition from one mode of unity to another. In a previous essay, 1 I have discussed difference between modes of unity of henads and of beings; present essay argues that Platonic Theology exhibits emergence of latter mode of unity from former. The beginning of procession of Being cannot be from the One, because there is, in a most important sense, no such thing: first principle is not, in itself, a cause. The beginning, rather, is from henads. This is why Platonic Theology is a theology. The Gods constitute Being, and do so simply by virtue of being-Gods. The Platonic Theology is not therefore about creation of Gods, but about their nature, and how this nature determines nature of Being. The aspect of Gods from which procession of Being begins, and which drives it throughout its several stages, I argue, is their individuality. That is, meaning I propose for statement that procession of Being begins

Reason, Irrationality and Akrasia (Weakness of the Will) in Buddhism: Reflections upon Śāntideva’s Arguments with Himself

Let it be granted that Buddhism has, e.g., in its logical literature, detailed canons and explicit rules of right reason that, amongst other things, ban inconsistency as irrational. This is the normative dimension of how people should think according to many major Buddhist authors. But do important Buddhist writers ever recognize any interesting or substantive role for inconsistency and forms of irrationality in their account of how people actually do think and act? The article takes as its point of departure a recurring theme in the writings of the 8th Century Indian Buddhist thinker, Śāntideva, who subjects his own behaviour and thought to minute scrutiny in argumentation with himself, only to be puzzled at his own seemingly irrational persistence in ways of thinking that he knows to be wrong and actions that he knows to be worse courses. The Buddhist’s situation is profitably comparable to issues of akrasia, weakness of the will, that are taken up by Plato, Aristotle and many modern philosophers, including notably Donald Davidson and David Wiggins.

Die Rezeption Maurice Maeterlincks in den deutschsprachigen Ländern (1891-1914) by Dirk Strohmann

8I2 Reviews how varied and ingenious the techniques of estrangement were in the theatre of the period. Hence, the suspicion that 'Brecht's theoryand theatremight be just onemode within a diverse range of avant-garde practices for making the familiar strange' (p. 5) makes a good starting-point, especially when coupled with concerns about which of the historical avant-garde's 'theoretical and aesthetic paradigms could be further applied and reworkedwithin our current contexts' (p. 3). Deliberately, one suspects, this compact survey often postpones answering such questions, choosing instead to leave us todraw our own conclusions. The main strength of Theatre of Estrangement lies in its ability to reactivate the debate about themerits and new possibilities of theatrical defamiliarization. We are shown over twenty devices theorized by the Formalists or exploited by theRussian avant-garde that arewithout counterparts inBrechtian theatre.The highlighting of such potential, togetherwith awelcome stress on reception's role in the estranging process, makes foran illuminating survey.However, while not irreparably damaging to thework's thesis, there are places where the overall picture ismarred by unsub stantiated claims, distorting emphases, and misleading assumptions. Compared with thework of Barooshian and Pomorska, for example, its account of the relationship between Formalism and Futurism is rigidly influence-dominated. And although the possibility thatBrecht's concept of Verfremdungwas primarily indebted toRussian Formalism has long since been dismissed asmere speculation, Jestrovic continues to cling to it without offering any new evidence. Her generally rewarding discussion of estrangement's transference from page to stage is over-concerned with Futurism's forays into 'transrational language' (zaum) at the expense of less irrational forms of linguistic defamiliarization exploited for socio-critical and political purposes. Since the Formalists had much to say about linguistic deformation, itwould have been useful to compare this feature ofRussian and German avant-garde theatre.Perhaps because Verfremdung's putative indebtedness to Shklovsky became so politicized an issue during theCold War years, Jestrovic remains unduly reticent about the ideo logical function ofBrechtian Verfremdungseffekte, preferring to talk of the 'ethics' of estrangement rather than placing it within itsappropriate political framework. Given the interest thisbook is likely tomeet with in theatre-related disciplines, its unacceptably high number ofmisspellings, misquoted names and titles,factual errors, and inconsistencies isunfortunate. Even Brecht's publisher appears in the carelessly estranged form 'Suhkramp' and Jestrovic's own subtitle iswrongly given on both spine and dust jacket. KING'S COLLEGE LONDON J. J.WHITE Die Rezeption Maurice Maeterlincks in den deutschsprachigenLandern (I89I-I9I4). By DIRK STROHMANN. (Europaische Hochschulschriften, Reihe I: Deutsche Sprache und Literatur, I926) Bern: Peter Lang. 2oo6. 8o6 pp. ?Ioo; ?65.50. ISBN 978-3-03-9Io855-8. That the dramas and theoreticalwritings of the Belgian Symbolist Maurice Maeter linckmade a substantial impact on German-language culture is broadly accepted, although despite pioneering work by Peter Szondi and Marianne Kesting in the 1950S and I96os ithas remained relatively under-investigated. Originally a doctoral thesis supervised byKarl Pestalozzi inBasel, in itspublished formDirk Strohmann's fine study of the reception ofMaeterlinck inGerman before the First World War goes some considerable way towards rectifying this situation. A huge, very readable, and elegantly produced tome, it is thorough and wide-ranging enough tomake it the standard work on this topic for the foreseeable future. MLR, I03.3, 2oo8 813 Strohmann's book is divided into two substantial sections, differentiated by their approach. The firstis intended as a quasi-objective empirical study ofMaeterlinck's reception inGermany, Austria, and Switzerland, looking at his principal champions (Bahr, Brahm, Harden, and von Oppeln-Bronikowski); his publishers (notably Eu gen Diederichs, whose campaign forhis recognition provided the decisive impulse fora breakthrough); the journals thatdevoted most attention both tohis literaryand to his philosophical work; the stagings of his plays inVienna, Munich, and Berlin; and finally the reviews of these performances. The main articles and performances are usefully tabulated in an appendix to the volume, too. There ismuch original material in this section-for example, Strohmann has for the firsttime delved into theDeutscher Biihnenspielplan in his search for Maeterlinck performances-and his documentation demonstrates a farfullerappreciation of Maeterlinck across Germany and Austria thanwe have hitherto been aware of. It clarifies howMaeterlinck's work was received in two phases, as...

SELF‐DECEPTION AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

Criticism against religions and religious beliefs has taken many forms [1]. Some of the criticism is in a broad sense pragmatic, while other objections are epistemic or metaphysical. Famous critics such as Richard Dawkins and D.C. Dennett have presented a whole range of arguments against religious convictions. A special form of criticism is the idea that religious beliefs or “avowals” are actually results of self-deception [2]. Since self-deception is a form of irrationality, having religious beliefs is irrational, at least in the epistemic sense. This claim has been defended, among others, by Georges Rey and Adele Mercier.