Foreign Power Research Articles

The development of the accounting profession in the Holy Land since 1920: cultural memory and accounting institutions

This study provides a history of the Israel accounting profession using a periodization strategy that identifies major shifts in the legal and economic environment of Israel and traces the effect of these changes on the institutional structure of accountancy. Specifically, four periods are identified, each with distinct accounting institutions: British influence (1920–1948), state building (1948–1977), market model (1977–1994), and globalization (1994–present). The focus is on various effects of culture on the development of the profession and how cultural tendencies, reflected in cultural memory and collective identity, interact with the imposition of institutional structures by a foreign power and by integration into a global economy.

Defining the relationship between Australia and the European Union: is the framework treaty enough?

Australia is currently negotiating a framework treaty with the European Union (EU) that aims at closer cooperation on a wide range of shared policy goals. The treaty is not expected to include trade-liberalisation commitments. This article queries why this is, given the importance of trade and business relations with the EU for Australia, and the fact that the EU exerts international influence primarily as a trade power, rather than a foreign and security policy power. Since 2006, the EU has also been negotiating ‘new-generation’ bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), focusing on tariffs and regulatory non-tariff trade barriers. It has now committed itself to FTA negotiations with many of Australia's trade partners in Asia and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. An FTA and a complementary framework treaty were concluded with South Korea in 2010, and the EU is currently negotiating a similar package with Canada. As Australia and Canada are comparable trade partners for the EU, the article argues that an FTA on the EU–Canada model could be a more effective avenue for Australia to achieve deeper engagement with the EU.

Religion and the Scottish Independence Referendum

The Scottish independence referendum debate, like the Act of Union of 1707, has significant religious dimensions. The Act gave special recognition through the monarch to the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. The Church, a national church, has not yet declared a position on independence, but is seeking to protect its existing privileges whatever the result. The Roman Catholic Church, recognised by the Scottish Parliament, unlike its formal rejection by the UK Parliament and monarchy, symbolically associates itself with the case for independence. Paradoxically, Catholics supporting independence subject themselves, in their religious lives, to an authoritarian foreign power. The SNP Scottish Government attempts to draw Roman Catholic support for independence from its traditional support base in the Labour Party by cultivating a sense of religious grievance that is not justified by the evidence. Old religious divisions are still relevant but non‐religion is growing fast and resulting in new perspectives on the independence debate.

A New Energy Strategy for the United States: Energy Independence

ABSTRACT“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men…are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” (2nd Continental Congress, 1776). In 1776, our founding fathers declared independence from the oppression of a foreign power and took action to create a free nation to be true to their ideals. Today, this freedom is being threatened by US dependence on oil supplied by foreign powers. This dependence is increasingly encroaching on the general welfare of the nation, in terms of our national security and economic well-being. US dependence on foreign energy imports is at an all-time high and will likely increase if current policies and strategies do not change.Since 2001, natural gas and oil prices have doubled largely due to lack of global capacity to supply world demand for energy. Fossil fuel prices will continue to rise over the next 20 years as world supplies of oil and natural gas struggle to keep up with rapidly in...

Theorizing Multilateralism in a Time of Unipolarity

Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War. By Sarah E. Kreps . Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011. 223 pp., $27.95 paperback (ISBN-13: 978-0-199-75380-2). In Coalitions of Convenience , Sarah Kreps addresses a key puzzle in both American foreign policy and great power politics: Why, despite its overwhelming military power, is the United States more likely to intervene multilaterally than to “go it alone”? In 10 post–Cold War interventions, the United States acted unilaterally—that is, without the support of an international institution and with a minimal number of partners—only twice. All other interventions involved various levels of institutional support and military cooperation (p. 22). Noting that this striking empirical variation is inconsistent with either a structural account, which would predict constant unilateralism, or a normative one, which would anticipate constant multilateralism, she offers an alternative based on (i) the unique American position atop the global power hierarchy (in that it often does not “need” much military assistance) and (ii) specific features of particular conflicts: the immediacy of threats (“time horizon”) and the effort required to produce a successful outcome (“operational commitment”). At its core, the theory is rooted in a notion of global order founded on power and maintained by its legitimate exercise. Powerful states would like to preserve their dominant positions, which they can achieve through strategic restraint, reassuring weaker states otherwise concerned about future exploitation and discouraging balancing behavior (Ikenberry 2001 …

Dealing with dictatorship: The US and Hungary during the early kádár years

Because of the legacy of 1956 the hardest country to engage behind the iron curtain was Hungary. The history of the Hungarian political amnesty, a milestone in the development of the most liberal system in the Soviet bloc is an anatomy of the hurdles of diplomacy in dealing with a closed dictatorship under the sway of a foreign power. The new Soviet-installed government launched massive reprisals against real and alleged participants of the revolution. For the first time the US was able to influence events in a Soviet controlled country through diplomatic efforts exerted in the UN. In 1962 after years of difficult negotiation the leaders in Budapest agreed to amnesty political prisoners in exchange for the removal of the Hungarian Question. The settlement was in the best interest of the Hungarians. The regime’s international position was an embarrassment for Moscow. Hungary was internationally isolated. That the deal was so long in themaking showed the difficulty of dealing with a client state supported by a world power. The political committee’s view of world matters was formed by the tenets of communist ideology. This and the knowledge that they would be backed by the Soviet Union through thick and thin allowed the Hungarians to adopt a rigid and uncompromising stance. They exploited domestic weakness to garner support in a conflict that Moscow was ready to settle. Kádár expected American officials to deal with Hungary as a proud independent national entity. Communist functionaries struggled to understand the motivations of American policy. American diplomats found it hard to strike the right tone when dealing with their communist counterparts. Also they did not know about the inner power struggle behind the facade of communist unity. The Kádár regime’s eventual willingness to strike a deal and put an end to domestic terror had to do with his desire to launch the country on a road to economic modernization. This required a gradual and limited opening to the West. One of the pillars of this new policy would be the normalization of relations with the US. Prudently the State Department made it known that this would not happen until political prisoners were freed.In the meantime US goals in Eastern Europe went through drastic change. This wasmatched by a new approach to the Soviet bloc. The liberation of Eastern Europe and the reunification of the continent were deemed unfeasible. Therefore a more moderate aim of “continental re-association” was adopted. In fact the restoration of the independence of states in Eastern Europe no longer seemed an unequivocally more preferable condition than the Soviet control of middle Europe. Rather than destabilizing them as in the fifties the US became interested in the consolidation of more liberal communist regimes as a prerequisite of western security. In other words as opposed to the doctrine of the 50s western security no longer required the restoration of national independence. Liberation and containment was replaced by the doctrine of bridge building. This aimed at the gradual transformation of communist regimes to more liberal and more autonomous albeit not independent or fully democratic entities within the tolerance limit of the Soviets. By the early seventies the European status quo was “not so bad” for the Americans. The East Europeans’ only hope for liberation would be change within the Soviet Union.

It's the Economy, Jemmy

It's the Economy, Jemmy Joshua M. Smith (bio) Brian Arthur . How Britain Won the War of 1812: The Royal Navy's Blockades of the United States, 1812-1815. Rochester, New York: Boydell Press, 2011. xiii + 328 pp. Maps, illustrations, appendices, bibliographical references, and index. $99.00. The War of 1812 has become something of a minor industry to a number of historians hoping to cash in on bicentennial celebrations. It was a murky conflict, and every side seems to claim victory, with Americans and Canadians foremost among these. The only people who never make this claim are Native Americans (First Nations in Canada). Until recently, Britons remained almost entirely aloof from what they regarded as a sideshow to the wars against Napoleon. Brian Arthur has now stepped up, in his provocatively titled How Britain Won the War of 1812, to assert Britannia's triumph. Sweeping aside the folklore of frigate duels and Andrew Jackson's victory at New Orleans, his approach focuses on the economic aspects of the war. His conclusion is blunt and difficult to refute: Britain crushed the United States economically, much as it had Napoleon, and felt little or no repercussions itself. By the last year of the war, the American government was completely bereft of funds; its maritime trade had almost entirely ceased and, with it, the bulk of its tax base. New federal taxes were burdensome and incited resistance to the war effort; domestic efforts to raise loans came far short of the mark, and no foreign power was willing to provide loans to the beleaguered republic. Fortunately, Britain proved willing to grant a generous peace treaty. The United States had achieved none of the war goals set forth in Madison's 1812 speech, in which he asked Congress to declare war. Simply put, the war was a disaster for the United States, and the American interpretation of it as a victory a singularly strange conclusion and one that required a strange brew of twisted facts, emerging mythology, and republican ideology to concoct. Arthur does not dwell on American historical fancies. He is determined to present the war as an economic struggle, one of several examples of British economic might strangling opponents surely and steadily. In Arthur's take on the war, the bland responses of Dutch financiers to the American government's requests for loans play a more important role than the rather puny battles in the North American forests in delivering victory to the British. In the face of [End Page 54] overwhelming British naval might and an increasingly strict blockade, the export-driven American economy almost ceased to function. The predictable and feeble response by President James Madison (known as "Jemmy" to some) was an embargo in 1813 that utterly failed, just as had Jefferson's Embargo of 1807-9 and the other various forms of Non-Intercourse before the war. To be fair to Madison, according to Arthur, the republican ideology which he promoted and followed weakened seriously the American ability to fight a war because it had a very narrow tax base. Ninety percent of the federal government's income was derived from customs duties, which of course withered as the United States went to war against the world's greatest naval power and also suffered from Madison's self-inflicted embargoes. Arthur's focus is admirable: he sets forth the problem, defines it and considers alternative viewpoints, sets the background, provides analysis and a conclusion. His take is data-driven, and he generates lots of it, providing eight chapters of concise text for a total of just over two hundred pages, plus forty pages of valuable appendices. Chapter one gives the background to maritime blockades as a form of economic warfare. Chapter two considers the operational difficulties of sustaining a blockade in the age of sail. Chapter three gives the background to the War of 1812. Chapter four looks at the operations of the early years of the British blockade up until 1814, while chapter five considers blockade operations from 1814 to 1815. Chapters six and seven mirror the previous two chapters in chronology but consider the blockades' impact on American merchants and trade and on the federal...

Current Situation of and Development Strategy for Non-Road Multi-Cylinder Diesel Engine with a Small Power

This article introduces the development of domestic and foreign small power multi-cylinder diesel engines which are below 37kW. It analyzes the structural characteristics of foreign products and clarifies the status of domestic small power multi-cylinder diesel engines as well as the causes which limit their development. It also points out that with the tightening of the emission regulations of non-road diesel engines, We need to develop high-performance small power multi-cylinder diesel engines which are compact, energy saving and environmental friendly to meet market demands at home and abroad. Based on the status quo of the domestic industry, it illustrates the development problems of small power multi-cylinder diesel engines that deserve our attention and the corresponding technical countermeasures, and provides recommendations on the development of the domestic industry.

THE EFFECT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS: THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF EUROPE AND TURKEY

Buying and selling of goods and capital across nations and territories is known as international trade. Also trade and trade management has been an important task for countries over centuries. Great imperial powers managed to benefit from the commercial agreements with the neighboring countries or the other world powers as the international trade was considered the backbone of the world trade in the past and in modern world. Countries wanted to trade and have profit over the borders rather than the domestic limited markets, buying and selling required international agreement to be able to have access to a particular market of a particular country. This paper attempts to introduce to trade agreements by the European powers and Turkey. The Ottoman Empire and the Great Britain created and signed a trade agreement on increasing international trade in the 19 th century. And about a century later was another agreement signed by the European Union (EU) and Turkey. European trade and merchants expanded in the Ottoman territories after 1770s especially after the Kucukkaynarca Agreement. It brought some social changes but more the economic changes and effected the Ottoman Empire socially and economically as different religious and ethnical groups occurred. The international cooperation with the foreign merchants and competition among Muslim and non Muslim traders and even in between the non Muslim traders existed over centuries. But particularly, during the 19th century after having number of commercial agreement with European powers the competition increased in domestic market and internationally. And with the agreement of 1838, the agreement with the Great Britain made the foreign power beneficiary of the Ottoman trade as the foreign trade went under their control and non Muslim merchants were the intermediaries that served for the best interest of the European powers. Turkey signed a Custom Union (CU) in between the EU member countries in 1994. The Commercial Agreement of 1838 and CU were for the same purposes that were to increase the trade in between Europe and Turkey. These two agreements aimed an increased in the trade relations and also trade volume and gain new markets for the national goods and also capital. The purpose of the paper is to introduce the effects of the trade agreements for developing the international trade. The Agreement of 1838 signed by the Ottoman Empire and the Great Britain allowed more and more foreign goods into the Ottoman market and it brought new opportunities to the intermediaries of the Ottoman Empire. Also the CU signed with the EU brought more trade options to both sides. As trade quotas’ and tariffs decreased on both sided, the international trade increased with the union. Methods used in the paper are the analysis of scientific literature, national archive for the data and the content analysis. It is expected that the trade relation in between two countries and as well as with the major European countries increased due to the agreement. With the agreement, the Ottoman Empire decreased the trade tariffs which resulted an increase in the foreign trade into the Ottoman territories. On the contrary, the CU was more beneficial as it aimed to increased trade and entry of goods into the domestic markets mutually. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.em.17.4.3038

Czynniki ryzyka w polityce międzynarodowej współczesnych Chin

China’s Power seems to be beyond discussion. People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the fourth biggest state in the world and its population accounts for one sixth of the human race. The Middle Kingdom’s economy is booming, its international status rises, its middle class is growing. All these features prove that PRC has a great political and economic potential. However, the future of China is not yet certain. Political elites of the state will have to face a series of challenges, concerning demography, coexistence of communist state with market economy, rising competition on energy markets, etc. Identifying these potential threats for PRC’s future development is crucial both for the Middle Kingdom in regards to its internal and international politics, and for foreign Powers in regards to their future agenda concerning relations with China.

Bringing Balancing Back In: Britain's Targeted Balancing, 1936–1939

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Neville Chamberlain rejected the British tradition of balance of power in the 1930s. In contrast to balance of power and balance of threat theories, states do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power. Instead, leaders define threats based on particular elements of a foreign state's power. The import is that different components of power of a foreign state are more or less threatening and aggregate shifts in power alone may not provoke counterbalancing behavior. In the 1930s, Britain balanced against the most threatening components of power: the German Luftwaffe and the threat of a knock-out air assault against the homeland, Japan's Imperial Navy and its threat to Britain's commercial trade routes and the Dominions in East Asia, and the Italian Navy and the threat to Britain's line of communication through the Mediterranean Sea to India and Asia. Given Britain's difficult financial circumstances, all other components of power, such as the army and the land components of power of Germany, Japan, and Italy were ranked as secondary in terms of its rearmament priorities. Thus, London was able to narrow the gap with Berlin in specific components of power of strategic importance such as aircraft production or to exceed Germany in other areas such as the Royal Navy and its battlefleet.

APR+ 표준상세설계 개발단계에서의 경제성 평가

KHNP CRI has been developing APR+ nuclear power plant since 2007, which is GEN III+ model with 4,361 MWth capacity. To develop safer and more economical nuclear power plant than APR1400, we studied domestic and foreign nuclear power plants under construction. We also reviewed nuclear power plants which are appropriate for domestic construction in Korea and also for export. Economic assessments were made twice during the second phase of standard detailed design of the plant. The result of the second phase of economic analysis for APR+ standard detailed design showed that APR+ N-th plant was 24.6% more economical than coal-fired 1,000MW power plant, and was evaluated to be competitive enough in global market for construction of the nuclear power plant.

The Futility of Force and the Preservation of Power: British Strategic Failure in America, 1780-83

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is [to] establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. (1) --Carl von Clausewitz In the spring of 1763 Great Britain, basking in the warm afterglow of decisive victory in the Seven Years War, presided over a vast and unprecedented global empire. The small island nation seemingly, and rather suddenly, found itself without peer--enjoying a level of military and political hegemony not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. (2) It was a unique, albeit fleeting, position. In the span of a mere twenty years, the world's preeminent global power, despite enjoying a considerable advantage in almost every conceivable category used to calculate military potential, found itself disgraced and defeated by a start-up nation possessing a markedly inferior conventional military capability. Crippled by a grossly burgeoning national debt, diplomatically isolated, and politically divided at home, the North Ministry became embroiled in a protracted and unpopular global war that its policymakers and military leaders seemed incapable of understanding--much less winning--until it was far too late. (3) The War for American Independence, especially if viewed from the British perspective, retains extraordinary significance for contemporary practitioners of national and military strategy. The conflict contains many valuable and exceedingly relevant insights regarding the rise, prevention, and challenges of insurgency, the perils of a people's war for a foreign power, and the absolute imperative of a thoughtful, coherent, and proactive national strategy that integrates all instruments of national power prior to, not just after, the commencement of hostilities. The British experience also provides timeless lessons regarding the difficulties of balancing ambitious political ends with limited military means, civil-military relations, and sustaining national will in democratic societies during protracted and unpopular wars. Finally, the conflict serves as a conspicuous example of the potential for irregular warfare to thwart the application of conventionally superior military force and thereby decide or influence the political outcomes of wars and campaigns. In that regard, Great Britain's experience in the War for American Independence provides an important prologue for many of the contemporary challenges associated with the application of coercive force in a postcolonial and postnuclear world. While predicting the future remains problematic, the United States should, in all likelihood, expect both the character and conduct of its future wars to more closely resemble that of the American revolution, albeit from the British perspective, than those of a bygone era where industrialized nation-states waged near-total wars of annihilation. (4) This article uses an abbreviated examination of the Southern Campaign (1780-82) to explore the principal causes of British strategic failure in the War for American Independence. The subject demands more attention than it traditionally receives, especially from the nation that has, in the span of a mere two generations, overtaken and largely assumed Great Britain's once dominant role on the world stage. America's ascendancy, however, has not come without cost. Ironically, several of the major political, economic, and military challenges confronting the United States today bear a remarkable similarity to those that plagued her one-time colonial master. (5) Chief among them is perhaps the most daunting and perplexing military issue of our time--how to translate supremacy on the conventional battlefield into enduring political success in an age of austerity and limited war. In a conflict full of dubious assumptions and missed opportunities, the pinnacle of British political and strategic miscalculation occurred in the South. …

Reversal of Fortune? Strategy Change and Counterinsurgency Success by Foreign Powers in the Twentieth Century

Will a strategy change toward one of “hearts and minds” alter the eventual outcome of the American-led allied war effort in Afghanistan? We investigate this question by analyzing 66 cases of counterinsurgency warfare from the twentieth century in which a foreign power seeks to defend a central authority in a state or colonial territory against an insurgency. We identify whether and when a foreign power implemented a change in its counterinsurgency strategy, whether said change involved a shift toward a strategy reflecting a hearts and minds emphasis, as well as the foreign power's eventual success or failure in prevailing over insurgents. We find that while shifting toward a strategy of hearts and minds increases the chances for success, the improvement is modest and requires nearly a decade to produce. Furthermore, we find that the impact of a strategy change is conditional on the timing of the change, with a “window of opportunity” associated with success closing after approximately eight years of war. Our findings bode poorly for allied efforts in contemporary Afghanistan.

A Cultural History of Cuba During the U.S. Occupation, 1898 – 1902

A Cultural History of Cuba During the U.S. Occupation, 1898 – 1902

Development of software means and normative documentation on the flow-accelerated corrosion of pipelines of nuclear power plants

Software tools (ST) and normative documentation (ND) on the flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC) of pipelines of foreign and domestic nuclear power plants are analyzed.

The Invention of Hebrew (review)

Reviewed by: The Invention of Hebrew Robert S. Kawashima The Invention of Hebrew, by Seth L. Sanders. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009. 258 pp. $50.00. The very title of Seth L. Sanders's audacious book is already a bit startling, inasmuch as natural languages—as opposed to, say, Esperanto and Fortran—cannot be said to be "inventions." What Sanders actually has in mind is the invention of vernacular literature, specifically, ancient Israel's creation of a standard written Hebrew that could serve as its language of culture and administration. In the Late Bronze Age, writing in one or another imperial dialect (using cuneiform, naturally) was de rigueur among scribal circles of the Ancient Near East. Why, then, did Israelite writers suddenly adopt the alphabet and turn to their native Hebrew in the ninth century B.C.E.? What in particular is the social significance of this linguistic displacement? To answer such questions, this prodigiously researched and wide-ranging study focuses not so much on the Bible as on the epigraphical data. The result is a thought-provoking social history of writing, combining philology, anthropology, and political theory. Sanders's overarching claim is that the rise of written vernacular forms in the Iron Age Levant—ultimately, the Bible itself—signals a new mode of political communication, one that introduced a new actor into history, namely, the people. The book consists of four central chapters framed by a brief introduction and conclusion. In Chapter One, Sanders traces in broad strokes the development of modern biblical studies in relation to general intellectual history, in an attempt to explain why the field has "lost sight of . . . the socially creative dimension of how a text speaks, not just what it says" (p. 14). He places particular emphasis on two pairs of intellectual figures: Hobbes and Spinoza, Lowth and Herder. Invoking the first pair establishes a first major premise: that the Bible is a specimen of "political communication." Invoking the second establishes a second major premise: that this political communication must be related to a people and a place. Chapter Two begins by surveying the early history of the alphabet and its first tentative uses, but the main goal here is to explore the significance of the first two known instances of vernacular literature, that of Ugarit and, later, Israel. It culminates in a fascinating comparison of the Ugaritic "ritual for national atonement and unity" (p. 59) and the biblical Day of Atonement (Leviticus 16). In both, one witnesses the appearance [End Page 150] of a new political entity, namely, the people as a collective participant in history; in both, this entity is addressed as "you." The kin-based political model of West Semitic cultures—versus the monarchic model of Mesopotamia and Egypt—he finally argues, provides the proper context for understanding this social-linguistic development. Chapters Three and Four trace the historical transition itself. Chapter Three describes how, under Egyptian rule of the Late Bronze Age Levant, cosmopolitan cuneiform dominated the realm of writing, leaving little to no room for local dialects. The Amarna Letters are noteworthy for recording the linguistic interference of West Semitic grammar. Otherwise, local languages enjoyed a furtive textual existence as mere snatches of alphabetic writing in the interstices of imperial power: abecedaries, objects scribbled with indications of private ownership, etc. (It was against this backdrop that Ugarit managed to express some level of local cultural autonomy.) Chapter Four finally focuses on the burgeoning of alphabetic vernacular writing in the Iron Age Levant, of which Israel was merely one, albeit major, instance. Sanders shrewdly interprets it as a West Semitic response to the rise of Assyria in the wake of Egyptian rule. Ironically, it was the voice of the Assyrian king, "speaking" to his vassal states through imperial cuneiform monuments, that constituted these as subjects, as they "recognized" themselves as objects of foreign power. By "imitating," in turn, these cosmopolitan literary forms, local peoples began to write in their own languages (pp. 120-22), as evidenced in the roughly contemporary monumental inscriptions in Moabite, Ammonite, and Aramaic, not to mention later Hebrew inscriptions. Sanders's central thesis is compelling and important, but aspects of his argument need clarifying. What...

State, nation, and empire: the formation of the US

This article discusses the role of state, nation, and empire in the formation and early development of the US. While recent debates on empire have mainly focused on current US foreign policy and global power, this historical analysis shows that the founding and early development of an American nation-state was driven by empire-building. A discussion of the dynamic relationship between empire-building and nation-state formation in Europe generates the general framework for the application of these concepts to the historical development of the US. The entanglement of empire-building and nation-state formation undermines the argument that American political development is somehow exceptional, putting the formation of the US in the context of similar dynamics elsewhere.

Barack Obama and Security In the East Baltic Sea Region

This paper addresses a number of fears that prevail in the East Baltic Sea Region about Washington’s commitment to their security under the administration of Barack Obama. While indicating that the Obama White House may have been cavalier about such concerns, they are unjustified. For example, the new anti-ballistic system that the U.S. intends to deploy in Europe is superior to the one favoured by the Bush Administration. Obama’s campaign to reset relations with Russia is good for Europe. And Obama has demonstrated that while he seeks to enhance the image of the U.S. in the world through a display of soft power, he has been resolute in applying hard power in Afghanistan where Russia has been a helpful partner. In conclusion, the Central and East European nations should join the U.S. in its quest to reset relations with Russia although there is no guarantee that it will be a success. Russia in turn must reconcile its differences with the countries in the East Baltic Sea region if it hopes to achieve fruitful relations with the West. At the same time, the EU must develop an energy security program that meets both the needs of the energy producing and energy consuming nations. As yet, this has not happened. Hopefully, it will as the EU takes the measures necessary to respond to the various economic and political challenges that threaten the European Project. The CEE states can rely upon the support of the U.S. but to deny any hostile foreign power the opportunity to compromise their security, they must address problems of corruption within their societies and reconcile points of discord with their neighbours.

The Purge of the SA Reconsidered: “An Old Putschist Trick”?

Early in the morning of June 30, 1934, SA Chief of Staff Ernst Röhm and other leaders of the National Socialist storm troopers, theSturmabteilungor SA, were arrested by Adolf Hitler in the Bavarian resort town, Bad Wiessee. Further arrests followed across Germany during the day. Many SA leaders, various German politicians, two generals, some dissident Nazis, and some of Röhm's friends were shot. Finally, Röhm himself was killed late the next day. This was the only violent internal party purge to occur in the entire history of Nazism. Some ninety people were killed, with the greatest proportion being in Berlin, Munich, and Silesia. At the time the purge was justified by the allegation that the SA leaders were plotting to overthrow Hitler, carry out a “second revolution,” and seize power in collusion with former Chancellor General von Schleicher (also shot) and with the aid of an unnamed foreign power (France). The need to rid the SA of corruption and decadence was emphasized; in this context Hitler's alleged discovery of Röhm's homosexuality was publicized.