Foreign Policy Stance Research Articles

On the History of Formation of Modern Taiwan Stance on the Rights to Maritime Features and Area in the South China Sea

The article highlights the history of formation of the official Taiwanese discourse on the problems of territorial affiliation and legal claims to the islands in the South China Sea. Two leading political parties of Taiwan (Guomindang and DPP) have substantial differences in their approach to the sovereignty on the features in SCS and “historical rights” to the sea. Details are given about reasons for emergence and disappearance of the concept of "historical waters" in the Taiwanese law, which allegedly should have been subject to the jurisdiction of the Republic of China. Taiwan's activities on the two features in the SCS aimed at demonstrating their "effective occupation" are highlighted. Official stance of different administrations and its changes are considered in detail. While sharing the same approach to the status of Taiping island, Guomindang and DPP disagree on affiliation of all other land features in the SCS. When considering the interpretation of the notorious "U-shaped line" by Taiwanese politicians, a conclusion is made about the actual proximity of the foreign policy stances of the PRC and the Guomindang, which are based on the idea of the common Chinese identity, revealed by significant part of the Taiwan inhabitants. As for the approach of DPP to the problem of SCS, the determining factor here is the Taiwanese identity of its supporters. This further complicates the situation: the DPP, on the one hand, proclaims sovereignty over all SCS facilities to demonstrate unity with PRC on the issue of China's territorial integrity, on the other hand — pragmatically recognizes the impossibility of actual exercising its nominal sovereignty over the disputed territories. Thus an obvious contradiction between theory and practice in the Taiwanese policy is revealed. The nuances of Taiwanese attitude to the award of the Hague Tribunal on the Philippines vs China case are elucidated. The reasons of the tribunal’s refusal to provide status of island to the biggest feature in Nansha group are determined.

Lebanon and the Syrian Civil War: Sectarian Perceptions and Positions

ABSTRACT This paper analyses the role of sectarian identity in foreign policy making by bringing sub-state sectarian actors into foreign policy studies. The paper takes Lebanon and the Syrian Civil War as a case study through a close scrutiny of the emergence and the consolidation of foreign policy orientations, preferences and behaviour of the Maronite, Sunni, Shia and Druze leaders in Lebanon. By doing so, it asks how sectarian groups behave as sub-state foreign policy actors in countries where society is divided along sectarian identities and how sectarian identities matter in terms of the definition of the self and the other and the ally and the enemy in weak states. It further questions to what extent sectarian groups can be considered as sub-state foreign policy actors with their own perceptions based on their identities. Building its main findings on various fieldworks in Lebanon conducted in 2016 and 2017, interviewing leaders of major sects; this study concludes that in the absence of a cohesive foreign policy stance in a weak state, the role of sectarian identity in defining self and other becomes central for understanding the foreign policy choices of sectarian leaders faced with an existential challenge.

Right-Wing Populism and International Issues

Most studies analyze right-wing populism in the framework of the nation state, while its impact on foreign policy is understudied. This article focuses on the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) to highlight its foreign policy stance. How is the AfD deliberately operating not only nationally but also on the European level? What are their aims and goals? How has the surge in right-wing populism impacted international issues and what does the rise of the right mean for Germany’s role in Europe and in world politics? In the first part of the paper, I contextualize the rise and significance of right-wing populism in Germany within the framework of social and political theory. Second, I address the AfD’s position to European affairs more specifically, including its stance in the European Parliament elections in 2019. Third, I highlight key topoi of the AfD’ s position regarding the eu, the United States and nato by drawing on critical discourse analysis. The analysis shows that the AfD is aiming to redefine Germany's foreign policy consensus based on the special responsibility paradigm that has characterized Germany's foreign policy after World War II. The party is not only nationalistic in outlook but moreover aiming to revise key paradigms of Germany's foreign and European policies.

Pakistani English Press during War on Terror: A Media Conformity Approach

The present research focused on how much Pakistani English press tracked the foreign policy stance of the Pakistani government in the presentation of incidents related to the war on terror. Pakistani authorities reinforced war on terror and Afghanistan war but did not support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. For the present analysis, the editorials of Dawn and the Nation were selected from 12 September 2001 to 11 September 2003. Thematic analysis of the editorial coverage through NVIVO 10 was conducted. It was found that, during the war against Afghanistan that took place in 2001, Pakistani English press did not support the Pakistani governments stance. Many critical themes were noted from the data. However, during Iraq war that happened in 2003, Pakistani English press toed the Pakistani governments policy during and stressed the government to take more proactive stance against Iraq war. Overall, it could be stated that the Pakistani English press partially conformed the foreign policy stance of Pakistani government.

The attitude of the Visegrad Group Countries towards Russian Infrastructural Projects in the gas sector

The article analyses individual stances of the Visegrad Group countries (i.e. Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary) towards infrastructural projects in the natural gas sector currently being built by Gazprom, and determining factors influencing their respective attitudes. More specifically, the research focused on Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, pipelines that aim at supplying Europe while circumventing traditional transit countries in the central and Eastern Europe, including the Visegrad group countries. The paper is organized as a series of individual case studies, each dedicated to one state under scrutiny. The author concluded that there is no common ground upon which a unified stance of the Visegrad Group could be formulated in this regard. Also, the states differ in adherence to theoretical attitudes to energy policy in general. Despite the declared unity, the Visegrad Group states pursue their own goals determined by economic interests or long-standing foreign policy stance. Consequently, central Europe is fragmented in its attitude towards the Russian infrastructural projects and thus more prone to penetration and individualized deals.

U.S. national interests and framing India in the U.S. press during and after Cold War

ABSTRACTThis research studied India’s portrayal in the U.S. press over a 48-year period during and after the Cold War. It used the Indexing theory and framing. The study found significant difference in India’s portrayal on five frames: nuclear, trade, defence ties between India and the U.S.A, terrorism and separatist movements in India. The study concluded that the U.S. press portrayed India in accordance with official U.S. foreign policy stance on India during and after the Cold War. The findings of the current research gave support to the Indexing theory.

Foreign Policy Preferences in Ukraine: Trade and Ethnolinguistic Identity

ABSTRACT Individuals tend to favor important trade partners in their foreign policy preferences. Cultural affinity is also known to influence individuals’ foreign policy stances. This study examines how citizens prioritize international relations with trading partners in the face of ethnolinguistic divisions. Using survey data on foreign policy preferences paired with data on bilateral trade between Ukraine and its two largest trade partners (Russia and the European Union [EU]), I find that ethnolinguistic identity and relative trade exposure both affect foreign policy preferences and that these effects introduce cross-cutting cleavages. Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in regions where the economic importance of trade with Russia is relatively higher are more likely to favor foreign policy oriented toward Russia than Ukrainian speakers elsewhere. Similarly, Russian speakers in areas with high levels of trade with the EU have more EU-oriented foreign policy preferences.

The Ardern Government’s Foreign Policy Challenges

With pressures growing on international rules, Jacinda Ardern’s new government faces extra challenges in shaping a principled New Zealand foreign policy based on the consistent assertion of values. Many of these external challenges are being felt in Asia. Even if force can be avoided on the Korean peninsula, escalating tariff competition between the United States and China may signal deep challenges for the rules of the road that suit New Zealand. As the wider storm clouds grow, the Ardern government’s focus on the South Pacific in cooperation with Australia offers some respite. But the Labour–New Zealand First coalition may complicate the delivery of predictable and creditable foreign policy stances.

Dış Politika Yapımında Mezhepsel Aktörler: 2006 Lübnan Savaşı’na Yeniden Bakış

This paper analyses the role of sub-state sectarian actors in foreign policy making in weakly established states by re-visiting the July War of 2006 in Lebanon. It mainly asks how sub-state sectarian actors behave as foreign policy actors in countries where society is divided along sectarian identities and how sectarian identities matter in terms of the definition of the self and the other and the ally and the enemy in weak states. By doing so, the paper analyses the emergence and the consolidation of foreign policy orientations, preferences and behaviour of the Maronite, Sunni, Shi’a and Druze communities in Lebanon, with a specific emphasis on the role of Hezbollah during the war. Building its main findings on various fieldworks in Lebanon, interviewing leaders of major sects; this study concludes that in the absence of a cohesive foreign policy stance in a weak state, the role of sectarian identity in defining self and other becomes central for understanding the foreign policy choices of sectarian actors.

Framing and Foreign Policy—Israel's Response to the Arab Uprisings

AbstractThe eruption of the 2010 Arab uprisings has generated a great deal of academic scholarship. However, the foreign policy of Israel, a key power in the Middle East, amid the Arab uprisings, has received limited attention. Furthermore, as we demonstrate, the conventional wisdom purported by the current debate, which is that Israel adopted a “defensive, non-idealist” realist foreign policy posture (Magen 2015, 114) in the wake of the Arab uprisings, is wrong. Rather, utilizing an innovative approach linking foreign policy analysis (FPA) and the literature on framing, we demonstrate that Israel adopted a foreign policy stance of entrenchment. This posture is predicated on peace for peace not territory, reinforcing Israel's military capabilities, and granting limited autonomy to the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Thus, the article demonstrates how framing can usefully be operationalized to uncover how binary discourse does not merely reflect foreign policy but is, in fact, constitutive of it. We demonstrate that diagnostic and prognostic frames helped to create a direct connection between the images held by a leader, his/her worldview, ideas, perceptions and misperceptions, and foreign policy actions. These frames constituted action-oriented sets of beliefs and meaning that inspired and legitimated certain foreign policy options and instruments while restricting others.

What does New Delhi’s engagement with the war in Syria (and Iraq) reveal about India as an International Actor?

ABSTRACTThis article examines whether New Delhi’s engagement with the ongoing conflict in Syria (and Iraq) demonstrates that India is leaving behind its traditionally cautious and risk-averse foreign policy stance and becoming a more proactive international actor. India has not engaged actively with and has not tried to wield substantial influence over the course of this conflict; instead, after a moderate burst of diplomatic activity in the second half of 2011 India has largely tried to avoid involvement. There are some indications that India is trying to become more proactive in its region, in trade diplomacy, and toward a rising China; yet, results sometimes fail to meet ambitions. Accordingly, the article concludes that, on balance, India’s foreign policy orientation has not yet changed significantly; it remains a cautious, reactive international actor unwilling to engage with and actively shape the outcome of crucial crises or conflicts.

Is the Death of the TPP Good News for Brazil? Mega-Regional Agreements and the Quest for Development ‘Policy Space’

Beyond the controversy between supporters and critics of the Trans-pacific Partnership (TPP), the agreement has generated broad scholarly interest as the first twenty-first century ‘mega-regional’ accord ever concluded. This article seeks to contribute to the debate, analysing the potential regulatory impact of a TPP-like agreement on Brazil and developing countries in general, arguing that third-generation broad economic partnerships may be incompatible with the foreign policy stance of keeping ‘policy space’ for development. The article compares the TPP legal text with previous free trade agreements (FTAs), and analyses provisions in various TPP chapters that contrast with Brazil’s traditional stance in key issues relating to market access, services, investments, intellectual property, electronic commerce and regulatory convergence. Evidence from this exercise outlined that Brazil has not acceded to various international agreements which participation is required under the TPP, and Brazil still lacks modern domestic regulations in crucial areas that would be demanded in a third generation agreement. The recent withdrawal of the United States from the TPP and the uncertainties surrounding trade global governance suggests that Brazil has a window of opportunity to revamp its domestic institutions and decision-making process to become a ‘rule maker’ instead of ‘rule-taker’ in international trade.

China's Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for Southeast Asia

China's Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for Southeast Asia Hong Yu (bio) During state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, Xi Jinping announced the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, respectively. Shortly after that, these two initiatives were combined to form one unified concept, known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This grand initiative, comprising various routes by sea and land, is intended to connect China with Southeast and South Asia, Central Asia, Pacific Oceania, Africa, and Europe. BRI is centered on both soft and hard infrastructure connectivity, aiming to forge an integrated and extensive network of regional infrastructure with China at its hub. BRI has gradually emerged as a top Chinese national strategy. Given China's emergence as a global power through industrial redeployment and outward investment, this initiative could reshape the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape of Asia and beyond. BRI signals a shift in China's foreign policy and a departure from its long-held low-profile approach. Since Xi came to power in 2012, the Chinese government has adopted a far more proactive foreign policy stance, driven by global thinking.1 BRI serves as the key driver to advance China's interests overseas and demonstrates China's growing confidence and aspirations to be a rule-shaper in the economic governance of the region and beyond. Meanwhile, the demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), following the withdrawal of the United States, offers China further leeway to promote its New Silk Road agenda. The TPP's failure will increase the international momentum behind BRI to accelerate regional economic cooperation and integration through forging infrastructure, trade, and investment linkages. For the Southeast Asian countries, regional economic integration plays a very important role in mitigating external uncertainties and global economic vulnerabilities. The collapse of the TPP hit certain participating countries within Southeast Asia very hard, particularly Singapore. Being a tiny nation without an economic hinterland, Singapore has developed as the [End Page 117] most open and trade-dependent economy in the region. China's realization of BRI depends on the support and participation of other countries; in particular, the neighboring Southeast Asian countries are vital to the success of this grand initiative. The Southeast Asian countries, particularly developing countries like Indonesia and the Philippines, have largely welcomed BRI, which aims to promote close regional trade and investment linkage based on the improvement of interregional physical connectivity. Southeast Asia needs to focus consistently on constructing infrastructure in order to unleash the region's economic growth potential. The Southeast Asian countries consider that participating in BRI will help address their serious infrastructure deficits and accelerate industrial and economic growth. China has offered much-needed investment for connectivity-related infrastructure construction.2 This essay will first examine the opportunities for Southeast Asian countries to participate in BRI and then consider their perspectives on the challenges for the initiative. Opportunities for Southeast Asia Arising from BRI China's rise to become the world's second-largest economy and the largest trading nation has exerted a very powerful pull on the Southeast Asian economies. China has become the largest trading partner for all Southeast Asian countries except for the Philippines. The region, for its part, has benefited enormously from China's economic growth. It has taken advantage of the Sinocentric regional production network created since China's admission to the World Trade Organization in the early 2000s to export raw materials, intermediate goods, and mineral resources to China for final manufacturing into industrial goods before their export to the major consumption markets in the West. Setting aside for the moment the underlying geostrategic and geopolitical considerations, the potential benefits from BRI for Southeast Asia could be enormous. China has committed enormous financial resources to build a number of large-scale transportation projects aiming to improve interregional connectivity. For example, construction has already started on the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway in Indonesia and on a railway linking Mohan, on the Chinese border, with Vientiane, the capital of Laos. These two projects, both largely financed by Chinese banks and being [End Page 118] built by Chinese companies, mark Beijing's efforts to...

Intervention and involvement of the United States on East Asia

With reference to of the Obama administrations foreign policy stance article such as the system of multilateral diplomacy and pragmatic diplomacy, the purpose of this paper is to analyze security and economic cooperation strategy of the United States in order to engage in Northeast Asia issues. This paper seeks to explain the change of Americas foreign policy stance in detail what action to come relations of Northeast Asia and the North Korean nuclear problem. This paper seeks to focus on the changes of environment in the international political economy which has caused the US not to stay in offshore balancing role. However the United States has conducted an ongoing intervention policy on the agenda given to multilateral agenda, regardless of the resources available in other areas.

Heading west? Georgia's Euro-Atlantic path

Events in Ukraine in 2014 are likely to transform the presence and role of western institutions such as NATO in the post-Soviet area. The crisis has starkly revealed the limits of their influence within Russia's ‘zone of privileged interest’, as well as the lack of internal unity within these organizations vis-a-vis relations with Moscow and future engagement with the area. This will have long-term implications for the South Caucasus state of Georgia, whose desire for integration into the Euro-Atlantic community remains a key priority for its foreign and security policy-makers. This article examines the main motivators behind Georgia's Euro-Atlantic path and its foreign policy stance, which has remained unchanged for over a decade despite intense pressure from Russia. It focuses on two aspects of Georgia's desire for integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures: its desire for security and the belief that only a western alignment can guarantee its future development, and the notion of Georgia's ‘European’ identity. The notion of ‘returning’ to Europe and the West has become a common theme in Georgian political and popular discourse, reflecting the belief of many in the country that they are ‘European’. This article explores this national strategic narrative and argues that the prevailing belief in a European identity facilitates, rather than supersedes, the central role of national interests in Georgian foreign policy.

Central Asian Stances on the Ukraine Crisis: Treading a Fine Line?

IntroductionFor over a year now, crisis in and over Ukraine has been a stable fixture among top issues of concern and deliberation internationally. The subject has become a point of polarized debate, with most contributions favoring one side or other between collective West and Russia. Similar to most trending debates, especially those as divided as this, discussion has tended to simplify issue by lumping everything into singular categories, be they Russian imperialism, American conspiracy, Ukrainian fascism, or the new Cold War. Flowever, matter is far more complex.This essay offers a mostly non-aligned analytical overview of positions of five Central Asian countries on subject. What these countries' stances elicit is complexity of problem and many-sided effects and challenges involved and sutTounding parties need to face, where it is far from obvious why a country takes this or that stance, or-even more tellingly-why it appears to vacillate. From such an overview, a number of more general conceptual rewards can be derived.One is level and character of agency in foreign policymaking by small states, such as Central Asian five. Both their differences and similarities underscore fact that a non-trivial level of agency is still left with and exercised by small states even when they seem to be seriously under domination of a major power.1 A second point is fact of structural constraints for multi-vectoralism. All of these countries have at various times claimed to be in pursuit of multi-vector foreign policies, not necessarily having much to show for it. As this paper indicates, robust multi-vector relations-especially in high-risk and geopolitically sensitive positions in which these states find themselves-require requisite prospects for sustained relations with a plurality of genuinely interested partners.2 The third observation is about place of uncertainty in international relations and for foreign policymaking. Uncertainty, such as that emerging in wake of Ukraine crisis, is condition under which countries-especially smaller states such as those in Central Asia-are able to venture into exerting greater degrees of agency while also facing greater levels of risk of miscalculation and suffering its consequences. The uncertainty about further developments-especially in regard to how Russia will fare-has been difficult for Central Asian capitals, and different instances of hedging, daring, speaking out, or keeping silent have shown how, in their different ways, these states have coped with and used condition of uncertainty.It is worth pausing here to briefly ask why anyone should care about foreign policy stances of Central Asian states on Ukraine crisis. Besides possibility that one may be interested in Central Asian politics in general, in which case Ukraine situation could be an edifying matter to consider, there are three reasons that can stand as justifications. One reason is significantly increased importance of these countries and of region as a whole for Russia, one of primary parties in crisis. A second reason is presence of some fears, not entirely unlikely, that some of Ukraine's ills could migrate to (or repeat themselves in) Central Asian countries.3 A third reason to think about Central Asian perspectives is because these countries are caught in center of broad and longer-term developments on international stage, and over Eurasian landmass more specifically, and therefore it is worth understanding views of these countries.4One more point of consideration is in order before proceeding further. In speaking about the crisis in Ukraine, one must remember that crisis is a complex one consisting of several parts, each with a slightly different relevance from others. To proceed in a chronological order, first component of crisis is Euromaidan and political destabilization in which it resulted. …

Why do conflict-generated diasporas pursue sovereignty-based claims through state-based or transnational channels? Armenian, Albanian and Palestinian diasporas in the UK compared

Over the past decade, diaspora mobilization has become of increasing interest to International Relations scholars who study terrorism, civil wars and transnational social movements and networks. Nevertheless, an important area remains under-researched: conditions, causal mechanisms and processes of diaspora mobilization vis-a-vis emerging states, especially in a comparative perspective. This article asks why diaspora entrepreneurs in liberal states pursue the sovereignty goals of their original homelands through the institutional channels of their host-states, through transnational channels or use a dual-pronged approach. Empirically, the article focuses on a comparison between the Albanian, Armenian and Palestinian diasporas in the UK and their links to the emerging states of Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh and Palestine. Two variables act together to explain differences in mobilization patterns: the host-state’s foreign policy stance towards the homeland’s sovereignty goal; and diaspora positionality, the relative power diaspora entrepreneurs perceive as deriving from their social positions in a transnational space between host-state and homeland. If a host-state’s foreign policy stance is closed towards the sovereignty goal, but diaspora entrepreneurs experience their positionality as relatively strong vis-a-vis the host-state, they are more likely to mobilize through host-state channels, as in the Armenian case. If the foreign policy stance is closed towards the sovereignty goal, but the diaspora positionality is weak, activists are more likely to pursue transnational channels, as in the Palestinian case. If the foreign policy stance is open towards the sovereignty goal, but the diaspora positionality is weak, entrepreneurs are likely to engage with both channels, as in the Albanian case.

Sovereignty and regional integration in Latin America: a political conundrum?

There is an inherent contradiction between the regional integration projects in Latin America, albeit rhetorically conducted, and the staunch defense by most countries of their national sovereignty, which restricts and opposes many liberalization mechanisms implicit in, and necessary to, the integration processes, based on the rendition of sovereignty in some areas of economic relevance, including, and especially, trade and industrial policies, as well as other sectorial measures. The dilemma is historically compounded by a juridical tradition that places the retraction into an introverted version of the sovereignty principle into the context of conceptual elaborations well known in the international law, such as Calvo doctrine and the Drago principle. Brazil is one of the most resolute promoters of the national sovereignty principle among Latin American countries, clearly expressed in its constitutional chart and foreign policy stances, since the Second Hague peace conference of 1907. Other Latin American countries, mainly in Central America and the Caribbean, are much more motivated by real concerns over recurrent United States interventionism in the regional, in some cases by military means. This framework has somewhat infringed on integration projects, which is also hindered by economic nationalism and state interventionism.

Russia's Foreign Policy toward Iran: A Critical Geopolitics Perspective

Russia's foreign policy stance on nuclear Iran has been a subject of debate. Why has Moscow oscillated between resistance to sanctions and support for punitive measures against Iran in the meantime supplying Tehran with new arms technologies, despite the protestations from the USA? This study engages with this question. It argues that the conventional approaches linking Russia's foreign policy to either geostrategic calculations or considerations of economic efficiency are insufficient because they do not take into consideration the changing conceptions of geopolitics held by Russia. This study shows that a pragmatic application of critical geopolitics, which calls for the examination of Russia's foreign policy through the lens of its own ‘geopolitics code’, can substantially enhance our understanding of Moscow's foreign policy.

After the Trials: Class B and C Japanese War Criminals and the Post-War World

‘Lesser’ Japanese war criminals, or those in Classes ‘B’ and ‘C’, were prosecuted by the various Allied powers in courtrooms around Asia after the Second World War. They were then executed or imprisoned in the places in which they had been tried. By the end of 1953, however, all surviving prisoners had been repatriated to Japan to serve out the remainder of their sentences, and by the end of 1958, all had been released. The decision to repatriate or release prisoners was made by the governments that had tried the war criminals, even after Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952, since the San Francisco Peace Treaty stipulated that the prosecuting countries retained the right to decide on any variation of the prisoners' sentences. The fate of convicted war criminals, therefore, was subject to diplomatic negotiation between Japan and the original prosecuting countries. These negotiations played an important role in the post-war reconfiguration of international relations in the East Asian region. Discussion about the repatriation and release of prisoners constituted one of the first topics of major international negotiation among a reconstructing Japan, the newly independent or decolonising nations of the region, the departing European imperial powers, a United States which was in the process of defining its Cold War aims in the region, and Australian governments seeking to establish a new foreign policy stance in the post-war world.