Central Asian Stances on the Ukraine Crisis: Treading a Fine Line?

Abstract

IntroductionFor over a year now, crisis in and over Ukraine has been a stable fixture among top issues of concern and deliberation internationally. The subject has become a point of polarized debate, with most contributions favoring one side or other between collective West and Russia. Similar to most trending debates, especially those as divided as this, discussion has tended to simplify issue by lumping everything into singular categories, be they Russian imperialism, American conspiracy, Ukrainian fascism, or the new Cold War. Flowever, matter is far more complex.This essay offers a mostly non-aligned analytical overview of positions of five Central Asian countries on subject. What these countries' stances elicit is complexity of problem and many-sided effects and challenges involved and sutTounding parties need to face, where it is far from obvious why a country takes this or that stance, or-even more tellingly-why it appears to vacillate. From such an overview, a number of more general conceptual rewards can be derived.One is level and character of agency in foreign policymaking by small states, such as Central Asian five. Both their differences and similarities underscore fact that a non-trivial level of agency is still left with and exercised by small states even when they seem to be seriously under domination of a major power.1 A second point is fact of structural constraints for multi-vectoralism. All of these countries have at various times claimed to be in pursuit of multi-vector foreign policies, not necessarily having much to show for it. As this paper indicates, robust multi-vector relations-especially in high-risk and geopolitically sensitive positions in which these states find themselves-require requisite prospects for sustained relations with a plurality of genuinely interested partners.2 The third observation is about place of uncertainty in international relations and for foreign policymaking. Uncertainty, such as that emerging in wake of Ukraine crisis, is condition under which countries-especially smaller states such as those in Central Asia-are able to venture into exerting greater degrees of agency while also facing greater levels of risk of miscalculation and suffering its consequences. The uncertainty about further developments-especially in regard to how Russia will fare-has been difficult for Central Asian capitals, and different instances of hedging, daring, speaking out, or keeping silent have shown how, in their different ways, these states have coped with and used condition of uncertainty.It is worth pausing here to briefly ask why anyone should care about foreign policy stances of Central Asian states on Ukraine crisis. Besides possibility that one may be interested in Central Asian politics in general, in which case Ukraine situation could be an edifying matter to consider, there are three reasons that can stand as justifications. One reason is significantly increased importance of these countries and of region as a whole for Russia, one of primary parties in crisis. A second reason is presence of some fears, not entirely unlikely, that some of Ukraine's ills could migrate to (or repeat themselves in) Central Asian countries.3 A third reason to think about Central Asian perspectives is because these countries are caught in center of broad and longer-term developments on international stage, and over Eurasian landmass more specifically, and therefore it is worth understanding views of these countries.4One more point of consideration is in order before proceeding further. In speaking about the crisis in Ukraine, one must remember that crisis is a complex one consisting of several parts, each with a slightly different relevance from others. To proceed in a chronological order, first component of crisis is Euromaidan and political destabilization in which it resulted. …