Foreign Policy Opinion Research Articles

Laurence Fenton. Palmerston and The Times: Foreign Policy, the Press and Public Opinion in Mid-Victorian Britain.

Laurence Fenton. Palmerston and The Times: Foreign Policy, the Press and Public Opinion in Mid-Victorian Britain.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND AMERICANS’ SUPPORT FOR TROOP USE

1. Introduction What is the role of a foreign policy ideal--democracy promotion--in shaping public opinion on foreign policy? (1) The experience of the 9/11 attacks on American soil, the ensuing wars against Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Bush administration's adoption of a new foreign policy doctrine brought the ideal of democracy promotion to the forefront of American foreign policy. While studies of public opinion on foreign policy have focused mainly on examining the existence of organized belief systems and the reasonableness of public opinion in foreign affairs, we know little about the role of democracy promotion in forming public opinion. The experience of the Bush administration's emphasis on democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy and the debate about the role of idealism and realism in accounting for citizens' opinion on foreign policy demands a closer examination of the role of belief in this ideal in shaping public opinion in foreign policy. In addition, the way in which citizens' belief in democracy promotion defines their opinions on foreign policy also needs to be elaborated. Specifically, it is necessary to explore the working mechanisms of this ideal goal in relation to political context. In studying public opinion on foreign policy, a major concern has been whether the mass public can make reasonable decisions. The majority of studies have attempted to counter negative views on the capacity of the mass public to do so. Lippmann (1955), Almond (1960[1950]), and Converse (1964) criticized public opinion on foreign policy as unstable, unorganized, and unreliable due to the lack of interests, information, and ideological constraints. However, along with the emerging studies that emphasized positive views of mass public opinion regarding domestic policy (e.g. Kinder 1983, Feldman 1988), studies on public opinion on foreign policy shifted toward optimistic views by showing the existence of organized belief systems (e.g. Wittkopf 1986, Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995, Holsti 1992), the role of social and psychological constraints in maintaining the belief systems (e.g. Hurwitz and Peffley 1987), and citizens' strategic and instrumental considerations in foreign policy choices (e.g. Jentleson 1992, Jentleson and Britton 1998, Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999). While these studies provide us with persuasive theories and evidence regarding the existence of structure and organization of the public's foreign policy attitudes and capacity to come up with reasonable decisions, they have a limitation in understanding the role of democracy promotion, since most of the studies that focused on the structure did not pay attention to the ideal itself, let alone to its role in shaping public opinion on foreign policy. This lack of interest in democracy promotion is ironic in that the debate about the relevance and effectiveness of idealism in American foreign policy has been around for a long time among scholars of international politics (e.g. Morgenthau 1952, Kennan 1984, Osgood 1953, Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi 2000). Furthermore, democracy promotion is the core concern of liberal idealists (e.g. Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi 2000, Diamond 1992) and neo-conservatists (e.g. Kristol and Kagan 1996) alike. However, we know little about the characteristics and working mechanisms of this ideal in forming public opinion on foreign policy. What will be the effect of democracy promotion on foreign policy opinion? Under what conditions will the effect of the belief in this ideal be strengthened, weakened or remain stable in accounting for citizens' foreign policy choices? This study finds that individuals' belief in democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal plays a significant role in accounting for their support for U.S. troop deployments in defending allies from potential enemies and hostile countries. Also it shows that the effect of democracy promotion depends on political context. 2. …

When governments ignore public opinion in foreign policy: Poland and the Iraq invasion

This article asks why the Government of Poland participated in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 when a large majority of the Polish public was opposed to national involvement in Iraq. The aim is to further an understanding of the circumstances under which democratic governments ignore public opinion in their foreign policy decision-making. The article argues that a combination of three circumstances increased the willingness of the government to ignore the public. First, the Iraq issue had relatively low salience among the Polish voters, which decreased the domestic political risks of pursuing the policy. Second, the government's Iraq policy was supported by a considerable consensus among the political elite. Third, the political elites were unified in their perceptions that participating in the invasion would yield essential international gains for Poland.

The public opinion–foreign policy paradox in Germany: integrating domestic and international levels of analysis conditionally

Does public opinion influence foreign policy? International relations theory is divided on whether foreign policy outputs follow public opinion in advanced democratic countries. Using the case of cold war and post-cold war Germany, I offer an integrated realist theory of the effect of public opinion on foreign policy. I test the theory and the generalizability of the hypothesis of a public opinion–foreign policy nexus using process tracing as well as a time series analysis between the years 1973 and 2002. Using new measures, results here contradict literature on expected public opinion and policy outputs in the cold war period yet are supported after. I find that the predicted effect of public opinion on foreign policy outputs to be confounded by such factors as security threats.

Swords into ploughshares: The effect of pacifist public opinion on foreign policy in Western democracies

This analysis focuses on the effects of domestic public pacifist opinion and international security threats on foreign policy outputs. Much work has suggested that governments’ foreign policy outputs are responsive to public opinion in advanced democratic countries. Using the cases of several Western democracies, this article offers a theory of the effect of public pacifism on foreign policy. It employs a cross-sectional time-series analysis over a period of a quarter century to test the theory and the generalizability of the hypothesis of an opinion–foreign policy nexus using new measures and broader data. Results here contradict literature on expected public opinion and policy outputs in the Cold War period, yet are supported after. The findings indicate that the predicted effect of public opinion on foreign policy outputs to be conditional on the presence of security threats. Convergence between leaders and public opinion in post-Cold War Western democracies is likely to make hawkish foreign policy less tenable in the West.

Culture Clash or Democratic Peace?: Results of a Survey Experiment on the Effect of Religious Culture and Regime Type on Foreign Policy Opinion Formation

We extend the logic of the democratic peace to query whether information about a foreign country's regime type affects US citizens' opinions of that country. We contrast this with the suggestion in other areas of international relations theorizing, such as the “clash of civilizations” thesis and constructivist frameworks, that a country's culture, especially its dominant religious tradition, may be more salient in citizen attitudes toward foreign countries. We designed a survey experiment to test the effects of randomly assigned cues regarding the regime type (democracy/nondemocracy) and religious culture (Islam/Christianity) of a foreign country on respondents' attitudes. Religious cultural cues outperformed regime type cues in determining respondents' perceptions of threat or expressions of trust, but respondents' views did not conform to maximalist claims of either the democratic peace or the clash of civilizations frameworks. These findings suggest that the need for a more synergetic approach to understanding the microfoundations of public foreign policy opinion formation.

Shock and Awe: Rapid-Fire Theory, Some Surprising Survey Results, and Triage Statistics in an Applied Freshman Research Seminar

This article seeks to contribute to the evolving literature on the scholarship of teaching and learning. We do this by describing and then reflecting on what we have learned from a year-long freshman applied research seminar, “International Affairs Knowledge and U.S. Foreign Policy Opinions.” After surveying the literature on public opinion and U.S. foreign policy and materials on survey research and design, the students devised, pretested, administered (to 1300+ undergraduates), analyzed a survey and presented their findings. To do this, we had to provide them, in an abbreviated time frame, survey design, basic statistics as well as statistical software and work with them on how to summarize and present their findings. Their paper (Arbitter et al., 2010), in which some of their findings from the survey accord with the preexisting literature and much of it go beyond that, is one way of assessing our course. But, in this article, we discuss the ways such a course can meet many of the challenges held out to us as educators by such bodies as the Association of American Colleges and Universities (AAC&U), especially if those following this path take advantage of the lessons we have learned.

Foreign Policy at the Ballot Box: How Citizens Use Foreign Policy to Judge and Choose Candidates

This paper uses the elections of 1980 to 2004 to illustrate that political candidates from opposing parties face different incentives in mentioning foreign policy during campaigns and in taking foreign policy positions. The paper demonstrates that citizens connect their own foreign policy views clearly to their evaluations of Republican candidates, but these same foreign policy opinions are much less likely to affect evaluations of the Democratic party and Democratic candidates. In addition, this paper reveals another significant asymmetry—in a threatening environment, Americans reward candidates and parties perceived to hold hawkish positions but even more severely punish candidates perceived to be dovish. Using two datasets, I find that Americans’ opinions on defense spending and diplomacy mattered significantly for the type of political leadership the public preferred at election time.

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy-Opinion regarding Japan's Withdrawal from the League of Nations-

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy-Opinion regarding Japan's Withdrawal from the League of Nations-

Korean Foreign Policy and Public Opinion: Focused on Theoretical mplications of Candlelight Protests against U.S. Beef Imports

Korean Foreign Policy and Public Opinion: Focused on Theoretical mplications of Candlelight Protests against U.S. Beef Imports

Tracing Foreign Policy Decisions: A Study of Citizens' Use of Heuristics

Public opinion researchers agree that citizens use simplifying heuristics to reach real, stable preferences. In domestic policy, the focus has been on citizens delegating judgement to opinion leaders, notably political parties. By contrast, citizens have been held to deduce foreign policy opinions from their own values or principles. Yet there is ample scope for delegation in the foreign policy sphere. In this exploratory study I use a ‘process-tracing’ method to test directly for delegation heuristic processing in university students' judgements on the Iranian nuclear issue. A substantial minority sought guidance on foreign policy decisions, either from parties, international actors or newspapers. This was not always simple delegation; some used such heuristics within more complex decision-making processes. However, others relied on simple delegation, raising questions about the ‘effectiveness’ of their processing.

The Public Salience of Foreign and Security Policy in Britain, Germany and France

The salience of foreign affairs to general publics is an important but often neglected parameter for the role of public opinion in foreign and security policy. This article explores the determinants of foreign affairs' public salience and probes into the respective patterns in Germany, Britain and France. Building on the theory of news values, the article proposes to distinguish between issue-specific and country-specific influences on the public salience of foreign and security policy. The data suggest that broad international crises on the scale of 9/11 or the Iraq war go along with distinct cross-national peaks in the salience of foreign affairs to general publics. At the same time, the effects of constant issue logics are refracted by country-specific factors: most notably, the latter account for the much higher overall salience of foreign affairs to the British public than to the German and French publics since late 2002.

Following the "Mail Hawks": Alternative Measures of Public Opinion on Vietnam in the Johnson White House

Scholars argue that public opinion grew in importance during the Vietnam conflict, yet most find President Johnson was not responsive to public opinion during the War. We amplify these theories by demonstrating the practical value of public opinion mail sent to the White House on Vietnam, reshaping theories about the constraining role of public opinion in foreign policy. We find that the White House mail, but not opinion polling, favoring escalation of the War had a significant and positive impact on President Johnson's policy rhetoric. From these and similar findings, we conclude that the Johnson Administration fol- lowed core hawkish political allies (those individuals desiring a rapid escalation and quick end to the war) rather than those approving of a with- drawal, suggesting mail-gauged opinion from electoral partners (and core political allies more broadly) has value in foreign policy making. The Vietnam War altered scholars' opinions of the role of public opinion in establishing support for foreign policy (Lunch and Sperlich 1979; Holsti 1992). In particular, public opinion grew in influence over elite opinion, a phenomenon that reflected the breakdown in elite consensus during the Vietnam conflict (Hallin 1986; Powlick 1995) and the White House's desire to cultivate public support independent of Congress or the media (Katz 1997). This historic opening provided a more influential role for public opinion in the disposition of the Vietnam War (Cohen 1973; Buzzanco 2002). Although presidents are generally able to strongly influence opinion on foreign affairs, presidents still need to have a favorable climate of opinion for their actions, especially if the crisis involves casualties or significant military resources. Ultimately, the president must adhere to the boundaries placed on foreign policy by public opinion (Sobel 2001).

Personality Traits and Foreign Policy Attitudes in German Public Opinion

This article examines the effects of personality traits on attitudes toward foreign policy issues among the German public. Building on previous research, it argues that personality characteristics shape an individual's motivation, goals, and values, thereby providing criteria to evaluate external stimuli and affecting foreign policy opinions. An analysis of survey data from a random sample of Germans eligible to vote confirms that the personality traits play a role in attitudes toward foreign policy issues. By and large, personality affects foreign policy opinions roughly as strongly as traditional factors such as partisanship, ideology, and social background. Among the traits studied, agreeableness and openness render persons more supportive of international cooperation and more skeptical of the use of military force, whereas conscientiousness exhibits reverse effects. Thus, personality traits merit serious attention in analyses of public opinion on foreign policy.

The foreign policy disconnect: what Americans want from our leaders but don't get

With world affairs so troubled, what kind of foreign policy should the United States pursue? Benjamin Page and Marshall Bouton look for answers in a surprising place: among the American people. Drawing on a series of national surveys conducted between 1974 and 2004, Page and Bouton reveal that contrary to conventional wisdom Americans generally hold durable, coherent, and sensible opinions about foreign policy. Nonetheless, their opinions often stand in opposition to those of policymakers, usually because of different interests and values, rather than superior wisdom among the elite. The Foreign Policy argues that these gaps between leaders and the public are harmful, and that by using public opinion as a guideline policymakers could craft a more effective, sustainable, and democratic foreign policy. Page and Bouton support this argument by painting a uniquely comprehensive portrait of the military, diplomatic, and economic foreign policies Americans favor. They show, for example, that protecting American jobs is just as important to the public as security from attack, a goal the current administration seems to pursue single-mindedly. And contrary to some officials unilateral tendencies, the public consistently and overwhelmingly favors cooperative multilateral policy and participation in international treaties. Moreover, Americans foreign policy opinions are seldom divided along the usual lines: majorities of virtually all social, ideological, and partisan groups seek a policy that pursues the goals of security and justice through cooperative means. Written in a clear and engaging style, The Foreign Policy Disconnect calls, in an original voice, for a more democratic approach to creating such a policy.

American Foreign Policy Opinion in 2004: Exploring Underlying Beliefs

This analysis identifies some underlying foreign policy beliefs of Americans in 2004 and explores the impact of those beliefs upon attitudes about specific foreign policies. We find, following Wittkopf (1986, 1987, 1990), that there remains a coherence to American mass foreign policy opinion. Americans can be described as clustering into four belief sets about foreign policy— accommodationists, internationalists, isolationists and hardliners. Further, these beliefs explain variation in public responses regarding specific foreign policies, such as the proper U.S. role in world affairs, the choice of multilateral or unilateral approaches, and support of increased defense spending.

European Public Opinion on Security Issues

Interest in the role of public opinion in foreign policy has grown steadily since the end of the Second World War. We distinguish at least three different waves of research on this topic and examine two main components of the present policy debate: the need for an Atlantic community and agreement on the means to reach common goals. As to the first issue, we explore the extent to which Atlanticism—defined as the willingness to cooperate among European partners and the US on problems perceived as common—is still high in the 2000s. We find considerable variation between European countries and the US. The left–right cleavage is still relevant in explaining attitudes toward collaboration across the Atlantic both in the US and in several European countries. As to the means, we look at the issue of support for the use of military force in Europe and the United States. On the basis of the available data, support for the use of force is much higher, across the board, in the US than in Europe. On the other hand, the contextual conditions under which force will be used seem to make a significant difference, albeit in different ways, in Europe and the US.

Sport, Cultural Politics and International Relations: England versus Germany, 1935[1

This paper follows the political evaluations conducted within British official circles concerning the 1935 England‐Germany football match, revealing the difficulties faced by those authorities in dealing with both German foreign policy and domestic public opinion.

All Against All: How Beliefs about Human Nature Shape Foreign Policy Opinions

Although the American public’s increasingly cynical views about human nature have drawn considerable attention from scholars, existing research says little about how interpersonal trust shapes mass foreign policy opinions. This study analyzes survey data to test the claim that citizens use their beliefs about human nature to reason about international affairs. The results indicate that cynical citizens are more likely than trusting citizens to endorse the principle of isolationism and to oppose cooperative forms of intervention in other nations’ problems. Citizens’ use of interpersonal trust as an information shortcut helps them to make inferences regarding a topic about which they typically know little, but such inferences are not necessarily realistic ones.

Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

Chapter 1 Old or New Ball Game? Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World Part 2 Part I: The Media and Foreign Policy Chapter 3 Declarations of Independence: The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War Chapter 4 Media and Public Sphere without Borders? News Coverage and Power from Kurdistan to Kosovo Chapter 5 New Issues and the Media: American and German News Coverage of the Global Warming Debate Chapter 6 Government's Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises,1946-1999 Chapter 7 Toward General Theories of the Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy Part 8 Part II: Public and Elite Attitudes after the Cold War Chapter 9 Elite Misperceptions of U.S. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Chapter 10 To Intervene or Not to Intervene in Bosnia: That Was the Question for the United States and Europe Chapter 11 Internationalism at Bay? A Contextual Analysis of Americans' Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Attitudes Chapter 12 NATO and European Security after the Cold War: Will European Citizens Support a Common Security Policy? Chapter 13 Public Opinion after the Cold War: A Paradigm Shift Chapter 14 Public Opinion and Decisionmaking in Russia: The Impact of NATO Expansion and Airstrikes on Serbia Chapter 15 Public Attitudes after the Cold War Part 16 Part III: The Public Opinion-Foreign Policy Linkage Chapter 17 Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy Chapter 18 Public Opinion and European Integration: Permissive Consensus or Premature Politicization? Chapter 19 Constraint, Catalyst or Political Tool? The French Public and Foreign Policy Chapter 20 Where Angels Fear to Tread: Italian Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Chapter 21 Toward a Comparative Analysis of the Public Opinion-Foreign Policy Connection