Following the "Mail Hawks": Alternative Measures of Public Opinion on Vietnam in the Johnson White House

Abstract

Scholars argue that public opinion grew in importance during the Vietnam conflict, yet most find President Johnson was not responsive to public opinion during the War. We amplify these theories by demonstrating the practical value of public opinion mail sent to the White House on Vietnam, reshaping theories about the constraining role of public opinion in foreign policy. We find that the White House mail, but not opinion polling, favoring escalation of the War had a significant and positive impact on President Johnson's policy rhetoric. From these and similar findings, we conclude that the Johnson Administration fol- lowed core hawkish political allies (those individuals desiring a rapid escalation and quick end to the war) rather than those approving of a with- drawal, suggesting mail-gauged opinion from electoral partners (and core political allies more broadly) has value in foreign policy making. The Vietnam War altered scholars' opinions of the role of public opinion in establishing support for foreign policy (Lunch and Sperlich 1979; Holsti 1992). In particular, public opinion grew in influence over elite opinion, a phenomenon that reflected the breakdown in elite consensus during the Vietnam conflict (Hallin 1986; Powlick 1995) and the White House's desire to cultivate public support independent of Congress or the media (Katz 1997). This historic opening provided a more influential role for public opinion in the disposition of the Vietnam War (Cohen 1973; Buzzanco 2002). Although presidents are generally able to strongly influence opinion on foreign affairs, presidents still need to have a favorable climate of opinion for their actions, especially if the crisis involves casualties or significant military resources. Ultimately, the president must adhere to the boundaries placed on foreign policy by public opinion (Sobel 2001).