Foreign Policy Adviser Research Articles

FREEZE! The Grassroots Movement to Halt the Arms Race and End the Cold War by Henry Richard Maar III

Henry Richard Maar III gives the reader the most definitive study yet of the nuclear weapons freeze movement and its impact on the arms race in the 1980s. (Full disclosure: As the chief foreign policy adviser to Senator Edward M. Kennedy from 1977 to 1984, I wrote the U.S. Senate resolution favoring a nuclear freeze, which Senator Kennedy introduced jointly with Senator Mark O. Hatfield, a Republican from Oregon.) The book provides broad discussion of the U.S. and European peace movements, covering the policies of the Reagan administration, the role of Congress, debates within the Catholic Church, broader cultural and political trends, and the outcomes in national politics and U.S.-Soviet diplomacy.Maar traces the freeze movement's evolution from a grassroots movement to a national vehicle countering the Reagan administration. He is especially persuasive in his discussion of policy and politics. He convincingly highlights the freeze movement's catalytic role in helping to transform President Ronald Reagan's rhetoric, at least, from nuclear weapons to disarmament advocacy. Maar also tells a compelling story of how congressional leaders, including Senators Kennedy and Hatfield and Representatives Edward Markey (D-MA) and Silvio Conte (R-MA), were able to harness a more diffuse national movement behind a more focused congressional initiative. The book also captures well the irony, even the hypocrisy, of congressional support for the freeze while simultaneously voting in favor of new weapons systems such as the B-1 bomber and the Strategic Defense Initiative.Maar acknowledges the tactical compromises the freeze movement found itself having to make with its political supporters, but he underestimates the contribution of the latter to elite support for the freeze. He gives little attention, for example, to how widely Senators Kennedy and Hatfield were able to garner academic, labor, professional, religious, think tank, and business support, which played a large role in transforming U.S. arms control policies in the 1980s.Maar also overstates his argument that the freeze movement played a major role in ending the Cold War. Although the movement did affect U.S. policies, far more decisive were such factors as the Soviet war in Afghanistan, anti-Communism in Eastern Europe, and the bankruptcy of the Communist system in the Soviet Union itself, not to mention the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev.In one of the book's best chapters, Maar examines the impact of nuclear weapons fears on political and popular culture in the 1980s. From Jonathan Schell's book The Fate of the Earth (1982) to the seminal made-for-TV film The Day After (1983), with references to comics, cartoon strips, Hollywood films, rock performances, and television shows, Maar vividly re-creates the spirit of the age and the freeze's place in it.The book is most effective, and moving, in its description of the rise and fall of the nuclear freeze movement itself. Maar achieves his goal of “decentering the narrative away from a top-down focus on the personalities of statesmen.” In the great tradition of U.S. popular movements, the freeze was perhaps most impressive as an expression of the grassroots, and Maar tells that story exceedingly well.

نگاه به شرق و نظم نوین جهانی

Considering two facts, namely the Islamic Republic’s “Looking East” strategy and the establishment of a new world order following Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, as well as Ali Khamenei’s support and justification for it, the Islamic Republic ties its future to the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Due to its worldwide isolation, Russia includes the Islamic Republic in the Ukraine conflict. The Islamic Republic’s leaders believe that the East will triumph over the West in the new world order and that they must remain active in the victorious world. The reality, however, is that as the Islamic Republic’s ability to tackle society’s concerns diminishes, the distance between society and government expands; and as this gap widens, the Iranian regime moves closer to Russia and China and away from the West. Thus, in the event of widespread disturbances that could lead to military conflicts, the likelihood of future Russian military action in Iran will increase. Russia must ensure the survival of the anti-Western Islamic Republic. Problematic, though, is the fact that “Russia itself has become a loathed nation.” In the event of internal conflict in Iran, the likelihood of foreign intervention in the region will increase. The public revelation by Khamenei’s foreign policy adviser Kamal Kharazi of the Islamic Republic’s technological capacity to produce nuclear weapons makes more sense. The Islamic Republic has pursued the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a deterrent for more than two decades and has no intention of abandoning this objective. “When it comes to system defense, no other tool appears as potent and efficient as nuclear deterrence.”

Do History Lessons Ever Pay off? A Diplomat’s Memoir

Sir Rodric Braithwaite was educated at Christ’s College, University of Cambridge, from where he went to serve in HM Diplomatic Service, having worked in Jakarta, Moscow, Washington, Warsaw, Rome, and Brussels, where he was a member of the British delegation to the European Community. From 1988 to 1992, Sir Rodric served as HM Ambassador in the Soviet Union during the decisive years of the Perestroika and the first British ambassador in Russia. Subsequently, he was appointed foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister in the second John Major ministry and chaired the UK Joint Intelligence Committee between 1992 and 1993. He was appointed Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George (GCMG) in 1994. As a career diplomat, Sir Rodric gained decades of insight into the troubled relations between Russia and West, having taken part in numerous negotiations on arms control. His affinity with the decision-making circles in both Russia and Britain alongside with the mastery of the Russian language allow him to skillfully dissect the underlying causes of ups-and-downs in Moscow’s relationship with the West, employing the works of both English- and Russian-speaking analysts. Among his recent books are Across the Moscow River (2002), Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (2006), Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 (2012), Armageddon and Paranoia: The Nuclear Confrontation (2017). In this essay, Sir Rodric reminisces of the years spent as a diplomat and provides his view on the usefulness and applicability of historical lessons while devising a foreign policy course.

Kremlin jalanjäljet: Suomettuminen ja vuoden 2002 vakoilukohun tausta

<i>Kremlin jalanjäljet: Suomettuminen ja vuoden 2002 vakoilukohun tausta</i>

India's Subnational Governments Foray into the International Arena

AbstractSubnational diplomacy has come to life in India. Although still nowhere near in the same league as their counterparts in North America, Europe, parts of Asia, and even other developing countries, subnational governments (SNGs) in India are increasingly engaged abroad through involvement in regional and global affairs, questioning the central government on international matters, seeking foreign direct investment, organizing trade fairs and investment summits, leading economic missions, and hosting visiting dignitaries to showcase their jurisdiction's economic potential. These new and emerging actors on India's foreign affairs landscape are pluralizing and decentralizing India's foreign policy, albeit in a limited way and on small scale, as all states and territories are not as yet actively involved in foreign affairs. The paper argues that management of India's external relations is no longer informed or conducted simply by a select group of diplomats, high-ranking political leaders, and other specialist foreign policy advisers in New Delhi. Today subnational actors are becoming an essential component in India's foreign affairs. They are joining the huge traffic of SNGs from countries around the world that are linking with counterparts and others across national borders to serve the interests of local constituencies. It is a trend that is changing not only diplomatic roles, but also the nature of economic and political relationships among government actors worldwide.

ENGAGING THE WORLD: ANTHONY LAKE AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1993–1997

ABSTRACTUsing recently available archival material, this article examines Lake's key beliefs and the part they had in shaping US grand strategy in the first Clinton administration. Lake operated as one of the major architects of the administration's foreign policy. His intellectual influence commenced in the 1992 presidential campaign, when he served as candidate Bill Clinton's principal foreign policy adviser, and continued through the first presidential term, reaching its most concrete manifestation in the Clinton administration's 1994 National security strategy. The article analyses Lake's ideas and his overarching concerns about national purpose, his strategic vision, and his definition of national security policy objectives using the analytical framework known as a mental map. Likewise, it considers his role in articulating a new grand strategy during a period of strategic adjustment, one in which the cold war doctrine of containment no longer applied.

Trust, Care, and Familiarity in the Politburo: Brezhnev’s Scenario of Power

Trust, Care, and Familiarity in the PolitburoBrezhnev’s Scenario of Power Susanne Schattenberg (bio) Mohammed Heikal, foreign policy adviser to Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser, recalls the following bizarre scene during his state visit to Moscow in June 1970. With consultations already in full swing, the door opened and a Foreign Office official came in and handed a document to the deputy foreign minister, Vladimir Vinogradov. Vinogradov gave the paper to [Andrei] Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who read it, got up, and took it to [Aleksei] Kosygin. Kosygin read it, and gave it to [Leonid] Brezhnev. Brezhnev read it, and gave it back to Kosygin. Kosygin then gave it to [Nikolai] Podgornyi. Podgornyi read it, and gave it back to Kosygin, who gave it back to Brezhnev. Then Brezhnev signed it, and gave it to Kosygin, who signed it too. Then Podgornyi signed. Then Podgornyi gave it to Gromyko, who gave it to Vinogradov, who gave it back to the Foreign Office official. The official then left the room. The whole transaction took, I suppose, about five minutes.1 Brezhnev explained to the flabbergasted Egyptians that they had just signed a telegram warning General Mohamed Siad Barre in Somalia that an attempt to assassinate him was being planned. Upon leaving the room, Nasser said to Heikal, “Did you see what happened?” “Over that bit of paper, you mean?” he asked. “Yes,” said Nasser. “If a telegram to General Siad in Somalia needs the signature of all those three, then we are in trouble.”2 Heikal and Nasser had just witnessed the collective leadership practice that Brezhnev had introduced upon taking up his duties in 1964. [End Page 835] Western historians have long speculated that Khrushchev was removed because he had embarrassed the country internationally in the Cuban Missile Crisis or because he was blamed for food shortages.3 However, in October 1964 the members of the party Presidium were less concerned about Khrushchev’s foreign and domestic failures than they were about their own sinecures. Before going on holiday in 1964, Khrushchev had announced that when he returned, he would break up the party Presidium, which he described as a “bunch of old men.”4 Khrushchev had already proved that his intentions were serious. He had reformed the structure of a number of ministries and the party committees and had limited terms in office.5 At the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) meeting on 14 October 1964, Brezhnev accused Khrushchev of suffering from “restructuring-itis”: “Comrade Khrushchev literally suffered from the itch of having to reorganize or restructure everything and believed blindly in its magical, secret power.”6 Above all, Brezhnev accused Khrushchev of breaking with the principle of “collective leadership.”7 Accordingly, the Presidium decreed that the offices of first secretary and chairman of the Council of Ministers were never again to be held by a single person.8 So to justify the overthrow of Khrushchev and secure his own power, Brezhnev declared himself the irreplaceable guarantor of “collective leadership.”9 Though it is common to speak of “collective leadership” under Brezhnev, this article seeks to shed light on Brezhnev’s specific practices of maintaining power as Heikal described it above, using unpublished and mostly unstudied [End Page 836] shorthand minutes of the CC plenary sessions and a number of memoirs. “Collective leadership” is defined here as a technique of ruling over the Politburo and the Central Committee. It did not mean that every Politburo member had the same impact on decision making, or that there was a free and controversial exchange of opinions, as in Western democracies. Rather it referred to the Leninist idea that the Party should speak with a single voice that reflected the one and only party line. This dogma had existed since Lenin had banned the formation of factions within the Party, thereby criminalizing every deviant opinion.10 But since there was no fixed rule concerning how “consensus” should be reached or how “collective leadership” should function, it was up to every party leader to determine which practices, rituals, or discourses he would subsume under this term. At least to a certain extent...

Rusya-NATO i sredata na sigurnost sled Studenata voina: Chast 1—1989–1999

<i>Rusya-NATO i sredata na sigurnost sled Studenata voina: Chast 1—1989–1999</i>

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon, Kissinger and Ford, 1969-1975, Part two: January 1972-January 1973

Although anticipated, the North Vietnamese ‘Easter offensive’ against South Vietnam in 1972 created problems for the United States. Having reached a rapprochement with Communist China, President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the attack could have serious repercussions for their attempt to balance it with détente with the Soviet Union, not to mention the US's credibility as a Great Power. They also feared it would damage Nixon's prospects for re-election in November 1972. Despite opposition from his Defense Secretary, Nixon renewed the bombing of North Vietnam which had been stopped by President Johnson in 1968. This helped to bring the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and after complex negotiations, a draft peace agreement was ready for initialling in October 1972. However, President Thieu of South Vietnam saw significant drawbacks in the agreement and refused to go along with it. The North Vietnamese chose to have one more attempt to win on the battlefield and President Nixon, who had scaled down the bombing when peace seemed closer and won a landslide victory in the presidential election, launched another eleven days of concentrated bombing raids on North Vietnam at the turn of the year. This led to the final agreement initialled on 23 January 1973, which President Thieu reluctantly acceded to. Thieu's reservations were justified, but Nixon realized that, despite his electoral victory, he could not count on the continued support of Congress and the American people for the war. Far from bringing ‘peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’, the January agreement was a fig leaf to cover American withdrawal.

The ICRC and the changing humanitarian landscape

Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon is the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations. He received his Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from Seoul National University and a Master’s degree in Public Administration from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. At the time of his election as Secretary-General, Mr Ban was his country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. His thirty-seven years of service with the Ministry included postings in New Delhi, Washington D.C., and Vienna, and responsibility for a variety of portfolios, including Foreign Policy Adviser to the President, Chief National Security Adviser to the President, Deputy Minister for Policy Planning, and Director-General of American Affairs. Mr Ban took office on 1 January 2007. He was unanimously re-elected by the General Assembly in June 2011 and will continue to serve until December 2016.

The War Lovers (Again)

Evan Thomas’s recent book, The War Lovers, chronicles the “monumental turning point” of the U.S. declaration of war against Spain in 1898, and the small circle of men who pressed for war, and for an American empire. The central figures, for Thomas, were Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, hawkish senator and foreign policy adviser to President McKinley; and William Randolph Hearst, editor of the New York Journal, whose paper did its upmost to fan war fervor in 1897-8. These men were inspired by, and had the strong support of Alfred Thayer Mahan a naval officer, history professor, and influential author of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. Though President McKinley hesitated about war with Spain, Roosevelt and Lodge had long dreamed of a war that would establish the United States as a major player on the world stage. When another prominent politician, Speaker of the House Thomas Reed, opposed substantial increases in naval funding that he thought “invited conflict,” Lodge promptly accused him of harboring “extreme pro-Spanish prejudices.”

A Lost Opportunity : The Flawed Implementation of Assertive Multilateralism (1991-1993)

Bill Clinton did not seek the presidency to initiate an activist foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War, but instead to champion domestic affairs and economic renewal. However, his foreign policy advisers entered office with their own, often differing, interpretations of the United States’ position in the post-Cold War era. After the unity demonstrated by the Gulf War, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations advocated a tactic of Assertive Multilateralism with which to provide inte...

Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman*

“That poor fellow is an emotional fellow,” a fretful Richard Nixon observed about Henry Kissinger on Christmas Eve 1971. The national security adviser had fallen into one of his typical postcrisis depressions, anguished over public criticism of his handling of the Indo-Pakistani War. In a long, meandering conversation with aide John Ehrlichman, Nixon covered many topics, but kept circling back to his “emotional” foreign policy adviser. “He's the kind of fellow that could have an emotional collapse,” he remarked. Ehrlichman agreed. “We just have to get him some psychotherapy,” he told the president. Referring to Kissinger as “our major problem,” the two men recalled earlier episodes of Kissinger's “impossible” behavior. They lamented his inability to shrug off criticism, his frequent mood swings, and his “emotional reactions.” Ehrlichman speculated that Nelson Rockefeller's team had “had all kind of problems with him,” too. Nixon marveled at how “ludicrous” it was that he, the president—beset with enormous problems on a global scale—had to spend so much time “propping up this guy.” No one else, Nixon said, would have put up with “his little tantrums.”1

The Ties that Bind? U.S.–Indian Values-based Cooperation

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India” (speech, New Delhi, November 8, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-india. 2. Among others, President Barack Obama has employed the term “natural allies.” See Kevin Whitelaw, “Obama: U.S., India ‘Natural Allies’ in 21st Century,” National Public Radio, November 24, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120712790. 3. Remarks by Ambassador Rajendra Abhyankar, German Marshall Legatum Institue Fund India Forum II, Stockholm, Sweden, October 2, 2010. 4. Robert Blackwill, “A New Deal for New Delhi,” Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2005, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1403/new_deal_for_new_delhi.html. 5. Manmohan Singh, “PM's Speech at India Today Conclave” (speech, New Delhi, February 25, 2005), http://www.pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=78. 6. C. Raja Mohan, “Balancing Interests and Values: India's Struggle with Democracy Promotion,” The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 3 (Summer 2007): p. 99, http://twq.com/07summer/docs/07summer_mohan.pdf. 7. This was the theme of India's much-noted marketing campaign at Davos in 2006. See, for instance, Fareed Zakaria, “India Rising,” Newsweek, March 6, 2006, http://www.newsweek.com/2006/03/05/india-rising.html. 8. Shyam Saran, “India and Its Neighbors” (speech, India International Center, New Delhi, February 14, 2005), http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=53019013. 9. U.S. Department of State, “U.S.–India Global Democracy Initiative,” Washington, DC, July 18, 2005, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/49722.htm. 10. The White House, “Joint Statement between Prime Minister Dr. Singh and President Obama,” Washington, DC, November 24, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-between-prime-minister-dr-singh-and-president-obama. 11. The White House, “Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India,” New Delhi, November 8, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india. 12. Cited in Sandeep Dikishit, “India Can Help Build Democracy in Arab World,” The Hindu, February 27, 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/2011/02/27/stories/2011022765391700.htm. 13. For further analysis on the possibilities for Indo–U.S. convergence on these issues, see Daniel Twining, “India's Relations with Iran and Myanmar: ‘Rogue State’ or Responsible Democratic Stakeholder?” India Review 7, no. 1 (January 2008): pp. 1-37. 14. Nilova Roy Chaudhury, “India Maps its Equation with the World,” Hindustan Times, October 20, 2006, http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/nm18/India-maps-its-equation-with-the-world/Article1-164069.aspx. 15. Obama–Singh Joint Statement, November 8, 2010. 16. The authors are grateful to Lorne Craner for this formulation. 17. Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “India-U.S. Joint Statement,” New Delhi, July 20, 2009, http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetail488/download_file.php?action=download&mainfolder=form_files/&filename=Form_Pdf_29.pdf. 18. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom” (speech, Washington, D.C., January 21, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm. 19. A New Engagement,” The Times of India, February 28, 2011, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-02-28/edit-page/28641277_1_gulf-countries-soft-power-gulf-states. 20. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities” (speech, Honolulu, January 12, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135090.htm. 21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India,” Tokyo, October 22, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0810/joint_d.html. Additional informationNotes on contributorsDaniel TwiningDaniel Twining is Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Previously handled South Asia policy at the U.S. Department of State and served as Senator John McCain's foreign policy adviser in the U.S. SenateRichard FontaineRichard Fontaine is Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Previously handled South Asia policy at the U.S. Department of State and served as Senator John McCain's foreign policy adviser in the U.S. Senate

Pierre Trudeau on His Foreign Policy

In the summer of 1988, Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein were pursuing their research for the final volume in the Canadian Institute of International Affairs' series Canada in World Affairs. As the concluding volume in the long-lived series, the ordinary two-year time span was abandoned; instead, the book was to cover the 1968 to 1984 period, or, in other words, all of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's foreign policy (as well as the Joe Clark interregnum). Moreover, it had been many years since the preceding volumes had appeared. This delay gave us the opportunity to make use of a wider range of sources than in most ofthe earlier volumes, and we secured access to a very broad spectrum of government and private papers. We also conducted dozens of interviews.1 But we had not been able to arrange interview with until Ivan Head, his key foreign policy adviser for much of his time in power, graciously intervened to set up a meeting for us. Unfortunately, Bothwell was in France on the selected date, which could not be changed, and Granatstein conducted the interview alone.As was our regular practice, Granatstein took notes during the rather than using a tape recorder. Immediately after the interview, he typed up a memorandum, not a transcript, ofthe discussion. This memorandum, cited as Trudeau conversation and used as a source in Pirouette: Pierre and Canadian Foreign Policy, is reproduced below with minor stylistic and grammatical corrections. The original memorandum can also be found in Bothwell' s papers in the University of Toronto archives and in the Granatstein fonds the York University archives, along with memoranda of all the interviews conducted for the book.PIERRE TRUDEAU INTERVIEW, MONTREAL, 30 JUNE 1988I met with Mr and Ivan Head over lunch the Ritz Carlton Hotel from 12:15 to 2 p.m. The understanding is that while everything is on the record, this is to be treated as a conversation, not as interview.Trudeau was dressed in a suit and tie, looked 15 years younger than his age (though he has liver spots on his hands and face), and he was sharp and tough. His answers could wander, however, he could forget questions, and he could get confused. Head had to help him out a few times, and once (see below), he went quite astray. He is quite vain, proud of his accomplishments, and not happy about criticism.We began with some discussion of the Donald Jamieson diary of the October 1970 crisis that I edited for Saturday Night (and L'actualite). pointed out that Jamieson was away during the critical period and didn't know much about Quebec in any case, though he was a good fellow. As for himself, he hoped the story ofthe October Crisis would come out.I asked about the question of Quebec-France relations and France's improper activities. There was nothing secret about this, he said. Whenever we found out they were doing something (like the efforts in Canada of Philippe Rossillon [a quasi-official representative from de Gaulle's committees for the promotion of the French language]), he had made a public crack about it. Certainly in his view there was little difference between France under Presidents de Gaulle, Pompidou, or Giscard, though it was different with Mitterrand. Giscard was sympathetic to the separatists because he needed Gaullist votes. He had long talks with Giscard about this, and as far as he could tell his support was a political concession rather than a plot. The Gaullists were always plotting to get Quebec out as far as possible. He recalled a story about Gerard Pelletier being told by a very senior French minister the UN the time ofthe 1984 election that at last you may have a French Canadian as Prime Minister, meaning Brian Mulroney. Pelletier said, What about Trudeau? The answer was that was an Anglo with a French name - and this, said, after 16 years in power.To Trudeau, the French were shit disturbers, playing safe in case the separatists won their referendum so they could say they had been there to help. …

The French Factor in U.S. Foreign Policy during the Nixon-Pompidou Period, 1969–1974

President Richard Nixon and his chief foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, sought to build a close relationship with the new French President Georges Pompidou, who had replaced the testy Charles de Gaulle in mid-1969. Initially, Pompidou and his ministers warmly welcomed the new U.S. policy. But by the end of the Nixon-Pompidou period in 1974, U.S.-French relations were in a tailspin. This article explores what went wrong, showing that numerous issues helped to produce a rift in bilateral ties: the new international monetary framework after the demise of the Bretton Woods system, the U.S.-French nuclear weapons relationship in the early 1970s, the “Year of Europe” affair, and U.S.-European tensions after the outbreak of war in the Middle East in October 1973. This period may have been a lost opportunity for lasting improvements in Franco-American relations.

Transforming the Soviet Sphere of Influence? U.S.-Soviet Détente and Eastern Europe, 1969-1976

The release of the joint volume, Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969–1972, by the Historian's Office at the State Department and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has raised anew the question of whether Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, and especially their main foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, “accepted Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.” Several reports to Moscow by Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin regarding his back-channel conversations with Kissinger and Nixon seem to suggest such a possibility. This has led Kissinger to question the accuracy of Dobrynin's reports in his preface to the joint volume. Kissinger writes, “From the beginning of the Nixon Administration, Dobrynin sought, obviously on Moscow's instruction, acceptance of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. … That assurance was never given with respect to the internal conditions in Eastern Europe, as is shown by the repetitiveness with which Dobrynin asked for it.”1 Nevertheless, a close reading of the U.S. record confirms the accuracy of Dobrynin's reports regarding Nixon's and Kissinger's statements on Eastern Europe. Moreover, they suggest that on most occasions, Nixon and Kissinger offered assurances on their own, without any prompting from Dobrynin. For example, on February 21, 1969, Dobrynin reported to Moscow Kissinger's remarks that the United States did not have “the slightest intention of intervening in the affairs of Eastern Europe.”2 Although no U.S. record of this conversation has been found, Kissinger reported to Nixon without comment Dobrynin's subsequent statement on March 3: “Moscow had noted ‘with due attention’ my comment at the previous meeting that the United States had no interest in undermining the Soviet position in Eastern Europe.”3 Similarly, Dobrynin reported President Nixon's comments to Moscow from a meeting on June 10, 1970: the United States “fully recognizes the USSR's special interests in Eastern Europe it … and does not intend to ignore or contest them. Among other things, that would be simply unrealistic, since the USSR has immeasurably greater capabilities and influence in that region than does the United States.”4 Although there is no U.S. record of the June 10 meeting, Kissinger once again reported Dobrynin's subsequent confirmation of the remarks to Nixon without any comment.5 Thus, if one were to accept Kissinger's implication in the preface to the joint volume—that the statements Dobrynin reported to Moscow constituted “acceptance of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe”—then the Nixon Administration accepted “Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.” The U.S. record basically confirms Dobrynin's reports.

Foreign policy fusion: Liberal interventionists, conservative nationalists and neoconservatives — the new alliance dominating the US foreign policy establishment

Several tendencies in US foreign policy politics generated a new foreign policy consensus set to outlast the Bush administration. Three developments are analysed: increasing influence of conservative organizations – such as the Heritage Foundation, and of neoconservatism; and, particularly, democratic peace theory-inspired liberal interventionism. 9-11 fused those three developments, though each tendency retained its ‘sphere of action’: Right and Left appear to have forged an historically effective ideology of global intervention, an enduring new configuration of power. This paper analyses a key liberal interventionists' initiative – the Princeton Project on National Security – that sits at the heart of thinking among centrists, liberal and conservative alike. This paper also assesses the efficacy of the new consensus by exploring the foreign policy positions and advisers of President-elect Barack Obama and his defeated Republican rival, Senator John McCain, concluding that the new president is unlikely significantly to change US foreign policy.

The Whisper in the Leader's Ear: How Do Foreign Policy Advisers Perform their Job?

This study seeks to identify the factors that determine advisers' choice of tools and assess their influence under different circumstances. It uses historical process tracing methods to examine the `battle' between President Truman's foreign policy advisers over the formulation of US policy towards the Palestine question. It finds that: (1) advisers' self-perception determines the degree of their flexibility in the choice of tools; (2) the distribution of formal powers, the personalities involved and the type of policy question determine the intensity of the advisory battle; (3) non-expert advisers can win the advisory battle by using psychological tools of persuasion but only under certain specific conditions, which existed in this case; and finally that (4) an adviser's influence will be limited by the extent to which the leader is willing and able to independently form an opinion on the policy question.

Presidential Foreign Policy Advisers’ Panel

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