Transforming the Soviet Sphere of Influence? U.S.-Soviet Détente and Eastern Europe, 1969-1976

Abstract

The release of the joint volume, Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969–1972, by the Historian's Office at the State Department and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has raised anew the question of whether Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, and especially their main foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, “accepted Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.” Several reports to Moscow by Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin regarding his back-channel conversations with Kissinger and Nixon seem to suggest such a possibility. This has led Kissinger to question the accuracy of Dobrynin's reports in his preface to the joint volume. Kissinger writes, “From the beginning of the Nixon Administration, Dobrynin sought, obviously on Moscow's instruction, acceptance of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. … That assurance was never given with respect to the internal conditions in Eastern Europe, as is shown by the repetitiveness with which Dobrynin asked for it.”1 Nevertheless, a close reading of the U.S. record confirms the accuracy of Dobrynin's reports regarding Nixon's and Kissinger's statements on Eastern Europe. Moreover, they suggest that on most occasions, Nixon and Kissinger offered assurances on their own, without any prompting from Dobrynin. For example, on February 21, 1969, Dobrynin reported to Moscow Kissinger's remarks that the United States did not have “the slightest intention of intervening in the affairs of Eastern Europe.”2 Although no U.S. record of this conversation has been found, Kissinger reported to Nixon without comment Dobrynin's subsequent statement on March 3: “Moscow had noted ‘with due attention’ my comment at the previous meeting that the United States had no interest in undermining the Soviet position in Eastern Europe.”3 Similarly, Dobrynin reported President Nixon's comments to Moscow from a meeting on June 10, 1970: the United States “fully recognizes the USSR's special interests in Eastern Europe it … and does not intend to ignore or contest them. Among other things, that would be simply unrealistic, since the USSR has immeasurably greater capabilities and influence in that region than does the United States.”4 Although there is no U.S. record of the June 10 meeting, Kissinger once again reported Dobrynin's subsequent confirmation of the remarks to Nixon without any comment.5 Thus, if one were to accept Kissinger's implication in the preface to the joint volume—that the statements Dobrynin reported to Moscow constituted “acceptance of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe”—then the Nixon Administration accepted “Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.” The U.S. record basically confirms Dobrynin's reports.