Force Posture Research Articles

Irreconcilable Differences? NATO's Response to Russian Aggression Against Ukraine

With Russia's full-spectrum war in Ukraine, NATO is rethinking its force posture and responding in ways that are consistent with its norms and identity as an alliance. While the war has been framed by some as a vindication of structural realism, we instead revisit constructivist arguments about security communities. This literature, which foregrounds learning and socialization processes, advanced scholarly and policy debates from NATO enlargement to defence sector reform. By contrast, how security communities engage with adversaries has received less attention. Noting the obvious balancing dynamics on display, we emphasize how threats take on particular meanings, which shape the types of military options considered. We also provide an explanation for NATO's resilience in the face of this external shock. Alliance disunity notwithstanding, we argue that collective defence is being redefined in real time, through dynamics that are not exclusively bound by a narrow focus on the military threat posed by Russia.

When Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Adversary Perceptions of Nuclear No-First-Use Pledges

Abstract The United States has repeatedly debated whether to adopt a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) pledge. Advocates for such a pledge emphasize its potential advantages, including strengthening crisis stability, decreasing hostility, and bolstering nonproliferation and arms control. But these benefits depend heavily on nuclear-armed adversaries finding a U.S. NFU pledge credible. A new theory based on the logic of costly signals and tested on evidence from NFU pledges by the Soviet Union, China, and India suggests that adversaries perceive such pledges as credible only when: (1) the political relationship between a state and its adversary is already relatively benign, or (2) the state's military has no ability to engage in nuclear first use against the adversary. Empirically, these conditions rarely arise. More typically, hostile political relations combined with even latent first-use capabilities lead adversaries to distrust NFU pledges and to assume the continued possibility of being subject to first use. The implication is that changes to U.S. declaratory policy alone are unlikely to convince adversaries to disregard the prospect of U.S. nuclear first use without changes in these countries’ political relationships or U.S. nuclear force posture. The beneficial effects of an NFU pledge are therefore likely to be more minimal than advocates often claim.

Effect of changing threat conditions on police and military commanders’ preferences for urgent and offensive actions: An analysis of decision making at the operational level of war

ABSTRACT A simulation was conducted to examine the decision making of 102 high-ranking police and military commanders (male/female = 88/12, mean years of employment = 22.15) engaged in a simulated hybrid attack on Norway. Four 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA tests were performed, with two groups (police, military) and three phases (peace, war, and post-conflict) as independent variables. The decision tasks of force posture and mission urgency, along with Subject Matter Expert (SME) ratings of decision-making performance, served as dependent variables. By using social cognitive theory as the theoretical framework, the analysis demonstrated within-group effects indicating how the transition from peace to war caused more offensive postures, higher urgency levels, and increased performance in wartime. Between-group differences were also found, illustrating that police commanders had higher levels of urgency than military commanders in general. Regarding force posture, within-group differences were only found in the post-conflict phase, when police commanders returned to pre-war levels, while military commanders showed less offensive postures than in peacetime. No significant between-group differences were found in decision-making performance. The analysis demonstrated new empirical findings about how crisis management is impacted by change and the backgrounds of those in charge. The findings have implications for designing interagency frameworks that improve police-military interoperability in collaborative efforts.

Usability of an Intelligent Sit-Stand Desk in Office Teleworkers

Office work often results in long bouts of time spent sitting without moving, accumulating prolonged static posture (PSP), which might cause musculoskeletal discomfort (MSD). Although sit-stand desks (SSD) allow posture changes, employees do not use them sustainably. In order to automate posture adjustments, an intelligent SSD with an interactive system (iSSD) was created. This study assessed the impact of the iSSD on postural hygiene and explored the user experience. Ten office employees working remotely from home (teleworkers) used the iSSD with (phase B) and without (phase A2) automation. The usage data of the iSSD was measured daily by sensors. We assessed MSDs and working conditions through questionnaires. Semi-structured interviews evaluated participants’ satisfaction. Results showed a 29% decrease in sitting time and absent PSP for phase B. Subsequently, in phase A2, the sitting time returned close to baseline values. Questionnaires reported MSD alleviation and stability of working conditions. Interviews confirmed automation’s benefits for maintaining postural hygiene. Findings suggest that an interactive system can facilitate SSD adoption and promote postural hygiene at the office. HIGHLIGHTS We added an interactive system to a usual sit-stand desk to force posture change. We tested iSSD usability by teleworkers through data tracked by the system sensors. We conducted qualitative interviews to assess participants’ satisfaction with iSSD. Using an iSSD could help office workers reduce prolonged static postures. Participants appreciated automated posture changes imposed by the interactive system.

Revisiting the Global Posture Review: A New U.S. Approach to European Defense and NATO in a Post-Ukraine War World

This article revisits the 2021 Global Posture Review’s determination for a status quo European force posture in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Considering the poor Russian performance and attrition in the war, and the likely frozen conflict that will emerge, the article lays out the process by which the United States can draw down its permanent presence in Europe to refocus on the Pacific and restructure its relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all while maintaining alliance unity. The article has two main recommendations. The first is a time line for a reduced U.S. force posture in Europe from the present to 2035 while placing more emphasis on a European role in NATO leadership. The second is focused on how to maintain strategic flexibility while reassuring NATO allies of U.S. commitment. It then identifies and provides mitigations for the anticipated risks associated with the recommendations.

THE CONCEPT OF DEFENSE PLANNING IN BUILDING THE MILITARY FORCE POSTURE OF INDONESIAN MARINE CORPS

The objective of this study is analyzing the Concept of Defense Planning in Building the Military Force Posture of Indonesian Marine Corps (IDMC). The methodology used is qualitative research with descriptive approach. The result of study shows that several constraints exist in defense planning, such as, personnels welfare and professionalism, varieties and inter-operability of weaponry, deterrence aspect, limited weapory, equipments, and training support, combat gears and equipments which are mostly in their maximum years of service, weaponry technology, and budget support. The concept of defense planning in building military force posture is an effort of the military in defining the objective, resources, and method of operation (strategy) necessary in reaching the objective of IDMC vision and mission. In implementing the vision and mission, IDMC establishes five-yearly strategic planning in the program of building the force posture, namely, the readiness of weaponry, non weaponry, facilities, facilities, and infrastructure, modernizing and enhancing the weaponry, facilities and infrastructure, as well as naval reinforcement which could support the main tasks of IDMC.

The Rising Security Challenge of East Asia's "Dual Graying": Implications for U.S.-Led Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific

executive summary: This article explains the impact of "dual graying"—the concurrent phenomena of rapid population aging and the proliferation of gray-zone conflicts—on the security planning and postures of Northeast Asian states and considers the implications of these trends in the broader context of Indo-Pacific demographics. main argumentThe major Northeast Asian powers (China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) as well as Russia are at the leading edge of one of the most consequential challenges of the 21st century: the rapid aging of their populations at a rate unprecedented in human history that is resulting in a shrinkage of their total population sizes. In addition to the graying of their populations, these powers face a range of new "gray" conflicts—interactions residing somewhere between war and peace—that exacerbate long-standing military concerns. Contrary to predictions that rapid aging will diminish the likelihood of interstate war, security tensions are rising among graying rivals in this region of the world, and states are increasing both military spending and military development. This "dual graying" underscores the need for new approaches to the U.S. network of regional security partners. policy implications• The rapid aging among regional powers does not so far suggest that an "aging peace" is likely to develop; rather, tensions are increasing over old and new areas of conflict. • The escalation of regional gray-zone conflicts is taxing U.S. allies and partners with graying and shrinking populations. Demographic changes in several of these major partners may necessitate a re-examination of roles and commitments within the U.S. alliance network. • Innovations in military and civilian technologies may eventually offset many of the challenges resulting from shrinking and rapidly aging populations, but in the meantime growing labor shortages will force many militaries to seek to adapt in other ways to maintain robust force postures. • In the wider Indo-Pacific, differential aging and population growth among major security actors suggests a growing role for several middle-power states (such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) that may benefit from a "demographic dividend" over the next several decades.

West Germany and NATO's Nuclear Force Posture in the Early 1960s (Part 1)

Abstract In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the member-states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debated whether a counterforce capability of hundreds of mobile medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) under joint command in Europe was needed to reinforce U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The conventional wisdom about this issue, echoing the official U.S. government position, has long been that deterrence was robust even without a joint missile force. According to this argument, U.S. policymakers tried to reassure NATO allies, particularly the West Germans, that sharing control of strategic nuclear weapons was unnecessary and unwise. The analysis presented here shows that the problem was not so straightforward. Many officials in NATO countries, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), viewed the MRBM debate not so much as a problem of nuclear weapons control but as a question of extended deterrence credibility and strategic stability, posing an all-or-nothing challenge to NATO.

Supporting African Partner States Through European Military Assistance Programmes

As the West debates defence spending to counter China and Russia, an affordable approach for constructive influence is possible through advising missions that create Sustainable Development Engineering Corps (SDECs) in militaries throughout Africa. Through interviews and surveys of defence officials, Nils Zimmermann, Ivor Wiltenburg and Jahara Matisek find strong support for using European militaries for cost-effective contributions to Western global force posture by creating and deploying advisor units focused on helping African partner militaries establish SDECs. ◼

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Strategic Substitution: China's Search for Coercive Leverage in the Information Age

Abstract China's approach to gaining coercive leverage in the limited wars that it has planned to fight against nuclear-armed adversaries differs from the choices of other states. A theory of strategic substitution explains why China relied on threats to use information-age weapons strategically instead of nuclear threats or conventional victories in the post–Cold War era. Information-age weapons (counterspace weapons, large-scale cyberattacks, and precision conventional missiles) promise to provide quick and credible coercive leverage if they are configured to threaten escalation of a conventional conflict using a “brinkmanship” or “calibrated escalation” force posture. China pursued information-age weapons when it faced a leverage deficit, defined as a situation in which a state's capabilities are ill-suited for the type of war and adversary that it is most likely to fight. China's search for coercive leverage to address those defi- cits became a search for substitutes because its leaders doubted the credibility of nuclear threats and were unable to quickly redress a disadvantage in the conventional military balance of power. A review of original Chinese-language written sources and expert interviews shows that China pursued a coercive cyberattack capability to address a leverage deficit after the United States bombed China's embassy in Belgrade in 1999. China's low dependence on information networks shaped its initial choice of a brinkmanship posture for large-scale offensive cyber operations. China switched to a calibrated escalation posture in 2014, following a dramatic increase in its vulnerability to cyberattacks.

Rising Strategic Instability and Declining Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia – A Pakistani Perspective

India and hence modifies their strategic priorities. The prevailing security dynamics in the region, such as changing nature of conflicts, introduction of new technologies, evolving deterrent force postures, and suspension of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), have increased states’ reliance on arms build-up and decreased their inclination to arms control and disarmament. This paper offers a Pakistani perspective on how the prevailing regional environment seems less favorable to nuclear disarmament and more inclined to deterrent force modernization. To explain the above rationale, this study takes guidance from primary and secondary sources to assess disarmament challenges, and discusses the prospects for creating a new security environment in the region to promote a renewed consensus on nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear Posture and Technology Trends in South Asia and Ways Ahead

The dynamics of nuclear posture and weapons technology development in South Asia are diverse and rapidly shifting. Without real measures to manage these, the situation can spiral out of control. Threat perceptions and misperceptions among the leadership of South Asian nuclear weapon states affect doctrinal and force posture shifts in the nuclear domain. Moreover, third parties play an increasingly important role in these dynamics. There is an impetus for creating and implementing risk reduction and arms control measures to address these various factors and their impact on nuclear posture and technology development. Keywords: South Asia, nuclear weapons, strategic stability, arms control, nuclear proliferation, emerging technologies

The Hybridisation of Conflict: A Prospect Theoretic Analysis

Revisionist actors are increasingly operationalising a broad number of non-violent threats in their quest to change the status quo, popularly described as hybrid conflict. From a defensive point of view, this proliferation of threats compels nations to make difficult choices in terms of force posture and composition. We examine the choice process associated with this contemporary form of state competition by modelling the interactions between two actors, i.e., a defender and a challenger. As these choices are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, we study the choice from the framework of prospect theory. This behavioural–economic perspective indicates that the defender will give a higher weight and a higher subjective value to conventional threats, inducing a higher vulnerability in the domain of hybrid deterrence. As future conflict will increasingly involve choice dilemmas, we must balance threats according to their probability of occurrence and their consequences. This article raises awareness regarding our cognitive biases when making these choices.

HEDGEMONY: A Wargame to Evaluate Senior Joint Professional Military Education Learning Objectives

The Officer Professional Military Education Policy directs Joint professional military education institutions to develop officers who demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s intent is to develop strategically minded officers who will “creatively apply military power to inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change.”1 The wargame Hedgemony is unlike most other wargames. Its focus is on teaching defense professionals how strategies are a complex interaction between force development, force posture, and force employment. Hedgemony also provides a way in which the Marine Corps War College measures its program outcomes.

All About Access: Solving America’s Force Posture Puzzle

The Biden administration has promised to revise US global force posture and alter the vast constellation of overseas forces, bases, and capabilities that underpin America’s ability to deter adversa...

The Biden Administration’s First Year in the Indo-Pacific: Balancing, Order-Building and Managing Competition with China

The Biden administration’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific is driven by three major endeavors: balancing, order-building, and management of competition with China. The US is currently enhancing its balancing act by leveraging its alliance with Australia epitomized by AUKUS and the Enhanced Force Posture Cooperation launched by AUSMIN. Order-building advanced by the Quad is promoting three functions: regional public goods provision, mutual resilience enhancement, and standard-setting for critical and emerging technologies. The Biden administration is attempting to pursue “responsible competition” with China, but its ultimate goals remain undefined. Based on these observations, the article will conclude by pointing out major tasks that lie ahead for the Biden administration in these areas.

UNFCCC's posture on displacement riskification: Conceptual suggestions

This paper poses the question of whether the discussions within Task Force on Displacement (Task Force) meetings contribute to conceptualisation and riskification of climate-related displacement and slow-onset events. Arguing that the Task Force undertakes displacement riskification, the paper ascertains whether the discussions might be a cue for pinpointing the Task Force's posture on riskification of climate-related displacement. Centring on the Task Force's main mandate, the paper explains displacement riskification through discourse analysis of Task Force's discussions. Discourse analysis of policy statements showed that climate-related displacement and slow-onset events appear to be gaining purchase as part of the FCCC's climate diplomacy strategy because they are explicitly debated at Task Force meetings. The paper finds that the discussions made contributions, but are currently not being incorporated through statements that are reported to the Conference of Parties (COP) – the manager of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). And finds that statements on and framings of displacement riskification may be considered definitive upon approval by the COP. The catch is that most security framings that can be found in the discussions within Task Force meetings has been poorly addressed at the COP mainly because the framings are largely absent in the Task Force reporting to the COP. These contributions/findings underpin the type of political knowledge mostly advanced and thus the likelihood of future directions of riskification politics by the Task Force.

The populist challenge to European defense

ABSTRACT This article assesses the consequences and implications of the rise of European populist parties for European defense cooperation. Focusing on six of the most prominent populist parties in Europe today, we examine their positions along three important defense-related issues: recommended national force posture; integrated military forces; and main national security threats. To determine their position on these three issues, we examine every party manifesto and, if available, official party document on security and defense policy since 2010. We argue that the rise of populism in Europe does not represent an inflection point for the future of European defense cooperation. Instead, our analysis reveals the following three findings: European defense cooperation will continue to be essentially ad hoc, functionally driven, and issue specific; populist parties’ attitudes and preferences regarding European defense cooperation both overlap with and diverge from those of other populists and non-populists in the EU; and populism over time may contribute to a shift in domestic preferences toward a Europe that more readily embraces military power.

A Military Drawdown in Germany? US Force Posture in Europe from Trump to Biden

The Biden administration has promised to revitalize a transatlantic alliance that has experienced much strain during Donald Trump’s presidency. Trump’s focus on strategic competition with China, eq...