Fisheries Subsidies Research Articles

What Changes Should be Made by China under Article 20.16 of CPTPP

For the first time, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) presents the series of environmental provisions as a separate chapter in a multilateral economic and trade agreement. This chapter deals with specific areas of environmental protection. Article 20.16 of the CPTPP is about marine capture. This article contains requirements for fisheries management systems of the contracting Parties, restrictions on illegal, unreported and unregulated Fishing (IUU fishing), and prohibitions and modifications of fishery subsidies granted by the contracting Parties. China is the largest fishing nation in the world, so Article 20.16 of the CPTPP will have a significant impact on China if China successfully joins the CPTPP after its application in September 2021. The issue of legal convergence is particularly important currently. WTO has passed the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, reaching an agreement on the issues such as the identification of IUU fishing and fishery subsidies based on Special and Differential Treatment. However, there are still several additional provisions waited to be negotiated, which China needs to keep working hard on.[1] In addition, although China has relatively domestic legislation in this area and has actively signed and participated in relevant international documents, it still lacks legal provisions on fishery subsidies and has not signed The Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels (Compliance Agreement). All of these will limit China's voice and basis for environmental provisions in bilateral free trade agreement negotiations. China should clarify the relevant concepts, improve its domestic legislation, accelerate its accession to relevant international documents and treaties, and upgrade its bilateral investment agreements in a timely manner.

World Trade Organization Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies

World Trade Organization Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies

Managing Externalities in the WTO: The Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies

Managing Externalities in the WTO: The Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies

Strengthening European Union fisheries by removing harmful subsidies

Harmful fisheries subsidies have historically contributed to fleet overcapacity and continue to be allocated to the fishing industry to artificially maintain its profitability. However, in this contribution we show that removing harmful subsidies and reducing overfishing will help to recover the resource biomass, subsequently leading to increased levels of sustainable catches, income and well-being of fishers, and reduces inequities in income and consumption when fish stocks are not effectively managed. Maintaining harmful fisheries subsidies is socially and economically inefficient. Taking the example of the EU fishing fleet, one of the largest fishing fleets in the world, we use the total factor productivity to show that small-scale fishing fleet's productivity is almost two-fold in the North Atlantic and 16% higher in the Mediterranean and Black seas compared to large-scale vessels. This result is explained because the harmful fisheries subsidies disproportionately allocated to large-scale vessels introduce distortions in the efficient allocation of inputs. With critical WTO negotiations ongoing regarding the global rules on fisheries subsidies, the EU must take advantage of the opportunity to lead a desirable transformative change while also supporting developing nations to truly achieve global sustainable and equitable fisheries.

Assisting Developing and Least Developed Countries in Legal Aspects of WTO Negotiations: A Case Study of the Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations

The Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) is an international organization charged with assisting developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs) in all legal aspects arising from the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Among its services, the ACWL provides, upon request, legal advice in WTO negotiations. The ACWL does not influence the political position of its Members or the LDCs. Rather, it confines itself to providing legal inputs that would enable its developing country Members and LDCs better to participate in WTO negotiations. In particular, the ACWL assists in drafting proposed legal provisions when a requesting government wishes to propose an idea. In addition, the ACWL conducts legal analyses of proposals tabled by other WTO Members in order to ascertain their potential legal effects were they to become part of the WTO covered agreements. In the context of the fisheries subsidies negotiations, the ACWL has made strides to become familiar with such areas as international law of the sea, fisheries law, and the legal aspects of sustainability and development in order to provide well informed legal advice to its developing country Members and the LDCs. Legal advice on the fisheries subsidies negotiations has, both qualitatively and quantitatively, become an important part of the ACWL’s work. Legal advice, WTO negotiations, fisheries subsidies, fisheries management, treaty interpretation, ACWL, developing countries, least developed countries

Influence of Fishery Subsidies on Fishing: Empirical Test Based on China’s Provincial Panel Data

Controversies surrounding fishery subsidy policies are widespread. Many stakeholders believe that fishery subsidies play an important role in ensuring the livelihood of fishermen. At the same time, fishery subsidies pose a threat to the stock of fishery resources and affect the sustainable development of fisheries. Based on the panel data of 30 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions in China from 2007 to 2017, the article empirically examines the influence of fishery subsidies on fishing. The results of the study show that China′s fishery subsidies are negatively correlated with fishing. On average, for each 1% increase in fishery subsidies, fishing will decrease by 2.9%. That is to say, in general, fishery subsidies are conducive to the sustainable development of fisheries. The results of heterogeneity analysis based on geographic location and economic development level show that fishery subsidies do not have a palpable negative influence on fishing in coastal areas or developed regions, whereas have an obvious adverse influence on fishing in inland areas or underdeveloped regions. The deterioration of the fishing environment and the natural environment explains the occurrence of this differentiation.

WTO FISHERIES SUBSIDIES NEGOTIATIONS - A BIG[GER] APPLIED PICTURE: mapping of the rules contained in the “Wills’ Draft” of 11 May 2021 against the progress of the negotiations and the reality

On 11 May 2021, the chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules, released a consolidated negotiations draft, accompanied by a comprehensive explanatory note. This is the first draft of the fisheries subsidies agreement, released to the public since 2008. The publication of the text greatly simplifies its analysis, which, before, was subject to important limitations due to the restricted character of the instruments (except for select member submissions). The purpose of this short paper is to offer a quick assessment of the ideas incorporated in the new draft, which currently serves as a background for the exchanges between technical experts and Heads of Delegations in preparation for the dedicated WTO Fisheries Subsidies Mini-Ministerial scheduled to take place in mid-July 2021.

Broadening the global debate on harmful fisheries subsidies through the use of subsidy intensity metrics

In line with Target 14.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations (SDGs), the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been tasked with achieving a multi-lateral agreement on eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies. Despite almost two decades of negotiations and increasing public attention, an agreement remains elusive. There are numerous roadblocks to these negotiations, but one key issue is that there is no clear metric for the potential scale and relative impact of fishery subsidies. As such, much attention has been targeted towards the provision of large sums of subsidies to industrial and distant-water fleets, and the subsidies provided by the largest subsidising countries—the top seven together provide over 65% of the global total. This large percentage justifies the focus on these countries but doing so alone and without understanding the context within which the subsidies are provided, may ignore pervasive impacts of subsidies unrelated to their scale, such as their inequitable distribution. Using recently available data and various scaling analyses we developed a series of different subsidy metrics in order to broaden our understanding of the distribution of fisheries subsidies. We show that different global regions and individual countries could be considered as ‘top’ subsidisers, depending on the metric used. This highlights a potential issue of focusing on the absolute amounts provided as a de facto indicator of harm alone, which can detract from efforts by developing countries to redirect their harmful subsidies towards better support for their fishers and industries. Failure to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies has ramifications across the SDGs and across global regions, regardless of the absolute amount of subsidies that are being provided therein.

WTO 수산보조금 협상 논의에 관한 고찰 : 제11차 각료회의 이후

The WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations, which began in 2001, have continued for 20 years due to disagreement among members states on the details of subsidies discipline. The consensus has been formed among members states regarding the necessity of regulation of fisheries subsidies, but there is still acute confrontation between members states regarding the details of how and to what extent to govern this. Following the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, the first draft fishery subsidy agreement

Effect of Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations on Fish Production and Interest Rate

We analyze the effect of fisheries subsidy negotiations on financial markets and aggregate demand in developed and developing countries. We examine the plausible scenarios that are likely to emerge in the event of elimination or reduction of subsidies, and the subsequent effect on the financial markets and the fish production. We use the Keynesian macroeconomic static framework, which is based on an extended well-known investment-savings (IS) and liquidity preference–money supply (LM) model for analysis. Our analysis shows that the impact of a reduction in fisheries subsidies would reduce the exploitation of fish and marine resources in developing countries, thus leading to a general increase in fish prices and quantity stabilizing at lower levels. We also find that this effect would transfer to financial markets, leading to a decline in interest rates for fish exporting developing countries, but interest rates tend to stabilize at higher levels for fish importing developed countries.

The WTO Reform Through the Prism of the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement – to – Be

Actively ongoing discussions shaping the WTO reform are aimed at solving urgent and systemic issues impeding both the functioning and the progress of the Organization and ensuring the relevance of the multilateral trading system in future. While a number of procedural and substantive suggestions were already accumulated, no big institutional decision has provided a reality check to the talks so far. A Doha Development Round issue, the dilemma of fisheries subsidization is a long-timer on the WTO agenda. Following certain reinforcement in Hong Kong (2005), yet stagnating thereafter, the subject made a return in Buenos Aires (2017). This time - largely due to the SDG 14.6, calling for the prohibition and/or elimination of certain forms of fisheries subsidies before 2020. Even though this deadline was extended [at least] till MC12, the fisheries subsidies agreement remains an only multilateral outcome expected for prospective delivery. The treaty-to-be could be viewed as a litmus paper for the WTO reform in several important respects, since the negotiators would have to find at least situation-specific solutions to the issues topping the agenda of the latter in order to reach a deal. As with other WTO subsidies disciplines, elaboration and implementation of the rules would heavily depend on transparency, which, so far, is crippled in the area, with notifications of trade-related effects of the fisheries subsidies being sporadic and, allegedly, incomplete. In the light of the ongoing discussions related to re-definition of development, it might be expected that a specific SDT approach would be espoused relying, to one extent or the other, on the fishing capacity or other indicators (national history of fishing subsidization; current volumes of subsidies granted; characteristics of the existent fishing fleet, etc.) or ability to implement particular disciplines, rather than on the development status as is. Particular ways towards implementing the SDT decided on should also be carefully considered. While discussions on the institutional aspects are not yet advanced, potential enforceability of the agreement via the WTO dispute settlement or, in alternative, ensuring its performance through other means, for instance, via a combination of transparency and deliberative mechanisms at the WTO, is to be established in the face of the recent AB demise. Finally, if reached, the agreement would explicitly open the door for the affirmative introduction of non-trade (in the present case – mostly environmental) concerns into the WTO Rule book, by shaping those as obligations, rather than exceptions.

Bridging a new concept of fisheries subsidies policy to support sustainable fisheries in Indonesia

Indonesia protested the policy of the WTO, which required the abolition of subsidies. Therefore, Indonesia, through the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs then attempted to roll out an exception to the WTO provisions. At the 11th Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the ministers of the member countries of the WTO agreed to accommodate the interests pursued by Indonesia to review the application of fisheries subsidies. This research then analyzes fisheries subsidies practice in Indonesia. Overall, the results of this study indicate that the policy of fisheries subsidies implemented by the government has not been planned with good policies and management so that the subsidy has an impact on overfishing, overcapacity or IUU Fishing. Therefore, the author initiated the Co-management of Green Fisheries Subsidy policy. The core of this idea focuses on the management of fisheries subsidies that support the sustainability of fisheries resources involving various relevant stakeholders. This idea uses seven principles which are then applied in the stages of establishing a policy of providing subsidies in each region based on the bottom-up principle so that the implementation of subsidies will be more effective and efficient based on the needs of each region. The author uses a normative juridical research method by examining library materials or other secondary materials. The author uses the literature study. The tools used are documents in the form of primary, secondary, and non-legal materials. The data obtained were analyzed qualitatively, then presented descriptively.

Remote reefs and seamounts are the last refuges for marine predators across the Indo-Pacific.

Since the 1950s, industrial fisheries have expanded globally, as fishing vessels are required to travel further afield for fishing opportunities. Technological advancements and fishery subsidies have granted ever-increasing access to populations of sharks, tunas, billfishes, and other predators. Wilderness refuges, defined here as areas beyond the detectable range of human influence, are therefore increasingly rare. In order to achieve marine resources sustainability, large no-take marine protected areas (MPAs) with pelagic components are being implemented. However, such conservation efforts require knowledge of the critical habitats for predators, both across shallow reefs and the deeper ocean. Here, we fill this gap in knowledge across the Indo-Pacific by using 1,041 midwater baited videos to survey sharks and other pelagic predators such as rainbow runner (Elagatis bipinnulata), mahi-mahi (Coryphaena hippurus), and black marlin (Istiompax indica). We modeled three key predator community attributes: vertebrate species richness, mean maximum body size, and shark abundance as a function of geomorphology, environmental conditions, and human pressures. All attributes were primarily driven by geomorphology (35%−62% variance explained) and environmental conditions (14%−49%). While human pressures had no influence on species richness, both body size and shark abundance responded strongly to distance to human markets (12%−20%). Refuges were identified at more than 1,250 km from human markets for body size and for shark abundance. These refuges were identified as remote and shallow seabed features, such as seamounts, submerged banks, and reefs. Worryingly, hotpots of large individuals and of shark abundance are presently under-represented within no-take MPAs that aim to effectively protect marine predators, such as the British Indian Ocean Territory. Population recovery of predators is unlikely to occur without strategic placement and effective enforcement of large no-take MPAs in both coastal and remote locations.

The Context of Fisheries Subsidies within the Trade Agenda – Developments to Date and the WTO 2017 Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires

Desde os anos 90, os fóruns multilaterais de negociações têm sido palco de discussões sobre a redução e eliminação de certos subsídios à pesca. O reconhecimento das distorções ao comércio e dos efeitos ambientais causados por este tipo de subsídio não foram, contudo, suficientes para as partes acordarem sobre regras de definições e determinações de subsídios. Com a adoção dos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS) em 2015, no âmbito das Nações Unidas, uma meta de proibição e eliminação de subsídios danosos foi pela primeira vez apresentada aos países. Este artigo descreve as principais negociações e proposições sobre subsídios à pesca com base em documentos oficiais e públicos desde a criação da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), passando pela falta de acordo na 11ª Conferência Ministerial desta Organização em Buenos Aires (2017), e desdobramentos até início de 2019. Since the 1990s, discussions aiming to reduce and to eliminate certain harmful fisheries subsidies have been taking place at multilateral forums. If the trade distorting effects and the environmental threats of these subsidies are no longer questioned, clear rules on definitions and determination of these practices have not been set giving divergences of approaches and interests of member States of the multilateral trade system. With the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015, within the scope of the United Nations, countries were firstly challenged with a clear target to prohibit and to eliminate types of harmful subsidies. This article covers the main developments on the thematic based on official and public documents since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and tackle the major proposals tabled in anticipation to the Organization`s 11th Ministerial Conference, in Buenos Aires in 2017, and its progresses until beginning of 2019. It also concludes that lack of technical cooperation and convergent interest made impossible for the Conference to drawn conclusive line under any sort of definition.

THE FISHERIES SUBSIDIES IN INDONESIA AND CHINA

The World Trade Organization (WTO) considers sustainable economic development. One of the regulations arranged is the unfair trade that several activities will be eliminated in the future, including the fisheries subsidies. The objectives of this research are (1) understanding the general descriptions about fisheries subsidies in Indonesia and China; (2) how large the impacts of fisheries subsidies that are linked with the policies; and (3) the opinion whether the fisheries subsidies must be stopped or not. This research use the literature studies from several sources and the supplementary data are also included to strengthen this study. Based on the result and discussion, the fuel subsidies are the largest fisheries subsidies in both Indonesia and China. Although the fuel subsidies are harmful and burden the government budget, the policy of subsidies is still needed, especially in the developing countries, including Indonesia. Those subsidies contribute the positive effects to the fisheries sector performance. On the other hand, eliminating fisheries subsidies, particularly the fuel subsidies, is expected to provide the negative impacts. For the policy, the government regulates the programs in the fisheries sector. There are two feasible schemes in the fisheries market in case talking about the fisheries subsidies with the aim of a trade policy tool and sustainability. The author does not agree if the fisheries subsidies stopped. The government must evaluate the subsidy policies that can be connected with the fisheries sector performance indicators and must still prepare state budget for fisheries subsidies, especially subsidies for small-scale household, such as fishers. The fisheries subsidies should be continued with applied terms and conditions, so the subsidies will be used wisely by the fisheries business actors and will be appropriately monitored by the government

Multifunctionality in fisheries and the provision of public goods

Multifunctionality is characterized by two key elements: the existence of jointly produced multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs (NCOs), and that NCOs exhibit the characteristics of public goods externalities. The term “multifunctionality” is almost not used outside agriculture. However, several issues discussed in fishery literature and in international contexts clearly refer to public goods provision and joint production. The key point is to recognize if fisheries, similar to agriculture, provide other (public) benefits beyond their primary food supply function. The paper establishes a theoretical framework for the classification and valuation of multifunctionality in fisheries, and outlines policy options to increase (through multifunctionality) social welfare. NCOs include: ecosystem- and biodiversity-related NCOs, other environmental public goods/bads, cultural heritage and coastal viability, coastal employment externalities, food security, and strategic benefits. The main NCO characteristics to be analysed are the degree of jointness between commodity outputs and NCOs, and the distribution of property rights over fish stocks and NCOs. Policy options to increase social welfare include, among others, command and control schemes, market based instruments (e.g., payment for ecosystem services), and marine protected areas. Customary marine tenure institutions, or other modern fishery organizations, may represent a framework for the communitarian provision of NCOs. Fishery subsidies, which can because of overfishing, are justified if they allow increasing social benefits, given by the sum of catch and NCOs value. Particularly, incentives may be necessary to support small-scale fisheries or other less efficient technologies.

The Estimation of Virtual Damage to Major Coastal Fisheries Based on Prohibition of Main Fisheries Subsidies

The Estimation of Virtual Damage to Major Coastal Fisheries Based on Prohibition of Main Fisheries Subsidies

The Concept of “Developing Countries” in the Context of the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiation

This paper explores the concept of developing countries in the context of the WTO DDA fisheries subsidies negotiations. It raises a question whether the concept of developing countries that is widely used in other WTO agreement should be applicable to the new disciplines on fisheries subsidies. In order to address the question, this paper outlines the history of the DDA fisheries subsidies negotiations and discusses the goal of fisheries subsidies negotiations. Then, it presents the concept of developing countries in the GATT, the WTO and other international institutions, and finds that it is almost exclusively based on economic indicators. Then, it reviews global fish production and the amount of global fisheries subsidies. On the basis of its analysis, this paper finds that, in order to achieve the proposed goal of the new disciplines on fisheries subsidies, and to strike a balance between the environmental and the developmental dimensions of fisheries subsidies, the concept of “developing countries” in the context of fisheries subsidies should be different from that in other WTO agreements. It should not include countries that have leading fishing industry for which the governments provide large amount of subsidies, in particular, fishing capacity-enhancing subsidies.

Trade and fisheries subsidies

Many renewable resource sectors are heavily subsidized and yet the resources are also seriously depleted. World Trade Organization members included subsidies in a key renewable resource sector (fisheries) in the Doha round of trade negotiations, which subsequently stalled. This paper develops a simple model to show why prospects for a deal on fisheries subsidies may be difficult. Typically international spillover effects create incentives among exporters to negotiate reductions in subsidies: one country's subsidy worsens other exporters' terms of trade. These incentives may not exist in fisheries for 3 reasons. First, open access fishery supply curves are backward bending and so if fisheries are depleted, subsidies raise prices (by reducing sustainable harvesting) and improve other exporters' terms of trade. Second, ecological constraints put an upper bound on sustainable harvesting. This means that subsidies that increase employment may have no effect on output and hence generate no international spillover effects if resources are well managed. And third, even if governments were compelled to reduce fishery subsidies, there may be no spillover benefits to trading partners because of policy substitution: governments would be motivated to weaken other regulations targeting the fish sector.

On the direction of fisheries subsidies programs in Korea under fortifying international regulations for fisheries subsidies

We propose some countermeasures needed to cope with fortifying international regulations for fisheries subsidies. The government should rigorously select the recipients of fisheries subsidies to ensure that they are not engaged in ineffective projects by resorting to subsidies. On the other hand, the government should make the individual applicant’s application for the subsidies easier by exempting them from the submission of a burdensome feasibility report. As for the strengthening regulatory international movements against the fisheries subsidies, we can consider the following countermeasures. One is not to designate and provide prohibitive subsidies in such a way that violates international norms. The other one is to reform the domestic fisheries subsidies system in Korea with the following points considered. It should be considered that fisheries subsidies, which can be categorized as the actionable subsidies, should not be granted to the items that can be exported but to the items that can be used for domestic consumption or processing. In the case of non-actionable subsidies, the subsidies are mainly allowed for promotion of public-sector research and development, regional development, and adaptation to new environmental regulations. Thus, the non-actionable subsidies should be designated in the consideration of the allowances for these activities.