Anglo-French planning to bomb Russian oilfields, and to insert a naval task force into the Black Sea for operations against Russian commerce, fleet units and installations, has often been noted but seldom in such a manner as to answer more questions than are raised by the discussion. What follows is an attempt to place such planning within the general scope of Allied policy on the brink of the precipice, and to explain why operations that once seemed possible, perhaps even probable, were never undertaken. Historically, Turkey and the Straits occupied a central position in British planning for war against Russia. The simple reason for this was that Turkey, as custodian of the Straits, could open the door into the Black Sea to the Royal Navy and, conversely, could close the Straits to Russian commerce. In 1939, such planning, from the viewpoint of London and Paris, seemed politically possible as, soon after the outbreak of war, Turkey had bound itself to Britain and France in a Tripartite Alliance, at least partly predicated upon Turkey's traditional fears of Russia fears greatly strengthened by the debacle of the Sara9oglu-Molotov talks in October. While these conceptions remained part of renewed naval planning in the event of war with Russia after September 1939, they were pushed into second place by other considerations as the Western Allies began to move towards a more aggressive posture following the Russian attack on Finland in November 1939: chiefly, the possibility of using Turkey as an air base for aerial attack on the Caucasian oil fields, and as a barrier to possible Russian counteraction. By the winter of 1939-40, such planning quickly progressed beyond the point where it was defensive and contingent and became increasingly offensive and driven by operational considerations. Throughout, the moving spirit
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