THERE IS A RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A NATION'S POLITICAL institutions and value it places on oratory. Some form of this maxim would have appeared a commonplace remark (and a locus of argument) throughout eighteenth century, and within context of political debate attempt to divorce oratory from a political or religious institution would have seemed unusual. The classical education of Englishmen who were prepared for the senate, bar, or encouraged them to view great oratory, among other arts, as indivisible from institutions; among ancient Romans, they judged, demise of oratory resulted from rise of luxury and degradation of senatorial virtue. (1) In eighteenth-century England, where democratic element of Commons supposedly balanced oligarchic and monarchic elements of Lords and King, connection between oratory and free institutions was played upon for sake of ideological support and liberally exploited by Whigs for purpose of political criticism. At same time, however, and often in reaction to this exploitation, eloquence was viewed as dangerous to free institutions because of its ability to rouse passions and put them under control of a talented speaker. (2) Fear of rhetoric went hand in hand with fear of complete subjection to democratic element and of tyranny that would inevitably result. From one point of view, therefore, it should seem strange (and eventually did seem strange) that William Godwin, long a partisan of parliamentary reform, would not seek it through democratic venue of public speaking, or at least approve of others' doing so. (3) From another point of view, it makes sense, however, that when in Enquiry concerning Political Justice (1793) he ended up proposing viability of a society without formal government, he should also discard public speaking with institutions which it would serve, in order to relocate scene of significant communication in private conversation. (4) Godwin's view of ars rhetorica harbors a further complication, moreover. (5) For while in 1793 he declared conversation medium of gradual reform, he also assiduously pursued his plan of enlightenment in public sphere of print journalism, venue open to private citizens who could use it to influence public decisions. This is an important choice, since he had earlier treated press virtually as a constitutional institution, as an extension of House of Commons' function of representing public opinion. To Godwin, not only press, but jury too had earlier constituted an important venue of public opinion, and it was not only not private, it was both traditionally a venue of authoritative public speaking and an institution deciding upon imposition of force. To be sure, value Godwin placed on press and jury in 1780S reflects his involvement with Foxite Whigs. The society without government he envisions in Political Justice, however, would integrate press into its new plan of education and would long preserve jury, to hear cases of violence against neighbors and property, before disappearing in final triumphant merging of private judgment and public good. This continuation of earlier views into later formulations is symptomatic of very rhetorical problem Godwin had continually to address: how to convince his audience that reform, even radical change, was possible. For, granted that in 1793 Godwin envisioned ultimate demise of parliamentary government and of entire legal edifice, yet if he wanted to effect this end gradually (and gradualness is a major component of his thought) what would he allow to carry over from old institutions, and how could old, rather than simply disappear, actually become something new? This question is intimately related also to his view of art of rhetoric, because it was originally in and for institutions of legislative assemblies and law courts that such an art was declared and described and (along with pulpit oratory) formed into stock of education in eighteenth century. …
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