On September 11, 2001, four passenger airplanes were hijacked from three airports on the east coast. Two of these planes collided into the 110-story twin towers of the World Trade Center ~WTC! in New York City, ultimately causing the collapse of both towers and several surrounding buildings. Another plane crashed into the Pentagon office building outside Washington, D.C. A fourth plane, whose intended mission is unknown, crashed in a rural area of Pennsylvania. Thousands of lives were lost in these various incidents, including passengers, building occupants, and emergency response personnel. This is a disaster unlike any other in U.S. history, and the intended and unintended consequences of this catastrophic event are only beginning to be understood. In the aftermath of the event, many turned to experts in the natural hazards and disaster field for answers. We contend that there is much to be learned from the existing body of natural hazards and disaster research, and given the unique nature of this event, many new questions to be explored. First, we discuss knowledge that can be applied from the field of natural hazards, and then we examine avenues for new exploration, both from a social science and an engineering perspective. For over 50 years, researchers, practitioners, and policy makers have worked to better understand the causes and consequences of natural and technological risks. While there has been less work in the field related to terrorist disasters, primarily due to our lack of experience with such events, much of the knowledge gained from a half century of disaster research is relevant in studying the events of September 11. In the social and behavioral sciences, we have learned to observe and document individual and group preparation for and response to ‘‘environmental jolts.’’ This documentation has led to a greater understanding of preand postdisaster risk and vulnerability, as well as human and organizational response. For example, we know that following a disaster, people tend to set aside individual identities and focus on the impacted community. The collective priority takes precedence over individual goals. Social and behavioral scientists possess the methodological know-how and have the research experience to enter the field and document human behavior following disastrous events. The events of September 11 provided a similar opportunity. In fact, the National Science Foundation and the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado sent over 20 social and behavioral scientists into the field to gather perishable data in the days and weeks following the attacks. Moreover, social and behavioral sci-