Participation Fee Research Articles

899PD - Association of Baseline Corticosteroid with Outcomes in a Multivariate Analysis of the Phase 3 Affirm Study of Enzalutamide (ENZA), An Androgen Receptor Signaling Inhibitor (ARSI)

ABSTRACT Background ENZA-proposed INN (MDV3100) increased median survival by 4.8 mo (P Methods Pts were randomized 2:1 to ENZA 160 mg/d or PBO, stratified by baseline ECOG & mean Brief Pain Inventory score (BPI). Efficacy endpoints included Overall Survival (OS), radiographic progression-free survival (rPFS), & time to PSA progression (TTPP). In a post-hoc analysis, pts were evaluated by oral daily CS baseline use. Using a stepwise multivariate Cox proportional-hazards analysis, associations between the OS and the prespecified baseline factors ( treatment [Trt], age, region, ECOG, BPI, visceral disease, number of chemotherapy regimens, progression type at entry, LDH, PSA, hemoglobin, alkaline phosphatase) and CS use were evaluated. Results 800 pts were randomized to ENZA & 399 to PBO. ∼30% of pts in each arm were on CS at baseline. Multivariate analysis showed baseline oral CS use was associated with the OS outcome, with median OS of 11 mo (95% CI: 10, 13) for pts on CS vs median OS not met (18, NM) for pts not on baseline CS (HR = 0.54; 95% CI: 0.45, 0.64)). Subgroup analysis showed for pts on CS median OS was 12.3 mo on ENZA vs 9.3 mo on PBO (P = 0.0116, HR 0.70) and for pts not on CS median was not met on ENZA vs 15.8 mo on PBO (P Results of Stepwise Multivariate Analysis of Overall Survival Variable Parameter Estimates HR for Death (95% CI) Coefficient P-value Treatment (ENZA vs PBO) -0.54 ± 0.090 0.58 (0.49-0.70) Mean pain score: -0.25 ± 0.098 0.0091 0.78 (0.64-0.94) Progression at study entry: PSA only vs radiographic -0.35 ± 0.094 0.0002 0.70 (0.59-0.85) Visceral disease at screening (No vs Yes) -0.42 ± 0.097 0.66 (0.54-0.80) Baseline hemoglobin -0.03 ± 0.003 0.97 (0.97-0.98) Baseline lactate dehydrogenase (LDH) 0.002 ± 0.000 1.002 (1.001-1.002) Baseline corticosteroid use (No vs Yes) -0.62 ± 0.091 0.54 (0.45-0.64) 1. Survival for pts who had not died by the time of analysis was censored at the date the pt was last known to be alive. 2. confidence interval Conclusions Use of CS at baseline was associated with reduced OS in the multivariate model. This finding should be further explored in future studies. While pts on baseline CS had worse outcomes, ENZA was consistently superior to PBO on OS, rPFS, and TTPP regardless of baseline CS use. Disclosure H.I. Scher: Consultant/Advisor Amgen, Aragon, BMS, Dendreon, Exelixis, Foundation, Janssen, J & J, MDV, Millennium, Novartis, Ortho Biotech, Sanofi Aventis. Research support from Aragon, BMS, Exelixis, Medivation, Orthobiotech & Veridex, F. Saad: Grants: Astellas; Consulting fee or honorarium: Astellas, Medivation, Johnson & Johnson; Board membership: Medivation, Astellas, Johnson & Johnson. M. Taplin: Consulting fee or honorarium: Medivation, JNJ, Tokai; Support for travel to meetings for the study or other purposes: Medivation; Travel/accomodations/meeting expenses unrelated to activities listed: JNJ, Tokai. C.N. Sternberg: Consultancy fee or honorarium: Johnson & Johnson, Astellas, Amgen, Sanofi-Aventis. A.J. Armstrong: Consultancy: Amgen, BMS, Sanofi-Aventis; Grants/grants pending: Medivation, Janssen Biotech, Sanofi-Aventis, Imclone, BMS, Pfizer, Novartis, Active Biotech, J & J/Veridex, Dendreon; Payment for lectures: Sanofi-Aventis, Dendreon, Janssen Biotech, Amgen. M. Hirmand: Employement: Medivation; Stock/stock options: Medivation, B. Selby: Employement: Medivation; Stock/stock options: Medivation; Payment for writing or reviewing the manuscript: Medivation; Fees for participation in review activities such as data monitoring boards, statistical analysis, ent point committies, Medivation. J.S. de Bono: Consultancy: Medivation, Astellas. All other authors have declared no conflicts of interest.

Erratum to: Inhibition of mTOR in carcinoid tumors

Conflict of interest Dr. Simona Grozinsky-Glasberg serves as an invited speaker for Novartis and IPSEN. Financial disclosures for Professor Marianne Pavel: 1. Grant Institution Novartis 2. Consulting fee or honorarium Novartis, Pfizer, IPSEN 3. Support for travel to meetings for the study or other purposes Novartis 4. Fees for participation in review activities such as datamonitoring boards, statistical analysis, end point committees, and the like -none 5. Payment for writing or reviewing the manuscript None 6. Provision of writing assistance, medicines, equipment, or administrative supportNone.

Time as a Medium of Reward in Three Social Preference Experiments

We report results from three well-known experimental paradigms, where we use time, rather than money, as the salient component of subjects’ incentives. The three experiments, commonly employed to study social preferences, are the dictator game, the ultimatum game and the trust game. All subjects in a session earn the same participation fee, but their choices affect the time at which they are permitted to leave the laboratory, with decisions typically associated with greater own payoff translating into an earlier departure. The modal proposal in both the dictator and ultimatum games is an equal split of the waiting time. In the trust game, there is substantial trust and reciprocity. Overall, social preferences are evident in time allocation decisions. Received laboratory results from dictator, ultimatum, and trust games are robust to the change in reward medium, though there is some suggestive evidence that decisions are even more prosocial with respect to time than money.

Two-Part Tariff Lottery: A Means to Provide Public Good at the Social Optimum

Pure public goods provided by charitable organizations may be provided at the first-best level when the provision is financed by an appropriately designed lottery. If lottery tickets are sold using a two-part tariff, the level of provision of the public good is greater than when fees are not charged to participate in the lottery. Unlike [13] who asymptotically approach the first-best level of provision with an arbitrarily large prize, a Pareto efficient level of the public good is produced when participation fees for the lottery are set appropriately.

Outsourcing for Sustainable Waste Disposal in Lagos Metropolis: Case Study of Agege Local Government, Lagos

The challenge posed by the population growth of Lagos emanates from the need to effectively manage the several tons of solid waste that are generated daily. The state Government has contracted the solid waste collection and disposal to the private sector operators with the hope that a clean Lagos can be sustained at no extra cost implication to the government. This study was undertaken to appraise the performance of the private sector participation (PSP) in the state using Agege Local Government as the case study. The study which is exploratory employed the use of questionnaires to elicit information from two sets of respondents, the residents and the private sector operators. Based on the findings, the scorecard as rated by the households gives the PSP operators a pass mark showing a wide acceptance of their service. Also, there is a need for the re-organisation of their accounting system with a view to ensuring proper accountability of all money paid as PSP dues. The PSP too deserve some assistance towards the improvement of the welfare of their workers to enhance staff commitment. Government should facilitate payment of participant fees. Commensurate punishment should be imposed on defaulters per default period and based on the amount. Finally, the Government should open up more and not too distant refuse dumps and landfills as well as increase the fees payable to the operators.

ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS

This article extends antitrust analysis to two-sided markets in which a virtual monopolist competes with local bricks-and-mortar dealers. The discussion examines the market power of an Internet market maker as well as an Internet matchmaker. The analysis shows that equilibrium in a two-sided market can be characterized as a one-sided market in which transaction demand depends on the bid-ask spread of the central market maker. This allows for a straightforward extension of critical demand elasticity and critical loss analysis from one-sided markets to two-sided markets, with antitrust tests based on the hypothetical monopolist's bid-ask spread. Antitrust analysis of a one-sided market also carries over to a two-sided market with a matchmaker where antitrust tests are based on the sum of participation fees.

Hidden costs of control: four repetitions and an extension

We report four repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5):1611–1630, 2006) low and medium control treatments with 476 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool of students and demographics vary across samples. We largely confirm the existence of hidden costs of control but, contrary to the original study, hidden costs of control are usually not substantial enough to significantly undermine the effectiveness of economic incentives. Our subjects were asked, at the end of the experimental session, to complete a questionnaire in which they had to state their work motivation in hypothetical scenarios. Our questionnaires are identical to the ones administered in Falk and Kosfeld’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 96(5):1611–1630, 2006) questionnaire study. In contrast to the game play data, our questionnaire data are similar to those of the original questionnaire study. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, we report an extension with 228 subjects where performance-contingent earnings are absent i.e. both principals and agents are paid according to a flat participation fee. We observe that hidden costs significantly outweigh benefits of control under hypothetical incentives.

THE SECOND-PRICE AUCTION SOLVES KING SOLOMON'S DILEMMA*

The planner wants to give k identical, indivisible objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k+ 1)st-price sealed-bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option not to participate in it. This simple mechanism implements the desired outcome in iteratively undominated strategies. Moreover, no pair of agents can profitably deviate from the equilibrium by coordinating their strategies or bribing each other.

Economic juries and public project provision

Juries charged with evaluating economic policy alternatives are the focus of this study. The recruitment and management of juries is a principal–agent problem involving the design of incentive mechanisms for participation and truthful revelation of values. This paper considers a simple general equilibrium economy in which juries of consumers are used to estimate the value of public projects and determine their provision. The impact of participation fees on jury selection and representativeness, and on statistical mitigation of response errors, is analyzed. Manski set identification is used to bound selection bias and determine participation fee treatments that minimize welfare regret from imperfect jury findings.

National Survey of Interscholastic Sport Sponsorship in the United States

Due to cuts in educational funding in the United States, interscholastic athletic administrators have turned to corporate sponsorship to fund athletic departments. While the academic literature in sport management has extensively covered corporate sponsorship at the intercollegiate and professional level, the purpose of this paper is to examine the prevalence, nature, and importance of sponsorship to high school athletics in the United States. This paper identified factors that predicted the use of sponsorship, the amount of revenue generated from sponsorship, who is responsible for selling sponsorship, motivators behind not soliciting sponsorship, and the extent to which fundraising and participation fees are utilized to supplement athletic department budgets. The most common form of alternative revenue generation is fundraising (87% of schools followed by), sponsorship (57%) and participation fees (34%). One - third of schools reported using sponsorship in response to budget cuts, and over one - fourth solicited sponsorship to prevent charging participation fees. Results also indicated that while the majority of high school athletic departments solicited corporate sponsorship, administrators were cautious in the solicitation of sponsorship as evidenced by the small dollar amounts involved and overall impact on the budget, reliance on game program advertisements and facility signage to activate sponsorships, and a lack of outsourcing to sport marketing firms to sell the sponsorships. There is clearly room for growth in the interscholastic sport sponsorship market.

Employee Benefit Plan Language And Sponsor Misconception

The employee benefit plan marketplace is a multi-trillion dollar industry as measured by assets under management. Previous research suggests that even sophisticated plan sponsors and participants are uncertain about the details of their plan. The variety of fee types, (wrap fees, transaction fees, participant fees, and set-up fees) and the use of industry jargon can lead to confusion and misunderstanding. This paper is a case study of an actual deferred compensation plan. We examine the business law aspects of the relationship, particularly how the complexity of the product, coupled with the contract language, could lead to plan sponsor and participant misunderstanding.

WILLINGNESS TO PAY IN CHINA'S NEW COOPERATIVE MEDICAL SYSTEM

Household survey data from China is used to analyze the determinants of households' willingness to pay to participate in the New Cooperative Medical System (NCMS). Wealthier households, households with at least one member who has been treated as an inpatient, and households in counties where NCMS is already established are willing to pay more for the program. Households who carry other forms of insurance, however, have a lower willingness to pay for the NCMS. We also find that the participation fee could be increased substantially to increase the size of the risk pool while scarcely affecting participation rates. (JEL I1, O1, D1)

Prevention of sudden cardiac death by the implantable cardioverter defibrilator

INTRODUCTION; Sudden cardiac death or, as it is also called, a modern man's killer occurs a few hours after the beginning of the disease. Sudden death is the one that happens within an hour from the onset of the subjective discomforts regardless of the existence of any previous disease. According to modern statistics, 450.000 people die suddenly in the USA and 150,000 in Germany. CAUSES OF SUDDEN DEATH: The most frequent causes of sudden death are cardiologic or, in other words, a heart rhythm disorder such as ventricular tachycardia, ventricular fibrillation and bradycardiac rhythm disorder. All these reasons can be efficiently prevented by the implantation of the cardioverter defibrillators. IMPLANTABLE CARDIOVERTER DEFIBRILLATOR: In comparison with the already known medications, the defibrillator seems to be the most efficient in prevention of sudden cardiac death. This fact has been confirmed by large multicentre studies. The implantation itself is a routine procedure. It lasts about an hour and it often passes without any complications. The patient leaves the hospital a few days after the procedure. About 150 of these procedures are performed per year at the Institute of Cardiovascular Diseases Vojvodina. The Social Insurance Fund bears medical costs and the patient only pays the participation fee, which is symbolical if compared to the value and use of the device. Owing to this fact, this device is available to every patient thus making the efficient sudden cardiac death prevention possible.

On the design of sponsored keyword advertising slot auctions: An analysis of a generalized second-price auction approach

The generalized second-price auction mechanism is commonly used in research in the context of keyword advertising slot auctioning. The mechanism sets the clearing prices for advertising slots on a search engine’s Web pages such that the advertiser will pay what was bid for the next lower advertising slot each time their own higher-ranked hyperlink is clicked. It also assigns advertising slots in the descending order of advertisers’ bid prices. Those advertisers who bid the highest prices are given the most attractive sponsored advertising slots at the top of the Web page, where the click-through rates have been shown to be the highest. We explore several issues with this auction mechanism for the sponsored keyword advertising slot context. They include: the distributional assumptions for the click-through rate; sponsored keyword advertising slot valuation over time; participation and click-stream fees and the role of a two-part tariff; alternative advertiser bidding strategies; and the design goals of sponsored keyword advertising slot auctions. We draw a number of conclusions for theory and practice.

Keeping an eye on future: Medical tourism

Keeping an eye on future: Medical tourism

Is education the link between orphanhood and HIV/HSV-2 risk among female adolescents in urban Zimbabwe?

As the population of orphans grows in AIDS-affected settings, recent studies describe a heightened risk of HIV and sexual risk behaviours among adolescent orphans compared to their non-orphaned peers. This study explores the role of education in explaining the excess sexual risk previously documented among unmarried female orphans in urban Zimbabwe. School attendance and attainment were assessed by type of orphanhood, and for their association with markers of sexual risk (HIV and/or HSV-2 infection) among 743 participants drawn from a random sample of 15-19-year-old girls identified in a cross-sectional survey in Highfield, Harare, in 2004. Multivariable logistic regression was used to assess the role of educational status in explaining the higher prevalence of adverse sexual outcomes among unmarried orphans compared to non-orphans, adjusting for possible confounders. Double orphans had significantly lower educational attendance and attainment than non-orphans. Maternal orphans had higher odds of school drop-out, although this association disappeared when adjusted for recent mobility. Educational status was strongly associated with HIV/HSV-2 risk, but explained only a small part of double orphans' sexual risk and did not explain the HIV/HSV-2 risk of maternal and paternal orphans. High overall levels of secondary school participation and school fee assistance provided to vulnerable families may have reduced the schooling disparities between orphans and non-orphans in Highfield. However, further efforts are needed to rectify the schooling inequities that persist, while additional research is needed to identify other socio-economic and emotional factors driving orphans' sexual risk so that prevention and support programmes can meet the needs of this growing population.

A Two-Step Subsidy Scheme to Overcome Network Externalities in a Dynamic Game

Many goods have network externalities. When the number of agents possessing such goods is small, the agents may not gain sufficient utility from the goods. Agents then have an incentive to delay their purchasing decisions. Such delays have negative effects on the agents' utility, so equilibrium with delays is inefficient. We propose a method of resolving this problem using a two-step scheme with participation fees and subsidies. If this method is used, and certain conditions are satisfied, all agents purchase the good and the delay in equilibrium decreases.

大学におけるスポーツ施設サービスに関する研究：デンマーク コペンハーゲン大学のUSGのスポーツサービスに関して

A study of the sports facilities service at Copenhagen University in Demark revealed the following features. It is used fully by the class, the extension courses, and extracurricular activities, even though only a few sport facilities are available. USG (Universitetets og øvrige højere læreanstalters Studenter-Gymnastik) is an organization in charge of sports services as extracurricular activities of University students, and is a very unique example of utilization of a few sports institutions for many students more effectively.USG offers many sports programs, about 300 courses being offered in the main season. Therefore, USG uses facilities outside the school too. There are many teams for the beginners in a variety of sports, and this offers more students the chance do sports. Because the activity time in each seesion is 60–120 minutes, most courses can offer a lot of courses. Participating students are required to pay an admission fee, and also pay the participation fee for the course. There is a subsidy from the university in addition to these admission and participation fees. This capital allows USG to secures many trainers and to manage facilities adequately.

Antitrust and Competition in Two-Sided Markets

This article extends antitrust analysis to two-sided markets in which a virtual monopolist competes with local bricks-and-mortar dealers. The discussion examines the market power of an Internet market maker as well as an Internet matchmaker. The analysis shows that equilibrium in a two-sided market can be characterized as a one-sided market in which transaction demand depends on the bid-ask spread of the central market maker. This allows for a straightforward extension of critical demand elasticity and critical loss analysis from one-sided markets to two-sided markets, with antitrust tests based on the hypothetical monopolist's bid-ask spread. Antitrust analysis of a one-sided market also carries over to a two-sided market with a matchmaker where antitrust tests are based on the sum of participation fees.

Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach

In most experimental studies of tax evasion, participants are instructed that they may report any amount of income from zero up to the amount they actually earned or received. This amounts to an invitation to gamble. In contrast, real-world tax authorities unambiguously demand compliance. We develop two new settings for conducting tax experiments. Both involve an explicit demand for compliance. Thus, we can determine whether knowing that the experimental authority would regard evasion as wrongful disobedience will influence compliance decisions. We demonstrate that simply telling people that they are required to pay a “participation fee” analogous to a tax produces remarkably high compliance rates and less sensitivity to changes in economic variables than in the earlier experimental literature using invitation-to-gamble language. This suggests that many people pay taxes despite the financial attraction of non-compliance because they are strongly inclined towards obeying authority. Furthermore, we show that giving participants a week to make their reporting decisions at home without an authority figure physically present overcomes the inclination to obey for some people, significantly lowering compliance rates. However, the majority still complies, even after the audit rate falls from 25% to 1%, which would make non-compliance extremely attractive if it were viewed only as a simple matter of risk and expected return.