Fear Of Punishment Research Articles

Predicting managers’ choice of influence mode: The effects of interpersonal trust and worker attributions on managerial tactics in a simulated organizational setting

The present study examined the effects of induced trust on subjects’ preferences for modes of influence in a simulated organizational setting. Using an exchange model, the authors predicted that coercive measures would be preferred by managers over reward or persuasion in conditions involving nontrusted workers; that persuasion would be perferred when workers were highly trusted; and that in intermediate situations, managers would prefer the use of reward as an influence tactic. In addition, the effects of sex of subject and sex of worker on preferred influence mode were examined. Results indicate that managers tend to use coercion with low‐trust workers and persuasion with high‐trust workers. Similarly they tend to attribute external motives (e.g., fear of punishment) to workers who are not trusted, and internal motivations (desire to do one's best) to highly trusted workers. Managers in the present study did not discriminate on the basis of worker sex. In the discussion the implications of the interaction of trust and influence mode are explored, and the likelihood of the occurrence of an inflationary power spiral is discussed.

Japanese psychoanalysis and the Ajase complex (Kosawa).

In 1932, Kosawa visited Freud at 19 Berggasse, and submitted to him a paper entitled: 'Two kinds of guilt feelings, the Ajase complex. In his paper, Kosawa expounded his theory of the Ajase complex, rooted in Buddhist thought. He discussed the psychological peculiarity of the Japanese as evidenced by the acceptance of oral dependency toward the mother, the repression of the resentment at the mother and 'guilt feeling over being forgiven' and a need to make restitution for harboring this evil intent. This type of guilt feeling is quite different from the guilt feeling as a fear of punishment which Freud embodied in his theory of the Oedipus complex.

The Limits of Legal Realism

This article will address some criticisms of legal realism, primarily those of H.L.A. Hart, that have been unanswered in the literature and have appeared to discredit the realist approach to law. The article will also articulate what I believe to be more difficult problems with legal realism. Tags: Legal realism, positivism, judicial decisions, H.L.A. Hart [pg468]** Holmes launched the highly successful American school of legal realism with his remark that consists of prophecies of what the courts will do in fact. [FN1] Later writers amended this proposition to include all officials, since decisions by judges constitute only a fraction of authoritative decisionmaking. [FN2] In its heyday, realism stimulated many proposals for legal reform and social change; [FN3] it also alerted students of the law to the effectiveness of arguments appealing to values, even if such arguments were not to be found in the decisions of appellate courts or in other materials traditionally used in law schools. The liberating perspective on legal processes offered by realism can still excite students of law. This article, however, will not restate the tenets of legal realism or reevaluate it from traditional perspectives. [FN4] Rather, it will address some recent criticisms of legal realism, primarily those of H.L.A. Hart, that have been unanswered in the literature and have appeared to discredit the realist approach to law. The article will also articulate what I believe to be more difficult problems with legal realism. Thus I shall attempt first to give realism its due by extending it to the limits of its logic. I shall then explore whether that extension can carry us to a full understanding of or whether other limiting considerations intervene before that point can be reached. I. A Realist's World View A. Rules and Reasons 1. What the Puzzled Man Wants to Know The first step is to sketch a thoroughly realistic portrait of a legal system. Start with a person, call him K, who lives in any country in the [pg469] world. As he looks around, he notices that the public order is maintained by people who either wear official uniforms or who proclaim themselves, in some manner that the public recognizes and accepts, as agents of the state. These agents often have a license to carry firearms, and all of the agents constitute the firearmslicensing authority. Some wear robes and sit as judges; some wear civilian clothes and sit behind desks in government buildings. As a group they control various institutions that have the power to investigate facts, to confiscate property, to question, arrest, incarcerate, and (in certain cases) execute citizens, and to engage in other forceful acts without fear of punishment from any higher or stronger group within the same territory. These agents of the state may be called officials or hirelings or co-conspirators. Since they control the physical power of the state, K naturally would like to know how to conduct his affairs so that the officials will not oppose, and perhaps will even cooperate with, his plans. These state officials are characteristically present in any modern nation. They may have just

Morality and Egoism

In every society there are certain rules which its members are expected to observe, certain ways of behaving and attitudes of mind which are commonly and officially praised or blamed, and classified as virtues or vices. This practice of requiring or banning certain types of action and praising or blaming certain dispositions of character I shall call the morality of the society. Morality in this sense imposes some restraints upon the operation of self-interest, requiring the members of the society sometimes to behave to their own disadvantage in order to carry out a rule or exercise a virtue. Obedience to the demands of morality will be enforced by penalties of various kinds. But I do not count a rule as belonging to the morality of a society if obedience to it depends mainly on the fear of penalties imposed by a minority of powerful persons. Moral rules and ideals are those which have the general support of the members, in that most of them are in favour of these rules being obeyed and these ideals pursued. Since morality depends on common consent, and is derived from the opinions and attitudes of the members in general, every member is entitled and expected to contribute towards defining and eliciting moral conduct by forming and expressing opinions about right and wrong. Such opinions I will call moral judgements: that is, I shall mean by a moral judgement a judgement about the rules and standards which the members of the society should be required and encouraged to live by. I think this is one admissible way of using the words 'morality' and 'moral judgement'; I am not suggesting that it is the only one. A moral judgement in this sense-a judgement about the modes of acting, feeling and thinking to be recommended and enforced in the community-must conform to certain conditions of both form and content. Formally, such a judgement must either be general, taking the form 'If anybody is in circumstances of the kind X, he must behave in the manner Y, or it must be an application of some such generalisation to a particular case. For moral judgements are concerned with public standards, which can be formulated, promulgated, enforced, taught, learned, followed on principle or from habit without reflection. For a morality has the essential purpose of enabling men to trust one another by assuring one man of the way another man will behave. So of this sort of moral judgement we can say that whoever affirms it must be ready to agree that either the judgement itself or the principle of which it is an application should be a universal law-universal, that is to say, in the society in question. Of course, many philosophers have held that this universalisability is essential to moral judgements. My point is that this claim is not to be justified by reference to some a priori Idea of Reason, but by regarding moral judgements as concerned with standards that must be public, teachable and enforceable, and provide reliable expectations of the behaviour of others. There is of course no formal

Some observations on humor and laughter in young adolescent girls

Some of the functions of humor and laughter in two groups of young adolescent girls were studied. When humor was successful and giggling and laughter a pleasureful release, the material, spontaneous talk and jokes, resonated with current developmental tasks. Among them were those dealing with bodily changes, early relationships with boys, disguised masturbatory wishes, and ambivalent feelings toward mothers. Some cognitive aspects of joking are examined. Humor worked when frightening words could be reduced to familiar or diminutive ones. Humor failed when content was too "grownup": when the subject matter stimulated frightening fantasies of male penetration and damage and frightening images of the mature female body or fears of punishment.

Sex differences in moral internalization and values.

The subjects were fifth- and seventh-grade white middle-class children and their parents. The major moral internalization indices pertain to internal moral judgment, guilt intensity, and fear of punishment. The findings support the prevalent view that consideration for others is more salient in females. They also suggest, with considerable consistency (especially in adults) that moral transgressions are more likely to be associated with guilt in females and fear in males. No sex differences in internal moral judgment were obtained. Evidence was presented suggesting that the differences in children may be due partly to different discipline and affection patterns. It was also suggested that the results for adults as well as children might be explained by differential sex-role socialization as well as by increasing pressures on males over the life cycle to achieve and succeed, which may often conflict with concerns about the welfare of others.

Erfahrungen über die Beeinflussung der Sexualität durch Cyproteronacetat

Doses of 100-250 mg cyproterone acetate were administrated over a period of 6-18 months to 18 patients suffering from oligophrenia, schizophrenia or abnormal personality development. Most of the patients were hospitalized through commitment. The employed rating scale was developed by the authors especially for the purpose of the present study, and treatment was always performed with the consent of the patient, his tutor or ‘guardian’. Cyproterone acetate proved to be an efficient clinical, home or ambulatory treatment, provided that the patient collaborated with it. Fear of punishment was the main cause why sexual abnormal oligophrenes took cyproterone acetate, as a social conscience could not be expected from this group of patients. Neurotic patients showed also a good response to the treatment. They should, nevertheless, be additionally treated by means of psychotherapy. We recorded encouraging results with cyproterone acetate in schizophrenics suffering from sexual delusions as the main symptomatology. The development of a long-acting drug for long-term treatment of non-hospitalized patients would be of great interest.

The effects of communicating threats and promises upon the bargaining process

This study sought to examine the effects of communicating contingent and noncontingent threats and promises upon cooperation in a two-person game (Deutsch and Krauss, 1960). We have adopted Schelling's (1958, 1960) definition of threat and promise as a conditional commitment by the threatening or promising party (sender) contingent upon whether the other party (receiver) acts or fails to act as the sender designates. According to Schelling, a threat is a that punishment is contingent upon the other's behavior; conversely a promise offers a contingent reward. In the context of a bargaining process both warnings and promises are designed to control the behavior of the other party and can be viewed as different forms of social influence. The warning appeals to the other party's fear of punishment and relies upon credible deterrents, whereas promise appeals to his desire to obtain rewards and relies upon incentives. The warning or promise works by influencing the receiver's expectations as to how the sender will react. The social context in which warnings

The Struggle for Negro Testimony in California, 1851-1863

Research Article| December 01 1969 The Struggle for Negro Testimony in California, 1851-1863 JAMES A. FISHER JAMES A. FISHER Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Southern California Quarterly (1969) 51 (4): 313–324. https://doi.org/10.2307/41170257 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation JAMES A. FISHER; The Struggle for Negro Testimony in California, 1851-1863. Southern California Quarterly 1 December 1969; 51 (4): 313–324. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/41170257 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentSouthern California Quarterly Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1969 The Historical Society of Southern California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Inherent and Acquired Difficulties in the Administration of Punitive Justice

That there is a general and well-grounded dissatisfaction with the administration of punitive justice in America, I shall take for granted. It is, if I may say so, a condition, not a theory. The criminologist complains that whereas the fear of punishment does not restrain crime, it is none the less the chief reliance of law for protecting society; that whereas his science has shown the necessity of special institutions with expert management for many classes of delinquents, the legal theory of ideal equality before the law leads criminal law to consign all offenders to a common prison; that whereas he has “demonstrated positively that crime is a disease,” the law persistently deals with the criminal as a normal person. The sociologist complains that whereas the true purpose of punishment is protection of society, the basis of judicial punishment is revenge; that whereas the rights of society ought to be borne in mind continually, the law looks chiefly at individual rights; that whereas sociology has shown the necessity of study of the actual criminal, the law deals with him in the abstract and speculates over responsibility; that whereas the certainty, not the severity of punishment operates as a deterrent and protects society, the law provides for the latter and takes scant account of the former. The plain citizen who, without scientific investigation, knows only that he pays taxes to maintain prisons, courts, sheriffs, constables, police, and public prosecutors, complains that notwithstanding the enormous cost—said to amount the world over to $400,000,000 annually—society is not protected, crimes are not punished, and lawlessness is general.

Correction in Historical Perspective

A study of the changes that have occurred in our ideas of how to deal with offenders against the criminal law brings us into contact with one of the most fascinating and challenging aspects of social history, the history of punishment. It is, by and large, a sordid history; a record of our slow progress in finding effective means of reducing criminality by punishment; a record of much violence, brutality, torture, and indifference to human suffering, but also of charity, compassion, and honest search for methods of correctional treatment that will salvage rather than destroy those who are its objects. It is the purpose of this paper to attempt to disengage a few of the general trends that are discernible in that record and lay bare some of the conspicuous elements that compose these trends, especially since the Middle Ages. To the casual student of the history of punishment and of the reasons given for its existence, character, and myriad forms, it would appear that there are two noticeable purposes of punishment and that while they are different in kind, they are not always completely separable. One of these purposes is the protection and conservation of the social interests or values which have been injured by the offender. It is a mundane purpose, nowadays often designated, especially abroad, by the term of social defense. This protection is thought to be achievable by various means, such as (a) the extermination of the offender; (b) making him so fear punishment that he will commit no more crimes (deterrence); or (c) reforming, re-educating, or curing him by more positive methods. The second purpose is other-worldly, so to speak. It views punishment as being inflicted in order to save the offender's soul, this end being achieved by his repentance and atonement. Next, we must consider the human motives, wishes, and desires that have led us to establish and apply punishments that would effect the means and thereby achieve the purposes or ends thereof. Prominent among these motive forces have been (a) a primitive desire for vengeance or retaliation; (b) compassion with sinners *A.B. I915, LL.D. 1942, Augustana College; A.M. I9I6, Ph.D. I922, University of Pennsylvania. Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania. Member and Consultant, American Law Institute, Advisory Committees on the Youth Correction Authority Act and the Model Penal Code; Chairman, Governor's Commission on Penal and Correctional Affairs, State of Pennsylvania; Chairman, Board of Trustees, City Prisons, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Secretary-General, International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, 1950-51; Consultant, Swedish Penal Code Commission, 1946-47. Author, A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL MANUAL FOR THE STUDENT OF CRIMINOLOGY (1935), RESEARCH MEMORANDUM ON CRIME IN THE DEPRESSION (1937), CULTURE CONFLICT AND CRIME (I938), THE CRIMINALITY OF YOUTH (1940), PIONEERING IN PENOLOGY (1944), and numerous monographs, pamphlets, and articles on various criminological and penological topics.

Emile Picard, 1856-1941

With the death of Picard on 12 December 1941 contemporary science has lost a great personality. Charles Emile Picard was born in Paris, 24 July 1856. During his high school studies at the Lycee Henri IV (which was then known as the Lycee Napoleon) he excelled in Greek translation, Latin verses, historical studies, but decidedly disliked geometry, which, from mere fear of punishment, he learnt by heart. On the contrary, when at the age of fifteen, in the class of ‘Seconde’, he became acquainted with algebra, he was at once strongly attracted, a tendency which he kept throughout his scientific life. Two years later, however, attending mathematical classes, he was no longer a geometry-hater; his masters rapidly began to form a high opinion of him, and they had to overcome his mother’s hesitations to let him pursue a scientific career. He, like almost every young Frenchman of those days with a gift for science, had to choose between the Ecole Poly technique—tending to lead to engineering careers—and the Ecole Normale Superieure, which is devoted to pure science. He decided on the latter, to which he was admitted with the first rank: it is said that this decision was taken after a moving visit to Pasteur, where the creator of bacteriology spoke of pure and disinterested science in such a noble and sublime way that his young hearer was definitely convinced. Emile Picard spent at the Ecole Normale Superieure the three normal years from 1874 to 1877, and then received an appointment for a supplementary year as an ‘agrege preparateur’, during the academic year 1877-1878. Meanwhile, he had gained the Doctor’s degree with a thesis on ‘Applications of linear complexes to the study of space curves and surfaces’.

Cain; or, The Future of Crime

A VERY strong plea for the humanitarian and scientific treatment of the criminal. At the same time, the author's wholesale rejection of the death sentence for murder is a matter for considerable argument. He thinks that the deterrent effect of hanging is of small moment. Let him visit a few of the London bars and study the occupants, and say if fear does not keep some of them from taking the lives of their fellow-creatures. Why do racecourse gangs work in gangs? For one reason—because of the individual's fear of punishment and hope of avoiding it in the crowd. There is, however, much very good sense in the book, and the author's plea for the delinquent child is sound and his peep into the future of crime not far off what will be truth.

The Sanction of International Law

Every satisfactory definition of law implies a sanction. Some penalty must be imposed upon a law-breaker, to be exacted, in the last resort, by external power. Force, therefore, is vital to law as it is to war, though normally it plays a less obvious part. A felon who is brought up for trial, condemned, and sent to prison, is induced by force, or by the fear of force, to submit to the court and to punishment. The policeman and the warder are the instruments of external power by which he is constrained to obey.Force also supplies the most important incentive for securing obedience to law. It is true, as Maine pointed out, that for every man who keeps the law through conscious fear of punishment, there may be hundreds who do so as it were instinctively, and without a thought on the subject. But while this law-abiding spirit, which is characteristic of large sections of a modern community, owes its origin to a number of causes, perhaps the most potent of all has been the enforcement of law through long ages in the past.

Inherent and Acquired Difficulties in the Administration of Punitive Justice

That there is a general and well-grounded dissatisfaction with the administration of punitive justice in America, I shall take for granted. It is, if I may say so, a condition, not a theory. The criminologist complains that whereas the fear of punishment does not restrain crime, it is none the less the chief reliance of law for protecting society; that whereas his science has shown the necessity of special institutions with expert management for many classes of delinquents, the legal theory of ideal equality before the law leads criminal law to consign all offenders to a common prison; that whereas he has “demonstrated positively that crime is a disease,” the law persistently deals with the criminal as a normal person. The sociologist complains that whereas the true purpose of punishment is protection of society, the basis of judicial punishment is revenge; that whereas the rights of society ought to be borne in mind continually, the law looks chiefly at individual rights; that whereas sociology has shown the necessity of study of the actual criminal, the law deals with him in the abstract and speculates over responsibility; that whereas the certainty, not the severity of punishment operates as a deterrent and protects society, the law provides for the latter and takes scant account of the former. The plain citizen who, without scientific investigation, knows only that he pays taxes to maintain prisons, courts, sheriffs, constables, police, and public prosecutors, complains that notwithstanding the enormous cost—said to amount the world over to $400,000,000 annually—society is not protected, crimes are not punished, and lawlessness is general.