Reviewed by : Oliver Stuenkel, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, BrazilThe history of US-Latin American relations is, above all, shaped by the vast power asymmetry between the two, US-American dominance over its weaker neighbours in the South, and attempts by Latin American leaders to reduce the influence of the Colossus of the North. Indeed, in International Relations theory, large states are seen as decisive, while small and weak states are vulnerable and usually enjoy only limited autonomy. Most traditional analyses of the topic - ranging from Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano's famous text The Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent (1971), and American scholar Lars Schoultz's Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America (1998), to the works of Brazilian political scientist Moniz Bandeira - use this framework and generally identify attempts by the United States to dominate or weaken Latin America, framing the latter as an object or victim.In a new book on the subject, Tom Long questions this traditional approach, examining how Latin American leaders have been able to overcome power asymmetries to influence US foreign policy. Latin America Confronts the United States explores a series of moments in post-Second World War inter-American relations - foreign economic policy before the Alliance for Progress, the negotiation of the Panama Canal Treaties, the NAFTA agreement, and the growth of counter-narcotics strategies in Colombia - to show how Latin American leaders influenced Washington's behaviour.Aside from providing detailed and engaging historical accounts of the cases above, Long makes interesting points vis-a-vis the dynamics shaping asymmetrical relations between great and weaker powers, arguing Latin America has exercised more influence in US-Latin America relations than is normally understood.Long's first case describes Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek's efforts during the late 1950s to rally the region to obtain more development aid from the United States - a remarkable and often overlooked example of regional cooperation at a time when ties between Brazil and its neighbours were still incipient (it took another three decades before Brazil's president Joao Figueiredo would become the country's first head of state to visit Colombia and Peru). Long says while Latin American attempts to convince President Eisenhower to finance a new Marshall Plan failed, they set the stage for Kennedy's 1961 Alliance for Progress, which aimed to establish economic cooperation between the US and Latin America.The second case, perhaps the most remarkable, explains how Omar Torrijos, dictator of one of the hemisphere's smallest countries, shrewdly used postcolonial rhetoric and international institutions to convince the United States to hand over control of the Panama Canal, something US foreign policymakers were strongly opposed to at first. Comparing Torrijos's goals in 1972 with the final treaty signed in 1977, it becomes evident Panama attained most of its objectives, Long writes. Most importantly, the treaties eliminated perpetuity. Panama began seeking a full transfer of the canal by 1995. After more than five years of negotiations, Panama's fallback position of 2000 was accepted - a remarkable concession from the 1972 US goal of perpetual defence rights, or a 90-year extension. Rejecting traditional historical accounts, which point to US president Jimmy Carter's arrival as the transformative event in the negotiations, Long argues: that the treaties figured so high on Carter's agenda was a testament to a long Panamanian struggle to put them there (110). …
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