Getting hedging right: a small-state perspective

Abstract

Hedging is one of the more commonly used but least studied concepts in international relations. This essay conceptualizes hedging and operationalizes it to the alignment choices of Southeast Asian smaller states. I define hedging as insurance-seeking behavior under situations of high uncertainty and high stakes, where a rational state avoids taking sides and pursues opposite measures vis-à-vis competing powers to have a fallback position. I argue that while Washington and Beijing understandably dislike small-state hedging, they both overlook that it is the uncertainties stemming from their actions that push the weak to hedge. As uncertainties deepen, the non-great powers in Southeast Asia—as elsewhere—are compelled to hedge one way or another, even as the space to hedge is shrinking. Hedging is not a panacea and it entails its own problems. But acting out of their survival instincts, smaller states opt to hedge for as long as conditions compel. Unless US–China rivalry escalates into a direct conflict, or unless strategic certainty prevails, e.g., if Washington retreats or reduces its long-term commitment to Asia—raising certainty about the absence of a reliable aligned support—then states will stop hedging and start bandwagoning with China; or if Beijing’s actions directly threaten most actors on all major fronts—heightening certainty about an imminent, across-the-board danger—then hedging will be replaced by balancing against China. Short of that, hedging is likely to persist, making ambiguities a defining theme of our time.