Factual Conditionals Research Articles

How people think about possibilities

Hypothetical thinking is an extraordinary human ability that allows people to think beyond the facts of a situation to imagine alternative possibilities. I first consider how people understand factual conditionals, such as, ‘if there was an apple in the fruit bowl there was a banana’, then how they understand counterfactual conditionals, such as, ‘if Pearl had studied harder she would have passed the exam’, and then how they understand counterpossible conditionals, that is, conditionals about impossibilities, such as, ‘ if people were made of steel they would not bruise easily’. I discuss the theory that people understand conditionals by envisaging models of possibilities, and consider experimental evidence that corroborates its predictions for factual, counterfactual, and impossible conditionals.

한중 조건문 영역의 차이 분석

Conditional is a universal category in human languages, but it’s usage in individual languages may be diverse. To describe the same situation, some languages may use conditional clause, whereas some languages may choose other forms. This paper focuses on the comparison of the conditionals in Korean and Chinese. According to the investigation, Korean conditionals is more widely used than in Chinese. This is because the two languages have different perspectives on specific categories. The differences are mainly on generic, temporal and factual conditionals. In Korean they are treated as conditionals, but in Chinese they use other semantic categories to express the same situation. Overall, Korean is a language that uses conditionals more flexibly according to context and speaker''s pragmatic intentions.

If and or: Real and counterfactual possibilities in their truth and probability.

The theory of mental models postulates that conditionals and disjunctions refer to possibilities, real or counterfactual. Factual conditionals, for example, "If there's an apple, there's a pear," parallel counterfactual ones, for example, "If there had been an apple, there would have been a pear." A similar parallel underlies disjunctions. Individuals estimate the probabilities of conditionals by adjusting the probability of their then-clauses according to the effects of their if-clauses, and the probabilities of disjunctions by a rough average of the probabilities of their disjuncts. Hence, the theory predicts that estimates of the joint probabilities of these assertions with each of the four cases in their partitions will be grossly subadditive, summing to over 100%. Five experiments corroborated these predictions. Factual conditionals and disjunctions were judged true in the same cases as their counterfactual equivalents, and the sum of their joint probabilities with cases in the partition ranged from 240% to 270% (Experiments 1a, 1b). When participants were told these probabilities should not sum to more than 100%, estimates of the probability of A and C, as the model theory predicts, were higher for factual than counterfactual conditionals, whereas estimates of the probability of not-A and not-C had the opposite difference (Experiment 1c). Judgments of truth or falsity distinguished between conditionals that were certain and those that might have counterexamples (Experiment 2a), whereas judgments of the likelihood of truth reflected the probabilities of counterexamples (Experiment 2b). We discuss implications for alternative theories based on standard logic, suppositions, probabilistic logic, and causal Bayes networks. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Explicit Conditionals in the Framework of Classical Conditional Logic

The paper proposes a first approach to systems whose language includes two primitives (>+ and >-) as symbols for factual and counterfactual conditionals which are explicit, i.e. that are stated jointly with the truth or falsity of the antecedent clause. In systems based on this language, here called 2-conditional, the standard corner operator may be defined by (Def>) A > B := (A >+ B)∨(A >- B), while in classical conditional systems one could introduce the two symbols for explicit conditionals by the definitions (Def>+) A >+ B := A∧(A>B) and (Def>-) A>- B := ¬A∧(A>B). Two 2-conditional systems, V² and VW², are axiomatized and proved to be definitionally equivalent to the monoconditional systems V and VW. A third system VWTr² is characterized by an axiom stating the transitivity of factual conditionals and is shown to be distinct from V², from VW² and from the 2-conditional version of Lewis’ well-known system VC, here named VC². The same may be said for a fourth system VW²◊ ±, based on an axiom inderivable in VC²: ◊(A >+ B) ⊃ ◊( ¬A >- ¬B). VC² contains what is here called a “semi-collapse” of the operator >+ and it is argued that it is inadequate as a logic for both factual and counterfactual conditionals. The last section shows that several different definitions of the corner operators in terms of >+ and >- may be introduced as an alternative to (Def>).

Sobre o estatuto e estrutura sintática das condicionais de se factuais do Português de Moçambique

Este artigo discute o estatuto e a estrutura sintática das condicionais factuais de se do português de Moçambique. Os resultados da aplicação de testes sintáticos às factuais mostram que podem ser integradas ou periféricas. Deste modo, são distintas das factuais de outras línguas, como o inglês, que são consideradas apenas periféricas (HAEGEMAN, 2003; BHATT; PANCHEVA, 2006). Do ponto de vista estrutural, as integradas ocupam uma posição relativamente baixa que é a de adjunção a VP e as periféricas, pelo contrário, posições altas na frase, em adjunção a CP ou TP (HAEGEMAN, 2003; LOBO, 2003). Para darmos conta das integradas antepostas, com base em argumentos empíricos, defendemos que são geradas por Move do interior do TP da matriz, onde são geradas, para a posição de especificador de tópico, por topicalização da oração adverbial condicional, na linha de Duarte (1987, 1996) e Valmala (2009), contrariando a hipótese de que são geradas por Merge (LOBO, 2003; IATRIDOU, 1991).

The Relation Between Factual and Counterfactual Conditionals.

What is the relation between factual conditionals: If A happened then B happened, and counterfactual conditionals: If A had happened then B would have happened? Some theorists propose quite different semantics for the two. In contrast, the theory of mental models and its computer implementation interrelates them. It postulates that both can have a priori truth values, and that the semantic bases of both are possibilities: states that are possible for factual conditionals, and that were once possible but that did not happen for counterfactual conditionals. Two experiments supported these relations. Experiment 1 showed that, like factual conditionals, certain counterfactuals are true a priori, and others are false a priori. Experiment 2 replicated this result and showed that participants selected appropriate paraphrases, referring, respectively, to real and to counterfactual possibilities, for the two sorts of conditional. These results are contrary to alternative accounts of conditionals.

Concessive and semifactual interpretations during reasoning with multiple conditionals.

The present research evaluates how people integrate factual 'if then' and semifactual 'even if' conditional premises in an inference task. The theory of mental models establishes that semifactual statements are represented by two mental models with different epistemic status: 'A & B' is conjectured and 'not-A & B' is presupposed. However, following the principle of cognitive economy in tasks with a high working memory load such as reasoning with multiple conditionals, people could simplify the deduction process in two ways, by discarding: (a) the presupposed case and/or (b) the epistemic status information. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we evaluated each of these hypotheses. In Experiment 1, participants make inferences from two conditionals: two factual conditionals or one factual and one semifactual, with different representations. In Experiment 2, participants make inferences with a factual conditional followed by two different semifactual conditionals that share the same representations but differ in their epistemic status. Accuracy and latency data suggest that people think of both the conjectured and the presupposed situations, but do not codify the epistemic status of either when the task does not require it. The results are discussed through theoretical predictions about how people make inferences from different connected conditionals.

Inherent directionality of “even if” counterfactual conditionals

ABSTRACTIn this research, we investigate whether semifactual conditionals such as “even if there had been an A, there would have been a B” are understood by thinking initially of the antecedent “A”, as was found with factual conditionals. The “inherent directionality” hypothesis assumes that for the comprehension of most relational statements, a presuppositional element (i.e. the “relatum”) is initially established. For “even if”, both terms could work as “relatum”. This is because on the one hand, people tend to infer “B” from “A” and “not-A” and, on the other hand, “B” could work as a pragmatic presupposition. In the present experiment, semifactual and factual conditionals were tested with a sentence-picture verification task. Results were consistent with the “inherent directionality” hypothesis: only “if then” factual conditionals, but not semifactuals, showed a preference for reasoning from the antecedent, with faster verifications.

Grammar and cognition: deficits comprehending counterfactuals in Turkish individuals with Broca’s aphasia

Background: Comprehending counterfactuals requires a well-developed cognitive system. Individuals with Broca’s aphasia have impaired cognitive functioning, which may affect their ability to comprehend counterfactuals.Aims: This study investigated whether cognitive complexity involved in counterfactuals adds to sentence comprehension deficits in Broca’s aphasia.Methods & Procedures: The sample consisted of 24 Turkish individuals with Broca’s aphasia (mean age: 52.7; SD: 12.7) who were matched in age with a control group of 15 neurologically intact Turkish individuals (mean age: 51.8; SD: 8.5). Each group completed a sentence comprehension task with three sentence conditions: nonconditional, factual, and counterfactual. Nonconditionals did not have if-embedding, whereas factual and counterfactual conditionals were morphosyntactically equivalent if-clauses, but only the latter was cognitively complex.Outcomes & Results: Conditionals were more difficult to comprehend than nonconditionals for the Broca group. Counterfactuals were more difficult to comprehend than the morphosyntactically equivalent factual counterparts for the Broca group. There was no discrepancy between test conditions for the control group.Conclusions: Individuals with Broca’s aphasia have difficulty processing counterfactuals due to morphosyntactic complexity (if-embedding) and the cognitive processes involved in comprehending counterfactuals. This indicates that cognitive complexity adds to sentence comprehension deficits in Broca’s aphasia.

The Probability Approach to English If-conditional Sentences

Users of the Probability Approach choose the right one from four basic types of conditional sentences—factual, predictive, hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals, by judging how likely (i.e. the probability) the event in the result-clause will take place when the condition in the if-clause is met. Thirty-three students from the experimental class received a 30-minute lecture on the Probability Approach between taking two conditional quizzes while 32 students from the control class did not. Averagely speaking, students who learned the Probability Approach were found to have scored 6 points higher in the second quiz than in the first quiz, compared with those who didn’t learn this approach. This finding proved that the Probability Approach was effective in helping students acquire the four basic types of conditional sentences.

Biscuit Conditionals as Disguised Conversations

Biscuit conditionals have been approached mostly with the theory of speech acts. This paper addresses them from a new perspective. The antecedent clause of biscuit conditionals can be paraphrased as a conversation that comprises an exchange of self-questioning and self-answering, and, under the conversational context, an implicature is drawn from the consequent clause which is characterized as conversational rather than as conventional. Albeit these apparent distinct characteristics, however, biscuit conditionals are parallel with factual and indicative conditionals once we view conditionals as a way to express epistemic modality and evidentiality. Biscuit conditionals seem peculiar at first sight in that they are abbreviations of otherwise elongated conversations, but must be understood as one of the prevalent information packaging strategies.

The Use of Conditionals in Korean College EFL Students' Writing

This study investigates the use of conditionals in Korean college EFL students' writing. The data for the study consists of 45 college students' argumentative and narrative writing pieces, i.e., 45 for each type. Using the data, first, the frequency and the distribution of conditionals were examined. Next, the use of if conditionals was coded, adopting Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman's (1999) semantic categorization and Ford and Thompson's (1986) functional categories. The results show, first, a strikingly high frequency of if conditionals in argumentative writing, almost one in every piece. Then, the analysis of the semantic categories used indicates that factual conditionals occur most frequently, which is somewhat similar to the pattern native speakers show. Lastly, as for the functions of conditionals, the students tend to resort to conditionals for the function of repeating the preceding text as a cohesive device unlike native speakers' use or for the functions not reported in the native speakers' writing, reflecting their novice writing style.

A Re-examination of illusory inferences based on factual conditional sentences

According to mental model theory, illusory inferences are a class of deductions in which individuals systematically go wrong. Mental model theory explains them invoking the principle of truth, which is a tendency not to represent models that falsify the premises. In this paper we focus on the illusory problems based on conditional sentences. In three experiments, we show that: (a) rather than not representing models that falsify the conditionals, participants have a different understanding of what falsifies a conditional (Experiment I); (b) specifically, participants think that a conditional with an impossible antecedent or consequent is false (Experiment 2); (c) if the domain of the conditionals in the illusory problems are expanded to show that their antecedents and consequents are possible, the participants find it easy to reach the correct conclusions (Experiment 3). According to our results, the illusory inferences based on conditional premises, differently from those based on disjunctive premises, are caused by a difference between the understanding of natural language factual conditionals and the truth table of the factual implication; the principle of truth is not necessary to explain them.

Alan Ross Anderson, A note on subjunctive and counter factual conditionals. Analysis (Oxford), vol. 12 (1951–1952), pp. 35–38.

Alan Ross Anderson, A note on subjunctive and counter factual conditionals. Analysis (Oxford), vol. 12 (1951–1952), pp. 35–38.