External Justice Research Articles

Compensation policies and their impact on job satisfaction among employees at the University of Jordan: سياسات التعويض المالي وأثرها في الرضاء الوظيفي لدى العاملين في الجامعة الأردنية

This thesis aimed to study the financial compensation policies and their impact on job satisfaction among workers in the University of Jordan, through the theoretical framework and previous related literature, and the results of statistical analysis of the answers of respondents on the measurement tool (questionnaire) prepared for this purpose. The study found the following results: - There is a statistically significant effect at the level of significance (0.05 ≥α) of the policies of financial compensation dimensions (direct and indirect) in the level of job satisfaction in the university of Jordan. The impact was direct financial compensation stronger than the indirect financial compensation in the Jordanian university policies. - The perceptions of the respondents towards the realization of employees to nature and the application of the compensation of financial policies came moderately stood in the university (2.7) from (4). - There are statistically significant differences at the level of significance (0.05≥α) for answers to job satisfaction scale due to the difference in the level of education variables, any satisfaction for the benefit of the highest qualified holds doctorate. Administrative level, for the benefit of senior management, and the level of salary, for the benefit of getting a salary (1,000 dinars and over) in the Jordanian university. The study presented several recommendations, most notably the work to build scientific and objective ways, in an equal financial compensation policies, between universities, to avoid the financial and administrative corruption, and to achieve job satisfaction among workers at university of Jordan. The study also recommends the need for further studies in this field in other Jordanian universities to achieve internal and external justice.

Passing Over

When Pope Francis was elected in 2013, the church and the world were in for many surprises. His first actions and gestures would speak volumes about his values, vision, and understanding of God's mission. In his humility, solidarity, and magnanimity, he paid his own bills, ate meals with common workers, and visited those in prisons. As he began articulating God's universal care for all, he showed his concern for the vulnerable and marginalized, especially those excluded from the centres of power, privilege, and opportunity--those from the margins. Beyond these initial, highly symbolic gestures, his travel itinerary also revealed much about his mission priorities and pastoral perspective. His first journey outside the Vatican was not to Washington, Geneva, London, Beijing, or other centre of political, economic, and cultural power. Instead he chose to visit a small island off the coast of southern Italy named Lampedusa, where thousands of refugees have perished in their dangerous sea crossing in search for better lives. For most of the world, this was an unknown, isolated, and insignificant territory. But to Pope Francis it would be the land from which he would speak about the message of the reign of God, a message that addressed directly the degrading and dehumanizing conditions that result in poverty, exploitation, and injustice. Pope Francis chose to go to Lampedusa because the tragic deaths of these migrants and refugees reached him like a "thorn in the heart." He went there to "make a gesture of closeness," "to challenge our consciences," and to pray for the thousands who have lost their lives after migrating from countries like Eritrea, Somalia, Egypt, Gambia, Mali, Pakistan, and other countries. (2) During his visit he celebrated a eucharist liturgy, and in addition to speaking through words, actions, and rituals, the symbols of the liturgy magnified the depth and importance of his message. Before mass began outside in the open air, he threw a wreath into the sea in memory of the many migrants who had drowned in these waters. A ship's wheel was placed at the lectern, and the cross, chalice, and altar were carved from refugee boats. During the homily, he contrasted the heart of God's mercy with our own heartlessness in the face of human suffering: Has any one of us wept because of this situation and others like it? Has any one of us grieved for the death of these brothers and sisters? Has any one of us wept for these persons who were on the [refugee] boat? For the young mothers carrying their babies? For these men [sic] who were looking for a means of supporting their families? We are a society which has forgotten how to weep, how to experience compassion--"suffering with" others: the globalization of indifference has taken from us the ability to weep! (3) Lampedusa, sadly enough, is not an isolated instance but rather a highly symbolic representation of a larger global phenomenon. Today there are more than 232 million international migrants in the world, making migration one of the defining issues of modern times. (4) In 2012 approximately 45 million migrants were forcibly uprooted, including 15.4 million refugees, 29 million internally displaced persons, and 2.4 million trafficked persons. (5) In 2010 alone 42 million were displaced by natural disasters. (6) By every estimate, these numbers will increase significantly in the coming years. They will continue to cross borders like those between Afghanistan and Iraq, Syria and Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece, Burma and Thailand, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, Mexico and the United States, and many others. Some of the most vulnerable people in the process are women and children, who bear much of the burden of the world's economic, social, and political disorders. (7) In this essay I would like to examine gender injustice and the issue of international migration in ways that expand on Pope Francis's liturgy at Lampedusa by looking at this "globalization of difference" and the challenges of conversion. …

Justifying Justice: Ricoeur’s Words of Wisdom

Justifying Justice: Ricoeur’s Words of Wisdom1 Dinda L. Gorlée (bio) Remembering the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) and the hermeneutic thoughts that won him worldwide fame, we widely acclaim his love of justice and human vulnerability that made him lash out against injustice. His protest against the conflict of good and evil in contemporary society was interpreted by him in law, medicine, theology, and politics. Ricoeur’s pluralistic, adversarial, and disputatious struggle in those realms was a future-oriented philosophical approach against ignorance, victimization, xenophobia, illness, and other ethical, political, or religious human fears. At the same time, Ricoeur’s precise thinking belonged to the old-style philosophy, in the history-linked sense that he used classical authors as his main sources. Ricoeur’s argumentation is built on Plato, Aristotle, John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, and George W. F. Hegel and on scientific and intellectual movements as the Enlightenment and Romanticism until present-day philosophy (Hannah Arendt, Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas). In his Nicomachean Ethics (ca. 350 BC), Aristotle discussed the moral virtue of sophia as theoretical wisdom and phronesis as practical wisdom and Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) facing as it stands for Ricoeur “a dissatisfaction with life over against the prohibition of suicide, personal distress over against the prohibition of false promises, another’s distress against the command to cultivate one’s talents” (128). Aristotle and Kant seem in this book to become Ricoeur’s favorite starting-points in his search for a contemporary ethics and a new capacity to act. Goodness is a duty to speak and to act. [End Page 293] The final collection of lectures and essays, Reflections on The Just is a continuation of The Just (2000). Both volumes hold the same cover image, a shadowy pair of scales figuring a male nude on top of one scale, symbolizing not so much external justice or social legality as inner judgment setting in motion the psychic (and psychosomatic) weighing of good and evil, right and wrong. Ricoeur made the false “shadows” of the image visible, including the “‘secret’ or ‘silence’ regarding the overall sense of his enterprise” (154). The Just, the previous book, totals 161 pages, whereas the Reflections on The Just counts 265 pages. The extensive appendix to the second book should add new material to the first, but the 265 pages are a surplus for an “expansion” or further unfolding. The fifteen essays are preceded by a lengthy introduction (1–41), which in itself is a review of (part of) the essays. Reflections on The Just poses an embarrassing and paralyzing question to this reviewer. Now only is the book a review (re-thinking) of the previous book, but the review of the volume has been turned into a review of a review. Such a reviewed review turns out to be a dissecting strategy, leaving the critical maneuver smashed and stripped of its vital contours. In short, a review must be the personal evidence of a “witness,” but the written attestation should prove valuable as a medium of some “proof.” Writing this review of Reflections on The Just could become a self-reflexive infraction and could degenerate into a penal punishment. Reflections on The Just has a speculative title—the French original was Le Juste 2 (2001) and the Reflections is supposed to be a secondary addition to the previous The Just. As reported in the OED, a “reflection” notes a critical angle of the “action of bending, turning, or folding back” taken in figurative sense as an “action of turning (back) or fixing of thoughts on some subject; meditation, deep or serious consideration.” Reflections suggests Ricoeur’s self-reflexions in his professorial spirit of self-education passed on to the readers or students, probably legal laymen. The Just is derived from Plato’s Dialogues: the verb “to dikaion (which will also be that of the Latin and German neuter), brought to the level of a substantialized adjective . . . . This return to the properly neutral use of the neuter adjective, turned into a substantive term, authorizes a broad opening to the conceptual field” (1). Ricoeur’s pirouette is an ungrammatical turn, evidenced by...

Responsibility Incorporated

Responsibility Incorporated

Externalised Justice and Democratisation: Lessons from the Pinochet Case

The attempt to try Pinochet in Spain exemplified and publicised a trend to use ‘externalised justice’ to tackle impunity for human rights crimes. It also demonstrated the possibilities and limitations of externalised justice initiatives, in terms of securing democracy at the national level, and of advancing accountability for serious crimes under international law. In Chile, Argentina and Spain the Pinochet affair served to restart stalled impulses towards accountability, accelerate democratic reform and challenge the legitimacy of compromises conceded during earlier democratic transitions. With regard to the wider role of international law in limiting impunity, expectations for rapid or consistent replication of ‘the Pinochet precedent’ have not been met. Despite some notable achievements, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts remains inconsistent and controversial. The International Criminal Court (ICC) provides a new mechanism for external justice. An aggressive US campaign to undermine it, and to reverse progress in international law, is a serious obstacle to fulfilment of the ICC's enforcement role. However, at the domestic level the ICC may have similar indirect effects to the Pinochet litigation, boosting domestic enforcement prospects and strengthening democratic commitment. In both cases the key role for externalised justice is as stimulus or back-up. This suggests that progress in tackling impunity depends on incremental and dynamic interaction between domestic and international law, and between national and transnational actors.

Equality Within Military Organizations

In this paper, I wish to discover whether there is some mark or feature common to all of the warfighting cooperative virtues, playing an essential, identifiable role in the intentions presupposed by each. While the fundamental intention not to harm innocents constrains and informs external justice (jus in bello) in the moral craft of warfighting, a similar intention constrains and informs justice internal to warfighting organizations. As I shall argue, ‘equality of innocence’, understood as ‘no harm’, serves a fundamental role within the intentions of internal justice at play for cooperative warfighting teams that excel. By ‘equality of innocence’ understood as ‘no harm,’ which plays some role within any martial cooperative virtue, I mean this: no one is to be harmed unless his contributions to the warfighting team are not what they ought to be. ‘No harm’ is an implicit expectation of virtuous soldiers, and it must be a part of the implicit and explicit norms of any excellent warfighting organization as well. This equality of intention along with the formal equality within military law [for example, the US Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)] are the only forms of equality in intentions that should be operative within hierarchical warfighting units given their architectonic warfighting activity of winning their nation's wars. This ‘equality of innocence’ represented by ‘no harm’ results further in an atmosphere of trust within the warfighting unit, where guile is minimized—if not eliminated—as a requirement for excellence internal to the warfighting unit. An atmosphere of excellence for the whole can then be best realized when such trust obtains.

Recognizing States and Governments

When the international Community recognizes political entities as states, it confers upon them the rights and powers of statehood. These include the right to territorial integrity, the right to noninterference in their internal affairs, the power to make treaties, and the right (subject to certain restrictions) to enforce legal rules on those within their territory. According to the justice-based account of recognition, political entities ought to be recognized as states if and only if they satisfy minimal requirements of internal and external justice. According to the pragmatic account, they ought to be recognized as states if and only if cooperating with them and giving them international support would be the best means of achieving peace and justice among and within them — that is, global peace and justice — whether or not they themselves currently satisfy minimal requirements of internal and external justice.