Experiences Of Seeing Research Articles

Semantic Extensions of Hausa Visual and Auditory Perception Verbs gani and ji in Romance Fiction

This study focuses on the metaphorical semantic extension of Hausa visual and auditory perception verbs as portrayed in romance fiction. Hausa language, just like any other language, provides a window into how speakers use language to make sense of the world around them. The study examines how language users attribute abstract concepts, such as thinking and understanding, to sensory experiences of seeing and hearing, drawing on the conceptual metaphor theory. The study analysed a corpus of Hausa romance fiction, focusing on the use of perception verbs and the metaphorical extensions they evoke. A qualitative research approach was employed, and literary texts were selected as the primary data source. The text data were extracted using the AntConc programme, and such data were then analysed using a cognitive semantics analytical framework. The study’s findings indicated that verbs of higher intellect, such as “understand” and “think”, are derived from hearing and vision, respectively. These metaphorical extensions are closely related to cultural beliefs and norms, emphasising the importance of visual and auditory cues in human relationships. This article provides insights into how language and culture intersect in using perception verbs in Hausa romance fiction texts and demonstrates the importance of understanding metaphorical extensions in studying language and culture.

Effect of Mass Media on Body Image and Self-Esteem of Teenage Girls

This paper investigates whether mass media (social media) affects the body image and self-esteem of teenage girls. For most people, the beauty or covetable feminine body image of teenage girls is defined by a charming face and thin body shape commonly known as zero figures. But this definition of beauty cannot be true always because it is based on the experience of seeing which is not all-encompassing. The whole beauty of the girls can be defined by the combination of all the experiences, as experiences of seeing, listening, touching and all other which we are perceived by an individual. Now a day’s social media is the major source to share information among individuals. This paper provides the effects of social media on the body image and self-esteem of teenage girls. This study targets teenage girls because physical attractiveness is especially important to them and a thin and beautiful idealized image in social media plays a significant role in influencing their self-confidence. Further a data driven model using Artificial intelligence (AI) suggested for future challenges.

The Embodied Brain of SOVEREIGN2: From Space-Variant Conscious Percepts During Visual Search and Navigation to Learning Invariant Object Categories and Cognitive-Emotional Plans for Acquiring Valued Goals.

This article develops a model of how reactive and planned behaviors interact in real time. Controllers for both animals and animats need reactive mechanisms for exploration, and learned plans to efficiently reach goal objects once an environment becomes familiar. The SOVEREIGN model embodied these capabilities, and was tested in a 3D virtual reality environment. Neural models have characterized important adaptive and intelligent processes that were not included in SOVEREIGN. A major research program is summarized herein by which to consistently incorporate them into an enhanced model called SOVEREIGN2. Key new perceptual, cognitive, cognitive-emotional, and navigational processes require feedback networks which regulate resonant brain states that support conscious experiences of seeing, feeling, and knowing. Also included are computationally complementary processes of the mammalian neocortical What and Where processing streams, and homologous mechanisms for spatial navigation and arm movement control. These include: Unpredictably moving targets are tracked using coordinated smooth pursuit and saccadic movements. Estimates of target and present position are computed in the Where stream, and can activate approach movements. Motion cues can elicit orienting movements to bring new targets into view. Cumulative movement estimates are derived from visual and vestibular cues. Arbitrary navigational routes are incrementally learned as a labeled graph of angles turned and distances traveled between turns. Noisy and incomplete visual sensor data are transformed into representations of visual form and motion. Invariant recognition categories are learned in the What stream. Sequences of invariant object categories are stored in a cognitive working memory, whereas sequences of movement positions and directions are stored in a spatial working memory. Stored sequences trigger learning of cognitive and spatial/motor sequence categories or plans, also called list chunks, which control planned decisions and movements toward valued goal objects. Predictively successful list chunk combinations are selectively enhanced or suppressed via reinforcement learning and incentive motivational learning. Expected vs. unexpected event disconfirmations regulate these enhancement and suppressive processes. Adaptively timed learning enables attention and action to match task constraints. Social cognitive joint attention enables imitation learning of skills by learners who observe teachers from different spatial vantage points.

Who is holding the baby? Women's experiences of contact with their baby immediately after birth: An Australian population-based survey.

Seeing and holding their baby immediately after the birth is the pinnacle of the childbearing process for parents. Few studies have examined women's experiences of seeing and holding their baby immediately after birth. We investigated women's experiences of initial contact with their newborns using data from an Australian population-based survey. All women who gave birth in September/October in 2007 in two Australian states were mailed questionnaires six months following the birth. Women were asked three questions about early newborn contact including where their baby was held in the first hour after birth and whether they were able to hold their baby as soon and for as long as they liked. We examined the association between model of maternity care and early newborn contact stratified by admission to SCN/NICU. The majority (92%) of women whose babies remained with them reported holding their babies as soon and for as long as they liked in the first hour after birth. However, for women whose babies were admitted to SCN/NICU only a minority (47%) reported this. Women in public models of care (with the exception of primary midwifery care) whose babies remained with them were less likely to report holding their babies as soon and for as long as they liked compared to women in private care. Our findings suggest that there is potential to increase the proportion of mothers and fathers who get to hold their baby immediately after the birth by modifying birth suite and operating room practices.

Who is holding the baby? Women's experiences of contact with their baby immediately after birth: An Australian population-based survey

Abstract Background Seeing and holding their baby immediately after the birth is the pinnacle of the childbearing process for parents. Few studies have examined women's experiences of seeing and holding their baby immediately after birth. We investigated women's experiences of initial contact with their newborns using data from an Australian population-based survey. Methods All women who gave birth in September/October in 2007 in two Australian states were mailed questionnaires six months following the birth. Women were asked three questions about early newborn contact including where their baby was held in the first hour after birth and whether they were able to hold their baby as soon and for as long as they liked. We examined the association between model of maternity care and early newborn contact stratified by admission to SCN/NICU. Results The majority (92%) of women whose babies remained with them reported holding their babies as soon and for as long as they liked in the first hour after birth. However, for women whose babies were admitted to SCN/NICU only a minority (47%) reported this. Women in public models of care (with the exception of primary midwifery care) whose babies remained with them were less likely to report holding their babies as soon and for as long as they liked compared to women in private care. Conclusion Our findings suggest that there is potential to increase the proportion of mothers and fathers who get to hold their baby immediately after the birth by modifying birth suite and operating room practices.

Support for mothers, fathers and families after perinatal death

Provision of an empathetic, sensitive, caring environment and strategies to support mothers, fathers and their families experiencing perinatal death are now an accepted part of maternity services in many countries. Interventions such as psychological support or counselling, or both, have been suggested to improve outcomes for parents and families after perinatal death. To assess the effect of any form of intervention (i.e. medical, nursing, midwifery, social work, psychology, counselling or community-based) on parents and families who experience perinatal death. We searched the Cochrane Pregnancy and Childbirth Group's Trials Register (28 January 2013) and article bibliographies. Randomised trials of any form of support aimed at encouraging acceptance of loss, bereavement counselling, or specialised psychotherapy or counselling for mothers, fathers and families experiencing perinatal death. Two review authors independently assessed eligibility of trials. No trials were included. Primary healthcare interventions and a strong family and social support network are invaluable to parents and families around the time a baby dies. However, due to the lack of high-quality randomised trials conducted in this area, the true benefits of currently existing interventions aimed at providing support for mothers, fathers and families experiencing perinatal death is unclear. Further, the currently available evidence around the potential detrimental effects of some interventions (e.g. seeing and holding a deceased baby) remains inconclusive at this point in time. However, some well-designed descriptive studies have shown that, under the right circumstances and guided by compassionate, sensitive, experienced staff, parents' experiences of seeing and holding their deceased baby is often very positive. The sensitive nature of this topic and small sample sizes, make it difficult to develop rigorous clinical trials. Hence, other research designs may further inform practice in this area. Where justified, methodologically rigorous trials are needed. However, methodologically rigorous trials should be considered comparing different approaches to support.

Reinventando lugares, pessoas e a educação a partir da arte em espaços cotidianos

Neste artigo são apresentadas ideias que, a partir de entrevistas realizadas em 2010 com dois professores graduados em artes visuais, um artista e uma estudante do ensino médio, discutem a educação em artes através de diálogos sobre a realização de experiências artísticas em espaços cotidianos, considerando como essas experiências podem estar presentes nos processos de aprendizagem. Os diálogos abordam o envolvimento dos educandos em experiências de ver e de fazer arte e a busca de possibilidades de reinvenção das relações entre pessoas e lugares, pensando a educação para além da arte e dos espaços escolares. A partir das entrevistas, foi possível perceber uma preocupação dos colaboradores em encontrar vieses para uma educação que não se distancie do cotidiano dos estudantes, fazendo da experiência artística um desafio para o conhecimento de si e dos outros em suas relações com o lugar vivido.

Seeing and touching: The role of sensory-motor experience on the development of infant reaching

Researchers agree that infants must learn from prior sensory-motor experiences to plan, perform, and fine-tune their actions to the environment. Yet, little is known about the actual influences of these experiences on the development of infants’ perception and action. This study investigated how repeated experiences of seeing, reaching for, touching, grasping, and manipulating objects of same sizes and textures contributed to the refinement of subsequent object-oriented motor responses in 6–9-month old infants. In addition, to understand whether infants relied on vision, touch, or both to tailor their motor response to objects, we analyzed the reach-to-grasp sequences. Results show that the youngest infants did not benefit from the repeated experiences. Seemingly stereotypical motor responses appeared to interfere with the process of perceptual-motor mapping. The older infants relied more effectively on prior experience, on touch initially and then vision, to match their motor responses to objects. Consistent with a dynamic systems approach, we interpret the observed developmental progression as a change in tensions between perception and action.

Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience

What is the difference between perception and mere sensation? Take a typical perceptual experience, such as an experience of a fish or a table, and a merely sensory experience, such as the experience of seeing stars or of enjoying a red phosphene. One difference between these experiences is that in the first case there is an external object that one sees. But this difference is not the only difference. On the face of it, typical perceptual experiences and mere sensations also differ in their phenomenal character. How can this difference be understood? In this essay, I will argue that there is a representational difference between perceptual experiences and mere sensations. In particular, in ordinary perceptual experiences of seeing, unlike mere sensations, cer tain relations between the subject of the experience and the objects of the experience are presented as obtaining. I will argue that typical perceptual experiences of ordinary objects present those objects both as independent of the subject and as perceptually connected to the subject, in senses that I will clarify.

Seeing our seeing and knowing our knowing

1. In the Charmides Plato argues that knowing our knowing is impossible for the same reason that seeing our seeing and hearing our hearing are impossible: like seeing and hearing, knowing does not possess the essential properties of its objects. Here Plato is arguing against the possibility of a mental capacity which is its own object. However such capacities do appear to exist. So, for instance, we speak about desiring our desires and thinking about our thinking. I do not wish to interpret Plato's text, but to address myself to the important problem suggested in the text: what is the difference between mental capacities that can refer to themselves and those that cannot; and to which of these knowing our knowing pertain? Plato does not reject every kind of self-knowing: the subject may be the object of his own investigation. However the problem is whether a particular mental capacity can be its own object (Tuckey, 1951). The crucial issue seems to be whether such a capacity can have the properties of its objects. Thus, since seeing does not have colors and hearing does not have sounds, seeing is not visible nor is hearing audible. (In "seeing" and "hearing" I refer to the experiences of seeing and hearing, rather than to their neurological bases. If, as some think, seeing and hearing do not have any other descriptive level but the neurological one, the problem discussed here disappears.) Emotions, on the other hand, have the properties of their objects. An old man can desire to have the desires he had when he was young, and one may love to love someone or fear the fears that one has often experienced. Similarly, thinking can refer to itself: we can, and often do, think about our thinking. The same applies to remembering our memories. It seems that apart from perceiving, other intentional mental capacities can refer to themselves. Why should this be so? I suggest that the difference is connected with the more complex nature of intentionality that is involved in these capacities.

Why Should the Science of Nature be Empirical?

In the past empiricist philosophy has urged one or other or both of two interconnected, and sometimes interconfused, theses. The first has been a thesis about the causal origins of certain beliefs, the second a thesis about the proper criteria for appraising these beliefs. The causal thesis is that all beliefs about the structure and contents of the natural world are the end-product of a process that originates wholly in individual experiences of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or touching. The criterial thesis is that all these beliefs are ultimately to be appraised for their truth, soundness or acceptability in terms of the data afforded by such perceptual acts. Of recent years the causal version of empiricism has been much attacked, primarily in regard to its implications about language-learning. The language in terms of which our beliefs are constructed is heavily conditioned, we are told, by certain congenital features of the human brain. But, whenever Chomsky and his followers have assailed the causal version of empiricism, they have always been careful to claim for their doctrines the warrant of empirical evidence. They have never questioned the correctness of the criterial version of empiricism.

Why Should the Science of Nature be Empirical?

In the past empiricist philosophy has urged one or other or both of two interconnected, and sometimes interconfused, theses. The first has been a thesis about the causal origins of certain beliefs, the second a thesis about the proper criteria for appraising these beliefs. The causal thesis is that all beliefs about the structure and contents of the natural world are the end-product of a process that originates wholly in individual experiences of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or touching. The criterial thesis is that all these beliefs are ultimately to be appraised for their truth, soundness or acceptability in terms of the data afforded by such perceptual acts. Of recent years the causal version of empiricism has been much attacked, primarily in regard to its implications about language-learning. The language in terms of which our beliefs are constructed is heavily conditioned, we are told, by certain congenital features of the human brain. But, whenever Chomsky and his followers have assailed the causal version of empiricism, they have always been careful to claim for their doctrines the warrant of empirical evidence. They have never questioned the correctness of the criterial version of empiricism.