Seeing our seeing and knowing our knowing

Abstract

1. In the Charmides Plato argues that knowing our knowing is impossible for the same reason that seeing our seeing and hearing our hearing are impossible: like seeing and hearing, knowing does not possess the essential properties of its objects. Here Plato is arguing against the possibility of a mental capacity which is its own object. However such capacities do appear to exist. So, for instance, we speak about desiring our desires and thinking about our thinking. I do not wish to interpret Plato's text, but to address myself to the important problem suggested in the text: what is the difference between mental capacities that can refer to themselves and those that cannot; and to which of these knowing our knowing pertain? Plato does not reject every kind of self-knowing: the subject may be the object of his own investigation. However the problem is whether a particular mental capacity can be its own object (Tuckey, 1951). The crucial issue seems to be whether such a capacity can have the properties of its objects. Thus, since seeing does not have colors and hearing does not have sounds, seeing is not visible nor is hearing audible. (In "seeing" and "hearing" I refer to the experiences of seeing and hearing, rather than to their neurological bases. If, as some think, seeing and hearing do not have any other descriptive level but the neurological one, the problem discussed here disappears.) Emotions, on the other hand, have the properties of their objects. An old man can desire to have the desires he had when he was young, and one may love to love someone or fear the fears that one has often experienced. Similarly, thinking can refer to itself: we can, and often do, think about our thinking. The same applies to remembering our memories. It seems that apart from perceiving, other intentional mental capacities can refer to themselves. Why should this be so? I suggest that the difference is connected with the more complex nature of intentionality that is involved in these capacities.