Existential Feelings Research Articles

Into the dark room: a predictive processing account of major depressive disorder

Major depression is a prevalent mental disorder that leads to persistent negative mood and tremendous suffering in affected individuals. However, the biological realization of this disorder and associated symptom clusters remain poorly understood. Recently, phenomenological accounts of major depressive disorder and contributions to the emerging predictive processing account have provided valuable insights into the phenomenological and neuro-functional components that lead to manifestations of major depressive episodes. The purpose of this paper is to weave together these different strands of research to develop a predictive processing account of major depressive disorder. In doing so, I will relate personal-level descriptions of associated phenomenal experiences to a sub-personal-level predictive processing account of the functional realization of major depression. I will argue that pervasive symptoms of the disorder, which include a diminished sense of agency, fatigue, social withdrawal, and rumination, are integrated by existential feelings of loss and impossibility. These phenomenal experiences, I will argue, are associated with dysfunctional processes of prediction error minimization, which are characterized by an overall decrease of the causal contributions of active inference and by distorted precision estimates. The emerging account promises to contribute to a better understanding of the complex processes that give rise to depressive experiences.

Episodes of depression: Existential feelings and embodiment in SHARP OBJECTS

Episodes of depression: Existential feelings and embodiment in SHARP OBJECTS

Um sobretudo de argila: afetividade e normatividade na fenomenologia do corpo

No presente artigo, examino o problema da normatividade na relação com a dimensão ancestral das possibilidades legadas pelos mortos. Seguindo o projeto de uma fenomenologia da espectralidade, apresentado por Hans Ruin, esboço uma interpretação de algumas indicações formais, presentes na analítica existencial de Ser e Tempo, a respeito da atmosfera (Stimmung) do ser-com-os-mortos. O sentimento existencial que manifesta uma sintonia já ocorrida com o âmbito da ancestralidade é o respeito (Ehrfurcht): respeito para com as possibilidades que podem ser retomadas no modo da réplica a uma herança. Da análise desse sentimento, resulta que a dimensão ancestral oferece a matéria da individuação histórica, mas não contém a medida da adequada resposta às possibilidades legadas. Concluo ressaltando que o aspecto autonoético do sentimento de respeito em relação às possibilidades ancestrais revela o abandono e a vulnerabilidade dos vivos em face a uma dimensão que comanda sem abrigar em si mesma uma medida da justa resposta.

Mythological Indifference in Schelling and Nerval

Mythological Indifference in Schelling and Nerval

Into the unknown: Treatment as a social arena for drug users' transition into a non-using life.

Background and aims:For people trying to stop using alcohol or other drugs (AOD), the process is often characterised by periods of abstinence followed by relapse into their previous drug-related way of life and subsequent re-entry into the treatment system. There is a call for greater attention to the how of these transitions, with a special focus on the phase of leaving treatment. The aim of this article was to get a better understanding of the transformation of practice when moving from a drug-using to a non-using lifestyle by exploring the experience of (1) the involvement in treatment settings, (2) the process of leaving treatment, and finally, (3) the early phase of changing everyday practice into a drug-free way of living.Method:The article takes on a social practice approach, in particular Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, “doxa” and field to analyse 17 in-depth interviews with Norwegian men and women seeking treatment for problems resulting from the use of drugs and/or alcohol.Results:The study shows that the support of professionals operates as transitional relations that can bridge the transformation from a drug-using to a drug-free life, by providing a social web of relations, positions, settings and activities. However, leaving treatment and establishing AOD-free practice involves moving into something unknown in the sense that there is no embodied, taken-for-granted knowledge about how to relate to a world where drug use is not the focal point of existence.Conclusions:The process of change, then, involves being exposed to an existential feeling of maladjustment. To get beyond the feeling of maladjustment, and get into the doxic mode takes time, and involves reconfiguration of habitus through reorientation of social settings, relations and networks. The treatment system could potentially develop a continuum of support during these transformations.

Self‐Esteem and Ethics: A Phenomenological View

This paper aims to provide an account of the relationship between self‐esteem and moral experience. In particular, drawing on feminist and phenomenological accounts of affectivity and ethics, I argue that self‐esteem has a primary role in moral epistemology and moral action. I start by providing a characterization of self‐esteem, suggesting in particular that it can be best understood through the phenomenological notion of “existential feeling.” Examining the dynamics characteristic of the so‐called “impostor phenomenon” and the experience of women who are involved in abusive relationships, I then claim that self‐esteem fundamentally shapes the way in which self and others are conceived, and the ethical demands and obligations to which they are considered to be subjected. More specifically, I argue that low self‐esteem—which in the experience of women may be rooted in particular assumptions regarding gender roles and stereotyping—can hinder autonomy, make it difficult to question other people's evaluative perspectives and behaviors, and attribute to others responsibility for their actions.

Lost in translation: Adolescents and young adults use words of hope to express their spirituality.

185 Background: Adolescents and Young Adults (AYAs) with cancer are at risk for poor psychosocial outcomes, in part because cancer may disrupt developmental processes such as spiritual questioning. Indeed, spirituality may enable hope, meaning, and purpose, in turn facilitating the adjustment to cancer. The need to address spirituality has been established among adult patients, how to do so in an AYA age-appropriate manner has not been described. We aimed to better understand the language and perspectives of AYAs regarding spirituality. Methods: AYA patients (ages 14-25 years) were eligible if they had been diagnosed with cancer within the past 60 days. Demographic surveys including self-reported spirituality and religiousness were completed at the time of enrollment. Semi-structured, 1:1 interviews were conducted at the time of enrollment, 6-12, and 12-18 months later. Verbatim transcripts were coded by three independent coders using directed content analysis for instances of spirituality, religiosity, hope, and fear. Additional deductive analyses used a priori coding themes defined from prior conceptualizations of AYA hope: forced effort, personal possibilities, expectations of a better tomorrow, and anticipation of a better tomorrow Results: Seventeen patients completed 44 interviews with > 100 hours of transcript-data. Their mean age was 17.1 (±2.7); 8 (47%) were male, their diagnoses were sarcoma (n = 8), acute leukemia (n = 6), and lymphoma (n = 3). At enrollment 10 (58%) & 6 (35%) endorsed personal spirituality and religiousness in surveys, respectively, few verbal narratives included explicit self-identification of either construct. Further, while many AYAs denied spiritual beliefs, all of them endorsed hopes, often as a source of strength, meaning, or self-expression. Longitudinal analyses suggested an evolution of spiritual beliefs and self-identities, even when patients selected other language to describe such processes. Conclusions: AYAs with cancer are trying to work-through complex existential beliefs and questions. Often, instead of defining themselves as spiritual or religious or using explicit spiritual language, they articulate their existential feelings with the language of hope.

Belonging and quality of life as perceived by people with advanced cancer who live at home

ABSTRACTIntroduction: In a previous paper, we explored how people with advanced cancer experience occupational engagement and perceive quality of life; this pointed to the importance of doing things with and for others. These emerging findings resonate with the theoretical conceptualization of belonging within occupational science.Purpose: To gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which perceived quality of life of people with advanced cancer who live at home may be associated with belonging, mediated through occupation.Methods: Nine participants took part in this study which used a combination of semi-structured interviews and photo-elicitation to generate data. Data from 18 interviews and 77 photographs were analyzed thematically, drawing on four dimensions of belonging.Findings: The findings highlight that maintaining engagement in occupations enables a sense of belonging which the participants associated with quality of life. Aspects related to the dimension of social belonging may become especially important when living with advanced cancer and isolation may constitute a potential barrier to experiencing a sense of belonging. Artefacts may also enable a sense of belonging and generate existential and spiritual feelings which may evoke concerns of impending death.

A critical examination of existential feeling

Matthew Ratcliffe (2008, 2015) has argued that existential feelings form a distinct class of bodily and non-conceptual feelings that pre-intentionally structure our intentional experience of others, the world, and ourselves. In this article, I will identify and discuss three interrelated areas of concern for Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings. First, the distinct senses in which existential feelings are felt as background bodily feelings and as spaces of possibility calls for further clarification. Second, the nature of the suggested bi-directional relationship between existential feelings and intentional experience remains ambiguous. Third, viewed in light of existential guilt, the categorically non-conceptual nature of existential feelings may not be as definite as presumed. The aim of the article is to draw critical attention to aspects of the theory that would benefit from further development, and therefore, to advance the ongoing discussion about existential feelings.

Mystical Feelings and the Process of Self-Transformation

There is a need for inner recollection opposed to our everyday distraction. Our distraction is partly based on anthropological features and partly on social and cultural features. As well as feelings of distraction, we know experiences of being focussed from everyday life. As feelings in which distraction is absent, and as feelings in which we are partly and temporarily released from our own egocentric perspective, they remind us that a different kind of relation to ourselves and the world is possible. Therefore, they can motivate a process of self-transformation aiming at a mystical state of mind, which is of a more profound and enduring kind than ordinary experiences of being focussed. The mystical state of mind is a state in which we transcend ourselves in the face of the universe and thereby relativize our own affective involvement. It is a feeling of an all-encompassing unity which ultimately concerns us; and it is a feeling of love, joy, and peace of mind. Mystical feelings thus shape and restrict spaces of possibilities, and they comprise an altered sense of what it means to be real. Therefore, they can be classified as existential feelings. Still, the mystical state of mind differs from prototypical existential feelings because it is a positive feeling, necessarily comprises active as well as passive moments, and presupposes an explicit way of attending to the world as world.

On The Adequacy of Emotions and Existential Feelings

Abstract: In the analytic tradition of the philosophy of emotions the folk notion of adequacy is understood with regard to – at least four – different questions, viz. (a) a moral question, (b) a prudential question, (c) an epistemic question, and (d) a fittingness (or correctness ) question. Usually, the fittingness question is treated as being the central one. I have some doubts concerning this assessment, particularly when it comes to substantial – interpersonal or cultural – controversies about whether a specific emotional response is adequate or whether a specific event deserves the emotional responses it triggers. To approach these matters, I recommend first doing without the established distinctions, for they may prematurely tempt us into assessing the adequacy of emotional responses in terms of one of these categories thereby overlooking other features that deserve attention. Instead, I will start with the folk notion of adequacy and then refine stepwise the conceptual landscape to get closer to what the crucial issues of adequacy are. Keywords: Philosophy of Emotions; Emotional Atmospheres; Existential Feelings; Adequacy of Emotional Responses L’adeguatezza delle emozioni e dei sentimenti esistenziali Riassunto: All’interno della tradizione analitica della filosofia delle emozioni la nozione comune di adeguatezza e presa in considerazione in relazione ad almeno quattro diversi problemi: (a) un primo e di carattere morale ; (b) un secondo riguarda la discrezionalita ; (c) un terzo e di tipo epistemico e (d) un quarto concerne l’ appropriatezza (o correttezza ). Di solito, all’appropriatezza viene riservata maggiore importanza. Personalmente nutro diversi dubbi su questa valutazione, in particolare quando si tratta di dirimere questioni sostanziali – interpersonali o culturali –, se una data risposta emotiva e adeguata o se un dato evento merita la risposta emotiva che ha innescato. Per affrontare questi problemi, mi sento in primo luogo di suggerire di fare a meno delle distinzioni maggiormente in uso, poiche possono spiprematuramente a valutare l’adeguatezza delle risposte emotive nei termini una delle categorie gia menzionate, trascurando quindi altre proprieta degne di attenzione. Intendo invece partire dalla nozione di adeguatezza propria del senso comune e poi gradualmente raffinare il panorama concettuale, per approssimarmi ai problemi fondamentali dell’adeguatezza. Parole chiave: Filosofia delle emozioni; Atmosfere emotive; Sentimenti esistenziali; Adeguatezza delle risposte emotive

Atmosphere: On the Phenomenology of “Atmospheric” Alterations in Schizophrenia - Overall Sense of Reality, Familiarity, Vitality, Meaning, or Relevance (Ancillary Article to EAWE Domain 5)

“Atmospheric” alterations are key aspects of altered subjectivity in mental disorder. Karl Jaspers famously described the “delusional mood”: a sense of uncanny salience and ominousness that often precedes the onset of schizophrenic psychosis or of delusions. Such experiences, he writes, involve “a transformation in our total awareness of reality” that often verges on ineffability. In psychiatry, these experiential alterations are often referred to in terms of “derealization.” Though derealization most obviously refers to a decline in the sense of objective presence or felt actuality, it can also refer to other unusual experiences in which things seem unlike normal or standard reality, including altered familiarity, vitality, meaning, or relevance. This paper first describes two complementary ways of approaching these phenomena: the notion of an “ontological” dimension (Sass) and that of “existential feeling” (Ratcliffe). It then offers a wider-ranging synopsis of work in phenomenological psychopathology that has sought to address atmospheric alterations believed to be especially characteristic of schizophrenia spectrum conditions, focusing on the themes of a diminished sense of reality, altered sense of meaning, disrupted feeling of familiarity, and diminished vitality and relevance.

Affectivity and narrativity in depression: a phenomenological study.

In this study I explore from a phenomenological perspective the relationship between affectivity and narrative self-understanding in depression. Phenomenological accounts often conceive of the disorder as involving disturbances of the narrative self and suggest that these disturbances are related to the alterations of emotions and moods typical of the illness. In this paper I expand these accounts by advancing two sets of claims. In the first place, I suggest that, due to the loss of feeling characteristic of the illness, the narratives with which the patients identified prior to the onset of depression are altered in various ways, thus leading to the weakening or abandonment of the narratives themselves. I then move to show that these autobiographical narratives are replaced by new stories which possess a distinctive structure and I argue that this is dependent upon specific configurations of affective experience, such as existential feelings of guilt, hopelessness, and isolation, and particular forms of temporal and spatial experience.

Identity Work as an Event

Depending on the dualisms of mind–body, subject–object, inside–outside, and so forth, most identity work studies in organization studies neglect the affective and material aspects of identity work. Drawing on an ethnographic study and practice theory, I analyze how the live-statue enacts her identity in the street. Her identity work can highlight the affective and material aspects of identity work beyond dualisms. Conceptualizing identity work as an event depending on existential feelings, I found that the live-statue’s identity work depends on existential feelings of “submission to the street” that have both active and passive aspects, and which emerge from the process of to affect and to be affected. My study also highlights this process within situated interactions and material arrangements.

Transcendental Self and the Feeling of Existence

In this essay, I investigate one aspect of Kant’s larger theory of the transcendental self. In the Prolegomena, Kant says that the transcendental self can be represented as a feeling of existence. In contrast to the view that Kant errs in describing the transcendental self in this fashion, I show that there exists a strand in Kant’s philosophy that permits us to interpret the representation of the transcendental self as a feeling of existence—as the obscurely conscious and temporally inaccessible modification of the state of the discursive subject, which is built into all the representations of such a subject. I also provide an account of how the transcendental self can be legitimately understood both as an epistemic condition for the possibility of experience as well as the representation of a non-naturalistic feeling of existence.

Affectivity and moral experience: an extended phenomenological account

The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between affectivity and moral experience from a phenomenological perspective. I will start by showing how in a phenomenologically oriented account emotions can be conceived as intentional evaluative feelings which play a role in both moral epistemology and the motivation of moral behaviour. I will then move to discuss a particular kind of affect, “existential feelings” (Ratcliffe in Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(8–10), 43–60, 2005, 2008), which has not been considered so far in the discourse on moral and affective experience. Relying on the notion of pre-intentionality through which Ratcliffe characterizes existential feelings (Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53(6), 602–626, 2010) and on some insights into the relationship between affectivity and ethics developed by De Monticelli (2003, 2006), I suggest that key to the role played by existential feelings in moral experience is that they determine the kinds of evaluations that it is possible for us to make and the range of our possibilities of action. I then illustrate and further develop this idea through a phenomenological analysis of some forms of psychopathological experience. More specifically, by considering some experiential features of depression and borderline personality disorder, I claim that, by acquiring an existential character, emotions such as guilt, feelings of isolation, anger and shame can radically alter the structure of the individual evaluative perspective, having a deep impact on both moral judgements and behaviours.

INFANTILISM: THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT AND OPERATIONALIZATION

The aim of the presented research is to define and operationalize theoretically the concept of infantilism and its construct. The content of theoretical construct «infantilism» is analyzed. Methods . The methods of theoretical research involve analysis and synthesis. The age and content criteria are analysed in the context of childhood and adulthood. The traits which can be interpreted as adult infantile traits are described. Results . The characteristics of adult infantilism in modern world taking into account the increasing of information flows and socio-economic changes are defined. The definition of the concept «infantilism» including its main features is given. Infantilism is defined as the personal organization including features and models of the previous age period not adequate for the real age stage with emphasis on immaturity of the emotional and volitional sphere. Scientific novelty . The main psychological characteristics of adulthood are described as the reflection, requirement to work and professional activity, existence of professional self-determination, possession of labor skills, need for selfrealization, maturity of the emotional and volitional sphere. As objective adulthood characteristics are considered the following: transition to economic and territorial independence of a parental family, and also development of new social roles, such as a worker, spouse, and parent. Two options of a possible operationalization of concept are allocated: objective (existence / absence in real human life of objective criteria of adulthood) and subjective (the self-report on subjective feeling of existence / lack of psychological characteristics of adulthood). Practical significance consists in a construct operationalization of «infantilism» which at the moment has so many interpretations. That operationalization is necessary for the further analysis and carrying out various researches.

Veiling existence with clothing

Our aim is to discuss the notion of freedom in severe depression. We will address it considering several phenomenological conceptions of the matter, from Binswanger's nicht können to more recent Ratcliffe's loss of existential feelings and also by clinging to our own clinical experience, in particular a case of melancholic depression in a 67-year-old woman.Our patient suffered a clear melancholic syndrome, with an intense psychomotor inhibition, she felt uncapable of doing anything, spent hours brooding over menial tasks and thought much about dying, because she sensed the world as being devoid of possibilities and the future closed, experiences she considered “not related to disease” but to her own “incurable moral failure”.In order to discuss the notion of freedom in depression, we will particularly focus on one of her psychopathologic phenomena, the empoverishment delusion-like experience of having run-out of proper clothing, which we consider was based on a inhibited “perception” of reality, an unreflective experience of corporeal “not being able”, a loss of the motivational force of intentionality. However, we will argue that this unreflective, pre-given experience showed striking connections to the patient's sub-depressive personhood, a classical Tellenbach's typus melancholicus.An hermeneutical analysis of her existence will be performed using the anthropologic person-centered dialectic model developed by one of the authors, and building on it, we will introduce the distinction between lived experience (Erlebnis) and factual experience (Erfahrung) which we consider it is essential to enlighten the nature of the loss of freedom that severe depression entails.Disclosure of interestThe authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.

THE EXISTENTIAL FACTORS IN THE DECISION MAKING

This article is devoted to an extensive and modern area of scientific knowledge – Decision theory. The author comprehends and analyzes critically the methodological bases of the Decision theory, he thinks, it rejects the most important thing – a human. In the article the reconstruction of historical development in the Decision theory is considered and also existential factors and feelings are discussed, which appear in human being and operate the situation of decision-making.

AUTISMO E VÍCIOS

A instalação de uma forma identificadora e do sentimento de existência em um corpo permanece problemática para as pessoas acometidas de autismo ou vícios. O refúgio dentro dos pensamentos ou de uma dispersão psíquica evita o contato com as vivências catastróficas, mas leva a um processo de desmantelamento sensorial e uma desconstrução da imagem do corpo, em níveis diferentes segundo cada caso. A anulação prolongada da consciência das sensações corporais provoca tais angústias por aniquilamento que o recurso urgente a sensações fortes e dolorosas restaura provisoriamente o sentimento de existência.