Existence Of Other Minds Research Articles

Our Certainty of Other Minds

In a recent number of Philosophy of Science, Mr. C. D. Hardie offers some interesting suggestions concerning the problem of other minds. In his view the fact that we feel certain of their existence constitutes a problem; and he wishes to find a rational justification for this certainty. “What grounds have I for believing in the existence of other minds?” he asks. He is attracted by the traditional argument from analogy, but finds it incomplete; for “any conclusion arrived at by analogy and induction is at best only probable,” and “I am certain that other minds exist.” Again we find him remarking that “there is room for an account which (1) makes our knowledge of them depend in some way on analogy ... but which (2) is such that we can be certain that other minds exist. ...” (page 311)

The Existence of Other Minds

In the October number of Philosophyx appears a very interesting article by Professor H. H. Price, entitled “Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds,” the main object of which is to formulate the grounds on which we (or I, as one should say at this stage) may claim logical justification for asserting that other minds exist. No attempt is made to “prove” the existence of other minds—an effort which is regarded as a wild-goose chase. Neither does Prof. Price seek to identify the actual process by which a particular mind accepts the existence of others as a fact; that, presumably, is a matter for the psychologist, and it may well turn out that the phenomena which give the conviction that other minds exist may vary from individual to individual and may often be logically unevidential. The object of the article, in short, is simply to state why it is reasonable to believe that other minds exist.

Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds

Inordinary life everyone assumes that he has a great deal of knowledge about other minds or persons. This assumption has naturally aroused the curiosity of philosophers; though perhaps they have not been as curious about it as they ought to have been, for they have devoted many volumes to our consciousness of the material world, but very few to our consciousness of one another. It was thought at one time that each of us derives his knowledge of other minds from the observation of other human organisms. I observe (it was said) that there are a number of bodies which resemble my own fairly closely in their shape, size, and manner of movement; I conclude by analogy that each of these bodies is animated by a

Is the Existence of Other Minds a Necessary Postulate of Scientific Knowledge?

Is the Existence of Other Minds a Necessary Postulate of Scientific Knowledge?

DO WE KNOW OTHER MINDS MEDIATELY OR IMMEDIATELY?

IN the October number of MIND there was an article by Mr, Joshua C. Gregory, criticising my paper on 'Our Knowledge of Other Minds' in the Aristoteictn Proceedings for 1918-19, and I should like to say something by way of a belated reply to him. Mr. Gregory disputes my contention that we know other minds as directly and immediately as we know physical things, and defends the orthodox view that minds can only know one another indirectly, via the material world. The truth of this view seems to him obvious from the consideration of such facts as the following: a person's thoughts, feelings and desires are conce?led from public inspection; absence of bodily signs makes it impossible for us to perceive a person's mental states; our knowledge of other minds depends upon our own previous experience and upon their resemblance to ourselves, some mental lives altogether elude our apprehension. Mr. Gregory then concludes that the existence of other minds is inferred and not perceived; but the inference, he insists, is implicit and spontaneous. It is the work of primary, unconsciously acting memory, and is made by us in our infancy, so that in mature experience the recognition of other mental lives appears to be immediate. It does not seem to me that the facts upon which Mr. Gregory bases his conclusion are all of them equally certain; thus, e.g., I should be prepared to argue that our knowledge of other minds is not limited to mental states similar to' those experienced by ourselves. But even granting that all Mr. Gregory says is correct, the facts he refers to in no way conflict with the ' direct acquaintance' theory. It is perfectly true, of course, that other people's thoughts do not lie exposed to our view and that even their emotions may be difficult to discern; but this is not a reason for denying that what little we do perceive of other minds Its perceived and not inferred. The fragmentary character of our acquaintance with other mental lives could only be regarded as an argument against the view I am defending if bv 'immediate' knowledge were meant a knowledge that is exhaustive and infallible. But 'immediacy' in this connexion simply means that when the act of discrimination is directed upon a mind, then what we apprehend is a mind and not something that intervenes between us and it; it does not mean that the discrimination is either perfect or attained without any trouble. Certain.conditions such as the similarity of a mind to our own may help us to discriminate it more perfectly, while under other conditions we may completely fail to detect the presence of a