Executive Head Research Articles

Leadership in international organizations: systemic, organizational and personality factors

The study of international organization has frequently involved a discussion of the skills necessary for effective leadership. Such an orientation flows from the notion that effective leadership may be ‘the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organization’. Thus there has long been a bias toward the study of dynamic executive heads, those who are either international organization founders or at least leaders during periods of rapid organizational growth. Indeed the characteristics of such leaders (often referred to as the skills of institutionalization and identified with the names of Haas and Cox) are frequently taken to be the characteristics of the ideal executive head.

Permanent secretarles, managing directors and microelectronics

Summary Microelectronic equipment has profound effects throughout any organization, large or small, in any sector. Good and bad effects can occur at the same time. Benefits may include direct improvements to the organization's results, secondary benefits to the workforce, and external benefits, e.g. to customers or the general public. Negative effects may include non‐use or under‐use of the equipment, deterioration of the organization's output, disruption in other departments, disruption in outside organizations such as suppliers, a series of staff difficulties; leading to possible disaster for small commercial organizations and to loss of profit and/or reputation for large ones. In this respect the whole world is ‘developing’. Some ‘developing’ countries in Southeast Asia may be further forward than ‘industrialized’ countries. Only the executive heads of organizations have the breadth of view and responsibility to take into account all kinds of difficulty and their causes, as well as all kinds of benefit...

History of the Pegasus vectored thrust engine

History of the Pegasus vectored thrust engine

An executive cabinet

i n British terms, the definition of cabinet function is simple: it is the government. A decision-making body in which binding votes are taken, the British cabinet collectively embodies the political will of Britain's parliamentary system. It acts, subject to parliamentary votes of confidence, as the final repository of executive authority. The U.S. cabinet possesses no such authority. Executive responsibility in the American system rests exclusively with the president. The cabinet has no formal authority: it does not collectively make decisions, nor does it normally advise on questions of importance. While there exists language establishing "Executive Departments and Heads of Departments" whose "opinion in writing" would be an important source of advice to the president, the cabinet as such has no constitutional mandate. Its institutional legitimacy derives solely from custom and function. It was George Washington who, acting upon what he saw as "the impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great business of state," began calling his executive secretaries and the attorney general into collective collaboration on a regular basis. To him it was clear that the chief executive alone could neither dig deeply enough into the vast range of presidential problems to be assured that all the dimensions of any given issue were covered, nor see to it that his decisions and overall priorities were faithfully carried out at all levels of government. Only by giving responsibility to specialists whose expertise and administrative authority spread over the entire range of issues and having them meet regularly could he begin to overcome this institutional predicament. In order for the administration of government to reflect coherent goals and strategies, therefore, a number of serious people had to be involved in the policy formation process. For Washington, it was the heads of the executive departments who collectively best met these requirements. Copied by his successors, Washington's organizational initiative (dubbed "the Cabinet" by James Madison) was quickly accepted as a permanent feature of the executive office. This institutionalization was a clear signal that the cabinet was indeed serving an important function in the presidential decision-making and coordination process, giving the president both a relatively complete display of the issues before him and an opportunity to extend his control throughout the executive bureaucracy. Its exact status, however, continued to change as presidents sought to establish clearer lines of authority within their administrations. By the mid-nineteenth century a new, more permanent relationship between the president and his cabinet had emerged--a relationship epitomized by President Lincoln's often-repeated quip: "Seven noes, one aye: ]'he ayes have it." According to Richard Fenno in The President's Cabinet, the cabinet had come to live "in a state of institutional dependency to promote the effective exercise of the president's authority and to help implement his ultimate responsibilities.'" Today the cabinet's mandate seems more compelling than ever. The extraordinary complexity and range of issues on the presidential agenda has compounded the chief executive's inherent organizational difficulties, limiting still further his ability to carry out his central decision-making and coordination responsibilities. Much more than in Washington's day, the contemporary president is forced to rely upon others to both advise him and carry out his policies. Who should these "others" be'? With close ties to interest groups, Congress, and their own bureaucracies, the men and women who head the departments of the executive branch still collectively appear the best suited to fulfill these functions. It is therefore not surprising that each newly elected president is attracted to the traditional cabinet idea. When faced with the necessity of organizing his office for central decision-making and coordination, it seems an entirely logical approach; the cabinet should make a major contribution to the effectiveness of any administration. But can it? Is the cabinet in its present form well suited to these tasks? Can it, as a collegial body, be a successful part of

Human settlements and the new international development strategy

At its sixth special session, held in May 1974, the General Assembly, in its resolution 3201 (S-VI)’ adopted the “Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order” and, in its resolution 3202 (S-VI)’ the “Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New lnternational Economic Order”. Subsequently, at its 33rd session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 331193, entitled “Preparations for an international development strategy for the third United Nations development decade” in which it affirmed that the new international development strategy “should be formulated within the framework of the new international economic order and be directed towards the achievement of its objectives.” in that resolution, the General Assembly also decided to establish a Preparatory Committee for the New International Development Strategy and requested the executive heads of all organs, bodies and organisations of the United Nations system to co-operate fully in the formulation of the new international development strategy.

Objective Setting: A Corporate Planning Approach

Business objectives play a vital role in providing direction and purpose for a company. Just as an individual cannot plan a route for a journey until he determines his destination, so a company needs to establish some notion of its final destination for its journey into the future before managers can begin to deploy company resources. Even in companies which do not have formal planning systems, managers must still make strategic decisions regarding investment, product development and the like which will set their course into the future, and so they must have some goals in mind in making their decisions. But whilst such companies will have objectives, in the absence of any formal planning these objectives are likely to remain implicit, being carried in the heads of executives. Thus there is always the danger that managers will operate with different goals in mind, so that the company lurches into the future in an unco‐ordinated fashion.

The appointment of executive heads in UN treaty-based organizations

The research reported in this article seeks to understand how and why individuals are appointed to serve as executive heads of international organizations. A simple statement of the behavioral rule used in selection of executive heads is developed in the form of an executive head appointment function. The type of data available for the analysis of the appointment of executive heads in international organizations is identified, and an empirical examination of changes in emphasis in the selection of executive heads is reported. The executive head appointment function utilized in the study views appointment as an executive head as a function of six factors (three organizational, one national, and two personal). Discriminant function analysis is used to determine if the function would distinguish between individuals appointed during the period 1945–57 and those appointed from 1958–70 as executive heads in UN treaty-based organizations. It is possible to distinguish, on the basis of the specified executive head appointment function, between executive heads appointed during the two halves of the time period under study. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the emphasis involved in the selection of executive heads has changed over time in UN treaty-based organizations.

Technocrats and the management of international fisheries

The paper examines the role of the world's fishery technocrats and experts in international fisheries management. The system of management provided by the regionally based international fisheries commissions is organized on transgovern-mental and transnational lines. Political delegates to the commissions are usually government technocrats, suggesting that the system is basically transgovernmental. However, the role of scientific advisers to the commissions is studied, since the group may preempt political control through its control on expertise. Results of a questionnaire sent to 900 scientists throughout the world are given, using the data from a structured sample of 84 scientists. Most were found to be trained as natural scientists, and most were employed directly by national governments or through government reseaich institutes. “Elite” scientists in the group, and some executive heads of commissions were also analyzed, and found to have a generally cautious approach to problems of fishery ownership and management. In sum, the transgovernmental system itself was found to allow yet set the limits of transnational role playing by fishery experts.

A Freeze on Missile Testing

“From a technical standpoint, the most amenable place for controls is testing; a comprehensive freeze on all missile tests would be most easily verified and would provide the utmost assurance against the perpetuation of a costly technology race.” Joshua Lederberg is executive head, department of genetics, Stanford University Medical School. He received the Nobel Prize in Medicine and Physiology in 1958 with George W. Beadle and E. L. Tatum. An abridged version of this article appeared in the “Washington Post.”

Al-Shaykh ‘Alī Ma’sūm ‘Alim Nahḍat al-‘Ulamā’ Dhū al-Ittijah al-Ḥadīth

K.H. Ali Maksum is recognized as one of the most leading 'ulama's (Muslim Scholars) of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the biggest traditional Muslim organization in Indonesia. This can be seen not only frorn the fact the he became rais 'am (the highest post in the structure of NU) from 1981 to 1984, but also from an important political role be played in this organization. It was Ali Maksum who supported the NU to take the principle (khittah) of 1925 in 1984 by which NU come back to be a social-religious organization after having had involved in the political practice. Likewise it was also Ali Maksum who "protected" Abdurrahman Wahid -the executive head of NU- from strong criticism of the 'ulami's as advocated by K.H. As'ad Syamsul Arifin. Abdurrahman Wahid was contended from his misconduct, especially from traditional Islamic viewpoint, so that be was elected again in 1989 as the executive head of the NU.DOI: 10.15408/sdi.v6i3.725

The Secretary-General: Some Comments on Recent Research

THE office of the Secretary-General has always been a central focus of those who have studied the structure and politics of the United Nations. Recently a number of studies have appeared which concern this office, and it is on some of the more important and general of these that this review will concentrate. It !shoiild be noted that two of the studies (those by Barros and Cox) do not specifically center on the office of the UN SecretaryGeneral, but at the same time they say a great deal about it. Barros' book concentrates on a particular Secretary-General of the League of Nations, but it seeks to clarify the background of the UN office and to generalize about the political role of both the League and UN Secretaries-General. Cox's article focuses on ;the executive officers of all international organizations, but in so doing makes numerous specific and general points Which are relevant to the UN executive head.

The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization

The quality of executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organization. Now sufficiently long and varied to allow a comparative approach, the history of international organization may provide elements for a theory of leadership. This essay is but a preliminary effort in that direction. It is concerned not only with how the executive head protects and develops his position as top man but also with how, by doing so, he may be the creator of a new (if yet slender) world power base.

The Assembly Elections in Pakistan

Compared to the recent Presidential elections, the assembly elections in Pakistan were relatively unexciting for some very obvious reasons. Under the Pakistan Constitution, the President is the central, if not the sole, repository of all power: besides being the executive head and the commander of the armed forces, he enjoys substantial powers in the field of legislation as well. The (unicameral) National Assembly is neither so powerful nor so influential in the formulation of national policies as the U.S. Congress, not to speak of legislatures in the parliamentary system. The Assembly's control of the purse is limited: its sanction is required only for the expenditures in the annual budget statement (which forms a very small part). Presidential appointments and decisions, and ministerial actions are beyond its control. The procedure for circumventing the President's veto on bills passed by it is extremely difficult and circuitous. Constitutional amendments call for a two-thirds majority with the presidential concurrence and a three-fourths majority without such concurrence. In such a situation, the President still has the power to refer the matter to referendum by the electoral college or dissolve the Assembly and seek re-election himself. Athough the question as to who would wield power for the next five years had been settled in the Presidential elections, no government likes to face a hostile legislature all the time, much less resort to special emergency provisions to circumvent the roadblocks in the path of governmental legislation put up by such a legislature. Hence the hope of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League party (PML) was to pick up at least two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly and the equally determined efforts of the Combined Opposition Party (COP) were to deny the ruling party such a comfortable majority. Notwithstanding the stake of both the parties in the composition of the new National Assembly, the elections failed to arouse major interest, chiefly because the outcome of the Presidential elections had, for good or ill, seemingly cast the die. Ayub's victory had more than recouped the sagging morale of the ruling PML, effectively checkmated the fastgathering momentum of the opposition and, most importantly, seriously affected its morale. Whereas the PML was going from one resounding victory to another, the opposition was floundering in one defeat after another, moving in the course of this from demoralization to despair. The opposition's gloom in the wake of the Presidential defeat could be traced largely to the fact that the opposition not only became a victim of

School Health

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsOliver E. ByrdOliver E. Byrd, M.D., executive head of the Department of Health Education, Stanford University, California, discusses nine misconceptions concerning the school health program.

Administrative Dangers in the Enlarged Highway Program

State Management Weaknesses It is appropriate to examine some of the management weaknesses which departments of highways have encountered in the past with particular reference to the enlargement of the program under stepped-up federal aid since 1956. One difficulty arises from the method by which state highway department officials are selected. Fundamentally, there are two patterns, and each of them has limitations. In the first, the director or commissioner of highways is appointed by the chief executive, with or without some sort of legislative approval. He usually serves during the tenure of a particular governor. In a few such states, the administrator is at the same level as other commissioners and associated with them in an official or unofficial cabinet. A second pattern appears where state highway commissions choose the executive head of the department,

Defining Our Employment Goal Under the 1946 Act

THE wording of Section 2 of Employment Act of I946 -its declaration of policy -is notoriously vague. There is, even today, widespread disagreement as to whether or not it is really a law or even what courses of action a full employment policy would entail for government or require from business community. The negotiated language of act suggests both ends and means that are breath-taking in their implications and also includes artfully contrived restrictions that might be so construed in practice as to paralyze action. It thus devolved upon President, his executive heads, and his economic advisers to interpret new law so as to vitalize it or perchance sterilize it and upon Joint Economic Committee of and two Houses to review executive interpretation and to implement or perchance to correct or frustrate it. We are now ending tenth year of this interpretative experience, and it would seem timely to look back over developments of these years to see what light they throw on question what goals of employment are in fact coming to expression or acceptance as a feature -perhaps a preponderant feature -of our national economic life. Prefatory to such an analysis it will be helpful to consider some concepts of employment problem and beliefs as to what should be expected by way of its solution which were entertained in business and academic circles where problem was considered in years just preceding passage of Employment Act. That review will shed considerable light on what was the intent of Congress as it reflected Congressional reading of will of people.

The Soviet Succession: Lenin and Stalin

T HE problem of succession to the headship of state and party was first posed for the new Soviet regime with dramatic suddenness a scant four and a half years after it had come into existence. Lenin, the acknowledged father of the Bolshevik revolution, the unquestioned leader of the Russian Communist Party (though without formal title as such), and the executive head of the Soviet state in his capacity as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, suffered a stroke-cerebral hemorrhage-on May 26, 1922, at the age of fifty-two. A good seven years were to pass before the regime was to regain the degree of individual direction which it lost on that date.

Food and Agriculture Organization

A report containing 57 proposals for expanded activities in technical assistance for economic development was transmitted by Director General N. E. Dodd to member governments of the Food and Agriculture Organization. The report contained portions of the general cooperative program agreed upon by the executive heads of the United Nations and the specialized agencies which referred particularly to work in FAO's field. The projects did not constitute an inclusive list but were rather a series of concrete examples of fields of activities in which technical assistance was needed for economic development. The projects were considered as part of an expanded program of general economic development and were to be closely related to the present program of work, but because the regular working program included little continuing assistance to governments in particular problems, the supplementary projects were to concentrate on that kind of aid. FAO proposed work in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, forestry, rural services and economic and statistical services. The proposals totaled in cost about $9.5 million for the first year and about $11.5 million for the second year, while actual programs and cost would depend on the degree of participation by beneficiary governments, who would be expected to bear a considerable part of the total cost.

Congress of the Universities of the Common-wealth

THE sixth Congress of Universities of the Commonwealth will be held at Oxford during July 19–23. Some three hundred delegates are expected to attend, and observers have been appointed by Unesco, the United States and various learned institutions. Among the topics to be discussed are : relations of the State and the universities ; inter-university relations; a critical review, from the points of view of a historian, a philosopher and a sociologist, of the structural and moral changes produced in modern society by scientific and technological advance; the balance of research and teaching in universities ; general plan for colonial higher education ; extension of the university secondment scheme. The Congress is being preceded by a private conference, held at Bristol during the past week, of executive heads of universities.

The Tenure of Cabinet Officers

Section 202(a) of Public Law 253 of the 80th Congress, 1st Session, approved July 26, 1947, provides that “there shall be a Secretary of Defense, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Section 311 of the same act amends the Presidential Succession Act, approved July 18, by striking out “Secretary of War” and inserting in lieu thereof “Secretary of Defense,” and striking out “Secretary of the Navy.”The effect of these changes is to elevate the Secretary of Defense to a position in the President's cabinet and to provide for his possible succession to the presidency. The law gives authority for his appointment, but says nothing about his term of office. This raises a question concerning which there is considerable confusion and lack of information. Specifically, what is the term of office of heads of the executive departments, i.e., those who compose the President's cabinet?If one turns to the more recently established executive departments—those of Commerce and Labor—he reads that in each case the Secretary's “term and tenure of office shall be like that of the heads of the other executive departments.” Further research discloses the interesting fact that only one of the other executive heads has a legal term. This is the Postmaster General. In his case, the law provides that “the term of the Postmaster General shall be for and during the term of the President by whom he is appointed, and for one month thereafter, unless sooner removed.”