Recent studies suggest that learners who are asked to predict the outcome of an event learn more than learners who are asked to evaluate it retrospectively or not at all. One possible explanation for this "prediction boost" is that it helps learners engage metacognitive reasoning skills that may not be spontaneously leveraged, especially for individuals with still-developing executive functions. In this paper, we combined multiple analytic approaches to investigate the potential role of executive functions in elementary school-aged children's science learning. We performed an experiment that investigates children's science learning during a water displacement task where a "prediction boost" had previously been observed-children either made an explicit prediction or evaluated an event post hoc (i.e., postdiction). We then considered the relation of executive function measures and learning, which were collected following the main experiment. Via mixed effects regression models, we found that stronger executive function skills (i.e., stronger inhibition and switching scores) were associated with higher accuracy in Postdiction but not in the Prediction Condition. Using a theory-based Bayesian model, we simulated children's individual performance on the learning task (capturing "belief flexibility"), and compared this "flexibility" to the other measures to understand the relationship between belief revision, executive function, and prediction. Children in the Prediction Condition showed near-ceiling "belief flexibility" scores, which were significantly higher than among children in the Postdiction Condition. We also found a significant correlation between children's executive function measures to our "belief flexibility" parameter, but only for children in the Postdiction Condition. These results indicate that when children provided responses post hoc, they may have required stronger executive function capacities to navigate the learning task. Additionally, these results suggest that the "prediction boost" in children's science learning could be explained by increased metacognitive flexibility in the belief revision process.
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