Over the last years, an increasing number of firms has started to integrate corporate social responsibility (CSR) criteria in executive compensation contracts, thereby tying CEO compensation directly to social and environmental performance. However, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of CSR incentives in improving social and environmental performance is mixed, finding both evidence in favor of and against its effectiveness. Using an eight-year sample consisting of 2,579 firm-year observations with manually collected compensation contract data, I zoom in on determinants of the adoption of CSR targets in CEO compensation and its effects on subsequent environmental performance. First, I show that both internal normative pressure and external mimetic pressure serve as a conduit for the adoption of environmental control mechanisms in executive compensation contracts. Further, I also show that not all types of pressure lead to substantive implementation of targets. That is, I document that internal normative pressure mainly results in substantive implementation, as internal pressure is associated with a subsequent increase in environmental performance. Mimetic pressure, on the other hand, does not automatically lead to improved environmental performance, suggesting that mimetic pressure might drive a symbolic commitment, potentially aimed at enhancing social legitimacy and acceptance.