Evolutionary Game Model Research Articles

Green technology innovation or pollution substitution? an evolutionary game for high-Energy-consuming enterprises’ strategy from a consideration of energy-consuming trading rights

ABSTRACT The energy-consuming rights trading (ECRT) environmental regulatory policy starting from demand side reform has a significant influence on the enterprises’ production strategies. However, there is still a lack of research on dynamic mechanisms from a micro perspective. Referencing ECRT policy implementation, this paper incorporates government, the public, and high-energy-consuming enterprises into a unified framework, and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the enterprises’ production strategy under the reward and punishment accountability mechanism. Then, a case study is addressed to examine the role of government. The results show that: (1) The steady-state conditions of the three parties depend on their own cost–benefit circumstances. Enterprises’ production strategy is driven by the coordination of the government and the public. (2) Achieving ideal equilibrium path evolution requires that the expected benefits of green technology innovation more strongly than the expected benefits of ‘pollution substitution’ practices. (3) A strict accountability system that includes penalties and rewards can enhance public supervision and accelerate the transformation of government active regulatory supervision strategies, stimulating the internal driving forces that motivate enterprises’ green technology innovation. The findings provide references for promoting the implementation of ECRT and helping to achieve the strategy of ecological civilisation construction.

Resources collection strategy of emergency materials based on evolutionary game model in complex network

PurposeIn recent years, the frequency of emergencies, such as natural disasters and public health crises, has markedly increased globally. These occurrences have introduced new challenges to national public security systems and emergency management capabilities. Post-disaster humanitarian logistic operations involve the collection of emergency relief resources to mitigate the impact of disasters in affected areas. Effective coordination among governments, enterprises and charities is essential to enhance the efficiency of these operations. This study employs evolutionary game theory to explore the strategic interactions and behavioral patterns among these key stakeholders during the collection of emergency materials.Design/methodology/approachA tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, enterprises and charities is developed. Subsequently, to validate the theoretical findings, a scale-free network is constructed for the purpose of numerical simulations. As this network evolves, both the edges between nodes and the strategy choices of the nodes also change. Numerical simulations are conducted using the network to examine the sensitivity of factors influencing strategic choices among game stakeholders.FindingsAccording to the model simulation results, penalties significantly influence government regulation strength, while enterprise philanthropic behavior is mainly affected by penalties, profit transfer benefits and trust loss. For charities, strategic choices are primarily driven by penalties, tax subsidies, illegal operation benefits and charitable costs. The findings provide a theoretical basis for governments, enterprises and charities to select the sensible strategy.Originality/valueOur study establishes a dynamic network of edges and nodes evolving over time to analyze the strategic evolutionary paths of governments, enterprises and charities from a micro perspective. The results assist governments, enterprises and charities in making more strategic decisions.

An evolutionary game theory between finance innovation and financial regulation

ABSTRACT Internet finance is a new type of financial industry that is different from traditional finance. This study constructs an evolutionary game model between financial regulators and Internet financial institutions and discusses the strategy choices of the two participants under different circumstances. When analyzing the stable equilibrium strategy, the results show that when there are stable points in the game, Internet financial institutions tend to ‘excessive innovation’, while regulators’ strategies are affected by costs and benefits. When there is no stable point in the game, financial regulators and Internet financial institutions are in a continuous game of ‘moderate innovation – maintenance regulation – excessive innovation – strengthen regulation – moderate innovation.’ The study also provides policy recommendations to balance Internet financial innovation and regulation.

Research on healthcare data sharing in the context of digital platforms considering the risks of data breaches

BackgroundWithin China's healthcare landscape, the sharing of medical data has emerged as a pivotal force propelling advancements in the insurance sector and enhancing patient engagement with healthcare services. However, medical institutions often exhibit reluctance toward data sharing due to apprehensions regarding data security and privacy safeguards. To navigate this conundrum, our research introduces and empirically validates a model grounded in evolutionary game theory, offering a robust theoretical framework and actionable strategies for facilitating healthcare data sharing while harmonizing the dual imperatives of data utility and privacy preservation.MethodsIn this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model involving medical institutions, big data innovation platforms, and insurance companies within the context of digital platforms. The model integrates exogenous causes of data breaches, endogenous causes of data breaches, compensation payments, government penalties, subsidies, unreasonable fees, claims efficiency, and insurance fraud.ResultsThe stability analysis of the evolutionary game identifies eight equilibrium points among medical institutions, platforms, and insurance companies. Numerical simulations demonstrate convergence toward strategy E7 = (0, 0, 1), suggesting a trend for medical institutions to adopt a fully anonymous information-sharing strategy, platforms to implement strict regulation, and insurance companies to opt for an auditing approach. Sensitivity analysis reveals that the parameters selected in this study significantly influence the players' behavioral choices and the game's equilibria.ConclusionsWhen breaches occur, medical institutions tend to seek co-sharing between platforms and insurance companies. This promotes enhanced regulation by platforms and incentivizes insurance companies to perform audits. If the responsibility for the breach is attributed to the platform or the insurance company, the liability sharing system will push healthcare organizations to choose a fully anonymous information sharing strategy. Otherwise, medical institutions will choose partially anonymous information sharing for more benefits. In case of widespread data leakage, the amount of compensation shall augment, and the role of compensation shall replace the role of government supervision. Then, the government shall penalize them, which shall reduce the motivation of each subject.

Evolutionary decision‐making behaviour among the government, leading enterprises and farmers: Based on the improvement of phaeozem quality in Northeast China

AbstractThe improvement of phaeozem quality in Northeast China is crucial to China's food security. This study incorporated government, leading enterprises and farmers into an evolutionary game model to explore the ideal state among the government, leading enterprises and farmers with the improvement of the phaeozem quality in Northeast China, thereby contributing to food security. The study includes the government, leading enterprises and farmers in an evolutionary game model to explore game relationship and evolution paths of decision‐making among the three stakeholders, and obtains the conditions for the three parties to evolve to the ideal state by analysing and combining with the actual data. The evolutionary process of the decision‐making behaviour of the three stakeholders to an ideal state is affected by many factors, and the value ranges of the different factors have different impacts on the convergence speed of the three stakeholders to an ideal state; when certain conditions are met, the decision‐making behaviours of the three stakeholders can evolve to an ideal state, which aims to provide beneficial suggestions for the government to supervise the quality of phaeozem, leading enterprises to control green agricultural products and farmers to apply organic fertilizer.

Study on Household Investment Decision of Household Photovoltaic Project Promotion -- Based on Inclusive Finance Perspective

Considering the lack of research on households' investment decisions in promoting photovoltaic projects in existing studies, this study constructs a four-party evolutionary game model based on local governments, financing institutions, photovoltaic enterprises and households from the perspective of inclusive finance. In addition, according to the influence of irrational psychological factors on the decision-making outcome of each interested party in decision-making, this study innovatively introduces regret theory to improve the evolutionary game model. Then, each subject' evolutionary stabilisation strategies and system equilibrium points are analysed explicitly using the perceived benefit function and the replicated dynamic differential equation. Finally, combined with the system dynamics method, the theoretical derivation results are verified by parameter assignment, and the sensitivity of each subject to multiple influencing factors is explored. The results show that: (1) under the current market condition, the system is stabilised in the strategy combination of Case I (subsidy, conventional finance, non-promotion, loan to build), but the ideal state can be achieved through the refinement and adjustment of policies. And there is a mutual influence between the subjects. (2) The regret-elation perception psychology of each subject has a non-negligible influence on their decision-making behaviour. The combination of strategies in Case I is a conservative decision by the subjects. (3) A variety of factors influences the behavioural decisions of each subject, and the amount of rent that photovoltaic enterprises can provide is a crucial factor affecting households' investment decisions. (4) Local governments incentives and penalties play a key incentive role in promoting the active participation of financing institutions and photovoltaic enterprises in the promotion endeavour. This study provides practical guidance and policy insights for promoting the diffuse use of renewable energy and the promotion of household photovoltaic projects while enriching the applied research by combining regret theory and evolutionary game theory.

Two-layer network evolutionary game model applied to complex systems

Two-layer network evolutionary game model applied to complex systems

Collaborative strategy towards a resilient urban energy system: Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model

Collaborative strategy towards a resilient urban energy system: Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Electric Vehicle Distribution Entities with Shared Charging Facilities

This study investigates the evolutionary game dynamics among electric vehicle distribution entities in the context of shared charging facilities, addressing the critical issue of inadequate charging resources. To understand the behavior of different stakeholders under government incentive policies, we develop an evolutionary game model involving a government department and two logistics enterprises (A and B). Through stability analysis, we explore equilibrium conditions of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) for the tripartite evolutionary game. To ensure the robustness of our findings, we conduct a MATLAB simulation analysis to validate the analytical results. Our findings highlight that government subsidies, the costs incurred by logistics enterprises to share charging facilities, and the additional distribution income derived from this sharing are critical in determining whether the evolutionary game can achieve a stable equilibrium state. This research enables logistics companies to optimize the use of charging resources, lower operating costs, and enhance delivery efficiency. Additionally, government subsidy policies play a crucial role in encouraging logistics enterprises to engage in charging facility sharing, thereby fostering the sustainable development of the entire logistics industry. Based on these insights, the paper offers practical recommendations to further promote the sharing of charging facilities in electric vehicle distribution.

A Study on Consumers’ Willingness to Purchase Autonomous Vehicles from a Multi-Party Interaction Perspective: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model Involving the Government, Automobile Manufacturers, and Consumers

With the rapid development of autonomous driving technology, the advent of the autonomous driving era has become inevitable. An in-depth study of consumers’ willingness to purchase autonomous vehicles is critical to accelerating the adoption and commercialization of autonomous vehicles. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of governments, automobile manufacturers, and consumers, we analyze the stable choice of unilateral strategy and equilibrium strategy of autonomous vehicle purchase intention. The MATLAB2022b tool was used for data simulation analysis to verify the validity of the conclusion and the influence of related factors on the purchase intention toward autonomous vehicles. The results show the following: (1) The combination of government support, active R&D, and consumer purchasing is the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the model. (2) With an increase in government support, the probability of automobile enterprises taking the initiative to participate in R&D also increases. However, the negative impact of risk can significantly reduce the incentive for firms to conduct R&D and reduce the effectiveness of government support. (3) Government subsidies to consumers and purchase incentives offered by automotive companies can significantly increase the likelihood that consumers will purchase an autonomous vehicle. Based on these findings, recommendations are made to strengthen government support, establish risk mitigation mechanisms, and strengthen market promotion efforts to promote the commercialization of autonomous vehicles. The study provides a new perspective for understanding multi-party interactions in the rollout of autonomous vehicles and provides valuable insights for policymakers and industry stakeholders.

Green technology diffusion mechanism in China's aviation industry cluster based on complex network game model

The aviation industry cluster's diverse strategic choices of firms significantly influence the green technology diffusion. To examine how external factors and intra-cluster associative structures influence green technology diffusion, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of green technology networks based on small-world networks, integrating governmental regulation and public oversight perspectives. Through simulations within the real-world aviation context, we analyze the dynamic characteristics of green technology diffusion. Furthermore, we investigate the driving effects of governmental and public initiatives in facilitating green transformation of aviation manufacturing firms. The empirical results reveal several critical insights: (1) A government-mandated minimum threshold for environmental subsidies is crucial to propel the green technology diffusion. In scenarios where environmental regulation penalties are inadequately low, speculative behaviors among firms occur, hindering the diffusion process. (2) Amplifying public engagement significantly bolsters the rate of green technology diffusion and augments the average returns for firms. The public's tolerance threshold for environmental pollution exhibits a high sensitivity to the success of green technology diffusion. (3) We discern variances in green technology diffusion across different network types. While green technology successfully permeates scale-free networks with diverse densities, its diffusion is notably impeded in small-world networks with lower densities. The associative structures and hierarchical distribution of firms within clusters drive varying outcomes in green technology diffusion.

Research on Knowledge Payment Product Supply Chain Governance Based on Blockchain: An Evolutionary Game Model

ABSTRACTBlockchain provides a new opportunity to govern the dilemmas in the knowledge payment product supply chain. This paper introduces blockchain into the evolutionary game to explore the behavioral strategies of knowledge providers, platforms, and consumers and to analyze in depth the influence of initial willingness and blockchain‐related factors by the system dynamics. The analysis shows that (1) improving the tripartite initial willingness is conducive to accelerating the process of supply chain governance and making the system reach an ideal state: knowledge providers choose compliance creation, platforms adopt blockchain, and consumers buy authorized product; (2) there are specific thresholds for the blockchain adoption cost and the premium of product brought by blockchain, only when the cost and premium are lower than the thresholds, the system evolves towards the ideal state; (3) when blockchain is adopted, it can effectively inhibit knowledge providers' illegal creation behavior and consumers' piracy behavior by increasing the punishments of platforms on knowledge providers and consumers. The results provide guidance to implement effective governance and the orderly development of knowledge payment industry.

Research on contractor claim strategy based on the principle of maximizing profits by using evolutionary game model

Research on contractor claim strategy based on the principle of maximizing profits by using evolutionary game model

Punishment or reward? Environmental information disclosure in Chinese listed companies based on evolutionary game systems

AbstractIn February 2022, the Chinese government implemented a mandatory environmental information disclosure policy for publicly traded corporations. To assess the factors influencing environmental information disclosure, we developed a tripartite evolutionary game system model based on strategic interactions between the government, enterprises and the public. Afterwards, we conducted a simulation to examine the systemic interaction equilibrium among the parties involved. Additionally, we assessed critical factor changes in decision‐making for three stakeholders: initial strategy selection, related policy subsidies, regulatory penalties and public incentives. Incorporating Gaussian white noise into the evolutionary game model enhances the realism of simulations, allowing for a more accurate representation of how random disturbances affect decision‐making among the government, the public and enterprises. The study reveals that the active participation of the public in information disclosure activities has a certain degree of substitution effect on the government's choice to regulate high‐quality information disclosure by enterprises actively. The penalty mechanism is more effective than the subsidy mechanism. The public's decision‐making process is susceptible to the direct economic benefits that enterprises can gain from disclosing low‐quality environmental information.

Research on the green development path of prefabricated building industry based on intelligent technology

PurposeIn order to make the construction industry develop in the direction of greening, this paper analyzes whether the application of intelligent technology in prefabricated buildings can achieve carbon emission reduction, starting from the problems of weak technology and insufficient encouragement policies in the prefabricated building industry. It also designs dynamic and adjustable incentives for the smart transformation of prefabricated buildings and makes recommendations to facilitate the transformation of assembly manufacturers into “smart factories”.Design/methodology/approachThis paper takes the intelligent technology for carbon reduction, energy efficiency and policy design in the prefabricated buildings industry as the starting point. Based on in-depth expert interviews and questionnaire survey data, a linear multiple regression model is used to establish an association network of intelligent technology in the production and transportation, construction, operation and maintenance, demolition and scrapping stages. On this basis, an evolutionary game theory is used to construct a smart transformation and carbon reduction utility game model between the government and manufacturers, and relevant suggestions for smart empowerment of green construction development technology combinations and policy settings are proposed.FindingsAn assembly manufacturing plant with smart empowerment is an important way to achieve green and sustainable development in the construction industry. Among them, BIM and IoT have made a greater impact on carbon emission reduction of prefabricated buildings in all stages of the whole life cycle. The government’s proposed energy efficiency incentives and environmental tax amount will effectively increase companies' motivation for smart transformation of prefabricated buildings. However, when the environmental tax amount is low, the government should strengthen the regulation of the industry in order to increase the speed of smart transformation of assembly manufacturers. Therefore, a reasonable setting of the environmental tax rate and energy-saving incentives and flexible adjustment of the regulatory efforts can maximize the functional utility of the government in the process of smart transformation.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper focuses on the impact of intelligent technologies on the overall carbon emissions of the industry and provides an evolutionary analysis of the strategic game between the government and assembly manufacturers, the main players in the smart transformation process of prefabricated buildings. However, smart technologies for different categories of assembly manufacturing plants and strategic options for a wider range of stakeholders have not been examined in depth.Originality/valueDifferent from existing research, this study focuses on exploring the strategic game between the government and assembly manufacturers in the smart transformation of prefabricated buildings. It provides an innovative explanation of the connection between intelligent technology and carbon emissions. The study develops an evolutionary game model for both parties, addressing the research gap on the combined effects of policy incentives and intelligent technology on carbon reduction and efficiency improvement in the prefabricated buildings industry. This research not only offers practical reference for the government in designing incentive mechanisms and establishing regulatory systems but also provides feasible practical guidance for the smart transformation and carbon reduction efforts of assembly manufacturing plants.

Methods to Stimulate the Proactivity of Enterprises in Fulfilling Safety Responsibilities: A Fundamental Issue in Construction Safety Management

Management factors are among the most significant causes of construction safety incidents, and there is an issue of insufficient supervision at present. The degree of diligence exhibited by relevant entities is crucial, and the payoff can influence the decision-making behaviors of involved parties. Based on this, the aim of this paper is to investigate how to enhance the initiative of enterprises in fulfilling their safety responsibilities during the construction process. By developing a tripartite evolutionary game model that involves supervision companies, general contractors, and labor subcontractors and conducting numerical simulation analysis, we reveal that simultaneous proactive investment in safety by all three parties is challenging, with labor subcontractors being relatively more prone to opt for active safety investment. Supervision companies and general contractors often struggle to fulfill their safety duties at the same time. Factors such as the rewards and penalties stipulated in a contract, rent-seeking amounts, and accident-related losses have a significant impact on the evolution of the system. Based on the findings, we propose recommendations for construction management, which include the management of labor subcontracting in construction, the control of rent-seeking behaviors, and the establishment of a cooperative safety culture during the construction process.

Research on the recycling decision of WEEE in rural China under dual supervision

Against the backdrop of promoting green, low-carbon, and high-quality development, this paper aims to promote efficient recycling of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) in rural China. In this paper, considering the integrated development of urban and rural areas and the standardization of industrial recycling system, under the joint action of the extension of producer responsibility and “dual regulation” of supply and marketing cooperatives, the evolutionary game model and system dynamics model of three-level recycling network of farmers, supply and marketing cooperatives and retailers are established. The mechanism of the participants to promote the recycling of WEEE in rural areas is discussed and the strategic choices and interactive relationships of various entities in the evolutionary process were used to analyze through the evolutionary game method. Meanwhile, using the theory of system dynamics, the main influencing factors of different evolution stages and the dynamic change process of the system are analyzed. The results show that: (1) supply and marketing cooperatives, retailers, and farmers can initially tend to participate in and supervise the recycling of WEEE; however, (2) they can finally achieve strong supervision, actively undertake and participate in the recycling and stabilization stable strategy of rural WEEE depends on their benefits and cost of expenditure expenditures are reasonable. (3) The strategic choice of supply and marketing cooperatives has the most significant impact on the strategic choice of retailers and the strategic choice of retailers has the most significant impact on the strategic choice of farmers.

Research on the diffusion and control of unsafe behaviors among chemical industry park enterprises based on the SEIR evolutionary game model

In order to control the diffusion of unsafe behaviors among chemical industrial park enterprises, a Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) evolutionary game model is constructed based on the theory of epidemiology and evolutionary game theory. By exploring the game relationship between emergency management departments and safety assessment agencies, the paper analyzes the diffusion paths and evolutionary patterns of unsafe behaviors in chemical industrial park enterprises under different behavioral strategies adopted by both parties. Furthermore, it examines the process and patterns of system evolution to a positive stable state, and conducts multi-scenario simulation and analysis. The results indicate that the interactive behaviors of "strict regulation" by emergency management departments and "high-quality safety assessment" by safety assessment agencies are more conducive to controlling the diffusion of unsafe behaviors among chemical industrial park enterprises. Improving the efficiency of emergency management departments, establishing an attractive and constraining reward and punishment system to guide safety assessment agencies in conducting high-quality safety assessments, and stimulating the initiative of chemical industrial park enterprises in safety behaviors will be more conducive to forming an integrated, coordinated, and mutually constraining mechanism for work safety governance.

Taxation Can Significantly Enhance The Effectiveness of Reward and Punishment Mechanisms in The N-Person Snowdrift Game

We extend the reward and punishment mechanisms in the N-person evolutionary snowdrift game (NSG) model by constructing a tax-based pure punishment NSG model and a tax-based pure reward NSG model. Using replicator dynamics, we established two sets of dynamic equations that describe the evolution of the frequencies of the three strategies. Over longer time scales, both systems exhibit stable states involving two strategies, with the exclusion of the third. Introducing tax factors into the reward and punishment mechanisms significantly increases the proportion of cooperators in the steady state and eliminates defectors, with the time to reach the steady state depending on the tax rate. Moreover, we found that tax-based pure reward strategies are more conducive to fostering cooperative behavior within the system compared to tax-based pure punishment strategies. We employed numerical algorithms to simulate the replicator dynamics, and the results of the dynamic equations were in perfect agreement with the numerical simulations.

Optimization strategies for green power and certificate trading in China considering seasonality: An evolutionary game-based system dynamics

China has adopted renewable portfolio standards and tradable green certificates (including hydropower) to increase the proportion of green power used and reduce carbon emissions. However, hydropower generation is affected by seasonal factors, making it difficult to increase green power consumption in water-scarce areas. Trading electricity and green certificates in regions with different resource endowments can effectively solve this problem. Therefore, this study uses evolutionary game theory to explore the impact of the change in the policy of issuing green certificates for hydropower on the strategic choices of the trading parties. Based on the evolutionary game model, a system dynamics model is established to explore the optimization strategies of green power and certificate trading under the influence of seasonal factors. The results of the case study show that (1) the price of green certificates varies with seasonal changes. (2) Sellers with abundant hydropower resources should increase the amount of hydropower connected to the grid during the water-abundant period to help deficit areas achieve their consumption targets (3) Expanding the scope of green certificates can gradually eliminate government subsidies and incentives and reduce the government's financial pressure.