Punishment or reward? Environmental information disclosure in Chinese listed companies based on evolutionary game systems

Abstract

AbstractIn February 2022, the Chinese government implemented a mandatory environmental information disclosure policy for publicly traded corporations. To assess the factors influencing environmental information disclosure, we developed a tripartite evolutionary game system model based on strategic interactions between the government, enterprises and the public. Afterwards, we conducted a simulation to examine the systemic interaction equilibrium among the parties involved. Additionally, we assessed critical factor changes in decision‐making for three stakeholders: initial strategy selection, related policy subsidies, regulatory penalties and public incentives. Incorporating Gaussian white noise into the evolutionary game model enhances the realism of simulations, allowing for a more accurate representation of how random disturbances affect decision‐making among the government, the public and enterprises. The study reveals that the active participation of the public in information disclosure activities has a certain degree of substitution effect on the government's choice to regulate high‐quality information disclosure by enterprises actively. The penalty mechanism is more effective than the subsidy mechanism. The public's decision‐making process is susceptible to the direct economic benefits that enterprises can gain from disclosing low‐quality environmental information.