Abstract
ABSTRACT The energy-consuming rights trading (ECRT) environmental regulatory policy starting from demand side reform has a significant influence on the enterprises’ production strategies. However, there is still a lack of research on dynamic mechanisms from a micro perspective. Referencing ECRT policy implementation, this paper incorporates government, the public, and high-energy-consuming enterprises into a unified framework, and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the enterprises’ production strategy under the reward and punishment accountability mechanism. Then, a case study is addressed to examine the role of government. The results show that: (1) The steady-state conditions of the three parties depend on their own cost–benefit circumstances. Enterprises’ production strategy is driven by the coordination of the government and the public. (2) Achieving ideal equilibrium path evolution requires that the expected benefits of green technology innovation more strongly than the expected benefits of ‘pollution substitution’ practices. (3) A strict accountability system that includes penalties and rewards can enhance public supervision and accelerate the transformation of government active regulatory supervision strategies, stimulating the internal driving forces that motivate enterprises’ green technology innovation. The findings provide references for promoting the implementation of ECRT and helping to achieve the strategy of ecological civilisation construction.
Published Version
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