European External Action Service Research Articles

The Impact of Disinformation on the Functioning of the Rule of Law and Democratic Processes in the Eu

Disinformation and propaganda are based on the fact that the information: i) is designed to be totally or partially false, manipulated or misleading or uses unethical persuasion techniques; ii) concern a matter of public interest; (iii) is intended to generate insecurity, hostility or polarization or attempt to undermine democratic processes; iv) is disseminated and/or amplified using automatic and aggressive tools, such as social bots, artificial intelligence, micro-targeting or paid human trolls, often with the aim of increasing the public visibility of the content. Especially the systematic dissemination of disinformation by active politicians, parties or authorities is a clear and immediate threat to democracy and is disrespectful of the values of the European Union according to Article 2 TEU, because the trust in such authoritative persons is a value choice which cannot be changed by rational arguments. Moreover, deepfakes (algorithmically generated messages flooding recipients to give a false impression of political consensus) present a significant challenge for democracy, because they may sow uncertainty which may, in turn, reduce trust in news on social media and hinder civic participation in online debates. Finally, a study commissioned by the European External Antion Service, published in 2021, has focused on two more categories of disinformation: 'influence operations' by third countries, aimed at influencing a target audience using a range of illegitimate and deceptive means, and 'foreign interference', aimed at disrupting the free formation and expression of political will. Therefore, among the many issues dealt with by the EP resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, it must be mentioned the fact that foreign interference, including disinformation, is a national and cross-border security threat. Consequently, the EP has stressed the need for solidarity between the Member States so that such activities can be effectively combated, also amending Article 222 TFEU (the solidarity clause) by including foreign interference. In fact, with respect to disinformation a process of securitization is being promoted, consisting of applying security tools and discourses upon an object that was previously not identified as such. An example of this trend is represented by the specific task force set up within the European External Action Service in order to address Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns. Another example, showing that disinformation has become a CFSP issue, is the Council regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022, based on Council decision (CFSP) 2022/351, concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine. However, when determining the focus and political actions of the EU against disinformation, two opposing logics – securitization and self-regulation – coexist and compete. As a result, the EU is promoting a discourse linking disinformation to security, exceptionality and geopolitical strategies, but being lax at the same time with the obligations and responsibilities of the digital platform companies. Received: 25 December 2023 / Accepted: 25 February 2024 / Published: 23 April 2024

Social trust and the stringency of public policies against the COVID-19 pandemic

ABSTRACT One may wonder why countries have used different public policies to cope with the Covid-19 pandemic. We argue that social trust could be the missing link in explaining why these public policies vary in stringency. Based on the logic of game theory, we draw the hypothesis that more social trust in a society means that less stringent policies are needed to abate the COVID-19 pandemic. Empirical results at both country and individual levels confirm this hypothesis. The implications for public policy stemming from these findings suggest the necessity of addressing initiatives like Team Europe’s 2020 package launched by the European External Action Service (EEAS) to combat Covid-19 in non-EU nations. The more social trust in a society, the higher the likelihood of informal cooperation. Thus, less stringent policies are needed to abate the COVID-19 pandemic. In perspective, policymakers are likely to encounter fewer compliance issues and more cooperative behavior in countries with high levels of trust when confronting future crises.

ENHANCING EU'S RESILIENCE AGAINST TERRORISM: A LEGAL APPROACH

The growth in amplitude and frequency of the terrorist phenomenon at both the European and international levels, in the past years, makes terrorism one of the most significant challenges for European Union's security. Given EU's international ambitions of a significant actor in the field of security (European External Action Service, 2016), this paper approaches EU's responses to terrorism, from a legal point of view. Arguing in favour of the legal instruments as the most appropriate tools to counter the terrorist phenomenon, the aim of this research is to analyse if and how Europe can become more resilient against the terrorist threat, by resorting to legal means. Specifically, the paper seeks to explore how the regulation of the crime of terrorism in international law might foster the resilience of the EU in an increasingly challenging international context. Addressing the issue of terrorism is of high importance taking into consideration the current international context, when Europe is facing again a war and the terrorist offences have significantly increased along with the conflict in Ukraine that started in February 2022 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022).

Response of the European Union on Return Directive and Readmission Agreements (RDRAs) on Nigerian Irregular Migrants

This study appraised the EU RDRAs on Nigerian irregular migrants and examined the challenges of RDRAs on Nigerian irregular migrants. The study made use of primary sources of data through in-depth interview conducted on EU delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS, European External Action Service, Frontex, International Organisation for Migration, Idia Renaissance, Nigeria Immigration Service and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons. Findings from the study showed that two types of return directive exits; voluntary return and enforced return. Voluntary returnees are provided with Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) while enforced returnees are not provided with AVRR, and they are likely detained, escorted by the policemen through the back door and corridor of the airport and deported to Nigeria or transit countries. Findings from the study showed the challenges of RDRAs on Nigerian irregular migrants in that, most return carried out by the EU are not in compliance with the laid down regulation as some migrants are return to countries of transit. Moreover, the conditionality attached to readmission agreements are only applicable for high-skilled migrants, a situation described as brain drain for Nigeria and brain gain for the EU. The study concluded that EU RDRAs are restrictive in nature which provide escape routes for irregular migrants in European countries, and that lack of compliance on RDRAs are the results of unlawful detention of Nigerian irregular migrants by the EU as well as torture and abuse by the security officials and traffickers, a situation that violate human rights.

Can we provide appropriate tools to measure the effectiveness of climate agreements? The Paris agreement and the role of the European External Action Service

Can we provide appropriate tools to measure the effectiveness of climate agreements? How effective will, for example, the Paris Agreement be? Global emissions levels can be applied as a sole measure of performance. Current emission trends predict 2.7 degrees of temperature increase in the year 2100. The challenge rests in both the unavailability or difficulty of compiling proper data and information and the dynamic aspect which demands estimates of future developments. Furthermore, we argue that regime performance should be evaluated against a non-regime benchmark and compared to the objectives that the regime is created to achieve. In the case of the Paris Agreement, our measurement tools find that the agreement is likely to make a difference but far from sufficient to reach the 1.5-degree target. Reaching the 1.5-degree target is only possible if new negative emission technologies are developed and implemented unrealistically fast. To make the Paris Agreement successful, swift political action is, therefore, necessary from central institutional actors such as the European Union. In particular, climate diplomacy through the European External Action Service may channel the knowledge about measurement tools to partners worldwide.

The EU approach towards China in the context of countering hybrid threats

The article examines the EU approach towards China in terms of dealing with the hybrid threats. The study is based on the method of systemic analysis. It is revealed that the EU intention to strengthen its role in the international arena and to reduce dependence on third countries in providing critical infrastructure, as well as its solidarity with the rhetoric and practice of the USA to limit the economic influence of China, provokes a debate on the PRC’s activity within the framework of the narrative of hybrid threats. The documents of the European Parliament contain the majority of accusations of China in creating such threats. The Commission and the Council of the EU are trying to adhere to a less politicized tone, but their publications also contain references to the RPC as an actor of hybrid threats. The approach of the EU’s “institutional triangle” is also illustrated by the documents of the European External Action Service, EU agencies, and specialized think tanks. The EU institutions are seeking to limit China’s role in every area, from investment to education and media.

Technology Diffusion and Climate Action: A Leader–Follower Model

Can a small technology-developing country increase technology diffusion to developing countries in climate action? We argue that when a country takes into account all direct and indirect benefits from pushing forward the transnational diffusion of national green technology, a free transfer may give the country a net benefit. This result is driven by the idea that technology transfer partnerships enable the countries to tailor technology development to best fit the special circumstances of receiving countries. Such decentralised cooperation can pave the way for scalable technology diffusion. The focus is on one country’s renewable energy technology development and how this can affect climate action in major developing countries such as China and India. We propose a leader–follower model between the technology-developing country and the developing country that allows complex payoffs and focuses on a situation in which one country makes a cooperative move to solve the inherent collective action problem. This effective shared learning platform has an upscaling potential, and international organisations, such as the European External Action Service, could further facilitate technology diffusion to developing countries.

Późnowestfalskie innowacje w polityce zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej

The purpose of this article is to take a closer look at the European Union’s (EU) external policy and its diplomatic apparatus, i.e. the European External Action Service (EEAS). as a post-Westphalian political innovation specific only to the EU. The article assumes that the EU’s post-Westphalian external policy is based on multilateralism, hybridism and normative plasticity. All the features of the EU’s external policy became apparent in the EEAS, which, originally constructed as a ‘service’, gradually turned into an ‘interstitial organisation’. Trying to find its place between standardisation and adaptation to the structures and practices typical of classical Westphalian diplomacy, and the emergence of transformative structures and new diplomatic practice, it has become a source of innovation related to the changing dynamics in diplomacy.

A New Kid in Town? The Evolution of the EEAS Headquarters’ Involvement in EU Climate Diplomacy

Relatively little is known about the precise activities of the European External Action Service (EEAS) headquarters in the European Union’s (EU’s) international climate diplomacy, especially since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015. This article therefore sketches the evolution of the climate diplomacy activities undertaken by EEAS headquarters between the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in 2015 and COP26 in 2021. Based on a triangulation of official documents and twenty semi-structured interviews, the article finds that although the EEAS headquarters continues to coordinate and mainstream EU climate diplomacy, it has also become more outwardly-involved and entrepreneurial. This entrepreneurship can be explained by the creation within the EEAS of an Ambassador at Large for Climate Diplomacy, the working style of the appointed ambassador, increased resources at EEAS headquarters dedicated to climate diplomacy, and a favourable institutional context within the EU. These findings provide a detailed and updated insight into the involvement of EEAS headquarters within EU climate diplomacy. Accordingly, they improve our understanding of the EU as a climate actor and also demonstrate the importance of individuals in shaping how the EU conducts its climate diplomacy. EEAS, European Union, climate diplomacy, international climate politics

European Union's Public Diplomacy Analysis: The European External Action Service Chapter

European Union's Public Diplomacy Analysis: The European External Action Service Chapter

CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN THE LIGHT OF CARD -22

The aim of the article is to highlight the problems of development of the European defense industry, and the attempts to reform it. The presented text was prepared on the basis of documents of the European External Action Service, in the structures of which they function, and among others the EU Military Staff and the European Defense Agency. In 2017, several institutions were established to modernize and integrate several hundred dispersed European defense companies and equip them with competitive technologies. The European Defense Fund and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) play an important role in this area. In 2022, integration processes in the field of defense were accelerated due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, as well as after the adoption of a new European Union security strategy called the Strategic Compass. The European Defense Agency has also published the results and conclusions of CARD 2022.

The influence of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the development of the European diplomatic service

The article is devoted to the analysis of the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the functioning and development of the European External Action Service. The authors investigated the main stages of the evolution of the European diplomatic service from the time of the establishment of the first information offices of the European Coal and Steel Association in the fifties of the twentieth century to the formation of the European External Action Service in 2009 as part of the reform defined by the Treaty of Lisbon.
 From the moment of the establishment of the European Communities until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European diplomatic service was carried out by information missions of the Communities and missions of the European Commission, and later by the Directorate General headed by the European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and Neighborhood Policy. The competence of these bodies was derived from the powers of the European Commission, therefore the sphere of activity of the European diplomatic service was limited mainly or exclusively to economic issues, and defense and military-political issues remained outside the attention of common European diplomacy.
 After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European External Action Service was headed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Their formal powers extend to all aspects of foreign policy, but in fact, until 2022, European diplomacy focused on economic issues and was not ready to effectively counter Russian aggression by diplomatic means. Therefore, the needs of guaranteeing the military-political security of the European Union itself, its member states and partners require a review of the institutional mechanism of the European External Action Service in terms of strengthening its role in solving military-political, defense and security issues, in particular, regarding the introduction of centralized models of adoption joint decisions.

The Role of EEAS Chairs in Council Negotiations on Foreign and Security Policy Post‐Lisbon

AbstractThis article examines the impact of the introduction of a permanent chair in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Lisbon Treaty transferred the functions of the rotating Presidency to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, represented at lower levels by officials from the European External Action Service (EEAS). Whilst the permanent chair was intended to improve effectiveness in CFSP negotiations, recent deadlocks challenge such expectations. Drawing on sociological approaches, we show that the ability of EEAS chairs to uphold the impartiality norm has been undermined by the fact that they are perceived as ‘outsiders’ by national negotiators. This has had negative consequences on the chairs' capacity to fulfil key roles of organiser, broker and political leader and, in turn, negotiation dynamics. Based on these findings, we argue for the need to take norms and identity factors more seriously when designing institutions.

The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy before the Court of Justice of the European Union

The article discusses the participation of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union (the High Representative) and that of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It recalls that, while the EEAS, in accordance with its prerogatives, has been accepted as a party mainly in staff cases since its creation, the High Representative itself has only recently asked for leave to intervene in order to protect its institutional standing. By order of 3 March 2022, the President of the Court of Justice allowed the intervention of the High Representative in an inter-institutional case (C-551/21), opposing the Commission and the Council on the question of which institution is allowed to decide who signs EU agreements with third countries. Only two months later, the order of the President of the Grand Chamber of the General Court of 11 May 2022 granted the High Representative leave to intervene in support of the Council in case T-125/22 RT France v Council. These two orders mark a milestone for the judicial presence of the Union’s foreign policy chief. The High Representative can now intervene before the Court in external relations cases which directly affect his institutional prerogatives. The authors submit that the same arguments should also allow the High Representative to bring direct action against other EU institutions or to be challenged in that way in certain constellations.

Dialogic approach in the EU’s international cultural relations: joint EUNIC-EU delegation projects as heritage diplomacy

ABSTRACT Culture and cultural heritage have become central aspects in the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy that increasingly emphasizes dialogue and people-to-people connections as the basis for international cultural relations. This article explores 11 projects jointly facilitated by the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) and EU Delegations in nine countries located in Europe, Africa, and South America as part of a strategic cooperation between the European Commission, the European External Action Service and EUNIC. We identify five modes of highlighting dialogue as a key element in the EU’s international cultural relations and discuss how the ideas of dialogue, cultural heritage, values, and diplomacy are entangled and interrelated in our data. The study underlines the core role of the cooperation between EUNIC and EU Delegations and shows how a dialogic approach determines the EU’s international cultural relations and at the same time interconnects its international and internal policy aims.

Genesis and evolution of EU anti disinformation policy: entrepreneurship and political opportunism in the regulation of digital technology

ABSTRACT Disinformation, the deliberate spread of false or misleading information, is a worrisome threat for the EU, as its uses in recent events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reveal. This article explores policy-formulation in the EU. It asks whether it is possible to explain the choice of the European Commission and of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to regulate disinformation in terms of political opportunism: using process tracing analysis supported by interviews with EU officials, this article finds that the European Commission sought to create an opportunity to regulate this matter because it considered it particularly salient, and that, contrary to what the literature on political opportunism might suggest, both the EEAS and the Commission can be considered the political entrepreneur in this domain, because the engagements against disinformation were led by an external threat perception.

A ‘Geopolitical Commission’: Supranationalism Meets Global Power Competition

AbstractThis article examines the origins and operationalisation of the concept of a ‘geopolitical Commission’, which has been promoted by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen since 2019. This concept has been used to guide the stronger co‐ordination of the external aspects of the Commission's work. It is also symptomatic of the growing role of strategic considerations in the Commission's recent initiatives, particularly through the objective of strengthening the EU's ‘open strategic autonomy’. To explain this phenomenon, I combine three different theoretical perspectives: neorealism, neofunctionalism, and geoeconomics. I conclude that the geopolitical Commission should be understood as the result of the interactions between exogenous factors – the intensification of global power competition and the rise of geoeconomic strategies – and endogenous factors, such as the rivalry between the Commission and the European External Action Service and the functional link between the Commission's economic powers and international security issues.

Is the annual UNFCCC COP the only game in town?: Unilateral action for technology diffusion and climate partnerships

Is the annual United Nations framework convention on climate change meetings (UNFCCC COP) the only game in town? Are there also other possible solutions to consider? We argue that there is indeed another game, namely unilateral action facilitated by public authorities. Our theoretical model shows the conditions under which unilateral and costly technology development can be spread to other countries; that is, to an extent that makes such action of the involved parties a rational choice, paving the road for future use of such best practice model. One example could be the EEAS (European External Action Service) demonstrating that such unilateral action is feasible in practice, i.e. when facilitating technology transfers and climate partnerships between the EU and large CO2 emitters in the developing world. Well-designed unilateral actions by the EEAS and other public authorities may in this way help achieving target levels such as the Paris Agreement.

Institutional Toolkit to Counter Fake News and Disinformation in the EU: Challenges and Achievements

The body of the article goes on to discuss the problem of the European Union’s leading institutions’ efficiency in combating fake news and disinformation, which has appeared to be a major threat to democracy in a modern world. The author’s focus revolves around the problem concerning the EU establishing a regulatory framework as well as an efficient institu-tional toolkit aimed at identifying, refuting, countering fake news and disinformation as well as media education development. In particular, there was the rise and the rise of the Strategic Communications Department (StratCom) and its working groups, the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell as a structural unit of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre within the Framework of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the research institution – the European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats were established. Noteworthy, to improve the efficiency of information exchange in the EU, EEAS has launched the Rapid Alert System to ensure joint awareness of the situation related to the spread of disinformation in EU member states as well as the development of common responses, however, due to the lack of trust between EU members, the System is not actively used by all of them. The next crucial steps of combating disinformation and misinformation through media were two projects efficaciously launched by the European Commission, namely SOMA (Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis) started up in 2018 and SOMA (Social Observatory for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis) in 2020, respectively. The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) was set up as a hub for fact-checkers to jointly fight fake news and disinformation. The author emphasises that despite the fact that EDMO was supposed to replace SOMA, both projects are equally efficient and successful. Furthermore, despite the rise of high-profile EDMO, stakeholders, in particular fact-checkers and media literacy experts still hold a significant sway, which resulted in its failure in achieving their ambitions to finally tackle the spread of misinformation and fake news.

European Diplomacy in Times of Crisis: the Approach of the EU High Representative Josep Borrell to Engagement with Russia

The article explores the EU diplomacy toward Russia since Josep Borrell took office as EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The approach adopted by the European External Action Service (EEAS) in a time of crisis is examined, in the context of the rapidly changing international security environment and the unprecedentedly low level of engagement between Russia and the EU. The research featured the EEAS official documents, press releases, and Josep Borrell’s statements issued from late 2019 to early 2022. The analysis revealed some of Borrell’s ideas about the international role of the EU, his image of Russia and his suggestions on the EU’s course of action towards Russia. The author believes that Borrell’s approach clearly failed the reality test. The EU diplomacy demonstrated its inability to adjust to the escalating tensions and the major changes in the bilateral relations, as well as in Russia itself. As a result, the European strategy has proven ineffective and unable to address adequately the challenges it faces.