Abstract

AbstractThis article examines the impact of the introduction of a permanent chair in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Lisbon Treaty transferred the functions of the rotating Presidency to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, represented at lower levels by officials from the European External Action Service (EEAS). Whilst the permanent chair was intended to improve effectiveness in CFSP negotiations, recent deadlocks challenge such expectations. Drawing on sociological approaches, we show that the ability of EEAS chairs to uphold the impartiality norm has been undermined by the fact that they are perceived as ‘outsiders’ by national negotiators. This has had negative consequences on the chairs' capacity to fulfil key roles of organiser, broker and political leader and, in turn, negotiation dynamics. Based on these findings, we argue for the need to take norms and identity factors more seriously when designing institutions.

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