From National to Transnational German Studies:Some Historical Reflections, 1977–2017 Konrad H. Jarausch (bio) The fortieth anniversary of the German Studies Association is a useful vantage point for looking back on its development since many founding members are still alive and the documentary record remains available. In spite of some health problems, the indefatigable founding director Gerald Kleinfeld continues to share his recollections with succeeding generations.1 Moreover, the programs of the annual meetings and the issues of the newsletter are accessible online, providing a corrective to an all too rosy memory. This double source base helps make up for the tendency of historians of science to neglect the humdrum life of scholarly organizations in favor of individual innovators or their intellectual breakthroughs. It is nonetheless important to analyze the activities of academic associations like the GSA, since their development provides a clear mirror of shifting methodological approaches and substantive interpretations. Ironically, the rapid growth of the German Studies Association has militated against a critical look at its actual development, since it has seemed to prove the original formula right. The rather modest regional beginnings of an interdisciplinary group of Germanisten, historians, and political scientists who founded the Western Association for German Studies (WAGS) by meeting in Tempe, Arizona in 1977 have assumed a somewhat legendary status with the passage of time. But the subsequent expansion, which I joined at the Wichita conference in 1980 to find out what the excitement was all about, has generally been treated as self-evident. In many ways the crucial step was the expansion to a national organization in 1983/84 to which I was privileged to contribute as president, since it transformed a small regional initiative into an internationally respected forum for academic discussions in the field of German studies.2 In contrast to the North American Conference for British Studies or the Society for French Historical Studies, dealing with modern Germany continues to be considered rather problematic. The two world wars with their attendant violence and propaganda have darkened the name of the country to such a degree that the leading historical organization of the field, founded in 1958, was called somewhat evasively [End Page 493] the Conference Group for Central European History, reviving the lapsed Journal of Central European Affairs as Central European History in 1967. Unlike the positive feelings evoked by references to erstwhile allies such as Britain or France, the very name “German” suggests a set of difficult questions to be explored. While in Western contexts it is assumed that nation and state coincide self-evidently, their relationship has been seen as a challenging problem in central Europe.3 Based upon a look at the annual programs, newsletters and my personal recollections, the following remarks will reflect on the manner in which the GSA has treated this thorny issue. Since the terrible German past prevented a simple affirmation, the national perspective that prevailed during the first couple of decades after the association’s beginnings could not but become self-critical. Though originating in post-colonial studies, the transnational widening of horizons during the past two decades was able to build upon this foundation, because German problems were intimately interwoven with more general European and even global developments. The challenge of “historicizing” the GSA is therefore not just to reconstruct this broadening of scope, but also to tease out the particular view of Germany which American scholars developed as a result of their own preoccupations and the inherent structure of the central European subject matter.4 The German Problem Three decisions on how to deal with the German problem paved the way for the rapid growth of the new association and journal. To begin with WAGS/GSA carried the name “German” explicitly in the title, thereby setting itself off from other groups studying eastern and central Europe, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, or Hungary. This choice was important since, as the conservative Göttingen historian Hellmut Diwald averred at the 1976 Historikertag, the nation was still considered the self-evident “reference point of history.”5 On the one hand, this premise raised questions about German nationalism which was charged with poisoning European politics from the romantics onward.6 On the...
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