EU-Russia Relations Research Articles

Kwestia transformacji relacji UE-Rosja w dyskursie politycznym przywódców państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej

The main purpose of the article is to analyze the transformation of EU-Russia relations in the political discourse of the Visegrad Group leaders in the context of Russia’s full-scale military aggression against Ukraine. Based on the analysis of selected speeches, the author focuses on explaining the style of political leadership of the prime ministers from V4 countries and on the main elements of the presented assumptions regarding the transformation of the European Union’s foreign policy. Particular attention is paid to the issue of future format of EU-Russia relations, as well as to the issue of EU enlargement. For this purpose, a comparative analysis of the leadership style evolution of the main actors (both institutional and individual) from the European Union and the Visegrad Group countries was carried out in relation to the issue of cooperation with Russia in 2014–2022 and after the full-scale Russian invasion that took place on February 24, 2022.

The Current Situation of Energy Trade Between Russia and the EU: From the Perspective of Economic Nationalism

Energy trade has been a long-standing pillar of EU-Russia relations and a critical economic driver, leading to higher interdependence in the energy sector. With the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the energy relations between the EU and Russia and the development of the energy trade have changed, which also generates different energy trade policies and the current state of the energy trade. For a long time, people tend to pay attention to the political nature of nationalism and ignore its economic and cultural nature; they pay attention to the study of energy issues from the economic perspective and neglect the comprehensive study of energy issues from the political, cultural, and even nationalist perspectives. Synthesis, multiple factors, and the interaction of national security in the overall national security situation are significant features of the nationalist-economist perspective. This paper will explore the EU-Russia energy trade dealings from an economic nationalist perspective, focusing on the current state of energy relations and energy policies. Analyzing the current state of cooperation and trade in Russian-EU energy trade from this perspective can fill the gaps in the political and economic interactivity of Russian-EU relations in related studies.

Relations between Russia and the European Union in the context of modern transformation of the World Order: Issues of studying and teaching

Studies of EU-Russian relations faced substantial problems in 2022. Deep crisis of the world order caused a collision of Russia and the West, and weakened EU-Russian relations. In this context, the goal of the article is to open a discussion on why and how to research and teach EU-Russian relations and European studies at present. Firstly, the article describes four models of how science interacts with policy, stressing the priority of the fourth model, that is co-production of science and policy. On the one hand, this model is based on social developments and responds to the needs of the state and society. On the other hand, it identifies social problems and their plausible solutions, defines new paradigms that shape the “feasible” and “appropriate” in the policy. Next the article formulates six thematic blocs, which will allow today’s studies of EU-Russian relations to meet the demands of the co-production model These are analysis of EU-Russian relations in 1992–2022; accepting that politics and security dominate over economic logics at present; modelling a new security system that will inevi-tably incorporate the EU and Russia at the global, regional and national levels, and will thus demand their dialogue; studying the potential and parameters of mutual sanctions (restrictive measures), as well as the influence of these measures on both actors and their relations; modelling the future of EU-Russian relations (in particular, economic ones); as well as identifying the EU’s evolution, which might also be useful for the Eurasian integration. At the same time, the co-production model faces serious practical challenges for scholars and lecturers. Among them are identity conflict, terminological discrepancies, access to primary sources and literature, and limited internationalization of scientific debates (at least when it comes to the interaction between Russian and Western participants). Overcoming these procedural difficulties will create preconditions for the co-production model in the studies of EU-Russian relations. The author sees the article as an invitation to further discussion among scholars and lecturers.

Dividing Lines in the EU’s Common Foreign Policy: Russia as a polarising factor

Amid the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West, the processes of consolidation and divergence among political elites are crucial for understanding the mechanisms that form dividing lines. This is particularly important when examining the elites of the European Uni­on in their opposition to Russia. This article aims to develop a framework for analysing the dividing lines among EU elites in the context of relations with Russia. The analysis em­ploys a multi-tier model establishing a relationship between the ‘depth’ of a dividing line and the degree of elite disunity. The model includes two levels of analysis of dividing lines within the EU: supranational and national. The research demonstrates that, depending on the degree of interest misalignment and the availability of communication channels, elite divergence can result in segmentation, fragmentation or polarisation. Each of the tiers of divergence increa­singly reduces the likelihood of forming a common EU position on foreign policy issues. All three tendencies — segmentation, fragmentation and polarisation — are observed within the EU in relation to Russia at different levels of elite analysis. Crucial to the formation of a dividing line is the aspect of EU—Russia relations in question: the degree of distancing from the country or support for, and funding of, containment. Additional variables include factors such as the regional affiliation of the elite, their ideology and position within the power structure. Among all levels of analysis, polarisation is most evident in the efforts of supranational elites to promote ‘militant integration’, which conflicts with the interests of national elites and citizens of member states.

Habit, Arguing and Emotions in Russia-EU Relations pre-2022: Concepts of Social Actions

The article draws on International Relations theorizing of different logics of social action to provide yet another conceptual interpretation of the dynamics of EU-Russia relations before the deepest crisis started in 2022. The research concentrates on the logics of habit, arguing and affective action. Logics precluding changes in EU-Russia relations are illustrated by foreign policy moves and perceptions of both sides pre-2022 crisis. According to the logic of arguing, Russia refuted the EU’s claim to have the better argument, while the EU did not accept Russia’s self-attributed status of a country belonging to the Western lifeworld with shared political culture and did not take Russian arguments as genuine. Consequently, in the logic of affective action, Russian authorities got frustrated and angry because of the EU’s denial of an important Russian affectual need for belonging. The habits of mutual distrust and the incompatibility of mutual perceptions lead to the routinization of the conflict that is very difficult if not impossible to overcome.

Russia-Europe: What we have in common and what distinguishes us: the answer to the question of Russian philosofas, historians and writers

Russia–EU relations are going through difficult times now. By its actions on the eve and during the Ukrainian crisis, the European Union has called into question its reputation as a reliable partner of our country. A serious blow to the relations was infl icted by unilateral sanctions decisions of the European Union, adopted to the detriment of mutual economic interests in the name of promoting the same geopolitical goals. The events of recent months have shown that the dynamically developing trade and economic ties between Russia and the EU have not yet developed into a genuine strategic partnership based on the principles of equality, indivisibility of security and mutual respect for interests. The outdated confrontational stereotypes of the Cold War, which instilled in the minds of European leaders the possibility of isolating Russia and abolishing Russian culture, are still making themselves felt. This article contains an answer to the question about the relations between Russia and Europe, which was previously heard from the lips of prominent representatives of the Russian creative intelligentsia, whose opinion is relevant today.

Connecting Eurasian Supply Chains the Impact of Covid-19 and the Russia–Ukraine War on the EU-China Rail Landbridge

International supply chains are dependent on ease of crossing borders and efficient connectivity in terms of price, speed, and reliability. Communication costs explain why intensification of international supply chains during the last 4 decades has occurred primarily within regional value chains (RVCs), centered on East Asia, Europe, and North America. Initially responding to demand from automobile and electronics firms to connect their European and Chinese supply chains with shorter and more reliable freight services than maritime shipping, the Eurasian rail Landbridge established in the 2010s was the first major overland link between RVCs. The Eurasian Landbridge was resilient through deteriorating EU-Russia relations after 2014 and the COVID-19 epidemic in 2020–21. However, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and inclusion of the Russian rail company in western sanctions in February/March 2022, traffic along the main Landbridge routes stalled. This paper analyzes the evolution of the Landbridge as an exercise in choice of connectivity for Eurasian supply chains, the response of supply chain managers to the closure of routes in 2022, and the role of public policy in creating reliable alternatives.

Many Narratives or a Single Voice? The Role of Historical Policy in EU–Russia Relations

The purpose of the article is to analyse the process of change in Russian historical policy from a foreign policy perspective. The article hypothesizes that the historical policy can be considered as an indicator of changes in Russia’s foreign policy, allowing to infer the direction of its future development, playing both an ‘integrative’ and ‘disintegrative’ role. Using the example of the EU, the impact of Russia’s historical policy on the EU’s historical narrative is examined. While in the analysed context the new Russian historical narrative signalled a growing distrust and a more confrontational stance towards the EU (a disintegrative role), its unintended side effect was the construction of a common European historical narrative (an integrative role) pushed by the Central and Eastern European states in response to Russia’s aggressive rhetoric on historical issues, the interpretation of which few years earlier had divided the ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states.

The EU’s International Relations in the Practice of Criticizing the Human Rights Record of Russia

Abstract The European Union’s international relations are organized into a series of practices that regulate its relationships with the third states, including with Russia. The primary practice is that of ‘criticizing’ the human rights record of Russia, and this represents a major part of the EU’s engagement with Russia. This article analyses the practice of EU criticism of Russia regarding its implementation of human rights norms and values as a case which helps define the role of human rights in EU-Russia relations. It proposes that the EU’s transformative power over Russia has been minimal. It further argues that the success of the practice of criticizing human rights records has been limited to the institutionalization of EU-Russia cooperation in this area.

Energy Security, Armed Conflict and the limits of Commitment Strategy: EU-Russia Relations and the War in Ukraine

Russia-Ukraine War altered the political landscape in Eurasia fundamentally even before we could see the end of the armed conflict. Not only through its direct impact but mostly because of a series of spillover effects, this massive military confrontation is already affecting the power distribution in the region. EU-Russia relations, from the perspective of energy security, has already been discussed extensively but a new dimension will have to be added to this crumbling cooperation. Similarly, the preponderance of Russia in former Soviet space may be collapsing. The strategies pursued by the Western Bloc and Russia can be analyzed withing the framework of a “commitment” policy. A strong strategy, binding one actor to a certain path, might be a strong signal to push the adversaries for cooperation. Yet, carries high risks, for in case of a non-cooperative response might multiply losses for all parties. The war dynamics and energy security situation in Eurasia displays characteristics of this high-risk strategy that might possibly not bring the desired outcome. This study evaluates the energy policies as well as Russia’s wartime policies from a perspective of commitment strategy.

Nothing to do with politics? International collaboration in higher education and Finnish-Russian relations

ABSTRACT This paper discusses Finnish-Russian relations from the perspective of cooperation in higher education, and particularly Finnish-Russian double degree programmes prior to 2022. It asks how internal stakeholders, in double degree programmes perceived the role of their cooperation from the point of view of interstate relations, and how cooperation had changed (if at all) after the political crisis intensified between the EU and Russia in 2014. The paper draws on research on EU-Russia relations, and on the link between higher education (collaboration) and international politics. The empirical part of the paper is based on a case study of double degree programmes between Finnish and Russian universities. Semi-structured interviews with internal stakeholders such as administrative and academic heads/coordinators of these programmes serve as the main source of primary materials. The study reveals that even though internal stakeholders explicitly wanted to depoliticise higher education cooperation and denied that interstate (or EU-Russia) relations would have had any impact on their collaboration, many of them still hoped that HE cooperation would help in improving the given relations. Accordingly, they argued for education diplomacy in the sense of ‘higher education for diplomacy’, but denied it in the sense of ‘diplomacy for higher education’.

Clashing rationales for international student mobility? The case of the EU and Russia

ABSTRACT After 2014 student mobility between the EU and Russia has remained high. International academic mobility (IAM) is an important part of the internationalisation of higher education, and the EU and Russia have multiple rationales for it – academic, economic, political and social, among others. This article analyses the rationales of stakeholders at institutional and individual levels. The article focuses on the cross-cultural experiences of European and Russian students, and compares their rationales to stakeholders’ rationales at the (supra)national level. The article applies an interpretive approach to analyse students’ narrations collected with semi-structured interviews. The study confirmed that the EU had succeeded in its political and economic rationales with regard to European and Russian students. The Russia's rationales had been met only partially. The study revealed complex rationales of individual stakeholders that partially corresponded with the rationales of institutional stakeholders. Although the political and economic rationales of stakeholders at the institutional level are ‘driving forces’ for the continuing internationalisation of higher education, including IAM, individual stakeholders succeeded in realising economic, academic and social rationales that were important for their professional and personal development. The later contributed to better understanding at a people-to-people level, which could have a long-lasting effect in terms of improving EU-Russia relations.

International Politics Shaped by the EU: A Critical Analysis of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy

This article seeks to conduct a critical analysis of the place the EU currently occupies on the international scene and how it uses its central position to shape international politics in order to promote international peace and security. For this purpose, it will firstly provide the reader with a general overview of the CFSP and how the Lisbon treaty changed the EU’s functioning in this field. Secondly, taking the EU-Russia relations as a starting point, this paper will evaluate the means the EU employs to achieve its CFSP goals. Thirdly, it will seek to predict the possible future of the EU role as a unitary political actor in the global fora.

Public diplomacy and the persistence of the conflict and cooperation dichotomy in EU-Russia relations

ABSTRACT The literature on relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia has proliferated during the last decade. However, little attention has been afforded to the role of public diplomacy (PD). Studies have generally focused on the gradual breakdown of the relationship between the two international actors in the background of the Ukraine crisis, but also on Russia’s gradual disenchantment with the Western-led liberal world order. The underlying assumption has been that Russia and the EU have gradually become engaged in a dialogue of the deaf, where PD does not serve a meaningful role, if any. With the breakdown of the current EU-Russia relations, the emphasis on cooperation is rather muted, which opens the space for questioning the role of PD in this dynamic. In this context, the article analyses the way in which EU PD (directed towards Russia) represents and perpetuates the conflict and cooperation dichotomy. It finds that, developed primarily from a monological perspective, the EU’s PD framing is rather ineffective in addressing in appealing to the Russian general public or changing the Kremlin’s behaviour.

Russian-German Economic Relations in the Context of the Deepening Political Confrontation Between the Russian Federation and the European Union

Relevance. Today, Russian-German economic relations, on the one hand, are developing in the context of Russia ‒ EU relations, and on the other hand, between the Russian Federation and Germany, but they are weighed down by the influence of political factors. The traditional areas of economic cooperation received their first cracks due to the introduction of sanctions in 2014, but the “fourth” package of sanctions in March 2022 from the EU, which was successfully joined by the Scholz government, disrupted the world economic ties between countries that had been established for decades.The purpose is to assess the economic cooperation between Russia and Germany, taking into account the complicated political relations between the EU and the Russian Federation.Objectives: identify priority areas of cooperation between Russia and Germany at the present stage; highlight the constraining factors of economic relations between countries.Methods. A discursive analysis of the official statements of the heads of government was applied to study the qualitative and quantitative indicators of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Germany. The secondary statistical data obtained on the basis of the gravity modeling approach are analyzed.Results. The study showed that one of the most effectively developing industries is the investment of German companies in enterprises of Russian regions. The sanctions of the EU countries had a negative impact on certain high-tech sectors of the Russian economy, but Russian counter-sanctions on meat, milk and dairy products, as well as fruits and vegetables "hit" the consumer in the EU countries and Germany. The forecast of trade and economic relations in connection with the upcoming "fifth" package of EU sanctions against the Russian Federation is difficult.Conclusions. Germany occupied a significant place in trade, economic and investment cooperation with Russia. At the moment, unfounded accusations of Russia that our country is a “threat” to the European Union continue to be unraveled. Germany actively supports the EU in its course towards the introduction of new sanctions measures against the Russian Federation.

‘Move the gateposts during the Game’: When Russia and the EU de-order both their relationship and the liberal world order

The article looks at EU-Russian relations and their current crisis through the prism of the liberal world order (LWO) and its contestation. Since the late 1990s Russia has gradually moved from neorevisionist to revisionist challenge of the LWO, undermining in its relations with the EU such components of this order as political values and security. The EU previously positioned itself as a staunch defender of the LWO; Brussels tried both to enforce elements of the LWO and to accommodate Russia’s concerns so that EU-Russian relations were embedded in the LWO. However, 24 February 2022 became a watershed moment. Moscow’s challenge to the security and values’ components of the LWO became too big for the EU to manage. The EU’s 2022 sanctions heralded a move from the efforts to integrate Russia by all means to the LWO to the efforts to isolate Russia by all means and to deny Russia access to any components of the LWO. In particular, the EU challenges cooperation through international institutions, political values, economic interdependence and transnational links. This EU change undermines the very LWO that the EU tries to defend and that guarantees the EU a privileged position. Moreover, prospects of long-term settlement in the European continent and of engagement with Russia are severely compromised.

Wizyta Josepa Borrella w Moskwie

Josep Borrell’s visit to Moscow was a substantial political failure of the EU’s diplomacy still it was not an accident neither a surprise. The EU’ policy towards Russia has been based on illusions and the European wishful thinking since the very beginning of the mutual relations that started in 1991-1993. The Borrell’s visit to Moscow rather showed the nature of the Russian attitude towards the EU than produced it. Russia prefers to act within the “great powers concerto” i.e. to deal with both - the leading EU member states (Germany, France) and the non-EU great powers (UK, USA) and not with the EU institutions and representatives who are not respected neither treated seriously in Moscow. There is a deep division within the EU between the Eastern flank member states whose perception of Russian threat is strong and well founded and the western and southern countries the political interests and priorities are focused on other problems. Russian capacity to corrupt the numerous prominent members of the European political class makes the EU policy vis a vis Russia even less coherent and realistic. The article shows the history of the EU-Russia relations in the last 30 years and proves the fiasco of the Borrell’s visit to Moscow was not just an accident still a logical consequence of the ill based EU policy towards Russia.

EU-Russian Relations and the Eastern Enlargement: Integration or Isolation

Initially, in the first half of the 1990s, Russia’s plans to include the countries of the former Eastern bloc within the EU were not seen as a threat to its interests. Furthermore, in the context of NATO’s enlargement, some Russians regarded them as an advantageous alternative. Russia is aware that the EU enlargement with the Central and Eastern European states resulted in a present increase in the number of EU members supporting close trans-Atlantic relations. Moscow’s fears of further EU enlargement were softened due to a dispute that continues to grow within the Union, regarding the rationale and limits of further enlargement, primarily for the Balkan states, Turkey, and the CIS states. Moscow expects that the reluctance of European societies towards further enlargement will inhibit this process.
 The external relations dimension of the European Union's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe has received surprisingly little attention despite the fact that in the long‐term the issues it raises may be far more important than those currently dominating the debate. Nowhere is this more likely to be correct than about Russia, for which the EU's enlargement poses a risk of increasing isolation from the rest of Europe. The danger of creating a new dividing line across Europe is widely recognised, and the challenge, therefore, is to find ways of ensuring that Russia can be fully integrated with Europe while almost certainly remaining outside the EU Itself. This article focuses on relations between the EU and Russia and addresses three fundamental questions: how Russia has responded to the prospect of the EU's eastern enlargement; the specific issues arising from expansion, and the kind of long‐term relationship that could develop between Russia and an enlarged EU.

Communicative Distraction?: Russia’s and the European Union’s Rival Perception Managements

This article examines the nature and implications of the current information/propaganda battle between Russia and the EU by placing it in the context of conceptions of argument and dialogue in international politics. Both sides are engaged in ‘perception management’ by which they try to defend their actions and influence positively the opinions of foreign publics. This seems far removed from ‘communicative action’, the Habermasian notion of engagement in argument and dialogue between equals. The article argues that the current crisis in Russia-EU relations is partly the result of the perception on the Russian side that there never was such communicative action – because Russia was not treated as an equal partner in dialogue, and its views/interests were ignored in a number of cases. On this account, Russia therefore became more assertive, culminating in the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s outright aggression which it tried to defend using perception management, echoed by the EU’s counter-disinformation campaign. We are therefore closer to ‘communicative distraction’ – attempts to control image and opinion – rather than the debate and dialogue inherent in communicative action. Nevertheless, the article argues that even within these rival perception managements, there is engagement in argument over norms and the application of norms in specific cases. In the present crisis of Russia-EU relations, we cannot expect more; but the fact that there is some form of argument might still provide a potential basis for fuller dialogue in the future. Russia, EU, Perception Management, Information Warfare, Communicative Action

TRADE BETWEEN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF SANCTIONS AND COUNTER-SANCTIONS

The year 2014 marked the deepest crisis in EU-Russia relations since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The bilateral relations cooled down because of the Ukrainian conflict. The EU started to impose restrictive measures on Russian Federation and Russia has responded by imposing counter-sanctions. The sanctions imposed by European Union in conjunction with the counter-sanctions adopted by the Russian Federation on EU food imports had massive consequences on the bilateral trade. The main purpose of this research is to identify and evaluate the impact of sanctions and counter-sanctions on trade in goods between eleven Central and Eastern European Countries and the Russian Federation. This paper tries to determine the factors that can explain why, after the adoption of economic sanctions, some Central and Eastern European Countries recorded losses higher than others. The research methodology combines tools of both quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis.