EU-Russia Relations Research Articles

V4: A new brand for Europe? Ten years of post-accession regional cooperation in Central Europe

The original purpose of the Visegrad Group (VG) was primarily to support its member states' (Czech Republic, Hungary Poland and Slovakia) accession to the EU and NATO. Despite some serious doubts about whether it would have a viable future beyond 2004, actual EU membership has given the VG an ever-expanding agenda for cooperation and coordination in many aspects of EU affairs, internal and external. The VG is now firmly embedded in the European political landscape and operates as a distinct regional grouping within the EU. Indeed, the February 2011 VG summit that marked the VG's 20th anniversary was attended by Angela Merkel. Moreover, the leaders of the VG states recently met with Merkel and Francois Hollande at two VG-Weimar summits in November 2012 and March 2013. This paper will reflect on ten years of VG cooperation inside the EU. It will focus on several issues: how actual EU membership revitalised the cooperation agenda of the VG; the 'modus operandi' of the VG and why it should be regarded as a specific vehicle for cooperation and coordination around EU affairs with well-defined limitations and not as some kind of Central European 'lobby' or regional 'bloc' within the EU; examples and areas of VG coordination on EU affairs, with special emphasis on the VG's role in EU foreign policy - in particular with regard to relations with the eastern neighbours. Some parameters of VG cooperation will also be discussed, taking the VG's inability to engage in any cooperation around EU-Russia relations as a key example. (original abstract)

Two futures: EU-Russia relations in the context of Ukraine.

The enduring crisis in Ukraine presents the European Union (EU) with a conundrum. Should it strengthen its economic and energy ties despite Russia’s growing assertiveness in the hope to solidify its medium term energy security and reel in Russian foreign policy? Or should it rather continue to tighten the screws on the Putin regime, in the hope that doing so will concurrently compel the Russian Federation to moderate its behaviour? This paper argues that it is not prudent for the EU to decrease cooperation with Russia in the short term, but rather push for a political solution without additional sanctions and in the long-term secure different fossil resources such as LNG and different suppliers such as Iraq and Iran. Whichever way the EU chooses, Ukraine’s role in EU energy security is depreciating. Nevertheless, the EU possesses a stronger bargaining position than widely believed because Russia lacks a credible alternative to European foreign direct investments (FDI). The EU should (1) establish an energy union that includes gas storage and distribution plans and extends the Energy Community to include Turkey to pave the way for future gas flows; (2) support infrastructure projects that increase reverse flow capacities within the EU as well as South Stream or its heirs and the Southern Corridor via Turkey to enhance import capacity; and (3) massively invest into energy research.

Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne w stosunkach Rosja - Unia Europejska w kontekście współzależności eksportowo-importowych

The paper is dealing with the role of energy security questions within EU–Russia relations, particularly in the context of their import–export interdepedence. The article is concentrating on the oil and gas sectors as this two branches play crucial role in EU–Russia energy relations. The paper is also analyzing the importance of Russian oil and gas sectors for the Russian economic security in general. By describing the problems of those two sectors, author is showing on the one hand threats for further Russian economic development and on the other hand risk for EU energetic security. Since EU is the biggest consumer of Russian energy resources and Russia is the biggest supplier of EU energy resources, problems of Russian energy sector strongly influence EU energy security. The article is analyzing this interdependencies.

Sketching the Contours of the Prospective EU-Russia Investment Architecture

Since the Lisbon treaty entered into force in 2009, the European Union (EU) is vested with the exclusive competence in the field of foreign direct investment (FDI). In principle, this competence encompasses the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with third countries including the negotiation of the standards of treatment applicable to foreign investors, which has been the domain of the EU Member States so far. The advent of the new EU competence for FDI has also had an impact on EU-Russia relations. The European Commission identified Russia as a priority country for EU investment negotiations. Eventually, all existing BITs between the Russian Federation and EU Member States will be substituted by a new investment law regime between the EU and Russia. Drawing on the investment treaty practice of the Russian Federation and the slowly emerging contours of the EU's investment policy, this article attempts to give a first impression of how the future EU-Russia investment architecture may look like. For this purpose, the article will take stock of the Russian BIT practice of the past and then analyse discrepancies with regard to the EU position.

Russia's perceptions and misperceptions of the EU Eastern Partnership

This article is devoted to the problem of the reaction to the Eastern Partnership by Russia's both the political establishment and the expert community. The question of reactions to the Eastern Partnership in the target countries has been extensively posed in academic literature. However, the question of Russia's reaction to the Eastern Partnership, one of the most important actors of the region, has been rarely raised by the academic community. A wide array of factors impacted Russian elites' perception of the Eastern Partnership – from problematic issues in the EU-Russia relations to the post-Soviet states' political and economic transformation. Studying the dynamics and peculiarities of Russia's perspective on the Eastern Partnership makes it possible to draw meaningful conclusions on the nature of Russia's phobias that fuel its domestic and foreign policy.

Is it time to transcend political realism in the EU-Russia security cooperation? Exploring the critical realist model of emancipatory windows

This article explores the possibilities of a novel methodological approach in the EU-Russia studies, namely the model of emancipatory windows based on critical realist philosophy. It is argued that the critical realist model can challenge the political realist hypothesis on the absolute gridlock of cooperation between the EU and Russia. The model reveals that collaboration between the two strategic partners is possible within narrow but deep sectors, that is, emancipatory windows, which are defined by three variables: materiality, normativity, and time. In terms of the Third Common Space on external security, an emancipatory window has opened for value-based joint action and operations aimed at the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. More specifically, it would be possible to incorporate and implement the UN-authorised principle of Responsibility to Protect in the roadmap of the Third Common Space and in the successor to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The adoption of RtoP could lead to new forms of cooperation between the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Russia in crisis management, particularly in Africa. Thus, emancipation from the current deadlock in the EU-Russia relations does not necessitate completely new normative or concrete structures, that is, ‘reinventing the wheel’. Instead, emancipation can be achieved by modifying and transforming the already existing CSDP-Russia structures.

Vilnius eastern partnership summit: milestone in EU-Russia relations – not just for Ukraine

Abstract The Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit on 28-29th November 2013 represents a milestone in EU relations not just with respect to the six Eastern Partnership countries (EaP Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and particularly Ukraine), but also with the EU’s ‘strategic partner’ Russia. The turbulence and numerous speculations regarding expectations about the signature of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (comprising a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement - AA/DCFTA), as well as progress in initialling similar future agreements with Georgia and Moldova, have been escalating before the summit. The association agreementswould bring EaP signatory countries closer to the EU not really closer to EU membership, but closer to the application of various EU norms and standards (takeover of the ‘acquis communautaire’) and - significantly - out of the Russian orbit, for the beginning at least symbolically. The last minute postponement of the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA signature announced by Ukraine’s government just one week before the summit represents a serious setback for the EU. Though the EU has no ‘Plan B’ and was stunned after Ukraine’s announcement, life will continue after the summit and new initiatives will have to be started. What are the relevant issues and challenges and what is at stake? This note attempts to evaluate the consequences (economic and otherwise) of alternate decisions following the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit, reviews some of the disputed arguments and discusses selected relevant economic issues.

Changes of EU-Russia Relations after Putin's 3rd Presidential Terms: From cooperation to conflict

본 논문은 제3기 푸틴 정부 출범 이후 EU-러시아 관계의 변화 가능성을 분석하고 이에 대한 시사점을 제시하는데 목적이 있다. 소련의 붕괴 이후 EU와 러시아는 지역 안보와 경제적 측면에서 상호 전략적 협력 관계를 유지하였다. 그러나 2004년 중동부 유럽 국가들의 EU 회원국 가입, 이에 따른 칼리닌그라드 및 우크라이나 문제 등의 갈등 요소는 존재해 있었다. 2012년 제3기 푸틴 정부 출범 이후 양측은 반기별 정상회담 및 다양한 경로를 통해 협력 관계 구축을 시도했지만 뚜렷한 성과물을 양산하지 못했다. 이러한 상황에서 EU 에너지 시장 자유화 및 통합을 위한 에너지 패키지 도입과 이에 따른 가즈프롬의 반경쟁적 행위에 대한 조사착수, 우크라이나를 중심으로 EU의 동부 파트너십 계획과 러시아의 유라시안 연합 계획의 대립, 비자 면제 협정 체결에 대한 이견 등으로 양측 관계에 있어 갈등 양상이 대두되었다. 그러나 경제 - 에너지 및 교역 등 - 및 정치적 차원에서 양측은 전략적 협력이 필요하다는 점을 인식하고 있음에 기본적인 협력의 틀은 지속될 것으로 보인다. 특히 에너지 분야와 관련하여 EU의 러시아산 에너지에 대한 의존 축소 노력은 결국 아시아 수출 증가로 이어질 것이며, 푸틴 대통령의 ‘남-북-러 경협 강화’의지는 한국에게 이에 맞는 정책의 수립 필요성을 의미한다.

Polish-Russian Small Border Traffic in the Context of Russia-EU Relations

Polish-Russian Small Border Traffic in the Context of Russia-EU Relations

The influence of European Union outer policy initiatives to the EU-Russia relations: cases of Northern Dimension and Black Sea synergy

This article discusses how Russia treats two foreign region initiatives of EU – Northern Dimension and Black Sea Synergy and how it responds to the EU-Russia bilateral relations. These two initiatives have been chosen because both of them directly border Russia and both concern Kremlin’s foreign policy. The problem arises from the fact that European Union sees its outer policy as a tool for development of cooperation and prosperity, whereas Russia wants to dominate or has a right to influence all the processes which are going on at its borders and Kremlin does not want any other huge player appear at its borders. Consequently, such a situation directly influences the bilateral relations between EU and Russia.

The EU's strategy on economic and social rights in Russia: a missed opportunity?

In recent years, the EU's policy on human rights in Russia has been the focus of considerable internal and external attention, much of it being critical. Despite long-standing programmes for funding human rights projects in Russia and the launch of biannual EU–Russia human rights consultations in 2005, the subject of human rights remains contentious within EU–Russia relations. One striking aspect of the EU's policy towards Russia is its focus on issues such as prison reform, freedom of speech and prevention of torture which can broadly be characterised as civil and political rights issues. The purpose of this article is to examine the EU's approach to another aspect of human rights policy which tends to receive very little attention, namely economic and social rights issues such as housing, health, access to social security and workers' rights. Using data gathered from elite interviews with EU officials and representatives of Russian human rights and social non-governmental organisations (NGOs) during fieldwork in Brussels and Russia in 2011, the article will argue that the EU's lack of internal consensus on the importance of economic and social rights issues hinders its ability to raise these issues in its interactions with Russia on human rights. Yet the fact that economic and social rights have traditionally enjoyed a relatively high degree of visibility and importance in Russia has the potential to make this an area where more fruitful engagement on human rights could take place.

The EU–Russia Strategic Partnership: Challenging the Normative Argument

Russia–EU relations have often been presented in terms of a normative gap, with the EU appearing as a normative and Russia as a non-normative actor. This article critically analyses this ‘normative argument’ which sees this gap as the cause of tensions. Pleading for a less dichotomous approach to norms and interests, it challenges the normative argument on the basis of the assumed congruence between the norm-driven input and norm-promoting output of European foreign policy. As an alternative, the article explores how the normative agenda in Eastern Europe serves instrumental purposes. Selective norm promotion has the potential to change the hierarchy of identities among post-Soviet states.

The EU, Russia and Models of International Society in a Wider Europe

The research objective of this article is two-fold: On the one hand, this study aims at analysing the multifaceted EU-Russia relations as seen from different theoretical/conceptual approaches. On the other hand, this article examines how the EU-Russia dialogue is organised in sectoral terms – economy, trade, visa regime liberalisation, and security cooperation. Both the promising and problematic areas in the EU-Russia bilateral relations are identified. The need for a more adequate conceptual framework applicable to the EU-Russia relations as well as a new, more efficient, EU-Russian joint strategy is explained.

Implementation of the EU Immigration Policy in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region: Towards a Framework for Policy Analysis

Abstract Finland and Sweden along with other countries in the Barents region wish to increase migration, in-line with their labour demands and demographic changes. These states have reformed their economic and immigration policy so that migrants may contribute to their national economies. However, they receive far fewer numbers of immigrants than envisaged. There is a need for increased cooperation within Barents Region on immigration issues, including integration of migrants for utilizing its natural resources properly. The European Union is an important actor in the Barents Region. The European Commission has been a member of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) since the beginning of regional cooperation. Two out of four states are EU members, with Norway being part of the European Economic Area,1 meaning that many EU regulations are relevant for all Nordic countries, including Norway. EU policies can be also seen as models and examples of best practice. Moreover, EU-Russia cooperation and Northern Dimension may play a major role in agenda-setting for regional cooperation and major changes in EU-Russia relations (like a visa-free agreement) would have major influence on the situation in the region. This paper aims to investigate whether there is coherence in immigration policy and its implementation between Barents Region and the European Union, how the EU places itself within the existing actors and governance frameworks of BEAR, and which role it wants to take up in relation to the migration policy in the region. Finally, this paper aims to highlight the main barriers to implement the existing policies in practice.

Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry?

z Until recently regional integration in the post-Soviet space was largely declarative. But the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), the latest initiative, appears more viable because of its better institutional framework, proven commitment to implementation and introduction of a system of rules harmonized with international norms and the WTO regime. z z This initiative, which offers a forward-looking, advanced form of economic integration, has serious implications for EU-Russian relations in general and the EU's strategy in the post-Soviet 'shared neighbourhood' in particular. z z Ukraine has turned into a normative battleground, with Russia trying to dissuade it from pursuing an Association Agreement with the EU containing the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and to join the ECU instead. z z Faced with this challenge, the EU needs to revisit its 'external governance' approach to its eastern neighbourhood in terms of short- and long-term opportunities and challenges.

New ‘dividing lines’ in Europe: A crisis of trust in European–Russian relations

The paper presents the materials of the special issue “Institutions, Networks and Trust in European–Russian relations” offering various interdisciplinary perspectives on EU–Russia relations. The positions of the authors of the special edition are analysed in the context of both Western and Russian literature on EU–Russia relations. This analysis is conducted within the framework of close to Constructivism “security community” approach that stresses the role of common interests, shared values, communications, interpersonal contacts and trust in overcoming conflicts. In this context, the emergence of new ‘dividing lines’ in Europe is considered as the result of crisis of trust and institutional crisis in EU–Russia relations. From this point of view the recent literature on the roots of European–Russian conflict, on connections between Russian domestic and foreign policy, on value-interest dilemma in Western–Russian relations, on the new Cold War/Cold Peace theory, on the structure of EU policy towards Russia and internal splits inside EU is reviewed.

Postmodern Geopolitics? The European Union Eyes Russia

The discourse on EU–Russia relations amongst practitioners, think-tank experts, journalists and academics has congealed around a postmodern–modern binary. It is frequently argued that whereas Russia is caught up in a ‘modern’ framework of fixed territory, national identity and traditional geopolitics, the European Union is driven by a ‘postmodern’ spatial mindset that transcends these ‘backward’ values. This article argues that the EU's supposed postmodern geopolitics remains enmeshed in a very modern temporality—a consciousness of time that valorises the present over the past. It also detects a problematic disillusion with the postmodern and questions its implicit normativity.

Традиции российского и европейского представления о государственной границе в условиях трансграничного регионального сотрудничества

This article deals with the key interpretations of in European and Russian political cultures as the most important instrument in the development of cross-border regional cooperation. The theoretical significance of this work lies in the definition of the term state frontier through the prism of regional integration processes. The practical component consists in the identification of the role of cross-border regional relations between Russia and the European Union in the developing of mutually beneficial joint strategic cooperation. The main results are as follows. Historical experience, geopolitical position, national psychology, and some other factors determine the perception on the in a political culture, which can be vary in the mass consciousness from country to country. State is a key imperative of the cross-border regional cooperation. Cross-border cooperation between Russia and the EU serves as a ground for the development of strategic partnership; it is cross-border cooperation that is most efficient to this end in the region of the Baltic Sea region. Recently, different joint cooperation mechanisms and projects have developed in the Baltic Region in the framework of Russia-EU relations. In the long-term perspective, the development of regional integration processes within the Baltic Region seems to be one of the most important elements for further strengthening of strategic cooperation. The ideas presented in the article contribute to the enhancement of scientific understanding of regional integration processes and identify the role of frontiers in the development of cross-border relations. A possible practical application of the results obtained is the formation of a conceptual framework for the analysis of cross-border cooperation between Russia and the EU in the Baltic Region as an important region for the development of joint strategic partnership.

Russia's Energy Leverage over the EU: Myth or Reality?

Today, the EU is less dependent on Russian energy than it was two decades ago. Nevertheless, EU-Russia energy relations are more widely understood in terms of power, security and zero-sum geopolitical competition. This article challenges this Neo-Realist argument. Drawing on Keohane's and Nye's concepts of interdependence sensitivity and vulnerability, it both tests the actual degree of EU energy dependence and the extent to which dependence may create Russian leverage. It is found that the actual EU supply dependence is overrated and is mainly due to the EU's internal divisions. Secondly, Russia's potential leverage is undermined by its high dependence on EU energy demand. Thirdly, its potential energy leverage is at least counterbalanced by other dimensions of asymmetrical interdependence outside the energy context. Explaining how geopolitical power-related explanations became dominant in the analysis of EU-Russia relations, this article refers both to structural changes in the energy market and also to new perceptions that resulted from a renewed geopolitical logic in early decisions over pipelines, changing attitudes as Russia grew stronger and the different nature of the energy markets in the EU and Russia. While geopolitical considerations may occasionally sneak in, the core of EU-Russia energy relations is still predominantly economic and commercial.

Introduction: EU-Russia Relations and the International Society Theory

This special issue embeds the discourse on EU-Russia relations in International Society (IS) theory in order to create a level-playing field that has thus far eluded scholarly debates.