Moral Psychology Research Articles

The epistemology of interpersonal relations

AbstractWhat is it to know someone? Epistemologists rarely take up this question, though recent developments make such inquiry possible and desirable. This paper advances an account of how such interpersonal knowledge goes beyond mere propositional and qualitative knowledge about someone, giving a central place to second‐personal treatment. It examines what such knowledge requires, and what makes it distinctive within epistemology as well as socially. It assesses its theoretic value for several issues in moral psychology, epistemic injustice, and philosophy of mind. And it offers an account of the complex content in play if interpersonal knowledge is to be understood in terms of its mental states and their functions.

From whispers to warriors: Public atmosphere’s role in mobilizing social media users against rumors

Governments and social media platforms strive to combat the spread of online rumors by fostering a positive public atmosphere of rumor combating. However, the effectiveness of this approach remains uncertain, as do the underlying mechanisms through which public atmosphere mobilizes social media users against rumors. Leveraging insights from psychological attachment theory and ethics research, this study aims to examine the mediating mechanisms and boundary conditions for the relationship between public atmosphere and rumor-combating participation (RCP). This empirical study employed a hypothetical scenario method to design two scenarios (i.e., strong vs. weak public atmosphere of rumor combating), and collected 331 valid responses using the MTurk platform. The results provide empirical evidence that public atmosphere significantly facilitates RCP. Moreover, high-level psychological attachment (i.e., identification and internalization) fully mediates the relationship between public atmosphere and RCP, but low-level psychological attachment (i.e., compliance) does not act as a mediator. Further examination of the boundary conditions revealed that moral judgment positively moderates the relationship between public atmosphere and psychological attachment (both high-level and low-level). However, anticipated guilt only exerts a positive moderating influence on the relationship between public atmosphere and low-level psychological attachment. This study provides fresh insights by revealing that public atmosphere can promote RCP by enhancing high-level psychological attachment, while uncovering the distinct moderating roles played by moral cognition and emotion in the process. Therefore, this paper not only advances our theoretical understanding of why and under what conditions public atmosphere influences RCP, but also offers practical insights into strategies for mobilizing social media users to combat rumors.

A call for theory-inspired analysis in qualitative research: Ways to construct different truths in and about healthcare.

Over the last 50 years, there has been significant development of qualitative research and related methods in healthcare. Theoretical frameworks support researchers in selecting appropriate research approaches, proceduresand analytical tools. However, the implications of the choice of theory are sparsely elucidated. Based on a text excerpt from a public debate article, the study aimed to show how different theory-inspired analytical perspectives produced varied understandings of the same text. The study presented three subanalyses inspired by Bourdieu's sociological theory, Lazarus and Folkman's psychological theoryand utilitarian ethics, respectively. The analyses showed that by using different theoretical analytical perspectives in inductive processes, an immediate interpretation of the text was not obvious. It became possible to spot the underlying meta-theoretical assumptions, as the interpretations were not taken for granted or indisputable. Our analyses suggest that different theoretical lenses lead to different interpretations of the same empirical material, recognising the existence of multiple truths or realities. Thus, utilising a theoretical perspective in inductive analyses can enhance transparency and rigour because the analytical optics are made explicit to the reader. This allows the reader to follow the analysis processes and comprehend from which theoretical starting point a truth arises.

Taking modelling beyond ‘teaching morally’ and ‘teaching morality’

ABSTRACT The central question of this paper is whether and how, from a virtue ethical perspective, teacher modelling and student emulation hang together in moral education. This matters, because philosophers have often focussed either on the moral psychology of emulation or on modelling as a moral educational method, neglecting the interplay between the two. It starts by analysing the conceptual framework underlying the influential Manner in Teaching (MiT) and Moral Work of Teaching (MWT) projects. It reconstructs how modelling is understood as ‘teaching morally’ or ‘teaching morality’. These two interpretations of modelling are developed further by drawing on additional literature on teacher education and moral education. Then, the conceptual framework is extended by focusing on how students may learn from modelling through mimicry, imitation or emulation. This results in several conceptual relations that illuminate the complex dynamics between teacher modelling and student emulation. For example, teacher modelling does not guarantee student emulation, which challenges the common advocacy for teachers as role models. At the same time, students may emulate teachers without teachers being aware of their impact. This results in a more nuanced understanding of what it takes for teachers to be moral role models.

Judith Shklar on the problem of political motivation

ABSTRACT The political thought of Judith Shklar is often invoked by contemporary theorists of realism in support of their arguments. This article contends, however, that realist discussion of Shklar has overlooked a concern central to her thought – the worry that individuals are often unwilling to reevaluate their views on the questions of political life. Shklar’s theoretical concern with this ‘problem of political motivation’ will be demonstrated by examining the evolution of her views on the relationship between utopia and hope, showing how this evolution maps on to her view of the affective conditions necessary to motivation. The article proceeds to show that Shklar seeks to address this problem directly, aiming to shape the psychology of her readers through her prose, and that in this she takes inspiration from her reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Evaluation of Shklar’s reflections on the purposes of political theory reveals her concern with the problem of political motivation to be a vital aspect of her conception of the discipline. This problem, I suggest, is one which should be taken into consideration by contemporary theorists of realism if they are to produce theories which fully adhere to the realistic moral psychology they endorse.

Reconceptualizing selective moral disengagement mechanisms as continuums of moral influence: a theoretical expansion

Abstract Mass communication researchers have applied Bandura’s selective moral disengagement (SMD) concept in diverse contexts to explain audiences’ acceptance of moral violations and reduced condemnation. Recent updates to moral psychology—specifically the application of social intuitionist theories—challenge SMD’s underlying assumptions, necessitating a reconceptualization. In this article, we incorporate modern social intuitionist theories of moral judgment into SMD’s underlying assumptions. We further propose a two-stage moral signal detection process consistent with current decision-making theory in order to explain how SMD reflects a modulation of both moral condemnation and moral commendation. Building on these extensions, we reconceptualize SMD’s eight original mechanisms as expanded continuums of moral influence applicable to diverse forms of moral perceptions and moral judgments. This reconceptualization of SMD removes unnecessary boundary conditions, improves the internal consistency of the theory, and can begin to resolve scholarly disagreements. We conclude the article by providing concrete suggestions for future empirical research.

To beckon or not to beckon: Testing a causal-evaluative modelling approach to moral judgment: A registered report

Moral judgments are increasingly being understood as showing context dependent variability. A growing literature has identified a range of specific contextual factors (e.g., emotions, intentions) that can influence moral judgments in predictable ways. Integrating these diverse influences into a unified approach to understanding moral judgments remains a challenge. Recent work by Railton (2017) attempted to address this with a causal-evaluative modelling approach to moral judgment. In support of this model Railton presents evidence from novel variations of classic trolley type dilemmas. We present results from a pre-registered pilot study that highlight a significant confound and demonstrate that it likely influenced Railton's results. Building on this, our registered report presents a replication-extension of Railton's study, using larger more diverse samples, and more rigorous methods and materials, specifically controlling for potential confounds. We found that participants' judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are influenced by both direct personal force, and by whether harm occurs as a means or as a side-effect of action. We also show the relationship between a range of individual difference variables and responses to sacrificial moral dilemmas. Our results provide novel insights into the factors that influence people's moral judgments, and contribute to ongoing theoretical debates in moral psychology.

The Effects of Side-Taking on Narrative Entertainment and the Perceptions of Events and Characters

ABSTRACT Media psychologists commonly study how narrative elements (e.g. characters) influence entertainment and perceptions. Research on the sequencing and structure of these elements (i.e. metanarrative; the shape of the story) is less common. In both areas, morality tends to ground theorizing (e.g. disposition theory). To extend knowledge in these domains, we conceptualize and observe the effects of side-taking (i.e. choosing a side during conflict), a core concept in narratives and moral psychology. Dynamic coordination theory explains that side-taking is fundamental to morality because it signals moral judgment/condemnation. In a preregistered experiment (N = 577), we observed how the direction (i.e. siding with/against the protagonists or taking no side) and timing of side-taking (i.e. early, middle, or late in the story) influenced variables at multiple levels of analysis (i.e. micro-to-macro). Although timing did not produce effects, we found robust evidence that the direction of side-taking affected variables at all levels of analysis.

Institutional design and moral conflict in health care priority-setting.

Priority-setting policy-makers often face moral and political pressure to balance the conflicting motivations of efficiency and rescue/non-abandonment. Using the conflict between these motivations as a case study can enrich the understanding of institutional design in developed democracies. This essay presents a cognitive-psychological account of the conflict between efficiency and rescue/non-abandonment in health care priority-setting. It then describes three sets of institutional arrangements-in Australia, England/Wales, and Germany, respectively-that contend with this conflict in interestingly different ways. The analysis yields at least three implications for institutional design in developed democracies: (1) indeterminacy at the level of moral psychology can increase the probability of indeterminacy at the level of institutional design; (2) situational constraints in effect require priority-setting policy-makers to adopt normative-moral pluralism; and (3) the U.S. health care system may be in an anti-priority-setting equilibrium.

One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence.

Why do we punish negligence? Some current accounts raise the possibility that it can be explained by the kinds of processes that lead us to punish ordinary harmful acts, such as outcome bias, character inference, or antecedent deliberative choices. Although they capture many important cases, these explanations fail to account for others. We argue that, in addition to these phenomena, there is something unique to the punishment of negligence itself: People hold others directly responsible for the basic fact of failing to bring to mind information that would help them to avoid important risks. In other words, we propose that at its heart negligence is a failure of thought. Drawing on the current literature in moral psychology, we suggest that people find it natural to punish such failures, even when they do not arise from conscious, volitional choice. This raises a question: Why punish somebody for a mental event they did not exercise deliberative control over? Drawing on the literature on how thoughts come to mind, we argue that punishing a person for such failures will help prevent their future occurrence, even without the involvement of volitional choice. This provides new insight on the structure and function of our tendency to punish negligent actions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Can We Teach the Intuitive Dog New Tricks? Reconciling Jonathan Haidt’s Viewpoint Diversity with His Moral Psychology

In recent years, many scholars drew attention to political polarization in academia and attempted to reduce it. Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist, suggests that his framework of “viewpoint diversity” can reduce polarization. However, this framework contradicts his earlier work, especially the “social intuitionist model.” On the one hand, he argues that reason is not crucial to changing someone’s mind. He uses the metaphor of a dog who makes intuitive decisions and wags its tail (reason) to communicate and justify them. On the other hand, he believes that scholars can change each other’s minds on political issues through reason. This paper seeks to reveal the tension between “viewpoint diversity” and the “social intuitionist model” and to reconcile it. In order to ground these frameworks into social psychological theories, this paper examines the social intuitionist model in relation to cognitive dissonance theory and suggests modifications to Haidt’s “viewpoint diversity” based on cognitive reappraisal.

Structural Validity Evidence for the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale Across 15 Languages

Abstract: Background: The Psychological Science Accelerator (PSA) recently completed a large-scale moral psychology study using translated versions of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS). However, the translated versions have no validity evidence. Objective: The study investigated the structural validity evidence of the OUS across 15 translated versions and produced version-specific validity reports. Methods: We analyzed OUS data from the PSA, which was collected internationally on a centralized online questionnaire . We also collected qualitative feedback from experts for each translated version. Results: For each version, we produced version-specific psychometric reports which include the following: (1) descriptive item and demographics analyses, (2) factor structure evidence using confirmatory factor analyses, (3) measurement invariance testing across languages using multiple-group confirmatory factor analyses and alignment optimization, and (4) reliability analyses using coefficients α and ω.

On the computational complexity of ethics: moral tractability for minds and machines

Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr’s three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the moral tractability thesis.

Moral Internalisation Influences the Attentional Bias to Smoking and Non-Smoking Stimuli in Malaysian Youth

The youth age group is a phase of life associated with risk-taking behaviour and challenging moral issues. This study aimed to provide electrophysiological evidence that could explain the interaction between attentional bias towards the health-risk of smoking and non-health risk behaviour stimuli as influenced by various levels of moral identity. Seventy eight eligible subjects (mean age of 22 + 2.1 years old) participated in the event-related potential session. Attentional bias towards the visual stimuli was determined by recording the N200 brain potential while participants emotionally reacted to the target (health-risk of smoking, nonhealth risk behaviour) and non-target (neutral) stimuli. N200 was extracted and analysed by using a mixed-design analysis of variance with target and non-target stimuli as within subject effects and types of moral identity as between subject effects. Attentional bias towards visual stimuli interacted significantly with the different levels of moral identity in the central part of the brain. High internalisation trait indicated shorter N200 latency when reacted to the health-risk of smoking stimuli than the non-health risk behaviour stimuli. An important insight regarding to moral psychology in relation to youth health risk behaviour was highlighted to focus for the development of the health promotion and education in future.

Plato and Nietzsche on the Ideal Soul

Abstract Nietzsche scholars have remarked on the similarities between his conception of the ideal soul and that of Plato. This article provides a systematic examination of this issue. The first part of the article demonstrates that there is in fact a substantive convergence between their views. However, this result is puzzling given that Nietzsche accuses Plato’s moral psychology of being deeply ascetic. Thus, the second part of the article focuses on this charge. Though the textual evidence provided by Plato’s dialogues remains ambiguous, the article concludes that it tends to support Nietzsche’s case. However, Nietzsche not only recognizes—at least occasionally—that Platonic ascetism is less rabid than Christian ascetism but even concedes that it can prove healthy for certain people.

Balancing self-interest and public interest: Virtues and the pandemic context

This article explores how the external conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic have affected individuals’ moral psychology. We will argue that challenging contexts like the pandemic are external conditions that shape human moral behavior. Supported by Adam Smith’s theory of virtues, it is argued that individuals can balance self-interest with concern for others, even in challenging circumstances, through the virtues of justice, benevolence, prudence, and, most importantly, self-control. We will conclude by stating that, even in challenging contexts, individuals need to balance private and public interests to develop appropriate moral action.

Why moral psychology needs personality psychology.

People vary in how they perceive, think about, and respond to moral issues. Clearly, we cannot fully understand the psychology of morality without accounting for individual differences in moral functioning. But decades of neglect of and explicit skepticism toward such individual differences has resulted in a lack of integration between moral psychology and personality psychology-the study of psychological differences between people. In recent years, these barriers to progress have started to break down. This special issue aims to celebrate and further increase the visibility of the personality psychology of morality. Here, we introduce the articles in this special issue by highlighting some important contributions a personality-based perspective has to offer moral psychology-particularly in comparison to the currently prominent social psychological approach. We show that personality psychology is well-placed to (a) contribute toward a rigorous empirical foundation for moral psychology, (b) tackle the conceptualization and assessment of stable moral tendencies, (c) assess the predictive validity of moral traits in relation to consequential outcomes, (d) uncover the mechanisms underlying individual differences in moral judgments and behavior, and (e) provide insights into moral development. For these reasons, we believe that moral psychology needs personality psychology to reach its full scholarly potential.

Conflict in moral and nonmoral decision making: an empirical study coupled with a computational model.

While moral psychology research has extensively studied decision making using moral dilemmas, such high-conflict situations may not fully represent all moral decisions. Moreover, most studies on the effect of conflict have focused on nonmoral decisions, and it is unclear how it applies to the moral realm. The present mixed-method research investigates how conflict impacts moral compared to nonmoral decision making. In a preregistered empirical study ( ), participants made moral and nonmoral decisions with varying levels of conflict while their mouse trajectories were recorded. Results indicate that moral decisions were more stable in the presence of conflict, while still seeking compromise. In addition, decisions were more affected when conflict got higher. Mouse-tracking data further indicate that some factors are impacting the decision process earlier than others, supporting the relevance of tracing methods to dig into finer-grained decision dynamics. We also present a computational model that aims to capture decision mechanisms and how conflict and morality influence decision making. The model uses dynamic neural fields coupled with sensorimotor control to map a continuous decision space. Two model versions were compared: one with greater perceptual weight for moral information, and another with earlier processing of moral versus nonmoral information. The simulated data more successfully reproduced empirical patterns for the second version, thus providing insights into the underlying decision processes for both moral and nonmoral decisions, in the presence of conflict or not.

How Do Individuals View Euthanasia In Different Cultural Backgrounds Based on Different Ideas of Moral Psychology

To this day, euthanasia remains a topic of lively discussion. The debate over whether it should be practiced or not never stops. This paper presents basic information about euthanasia and analyzes different people's views on euthanasia in the context of religious beliefs and philosophical ideas based on moral psychology. People who grow up in different cultures will have different views on euthanasia. This paper argues that Catholicism, Christianity, and traditional Confucianism are associated with the central idea of deontology (absolute regularity) and tend to reject euthanasia. In contrast, Taoism is associated with the central idea of utilitarianism (the pursuit of the greatest happiness of mankind) and tends to accept the practice of euthanasia. Various ideas have their reasons for rejecting or accepting the practice of euthanasia, each of which thoroughly explains their respective claims. Each idea also has its staunch followers. But regardless of the view one supports, one should be cautious regarding issues related to their own life.

Pathogens or promiscuity? Testing two accounts of the relation between disgust sensitivity and binding moral values.

A recurrent observation in the field of moral psychology is that disgust sensitivity is associated with greater moralization of the binding (and particularly sanctity) moral domains. It is generally assumed that these effects are the result of disgust's role as an emotion that motivates pathogen avoidance (i.e., the pathogen avoidance account), yet alternative disgust-based accounts of moralization, namely those grounded in sexual avoidance (i.e., the promiscuity avoidance account), might also explain these observations. Across two studies (total N = 2,718), involving 10 diverse samples (from Australia, the United States, and Brazil), we found that after controlling for the shared variance of pathogen and sexual disgust, only measures of sexual disgust exhibited a positive (and strong) association with the binding moral foundations. These results argue against the pathogen avoidance account of disgust-binding effects and instead support the promiscuity avoidance account. Above all, this work highlights the utility of delineating the dimensionality of disgust to better characterize the different disgust-based motives underlying moral cognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).