Equal Consideration Of Interests Research Articles

Representing non-citizens: a proposal for the inclusion of all affected interests

ABSTRACT This article defends the normative relevance of the representation of non-citizens in democracies. I argue that representation within nation-states constitutes a realistic institutionalisation of the All-Affected Principle, allowing justificatory practices towards non-citizens and establishing political institutions that can realise the ideal of inclusion of all externally affected individuals. I defend electoral, non-electoral and surrogate forms of representation of affected interests that satisfy both the cosmopolitan concern for the equal consideration of interests and the statist defence of the importance of a territorially and civically bounded demos. I assess piecemeal implementations of representation practices, namely reciprocal representation, ombudspersons, self-appointed representatives and deliberative and advocacy groups. Gradual and pluralised means of representation constitute necessary and feasible first steps to consider affected interests and offer an alternative route to an all-or-nothing defence of inclusion as national enfranchisement.

Unitarianism or Hierarchical Approach for Moral Status? A Very Subtle Difference

The article is inspired by Shelly Kagan’s recent book “How to Count Animals”, which focuses on the alternative between a unitarian and a hierarchical conception of the moral status of beings in the animal ethics debate. The paper finds a way of compromise between the two perspectives in the principle of equal consideration of interests, but above all it lessens the role of such opposition – especially its practical relevance – by emphasizing that, regardless of the fact of conceiving moral status in terms of all or nothing or in gradual terms, what really counts in our attitude towards non-human animals is to assign them an important moral consideration, that protects them not only from suffering, but also from an induced death in advance of natural times, a thesis that is compatible with both unitarianism and a hierarchical approach.

XI—Equality, Friendship, and Politics

Abstract A growing number of theorists have argued for equality as an ideal of social relations. For these theorists, the ideal of relational equality is embedded in many social relationships in modern society with which people are familiar. Friendship, they argue, is a paradigmatic case of relational equality, in the sense that it is essentially constituted by two norms of equality: equal power or authority and equal consideration of interests. Furthermore, equality in personal relationships can support equality in the political relationship of citizens. This essay challenges these claims made by relational egalitarians. It argues that friendship is not constituted by the two norms of equality, and is a poor model for political relationships.

Misunderstanding and Truth About Peter Singer's Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests

Misunderstanding and Truth About Peter Singer's Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests

Game theoretical approach for a fair and effective pricing strategy in cloud computing

The most proven pricing models for the healthy competition are based on game theory techniques that ensure equal consideration of interests for both clients and providers. However, user's preferences and price's sensitivity have a direct influence on the acceptance of new services, an issue that has been relatively neglected by previous research in this area. Thus, we formulate a mathematical model that takes into consideration users' behaviour and at the same time increases the marginal profit. The objective of this work is to improve the revenue for cloud providers as well as users' satisfaction. Experimental results show that the proposed approach is an optimal solution to obtain a reasonable price strategy in a competitive cloud market. More importantly, client's satisfaction has a considerable influence on pricing policy and the expected payoff. In this context, cloud providers compete with each other to maximise their expected utility even when they offer services at a reasonable price.

Consciousness reduced: The role of the 'idiot' in early evolutionary psychology.

A conception of the idiotic mind was used to substantiate late 19th-century theories of mental evolution. A new school of animal/comparative psychologists attempted from the 1870s to demonstrate that evolution was a mental as well as a physical process. This intellectual enterprise necessitated the closure, or narrowing, of the ‘consciousness gap’ between human and animal species. A concept of a quasi-non-conscious human mind, set against conscious intention and ability in higher animals, provided an explanatory framework for the human–animal continuum and the evolution of consciousness. The article addresses a significant lacuna in the historiographies of intellectual disability, animal science, and evolutionary psychology, where the application of a conception of human idiocy to advance theories of consciousness evolution has not hitherto been explored. These ideas retain contemporary resonance in ethology and cognitive psychology, and in the theory of ‘speciesism’, outlined by Peter Singer in Animal Liberation (1975), which claims that equal consideration of interests is not arbitrarily restricted to members of the human species, and advocates euthanasia of intellectually disabled human infants. Speciesism remains at the core of animal rights activism today. The article also explores the influence of the idea of the semi-evolved idiot mind in late-Victorian anthropology and neuroscience. These ideas operated in a separate intellectual sphere to eugenic thought. They were (and remain) deeply influential, and were at the heart of the idea of the moral idiot or imbecile, targeted in the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act, as well as in 20th-century animal and human consciousness theory.

The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances.

Simple SummaryAn influential idea in animal ethics is that moral favouritism towards members of one’s own species is a prejudice. This prejudice has been labelled ‘speciesism’, in analogy with racism and sexism. But not all ethicists subscribe to the view that speciesism is a prejudice. In fact, the tenability of speciesism is a topic of ongoing ethical debate. A recent exchange between Peter Singer and Shelly Kagan might leave the impression that this debate has essentially reached a stalemate, since the disputing parties rely on irreconcilable moral intuitions. In the present article, I argue that this impression is misleading. I highlight both philosophical and empirical research avenues that can help to move the speciesism debate forward, emphasizing that not all ethical intuitions about speciesism should be given equal weight. The article is part of the special issue ‘Animal Ethics: Questioning the Orthodoxy’.This article identifies empirical, conceptual and normative avenues to advance the speciesism debate. First, I highlight the application of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) as one such avenue: especially where (anti-)speciesist positions heavily rely on appeals to moral intuition, and EDAs have potential to move the debate forward. Second, an avenue for conceptual progress is the delineation of speciesism from other views in its vicinity, specifically from the view that biological differences between species are sometimes morally relevant (‘species-relativism’). Third, if we adopt Singer’s definition of speciesism, then a limitation of the current debate is that it is not obvious whether the core ethical principle that underlies anti-speciesist positions—the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests—is widely applicable. Arguably, the interests of animals are often too dissimilar to establish what equal consideration amounts to. I underscore the need for integrating philosophical and empirical research, to come to terms with the extent to which the interests of members of different species are alike, and with the question of whether any dissimilarities might be morally relevant.

Misadventures of Sentience: Animals and the Basis of Equality.

Simple SummaryEqual moral worth in animal ethics is an elusive moral notion not only because of the notorious human prejudice but also because grounding equal moral worth requires attending to the problem of the basis of equality. How can we ground equality given that all human and nonhuman individuals vary in all the morally considerable features? John Rawls claimed that we can use range properties, namely properties that are equally possessed by all people who pass a certain threshold of moral relevance (e.g., the age of majority gives equal right to vote). In this paper, I critically discuss two different attempts to defend an egalitarian theory in animal ethics: Alasdair Cochrane’s and Peter Singer’s. The former seeks to eschew the problem of range properties by appealing to a binary property naturally possessed by all sentient beings (the property of having interests). His attempt fails because this property has the same problems as range properties. The latter dispenses with equal moral worth altogether by defending the principle of equal consideration of interests. I argue that this principle has weak egalitarian credentials. I conclude by outlining the conditions that a sound theory in animal ethics should meet.This paper aims to put in question the all-purposes function that sentience has come to play in animal ethics. In particular, I criticize the idea that sentience can provide a sound basis of equality, as has been recently proposed by Alasdair Cochrane. Sentience seems to eschew the standard problems of egalitarian accounts that are based on range properties. By analysing the nature of range properties, I will show that sentience cannot provide such a solution because it is constructed as a sui generis range property. After criticizing the approaches seeking to ground animals’ equal status, I turn to Singer’s principle of equal consideration of interests. Despite its seeming non-controversiality, I argue that it cannot do without referring to the moral status of a being in order to determine the weight of a being’s interests. Moreover, it outlines a weak egalitarian basis because it relies on the presumption of equality of interests in virtue of our lack of knowledge of the weight of individuals’ interests. I conclude in a more positive tone by arguing that, irrespective of the troubles of range property egalitarianism, animal ethics can rely on other normative resources to defend the cause of animals.

Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests

The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people’s features. In this paper, I challenge Singer’s argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality.

Why Speciesism is Wrong: A Response to Kagan

AbstractIn Animal Liberation I argued that we commonly ignore or discount the interests of sentient members of other species merely because they are not human, and that this bias in favour of members of our own species is, in important respects, parallel to the biases that lie behind racism and sexism. Shelly Kagan, in ‘What's Wrong With Speciesism’ misconstrues this argument, as well as the principle of equal consideration of interests, which I offer as an alternative to speciesism. Kagan also offers, as an alternative explanation of, and possible justification for, our discounting the interests of nonhuman animals, the suggestion that your interests count more if you are a member of a species whose typical adult members are persons. Although this view is not a form of speciesism, Kagan seems not to be aware of the fact that it is a view commonly defended by advocates of natural law ethics, on which there is already an extensive critical literature.

Global Internet Governance: Russian Approach and International Practice

The article studies the processes of Internet governance at the international level in the context of the position and interests of Russia in this area. The theory of global governance was used as a theoretical and methodological framework of the study. Initially, Internet governance was carried out on the state level, with coordination carried out in the interests of the United States created the Internet. At the present stage states and other actors in world politics has to be integrated into the existing system of Internet governance, resulting in development of multi-level or multi-directional diplomacy, formation of the so-called "hybrid" organizations and new models of cooperation. There are new formats of regulation of international relations formed under the influence of scientific and technological progress. Russia's position on Internet governance is based on the goal to ensure equal consideration of interests of all states in the governance of the Internet.

“Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”

The paper explores the meaning of the principle of equal consideration of interests as expressed by the famous dictum that John Stuart Mill attributed to Jeremy Bentham: “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”. It examines the contributions of these two authors and the comments by Henry Sidgwick, Stanley W. Jevons, Francis Y. Edgeworth and Arthur C. Pigou. The hedonistic and cardinalistic assumptions that these authors shared made the question of how to weigh the happiness of different individuals crucial for the application of utilitarian ethics, since the distribution of happiness and the distribution of the means of happiness were strictly related in this perspective. In particular, the hedonistic approach suggested to Edgeworth a strong argument in favour of inequality, and a comparison of his conclusions with those of his predecessors – and with those of Pigou after him – is essential to understand the limits of the egalitarian implications of utilitarian ethics.

Equality and Democracy

In a recent article, Thomas Christiano defends the intrinsic justice of democracy grounded in the principle of equal consideration of interests. Each citizen is entitled to a single vote, equal in weight to all other citizens. The problem with this picture is that all citizens must meet a threshold of minimal competence. My argument is that Christiano is wrong to claim a minimum threshold of competency is fully consistent with the principle of equality. While standards of minimal competency may be justifiable, these standards justify political inequality. This paper explores the relationship between equality and democracy in terms of minimal competency, demonstrating how minimal competency is justified and why it is inegalitarian in interesting ways.

Between Humans and Animals: Animal Liberation and Equal consideration of Interests

Between Humans and Animals: Animal Liberation and Equal consideration of Interests

The Prodigal and his Brother: Impartiality and the Equal Consideration of Interests

At the heart of Peter Singer's utilitarianism is the impartial weighing of the interests of those affected by our actions. Singer calls this the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. This paper argues that Singer's Principle does not accord with our moral intuitions and the logic of our moral thinking. It discusses the Principle in the context of the parable of the Prodigal Son and his Brother--a parable that raises the issue of impartiality in a particularly challenging way. What the parable shows is, first, that our moral thinking often turns on judgements of fairness that are prior to any impartial weighing of interests; and, second, that impartial fairness itself is sometimes transcended by compassionate love. Both of these points have important implications for bioethics.

Refuting Peter Singer's ethical theory: the importance of human dignity

Introduction The Goal of Ethics The Source of Moral Value The Role of Reason in Ethics The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests Why Singer's Principle of Equal Consideration is a Threat to Morality and Human Values On Human Dignity Bibliography Index

A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism

Although supporters of vegetarianism (and animals' interests in general) come in many varieties, we may distinguish two groups. First, utilitarians such as Singer base their argument on the suffering that factory farming causes to nonhumans and the absence of comparable benefits to humans. l Second, the animal rights view, as expressed by Regan, extends Kant's respect for persons principle to include nonhumans and argues that meat eating wrongly treats nonhumans merely as means.2 Similarly, I find it useful to distinguish two types of defense of meat eating. My division is based on how each group responds to Singer's demand that we extend the equal consideration of interests principle3 to include nonhumans and to his parallel between speciesism and, on the other hand, racism and sexism. Some grant Singer's premise that nonhumans do deserve equal consideration of interests, but they argue either that animals actually benefit from being raised on farms or that their suffering is outweighed by human gains. Others, paralleling Regan's rights approach, reject utilitarian calculations of interests. However, thcy argue, in direct opposition to Regan,

Interspecific Justice

This essay supposes that the question of what treatment of animals is morally acceptable cannot be decided in any straightforward way by appeals to ‘equal consideration of interests’ or to animal rights. Instead it seeks to survey a variety of proposals as to how we ought to adjudicate interspecific conflicts of interests ‐ proposals that are both ‘speciesist’ and ‘non‐speciesist’ in nature. In the end one proposal is defended as the most reasonable one, and is claimed to provide a partial basis for developing an adequate theory of interspecific justice. In the course of this argument the challenge posed by radical critics of current treatment of animals (e.g. Tom Regan and Peter Singer) is considered. The schema of a theory developed here partly supports and partly conflicts with positions they have defended. Regarding the latter point it proposes a non‐anthropocentric basis for discounting the interests of sentient animals.

Sistemas de classificação de severidade: análise abolicionista da categorização do animal-coisa


 
 
 
 Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar os sistemas de classificação de severidade em experimentação animal, não somente em relação à efetuação dos princípios dos 3Rs, mas sobretudo a partir de uma perspectiva abolicionista. Os sistemas de classificação foram criados para implementar os princípios dos 3Rs e, consequentemente, minimizar o sofrimento dos animais na pesquisa científica. Sob a ótica abolicionista, todavia, tal tarefa se encontra eminentemente prejudicada a partir do momento em que o animal continua a ser concebido como propriedade. O que ocorre neste interim é a manutenção de uma relação assimétrica de dominação entre proprietário e propriedade, em que nunca ocorre efetivamente o balanço de interesses defendido pelo princípio da igual consideração de interesses. Para que este cenário se transforme, é imperativo construir um paradigma que assuma o animal como um sujeito, e não uma coisa.