Epistemic Role Research Articles

On the relationship between epistemology and science: synergies between experience-first epistemologies and agent-centered interpretations of quantum mechanics

Although contemporary analytic epistemology continues to be dominated by externalist accounts, an alternative internalist approach has recently emerged that emphasizes the epistemic role of consciousness, in particular of conscious experience. According to the phenomenological experience-first epistemology (PEFE) discussed in this paper, certain experiences constitute a source of immediate justification as well as our ultimate evidence. One reason why internalist approaches are less popular in current debates is the common assumption that externalism fits better with scientific practice. In this picture, the natural sciences are typically understood as adopting a third-person perspective that successfully abstracts away from the subject and her personal experiences. Here, I discuss an alternative view of science, namely science as understood within the framework of agent-centered approaches to quantum mechanics. More specifically, my focus will be on QBism, a highly controversial but increasingly popular interpretation of quantum mechanics, whose defining feature is the interpretation of quantum probabilities as subjective Bayesian probabilities. The objective of this paper is to clarify the relationship between epistemology and science under the assumption that both PEFE and QBism are correct.

Vindicating Lineage Eliminativism

AbstractThis article defends a selective eliminativist position with respect to the concept of “biological lineage” as used in certain areas of contemporary evolutionary biology. We argue that its primary epistemic roles in these contexts—explaining social evolution and cumulative selection—clash with empirical evidence, and that enforcing the concept of “lineage” even obstructs fruitful research avenues in several biological research fields, including phylogenetic research. Drawing on this, we suggest that, in many instances, it would be best to get rid of the concept of “lineage” and think in terms that are more closely aligned with the empirical complexity of the biological world. Specifically, this entails that, instead of looking for the lineage that may have given rise to the entities possessing certain biological characteristics, biologists should generally look for any potential process allowing such possession, with the formation of a lineage just one possibility among many.

On the Epistemic Roles of the Individualized Niche Concept in Ecology, Behavioral Biology, and Evolutionary Biology

Abstract We characterize four fruitful and underappreciated epistemic roles played by the concept of an individualized niche in contemporary biology, utilizing results of a qualitative empirical study conducted within an interdisciplinary biological research center. We argue that the individualized niche concept (1) shapes the research agenda of the center, (2) facilitates explaining core phenomena related to interindividual differences, (3) helps with managing individual-level causal complexity, and (4) promotes integrating local knowledge from ecology, evolutionary biology, behavioral biology, and other biological fields. We thereby also challenge arguments that the niche concept is superfluous in ecology.

Embodied simulation and knowledge of possibilities

ABSTRACT We argue that our capacity to use imagination to acquire knowledge of objective possibilities should be explained in terms of the embodied nature of our imagination. Our imagination is able to be sufficiently reality oriented due to constraints that are a natural consequence of embodied simulation. That is, our bodies, shaped by their histories of interactions with the environment, can play a role in constraining the imagination so that it, sometimes, is epistemically useful. However, insofar as these constraints support our capacity to acquire knowledge of non-actual possibilities, this support is only likely to accrue for knowledge of relatively mundane and parochial possibilities, yet potentially detrimentally distorting when dealing with possibilities that are alien to our specific embodied ways of being. The cases where embodied constraints are likely to fail to provide epistemic support to the imagination include many of the kinds of thought experiment that are central to philosophers’ attempts to gain knowledge of possibilities. Thus, at least insofar as imagination is taken to play a central epistemic role in these cases, one should exercise a degree of modesty.

The legacy and evolvability of Pere Alberch's ideas.

Pere Alberch played a pivotal role in shaping the field of evolutionary developmental biology during the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas initially his contributions were sidelined by the empirical advancements of the molecular revolution in developmental and evolutionary biology, his theoretical insights have left a lasting impact on the discipline. This article provides a comprehensive review of the legacy and evolvability of Alberch's ideas in contemporary evo-devo, which included the study of morphogenesis as the proper level of developmental causation, the interplay between developmental constraints and natural selection, the epistemic role of teratologies, the origin of evolutionary novelties and the concept of evolvability.

Surprise in Science: A qualitative study

AbstractA growing literature in philosophy of science focuses on the role of surprise in scientific practice. The aesthetic dimension of science is also gaining momentum in very recent discussions. While surprising results have been recognised as playing an important epistemic role in science, the literature so far has primarily focused on establishing the power of simulations and thought experiments as compared to experiments and the epistemic superiority of novel predictions over accommodations. In this paper we offer the first empirical analysis of the role of surprise as an aesthetic response, drawing from in-depth interviews with 215 scientists in four countries. We identify what roles scientists assign to surprising results, show that surprise is often experienced as an aesthetic response and identify properties, triggers, and outcomes of surprise in science.

Making sense of big questions that require multiple subjects: preliminary theorisation of an integrative philosophy of knowledge and empirical indications of a lack of subject connection within school curricula

AbstractThis paper provides theorisation about a novel concept for education: an integrative philosophy of knowledge (IPK). This is proposed for school curricula to relate multiple subjects to big questions of personal and existential importance. Critical contemporary issues such as climate change education require multiple subject contributions but there is little clarity in the English education guidance on this drawing together, beyond the encouragement to do so in priority areas. Leading British thinkers have engaged the idea of the unity of knowledge, not without difficulty and criticism. The paper identifies reasons for a practical approach to consilience in school curricula. In addition to preliminary theorisation, in methodological ‘harmony’, this paper adds tentative empirical findings from a related research project that provides quantitative indications that such multi-subject connection is likely not happening. The findings are not definitive, but the perceptions of three groups of beginning and experienced teachers (secondary Religious Education (RE), secondary science and primary teachers) indicate that school curricula do not reflect an integrative approach to climate change education, and sex and relationships education, despite policy priority. A significant national survey could not detect many signs of connection. The paper speculates that RE could have a key epistemic role for the curriculum as a whole in this regard.

Emotions and the phenomenal grasping of epistemic blameworthiness

AbstractIn this paper, I consider the potential implications of the observation that epistemic judgment seems to be less emotional than moral judgment. I argue that regardless of whether emotions are necessary for blame, blaming emotions do play an important epistemic role in the moral domain. They allow us to grasp propositions about moral blameworthiness and thereby to appreciate their significance in a special way. Further, I argue that if we generally lack blaming emotions in the epistemic domain, then we are unable to grasp propositions about epistemic blameworthiness. As a result, regardless of one's theory of epistemic blame, there emerges a tension between the claims that we are epistemically blameworthy for our epistemic failings and the claim that we do not feel epistemic blaming emotions.

Absence and objectivity

AbstractI first show that a growing body of literature about the phenomenological and epistemic role of the structural features of experience can be recruited in favour of the view that absence experience is non‐veridical. Then I argue that such literature is in fact amenable to the view that absence experience is veridical if we rethink our conception of absence, and presence, itself.

Different kinds of data: samples and the relational framework

This paper proposes an original definition of samples as a kind of data within the relational framework of data. The distinction between scientific objects (e.g., samples, data, models) often needs to be clarified in the philosophy of science to understand their role in the scientific inquiry. The relational framework places data at the forefront of knowledge construction. Their epistemic status depends on their evaluation as potential evidence in a research situation and their ability to circulate among researchers. While samples are significant in data-generating science, their role has been underexplored in the philosophy of data literature. I draw on a case study from data-centric microbiology, viz. amplicon sequencing, to introduce specifications of the relational framework. These specifications capture the distinctive epistemic role of samples, allowing the discussion of their significance in the inquiry process. I argue that samples are necessarily transformed to be considered as evidence, portable in the limits of a situation, and they act as world anchors for claims about a phenomenon. I compare these specifications with other data and evidence frameworks and suggest they are compatible. The paper concludes by considering the extension of these criteria in the context of biobanking. The specifications proposed here help analyze other life sciences cases and deepen our understanding of samples and their epistemological role in scientific research.

The epistemic role of language on the belief about Trinity and Incarnation

The epistemic role of language on the belief about Trinity and Incarnation

Affordances, phenomenology, pragmatism and the myth of the given

AbstractThis paper addresses a potential contradiction between the two primary philosophical traditions that inform Gibsonian ecological psychology: the phenomenological and pragmatist traditions. These two traditions exhibit potentially contradictory intuitions about the epistemic role of direct perception. This epistemic role of direct perception was famously problematized by Sellars’ critique of the myth of the given (1956; 1997), and we draw on it here to serve as a test case for the Gibsonian synthesis of phenomenology and pragmatism. While ecological psychology’s emphasis on the firstperson perspective of organisms shares in the legacy of the phenomenological tradition, it also tends to assume direct experience as a given, something basic and foundational to knowledge. Pragmatism, on the other hand, is generally suspicious of experience as a foundational given. We argue that Gibson’s successful synthesis of these two traditions is also what makes his theory of affordances less susceptible to the myth of the given than some phenomenological approaches to perception. Namely, on the Gibsonian account of perception is always part of an action-perception cycle that takes place in and through embodied action and therefore no one act of perception functions as an epistemic given

The epistemic role of vividness

Abstract The vividness of mental imagery is epistemically relevant. Intuitively, vivid and intense memories are epistemically better than weak and hazy memories, and using a clear and precise mental image in the service of spatial reasoning is epistemically better than using a blurry and imprecise mental image. But how is vividness epistemically relevant? I argue that vividness is higher-order evidence about one’s epistemic state, rather than first-order evidence about the world. More specifically, the vividness of a mental image is higher-order evidence about the amount of first-order information one has about its subject matter. When vividness is sufficiently low, it can give one reason to doubt the epistemic basis of the mental image and thereby act as a defeater. This account has important implications for theorizing about the epistemic roles of memory, imagination, mental imagery and phenomenal consciousness.

Should we consider information as a physical concept? (About R. Krzanowski’s recent articles)

In this article, the authors critically analyze the content of the physical interpretation of information developed by the Polish researcher R. Krzanowski. They demonstrate the connection of Krzanowski’s views with the views of R. Landauer and T. Stonier on the place of information in the context of physical reality and the mode of its existence. The research is aimed at identifying the theoretical difficulties that arise when accepting the principles of Krzanowski’s understanding of information. These difficulties relate to the connection of the concept of information with the concepts of structure and meaning, as well as understanding the epistemic role of information in general. The authors also consider the list of topical issues of the philosophy of information, given by Krzanowski in his article “What is Physical Information?” published in 2020: a number of proposed questions are speculative-metaphysical, which makes it possible to criticize his position for trying to «confirm» and «substantiate» metaphysical assumptions through the use of theoretical tools and data from specific scientific disciplines.

On the Epistemic Role of Narrative Features in Determining Unsubstantiated Scientific Practices

Purpose: This study explores the disciplinary narrative structured in a specific scientific context: cancer research. Specifically, it examines the narratives of ten biologists vis-à-vis the use of machines and consumables within a cancer research lab in Belgium. The aim is to answer the following main research question: What is the relationship between the scientists and the lab's machines and consumables?Design: A qualitative analysis is conducted over 18 months of a) participant-observation recordings, b) semi-structured individual interviews, and c) collective interviews with ten lab scientists. The analysis is guided by Walter Fisher's narrative paradigm and Mona Baker's narrative features.Findings: The findings expose a problematic relationship between the scientists and their lab machines and suggest that scientists trust machines and consumables unquestionably. This problematic relationship is evidenced as the scientists' narratives violate four narrative features: 1) temporality, 2) causal emplotment, 3) relationality, and 4) selective appropriation. The study claims that these narrative features are well-positioned to identify unsubstantiated scientific practices.

Thinking different as an act of resistance: Reconceptualizing the German protests in the COVID-19 pandemic as an emergent counter-knowledge order

Massive anti-government protests erupted during the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany. The crisis activated a potential for resistance that has been simmering under the impositions of late-modern knowledge society. Made salient by the pandemic conditions of sudden extreme reliance on scientific (non) knowledge, the corona protestors activated this potential for resistance and constructed their own counter-knowledge order bound by shared resentment of and distrust in the established order and facilitated by digital platforms. Utilising social network analysis and structural topic modeling for digital critical discourse analysis, in this paper I explore how the corona protest counter-knowledge order is constructed with a particular focus on its contexts, roles, and hierarchies. I find that far-right and conspiracy imaginations are used to level out hierarchies and detach epistemic roles from their contexts to reinstate a superior self into interpretative power. The counter-knowledge order’s inherent construction of unwarranted omnipotence points to a more fundamental resistance to the established normative orders of our society that should be addressed more effectively if we want to be prepared for future crises and not lose common ground for making sense of them.

Phenomenal character and the epistemic role of perception

Phenomenal character and the epistemic role of perception

Imaginative beliefs

ABSTRACT I argue for the existence of imaginative beliefs: mental states that are imaginative in format and doxastic in attitude. I advance two arguments for this thesis. First, there are imaginings that play the functional roles of belief. Second, there are imaginings that play the epistemic roles of belief. These arguments supply both descriptive and normative grounds for positing imaginative beliefs. I also argue that this view fares better than alternatives that posit distinct imaginative and doxastic states to account for the same phenomena. Along the way, I demonstrate the theoretical significance of imaginative beliefs by showing how they pose a challenge for standard taxonomies of the mind, clarify the sense in which imagination is occurrent and voluntary, explain the justificatory role of the imagination, and point to a deep but underappreciated symmetry between imagistic and non-imagistic thought.

What is an experiment in mathematical practice? New evidence from mining the Mathematical Reviews

From a purely formalist viewpoint on the philosophy of mathematics, experiments cannot (and should not) play a role in warranting mathematical statements but must be confined to heuristics. Yet, due to the incorporation of new mathematical methods such as computer-assisted experimentation in mathematical practice, experiments are now conducted and used in a much broader range of epistemic practices such as concept formation, validation, and communication. In this article, we combine corpus studies and qualitative analyses to assess and categorize the epistemic roles experiments are seen—by mathematicians—to have in actual mathematical practice. We do so by text-mining a corpus of reviews from the Mathematical Reviews, which include the indicator word “experiment”. Our qualitative, grounded classification of samples from this corpus allows us to explore the various roles played by experiments. We thus identify instances where experiments function as references to established knowledge, as tools for heuristics or exploration, as epistemic warrants, as communication or pedagogy, and instances simply proposing experiments. Focusing on the role of experiments as epistemic warrants, we show through additional sampling that in some fields of mathematics, experiments can warrant theorems as well as methods. We also show that the expressed lack of experiments by reviewers suggests concordant views that experiments could have provided epistemic warrants. Thus, our combination of corpus studies and qualitative analyses has added a typology of roles of experiments in mathematical practice and shown that experiments can and do play roles as epistemic warrants depending on the mathematical field.

Perception's objects, border, and epistemic role: Comments on Christopher Hill's Perceptual experience

Christopher Hill's book Perceptual experience argues for a representational theory of mind that is grounded in empirical psychology. I focus here on three aspects of Hill's picture: The objects of visual awareness, the perception/cognition border, and the epistemic role of perceptual experience. I introduce challenges to Hill's account and consider ways these challenges may be overcome.