Should we consider information as a physical concept? (About R. Krzanowski’s recent articles)

Abstract

In this article, the authors critically analyze the content of the physical interpretation of information developed by the Polish researcher R. Krzanowski. They demonstrate the connection of Krzanowski’s views with the views of R. Landauer and T. Stonier on the place of information in the context of physical reality and the mode of its existence. The research is aimed at identifying the theoretical difficulties that arise when accepting the principles of Krzanowski’s understanding of information. These difficulties relate to the connection of the concept of information with the concepts of structure and meaning, as well as understanding the epistemic role of information in general. The authors also consider the list of topical issues of the philosophy of information, given by Krzanowski in his article “What is Physical Information?” published in 2020: a number of proposed questions are speculative-metaphysical, which makes it possible to criticize his position for trying to «confirm» and «substantiate» metaphysical assumptions through the use of theoretical tools and data from specific scientific disciplines.