According to Isaiah Berlin, ‘What the historian says will, however careful he may be to use purely descriptive language, sooner or later convey his attitude. Detachment is itself a moral position. The use of neutral language (“Himmler caused many persons to be asphyxiated”) conveys its own ethical tone’ (Introduction to Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford UP, 1969), p. xxix). Matthew Kramer's book makes the same claim about the moral philosopher: the attempted detachment of many meta‐ethicists is itself a moral position, and if anti‐realist, a ‘repellent’ and ‘morally untenable’ one (p. 32). That is, Kramer argues for moral realism and against meta‐ethics. There are objective moral facts, and meta‐ethical claims are themselves first‐order moral claims: Kramer's moral realism, like its competitors, ‘is firmly within the domain of which it offers an account’ (p. 17). Kramer's spelling out of what his moral realism means is what structures the book. The objectivity of morality can be distinguished into seven types under three headings (expanded from Kramer's earlier book Objectivity and the Rule of Law, which applied a similar schema to legal norms): under ontological objectivity, (ch. 2) mind‐independence, (3) determinate correctness, (4) uniform applicability, and (5) invariance; under epistemic objectivity, (6) trans‐individual concurrence and (7) impartiality; under semantic objectivity, (8) truth‐aptitude (table 1, p. 15). Apart from an introduction (1), two more chapters deal with (9) further aspects of objectivity and (10) supervenience. More roughly, the objectivity of the correct moral claims is that they are knowably true always, everywhere, for everyone, regardless of what anyone believes or feels about them.