Abstract
In this article, I defend a non-classical version of descriptive theory of reference-fixing for proper names against objections raised by Kripke. I consider that descriptive information associated by speakers with a proper name has semantic value and thus should be taken into account by any theory of proper names. I do not defend any one descriptive theory in particular, only general assumptions that can underpin different elaborations of a descriptive theory of names. The structure of this paper is as follows. In the first part, I will briefly explain the notion of descriptivism and how taking temporal parameters into account influences the formulation of the theses of descriptivism. Next I will explain why Kripke’s modal objection does not apply to a descriptive theory of reference-fixing, formulate assumptions of the descriptive theory defended in this paper and respond to Kripke’s epistemic objection. In the second part (to be published in the next issue), I respond to particular strands of Kripke’s semantic objection and show that the defended version has all the virtues traditionally associated with descriptive theories.
Published Version (
Free)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call