Epistemic Concepts Research Articles

Judgments vs Propositions in Alexander of Aphrodisias' Conception of Logic

This paper stresses the importance of identifying the nature of an author's conception of logic when using terms from modern logic in order to avoid, as far as possible, injecting our own conception of logic in the author's texts. Sundholm (2012. “‘Inference versus consequence” revisited: Inference, conditional, implication’, Synthese, 187, 943–956) points out that inferences are staged at the epistemic level and are made out of judgments, not propositions. Since it is now standard to read Aristotelian sullogismoi as inferences, I have taken Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentaries to Aristotle's logical treatises as a basis for arguing that the premises and conclusions should be read as judgments rather than as propositions. Under this reading, when Alexander speaks of protaseis, we should not read the modern notion of proposition, but rather what we now call judgments. The point is not just a matter of terminology, it is about the conception of logic this terminology conveys. In this regard, insisting on judgments rather than on propositions helps bring to light Alexander's epistemic conception of logic.

Community, solidarity and care through data? An ethical analysis of the interpersonal dimension of self-tracking

AbstractThis paper discusses the interpersonal dimension of self-tracking technologies from the standpoint of Dewey’s pragmatist ethics. Users of self-tracking routinely exchange data with others, interact through social features embedded in their tools, and form communities focused on the sharing and discussion of data. I employ Dewey’s notion of transaction to discuss how self-quantification impacts users’ perception of others and how it mediates interpersonal relations. In Dewey’s ethics engagement with others is a fundamental part of moral life and individual flourishing can only be achieved in social contexts and through the extension of care towards other people. The ethical ideals and epistemic concepts present in pragmatism allow me to argue that despite claims that self-tracking technologies lead to the formation of communities, pro-social instincts exist prior to the adoption of the devices and self-tracking actually inhibits the formation of mutually uplifting social bonds. In my discussion, I focus on the degree of epistemic distance that makes genuine engagement with others difficult, limits to transactional agency that prohibits users from deciding how they are perceived by others, and the reductive and instrumental nature of interactions embedded in the social features of self-tracking technologies. Moreover, I also analyse some political aspects of community-formation in the context of self-quantification and criticise the ownership structures of data and infrastructure that limit communities’ political agency.

Pursuit of the concept of validity: A dialogue

AbstractThis is a dialogue between Lisa and Max on Dag Prawitz's work concerning the concept of deductive validity. Lisa first explains Prawitz's criticisms of the presently prevailing non‐epistemic analyses of validity. Then Lisa describes three different ways in which Prawitz attempted to develop an epistemic concept of validity. Max asks questions for clarification, raises some objections and compares Prawitz's three approaches with other lines of thought. Two inference rules are specially discussed: disjunction introduction and ex contradictione quodlibet. Max and Lisa view Prawitz's contribution as part of a variegated, ongoing research pursuing an explication of the concept of validity, which began with the Socratic and Platonic distinction between merely persuasive arguments and good arguments and with Aristotle's definition of syllogism. Throughout the history of philosophy, logicians have aimed at clarifying a pre‐theoretic idea of good deduction and have proposed, criticized, refined, adjusted precise theoretical concepts of validity. Prawitz has criticized current views about validity, has advanced new proposals and revised them. His work is an important chapter of the long pursuit of the concept of validity.

Justifying political choice: from probability and institutions to communication

The article is devoted to the study of the dynamics of development of concepts that justify political choice. There is a general turn from the moral justification of political choice to ontological concepts based on the ideas of pragmatic and impartial behavior in the search for criteria for the “correct” decision, which includes the truth and the institutions that ensure it. The epistemic concept of democracy, based on Condorcet's jury theorem, defines the possibility of achieving the correct choice through majority rule voting, implies a competent, independent and sincere voter, which ensures an increase in the probability of the correct choice. The expansion of the composition of participants in political choice increased the role of diversity of knowledge and opinions in the justification, which led to the concept of the “smart plurality”, which ensures the correct choice is made by reducing its overall error through random mass participation. The development of social networks and their argumentative function in disputes have contributed to the transition to the concepts of argumentative networks that ensure the correct option is selected through communication. The identified dynamics allow us to conclude that the concept of politics is reviving its importance as a reasoning.

Explanation, representation and information

The ontic conception of explanation is predicated on the proposition that “explanation is a relation between real objects in the world” and hence, according to this approach, scientific explanation cannot take place absent such a premise. Despite the fact that critics have emphasized several drawbacks of the ontic conception, as for example its inability to address the so-called “abstract explanations”, the debate is not settled and the ontic view can claim to capture cases of explanation that are non-abstract, such as causal relations between events. However, by eliminating the distinction between abstract and non-abstract explanations, it follows that ontic and epistemic proposals can no longer contend to capture different cases of explanation and either all are captured by the ontic view or all are captured by the epistemic view. On closer inspection, it turns out that the ontic view deals with events that fall outside the scientists’ scope of observation and that it does not accommodate common instances of explanation such as explanations from false propositions and hence it cannot establish itself as the dominant philosophical stance with respect to explanation. On the contrary, the epistemic conception does account for almost all episodes of explanation and can be described as a relation between representations, whereby the explanans transmit information to the explanandum and that this information can come, dependent on context, in the form of any of the available theories of explanation (law-like, unificatory, causal and non-causal). The range of application of the ontic view thus is severely restricted to trivial cases of explanation that come through direct observation of the events involved in an explanation and explanation is to be mostly conceived epistemically.

The nature and norms of scientific explanation: Some preliminaries

There are at least two deep and related debates about explanation: about its nature and about its norms. The aim of this special issue of Philosophical Problems in Science/Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce (ZFN) is to survey whether or not a consensus is at hand in these debates and to help settle what it can. The overarching foci are twofold: (i) the nature of scientific explanation, with special attention to the debate between ontic and epistemic conception of explanation, and (ii) the norms of scientific explanation, with special attention to so-called ‘ontic’ (or better, ‘alethic’) norms like truth and referential success and epistemic norms like intelligibility and idealized understanding. It called for advocates of various conceptions to articulate the current state of these debates. Researchers and scholars from around the globe—including Poland, Canada, Korea, The Netherlands, the United States, Greece, Austria, and Belgium—contributed. The special issue also attempts to provide an opening for new work on the norms of explanation, such as truth or model-based accuracy, information compression, abstraction, and generalization.

Ontic or epistemic conception of explanation: A misleading distinction?

In this paper, I discuss the differences between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific explanation, mainly in relation to the so-called new mechanical philosophy. I emphasize that the debate on conceptions of scientific explanation owes much to Salmon’s ontic/epistemic distinction, although much has changed since his formulations. I focus on the interplay between ontic and epistemic norms and constraints in providing mechanistic explanations. My conceptual analysis serves two aims. Firstly, I formulate some suggestions for recognising that both sets of norms and constraints, ontic and epistemic, are necessary for scientific theorising. Secondly, I emphasize that there are multiple dimensions involved in scientific explanation, rather than clear-cut alternatives between ontic and epistemic aspects. I conclude with a general observation that although contextual aspects of explanations are unavoidable, the epistemic-relativity of our categories, explanations and models can in fact be compatible with their objectivity. Instead of making hastily drawn ontological implications from our theories or models, we should carefully scrutinize them from the ontic-epistemic perspective.

Epistemic outsiders: Unpacking and utilising the epistemic dimension of disruptive agency in sustainability transformations

Disruptions (systemic disturbances) are crucial to initiate and accelerate sustainability transformations of large-scale social systems (be they socio-ecological, socio-technical, or socio-institutional). Their emergence, characteristics and effects strongly relate to the role of agents who aim to disrupt and transform the status quo, and which thus possess what we call disruptive agency. In this paper, we highlight the epistemic dimension of disruptive agency in social transformations, first by conceptualizing disruptive agents as epistemic outsiders with respect to the social system that they intend to disrupt and transform, and second by connecting this conceptualization to notions of belief, social practices, social networks, discourses, or institutions. We identify five advantages of this approach. Firstly, it informs and conceptually enables various promising interdisciplinary avenues to explore and potentially influence transformative change towards sustainability. Secondly, an epistemic conception of disruptive agency offers a key for an integrated analysis of the individual and collective levels of agency involved in sustainability transformations. Thirdly, the notion of epistemic outsiders conceptually connects agent positions across system boundaries that are understood to be of crucial importance for sustainability transformations respectively (e.g., “niche innovators” or “regime intermediaries”) but which lack an integrated understanding. Fourthly, an epistemic perspective additionally highlights the changing requirements and challenges resulting in two principal stages of transformations unfolding over time, namely before/after a new epistemic layout is shared by a majority of agents. Finally, the above features allow to derive and conceive of new intervention formats and strategies.

The Dot: Statistics, Society, and Graphic Design, c. 1830–1970

Abstract This article takes Chermayeff & Geismar Associates’ cover designs for a paperback reprint series, “Studies in American Negro Life” (1968–c. 1972), as a starting point for investigating the history of the dot as a tool for social-statistical visualization. It first situates the series—which re-issued texts on Black history, sociology, and literature—within the context of 1960s urban unrest in the United States and shows how the arrangements of dots on each cover relate to contemporaneous experiments in urban cartography. It then traces a longer genealogy, considering the dot in relation to the 19th-century emergence of “society” and “the social” as novel epistemic concepts that came to serve as the primary objects of study for the modern social sciences in the 20th century. I address the integral role of statistics in this history, demonstrating how the logic of aggregation that undergirds statistical thinking has been habitually visualized through the dot. The article concludes by returning to the book series, addressing some of the individual covers and arguing that by evoking the visual vocabulary of the social sciences, the cover designs frame the series as a social scientific project overall.

Is a Moral Right to Privacy Limited by Agents’ Lack of Epistemic Control?

In their Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argued that there is no moral right to privacy, which resulted in a string of papers. This paper addresses an argument in their most recent contribution, according to which there is no moral right to privacy because individuals cannot control their access to information. Here their argument is first denied after which their epistemic conception of a moral right to privacy is criticized.

Crafting Attributes of a Geological Now

Taking an Earth Science framework as its point of departure, this paper delves into the sociocultural ramifications of two distinct geological interpretations—epoch and event—of the contested but widely acknowledged term “Anthropocene.” While the term has gained considerable traction for encapsulating planetary-scale anthropogenic changes (PSAC), its meanings are varied, spanning scientific, philosophical, and cultural discourses. Earth scientists often examine PSAC through the lens of their discipline, yet the complex sociocultural implications attached to such geoscientific concepts call for an interdisciplinary perspective. Introduced by Crutzen and Stoermer in 2000, the term “Anthropocene” is designed to account for the transformative impact of modern societies on Earth System dynamics. Presently, two opposing viewpoints exist within geological discourse to describe PSAC: the “Anthropocene-as-an-event” concept, which underscores the accretion of human-induced changes, and the “Anthropocene-as-an-epoch” concept, focusing on a substantial alteration in Earth System dynamics. Utilising Renn’s theory of “The Evolution of Knowledge,” the paper posits these concepts as scientific borderline problems, catalysts for epistemic inquiries, linked to specific “economies of knowledge.” The ensuing analysis accentuates the multidimensionality of articulating PSAC from an Earth Science viewpoint, asserting that it not only mandates understanding the geological dimensions but also calls for integrating sociocultural and philosophical contexts. The paper concludes that geological terminology should consider associated cultural contexts of Earth Science to establish leadership for vital epistemic concepts.

Symbolic belief in social cognition

AbstractKeeping track of what others believe is a central part of human social cognition. However, the social relevance of those beliefs can vary a great deal. Some belief attributions mostly tell us about what a person is likely to do next. Other belief attributions tell us more about a person's social identity. In this paper, I argue that we cope with this challenge by employing two distinct concepts of belief in our everyday social interactions. The epistemic concept of belief is primarily used to keep track of what other people take to be true, and this informs how we predict and interpret their behaviors. The symbolic concept of belief, in contrast, is primarily used as a means of signaling one's social identity to other members of one's community. In turn, community members closely monitor each other's symbolic beliefs as a means of enforcing social norms.

Beyond generalization: a theory of robustness in machine learning

The term robustness is ubiquitous in modern Machine Learning (ML). However, its meaning varies depending on context and community. Researchers either focus on narrow technical definitions, such as adversarial robustness, natural distribution shifts, and performativity, or they simply leave open what exactly they mean by robustness. In this paper, we provide a conceptual analysis of the term robustness, with the aim to develop a common language, that allows us to weave together different strands of robustness research. We define robustness as the relative stability of a robustness target with respect to specific interventions on a modifier. Our account captures the various sub-types of robustness that are discussed in the research literature, including robustness to distribution shifts, prediction robustness, or the robustness of algorithmic explanations. Finally, we delineate robustness from adjacent key concepts in ML, such as extrapolation, generalization, and uncertainty, and establish it as an independent epistemic concept.

The fixed points of belief and knowledge

Abstract Self-referential sentences have troubled our understanding of language for centuries. The most famous self-referential sentence is probably the Liar, a sentence that says of itself that it is false. The Liar Paradox has encouraged many philosophers to establish theories of truth that manage to give a proper account of the truth predicate in a formal language. Kripke’s Fixed Point Theory from 1975 is one famous example of such a formal theory of truth that aims at giving a plausible notion of truth by allowing truth value gaps. However, not only the concept of truth gives rise to paradoxes. A syntactical treatment of epistemic notions like belief and knowledge leads to contradictions that very much resemble the Liar Paradox. Therefore, it seems to be fruitful to apply the established theories of truth to epistemic concepts. In this paper, I will present one such attempt of solving the epistemic paradoxes: I adapt Kripke’s Fixed Point Theory and interpret truth, knowledge and belief within the framework of a partial logic. Thereby I find not only the fixed point of truth but also the fixed points of knowledge and belief. In this fixed point, the predicates of truth, belief and knowledge find their definite interpretation and the paradoxes are avoided.

Epistemic Markers in the Scientific Discourse

AbstractThe central role of such epistemic concepts as theory, explanation, model, or mechanism is rarely questioned in philosophy of science. Yet, what is their actual use in the practice of science? Here, we deploy text-mining methods to investigate the usage of 61 epistemic notions in a corpus of full-text articles from the biological and biomedical sciences (N = 73,771). The influence of disciplinary context is also examined by splitting the corpus into subdisciplinary clusters. The results reveal the intricate semantic networks that these concepts actually form in the scientific discourse, not always following our intuitions, at least in some parts of science.

A hyperintensional approach to positive epistemic possibility

The received view says that possibility is the dual of necessity: a proposition is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc.) possible iff it is not the case that its negation is (metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc., respectively) necessary. This reading is usually taken for granted by modal logicians and indeed seems plausible when dealing with logical or metaphysical possibility. But what about epistemic possibility? We argue that the dual definition of epistemic possibility in terms of epistemic necessity generates tension when reasoning about non-idealized agents and is a problem of concern for most hyperintensional epistemic logics that alleviate the problem of logical omniscience. The tension is particularly evident when knowledge is taken as a primitive to define other epistemic concepts, such as justification and belief, as done in the knowledge-first tradition. We propose a non-dual interpretation of epistemic possibility, employing a hyperintensionality filter similar to the one that makes the corresponding epistemic necessity operator hyperintensional. We employ the proposed semantics to model Stalnaker’s belief as epistemic possibility of knowledge and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for a hyperintensional version of his bimodal logic of knowledge and belief.

The Tawhidi Methodological Worldview as A Model of Circular Political Economy

The critique of mainstream socioeconomic reasoning in the light of the new yet opposing methodological worldview is explained by the specific problem of circular economy. Circular economy in its mainstream is functionally a macroeconomic concept disjointly constructed and explained away from any possible interrelations with microeconomics. Thereby, all the extra-domain of social and scientific phenomena are dissolved from mainstream socio-scientific reasoning. Yet reality is far from such a digitalized narrowed perception when viewed from the objectivity of the wellbeing criterion and its common sustainability prospect. In reference to such an opposing epistemic criticism the mainstream meaning of the General Flow of Goods and Services in the context of Circular Political Economy (CPE) is of exogenously separable connectivity of flows of inputs, resources, production, consumption, distribution, and re-circulation across financial and real economic sectors. Contrarily, from the participatory and unified organic linkages between micro-social entities aggregating to integrated society-wide unit of analysis, there is the new epistemic conception and methodology of a new GFGS-CPE understanding. This paper examines the emergent substantive methodological difference between the two worldviews – Tawhidi methodological contra mainstream

Charting the Territories of Epistemic Concepts in the Practice of Science: A Text-Mining Approach

Charting the Territories of Epistemic Concepts in the Practice of Science: A Text-Mining Approach

FRIEDRICH HAYEK’S EPISTEMIC APPROACH TO LAW

This study aims to fill the lacuna in the legal views of a famous economist and philosopher, Economics Nobel Prize winner Friedrich Hayek. Although Hayek’s economic and political ideas have eclipsed many other attempts to understand and overcome the social cataclysms of the 20th century, his legal views have never been explored in detail. Despite a considerable volume of secondary literature, the essence of Friedrich Hayek’s concept of law is yet to be pinned down by scholars. In order to shed light on the topic, we will resort to the reconstruction method, a classic in Hayek studies. For the main hypothesis, we assume that Hayek’s conception of law is based not on his liberal political philosophy but rather on his theory of knowledge or, in other words, his epistemology. This idea has not been tested systematically in earlier Hayek studies. The main conclusion is that the epistemological perspective on the topic allows us to observe some of the specific features of Hayek’s legal views in greater depth than the traditional “liberal” approach. Unlike these interpretations, the “epistemic concept of law” approach can help explain the radical changes in Hayek’s late works and organize his often-disparate legal ideas into a logical system. Therefore, we claim to have achieved a clearer understanding of the essence of Hayek’s legal views and further clarified his contribution to the theory of law.

The Value of Knowledge and Other Epistemic Standings: A Case for Epistemic Pluralism

In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected in the discussion of epistemic value, which focuses to a large extend on the value problem of knowledge. This discussion suggests that knowledge has an outstanding value among epistemic standings because its value exceeds the value of its constitutive parts. I will argue that the value of knowledge is not outstanding by presenting epistemic standings of checking, transferring knowledge, and proving in court, whose values exceed the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology.