Epistemic Benefits Research Articles

From Individual to Group Privacy in Big Data Analytics

Mature information societies are characterised by mass production of data that provide insight into human behaviour. Analytics (as in big data analytics) has arisen as a practice to make sense of the data trails generated through interactions with networked devices, platforms and organisations. Persistent knowledge describing the behaviours and characteristics of people can be constructed over time, linking individuals into groups or classes of interest to the platform. Analytics allows for a new type of algorithmically assembled group to be formed that does not necessarily align with classes or attributes already protected by privacy and anti-discrimination law or addressed in fairness- and discrimination-aware analytics. Individuals are linked according to offline identifiers (e.g. age, ethnicity, geographical location) and shared behavioural identity tokens, allowing for predictions and decisions to be taken at a group rather than individual level. This article examines the ethical significance of such ad hoc groups in analytics and argues that the privacy interests of algorithmically assembled groups in inviolate personality must be recognised alongside individual privacy rights. Algorithmically grouped individuals have a collective interest in the creation of information about the group, and actions taken on its behalf. Group privacy is proposed as a third interest to balance alongside individual privacy and social, commercial and epistemic benefits when assessing the ethical acceptability of analytics platforms.

Exploring US Millennial consumers’ consumption values in relation to traditional and social cause apparel product attributes and purchase intentions

Millennial consumers, born between 1980 and 2000, are one of the largest consumer groups, yet there is limited knowledge about their apparel product purchasing intentions. Millennials are said to make sustainability-based decisions and to have a strong social and environmental consciousness. This study explores US Millennial consumers’ consumption values in relation to social cause product attributes of environment, labor, and traceability along with 12 more traditional attributes such as fit or style. Consumption values include the perceived importance of functional, monetary, emotional, social, and epistemic benefits derived from the apparel products. Online survey data were collected from 307 students attending a major western US university. The research hypotheses are tested using regression analyses with jeans as the apparel product category. Results suggest that traditional attributes remain a stronger influence on consumption values than social cause attributes, and that social cause product attributes, while influencing four consumption values, did not influence the social consumption value. Consumption values influence US Millennial consumers’ purchase intentions and these mediate the influence of traditional and social cause attributes on purchase intentions. Further investigation is suggested for clarifying the discrepancy between what is reported regarding Millennial consumers’ convictions and their intended apparel purchase behavior.

MAKING PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRESS: THE BIG QUESTIONS, APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, AND THE PROFESSION

Abstract:The debate over whether philosophy makes progress has focused on its failure to answer a core set of “big” questions. I argue that there are other kinds of philosophical progress which are equally important yet underappreciated: the creative development of new “philosophical devices” which increase our ability to think about the world, and the broadening of philosophical topics to ever greater adequacy to what matters. The conception of philosophy as defined by a narrow “core” set of questions is responsible for skepticism about progress, as well as for philosophy’s “marketing problem” — its failure to reach the general public. I argue for abandoning the distinction between “core” and “marginal” questions. The greater openness of philosophy to methodological diversity and diversity in topics, especially applied topics, will make a distinct kind of progress: in the breadth and completeness of the questions asked, phenomena investigated, and theories generated. Such openness may also make philosophy more hospitable to more diverse practitioners. This would also be conducive to progress, in the sense of reaching true answers to philosophical questions: greater diversity of philosophical practitioners has epistemic benefits, such as increasing objectivity.

Idealization and Abstraction in Models of Injustice

Charles Mills has argued against ideal theory in political philosophy on the basis that it contains idealizations. He calls for political philosophers to do more nonideal theory, namely political theory that pays more attention to the most visible oppressions in society, such as those based on race, gender, and class. Mills's argument relies on a distinction between idealization and abstraction. Idealizations involve adding false assumptions to one's model, which is unacceptable, whereas abstractions merely leave out details without undermining descriptive power. By studying formal models of injustice, I argue that the idealization/abstraction distinction is unhelpful. Either the distinction exists only relative to one's modeling purposes, or all models in political theory contain idealizations. Either way, the distinction does not help Mills's cause. Furthermore, there are arguments from philosophy of science for the epistemic benefits of idealizations. However, Mills's call for greater emphasis on the most visible mechanisms of oppression can be supported without relying on an idealization/abstraction distinction. I provide three alternative reasons for why we should prefer political theories that place more emphasis on race‐, class‐, and gender‐based oppression.

What is unrealistic optimism?

Here we consider the nature of unrealistic optimism and other related positive illusions. We are interested in whether cognitive states that are unrealistically optimistic are belief states, whether they are false, and whether they are epistemically irrational. We also ask to what extent unrealistically optimistic cognitive states are fixed. Based on the classic and recent empirical literature on unrealistic optimism, we offer some preliminary answers to these questions, thereby laying the foundations for answering further questions about unrealistic optimism, such as whether it has biological, psychological, or epistemic benefits.

The Roles of Institutional Trust and Distrust in Grounding Rational Deference to Scientific Expertise

Debates about climate change, genetically modified crops, and immunization have both strengthened for many the necessity to appeal to some form of scientific expertise while at the same time relativizing for others the epistemic authority of its claims. Scholars have offered diagnoses of this phenomenon. Their contribution has focused mostly on describing how expertise is marshalled, not why it is epistemically legitimate to invoke it. I will focus instead on two type of contributions that focus on the latter: some (e.g., John Hardwig, Naomi Scheman, Heidi Grasswick) offer moral underpinnings for expertise based on trust in individual experts, while others (e.g., Alvin Goldman) offer an epistemic analysis of the reasons why it is sometimes reasonable to defer to scientific expertise regardless of trust in individuals. I will argue that both these “trust-centered” and “assessment-centered” accounts of expertise are partially right but that in order to develop a general theory of rational deference to experts, one needs to include the epistemic benefits of both trust and distrust. Using Michel Blais’ and Robert Merton’s work, I will argue that rational deference to experts based on institutionally organized skepticism about experts’ claims offers a better account of deference to expertise than rational trust in individual experts: deference to expertise should be grounded in trust in scientific institutions, not trust in individual experts.

Value of cognitive diversity in science

When should a scientific community be cognitively diverse? This article presents a model for studying how the heterogeneity of learning heuristics used by scientist agents affects the epistemic efficiency of a scientific community. By extending the epistemic landscapes modeling approach introduced by Weisberg and Muldoon, the article casts light on the micro-mechanisms mediating cognitive diversity, coordination, and problem-solving efficiency. The results suggest that social learning and cognitive diversity produce epistemic benefits only when the epistemic community is faced with problems of sufficient difficulty.

Different motivations, similar proposals: objectivity in scientific community and democratic science policy

The aim of the paper is to discuss some possible connections between philosophical proposals about the social organisation of science and developments towards a greater democratisation of science policy. I suggest that there are important similarities between one approach to objectivity in philosophy of science—Helen Longino’s account of objectivity as freedom from individual biases achieved through interaction of a variety of perspectives—and some ideas about the epistemic benefits of wider representation of various groups’ perspectives in science policy, as analysed by Mark Brown. Given these similarities, I suggest that they allow one to approach developments in science policy as if one of their aims were epistemic improvement that can be recommended on the basis of the philosophical account; analyses of political developments inspired by these ideas about the benefits of inclusive dialogue can then be used for understanding the possibility to implement a philosophical proposal for improving the objectivity of science in practice. Outlining this suggestion, I also discuss the possibility of important differences between the developments in the two spheres and show how the concern about the possible divergence of politically motivated and epistemically motivated changes may be mitigated. In order to substantiate further the suggestion I make, I discuss one example of a development where politically motivated and epistemically motivated changes converge in practice—the development of professional ethics in American archaeology as analysed by Alison Wylie. I suggest that analysing such specific developments and getting involved with them can be one of the tasks for philosophy of science. In the concluding part of the paper I discuss how this approach to philosophy of science is related to a number of arguments about a more politically relevant philosophy of science.

Inclusion and the Epistemic Benefits of Deliberation

Contrary to the popular belief, I argue that a more inclusive polity does not necessarily conflict with the goal of improving the epistemic capacities of deliberation. My argument examines one property of democracy that is usually thought of in non-epistemic terms, inclusion. Inclusion is not only valuable for moral reasons, but it also has epistemic virtues. I consider two epistemic benefits of inclusive deliberation: (a) inclusive deliberation helps to create a more complete picture of the world that everyone dwells together; and (b) inclusive deliberation can be helpful in reducing biases and errors endemic to a society. Having advanced two epistemic arguments for inclusive deliberation, I argue that the Deweyan model best captures the knowledge-pooling function of deliberation.

The epistemic innocence of psychedelic states.

One recent development in epistemology, the philosophical study of knowledge, is the notion of 'epistemic innocence' introduced by Bortolotti and colleagues. This concept expresses the idea that certain suboptimal cognitive processes may nonetheless have epistemic (knowledge-related) benefits. The idea that delusion or confabulation may have psychological benefits is familiar enough. What is novel and interesting is the idea that such conditions may also yield significant and otherwise unavailable epistemic benefits. I apply the notion of epistemic innocence to research on the transformative potential of psychedelic drugs. The popular epithet 'hallucinogen' exemplifies a view of these substances as fundamentally epistemically detrimental. I argue that the picture is more complicated and that some psychedelic states can be epistemically innocent. This conclusion is highly relevant to policy debates about psychedelic therapy. Moreover, analysing the case of psychedelics can shed further light on the concept of epistemic innocence itself.

Hero Worship: The Elevation of the Human Spirit

AbstractIn this article, we review the psychology of hero development and hero worship. We propose that heroes and hero narratives fulfill important cognitive and emotional needs, including the need for wisdom, meaning, hope, inspiration, and growth. We propose a framework called the heroic leadership dynamic (HLD) to explain how need‐based heroism shifts over time, from our initial attraction to heroes to later retention or repudiation of heroes. Central to the HLD is idea that hero narratives fulfill both epistemic and energizing functions. Hero stories provide epistemic benefits by providing scripts for prosocial action, by revealing fundamental truths about human existence, by unpacking life paradoxes, and by cultivating emotional intelligence. To energize us, heroes promote moral elevation, heal psychic wounds, inspire psychological growth, and exude charisma. We discuss the implications of our framework for theory and research on heroism, leadership processes, and positive psychology.

Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia.

In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that agent at that time. Elaborated and systematized delusions in schizophrenia are typically false and exemplify failures of rationality and self-knowledge. Empirical studies suggest that they may have psychological benefits by relieving anxiety and enhancing meaningfulness. Moreover, these delusions have been considered as adaptive in virtue of the fact that they enable automated learning to resume after a significant disruption caused by incorrect prediction-error signalling. I argue that such psychological benefits and adaptive features also have positive epistemic consequences. More precisely, delusions can be a means to restoring epistemic functionality in agents who are overwhelmed by hypersalient experiences in the prodromal stage of psychosis. The analysis leads to a more complex view of the epistemic status of delusions than is found in the contemporary philosophical literature and has some implications for clinical practice. 1 Introduction2 Types of Delusions3 What Is Wrong with Elaborated and Systematized Delusions?4 Finding Life Meaningful5 Learning Resumed6 Epistemic Innocence7 Epistemic Benefit8 No Alternatives9 Conclusions and Implications

Plural voting and political equality: A thought experiment in democratic theory

I demonstrate that a set of well-known objections defeat John Stuart Mill’s plural voting proposal, but do not defeat plural voting as such. I adopt the following as a working definition of political equality: a voting system is egalitarian if and only if departures from a baseline of equally weighted votes are normatively permissible. I develop an alternative proposal, called procedural plural voting, which allocates plural votes procedurally, via the free choices of the electorate, rather than according to a substantive standard of competence. The alternative avoids standards objections to Mill’s proposal. Moreover, reflection on the alternative plural voting scheme disrupts our intuitions about what counts as an egalitarian voting system. Undue emphasis on Mill’s version of plural voting obscures three important reasons to reject plural voting in favor of strictly egalitarian voting systems: (1) that certain choices that generate inequalities of political power are morally impermissible; (2) that even chosen inequalities may undermine the potential epistemic benefits of democratic decision-making; and (3) that such choices may undermine citizens’ commitments to democracy understood as a joint project.

Developing multi-dimensional green value

Purpose– The purpose of this study is to elucidate how green value influences potential green hotel customers’ propensity to choose green. Studies on green hotels emphasized environmental and financial benefits that conventional hotels do not provide to society or the companies. However, these benefits may not be the ones that resonate best with its potential customers. Besides, given the characteristics of green products, it is also important to point out how customers perceive green-related costs.Design/methodology/approach– A pilot test was conducted in three universities and then an anonymous questionnaire was randomly administered to Korean passengers at the Incheon International Airport. Exploratory factor analysis and structural equation modeling were the primary methods of data analysis.Findings– Four dimensions for perceived green benefits and three dimensions for perceived green costs emerged: functional, emotional, social and epistemic benefits; and monetary, explicit and implicit costs. Environmental concern influenced perceived green benefits positively and perceived green costs negatively, while its relationship with purchase intention was insignificant. Perceived green benefits was not a significant predictor of purchase intention, but perceived green costs was, and it partially mediated the effect of environmental concern on purchase intention. Functional and emotional benefits as well as monetary and explicit costs were significantly associated with purchase intention.Research limitations/implications– This study has only investigated customer perceived value of a green hotel stay in the pre-purchase stage, and hotel brand level was not taken into consideration. Besides, convenience sampling of Korean respondents only may limit the generalizability of the research findings.Practical implications– Research findings help to explain the inconsistency between eco-friendly attitude and green purchase intentions. Managers may understand the importance of developing customers’ green awareness and how to market the green value to them.Originality/value– Few researches have focused on the role of customer perceived value in explaining true behavioral change of green hotel guests. The current study may be the first attempt to incorporate the social exchange theory into the conceptual model, and extend the knowledge of perceived value in this specific green context by not only emphasizing multi-dimensional perceived green benefits and perceived green costs but also incorporating a situational factor of environmental concern.

Positive word-of-mouth for mobile location-based service retail apps usage

Mobile location-based service LBS retail apps, a prominent web 3.0 trend, offer customers reward opportunities when they physically walk into stores or scan the barcodes of certain products using mobile cameras. The purpose of our study was to examine: 1 whether m-internet users' characteristics were related to perceived multidimensional benefits such as conditional epistemic benefit, social self-concept benefit, emotional benefit, and functional benefit; 2 whether perceived multidimensional benefits were related to positive word-of-mouth WOM behaviours relative to mobile LBS retail apps. Data were collected from US female m-internet users n = 901. Structural equation modelling was employed to test the proposed model. Conditional epistemic benefit, social self-concept benefit, emotional benefit, and functional benefit affected positive WOM behaviours relative to mobile LBS retail apps. Economic orientation, mobile affinity, and recreational orientation all had an indirect influence on positive WOM behaviours, mediated by perceived multidimensional benefits.

Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence.

In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of those cognitions which have both obvious epistemic faults and some significant epistemic benefit. A cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some epistemic benefit to the subject which would not be attainable otherwise because alternative (less epistemically faulty) cognitions that could deliver the same benefit are unavailable to the subject at that time. I ask whether confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias have epistemic benefits and whether there are genuine alternatives to forming a confabulatory explanation in the circumstances in which subjects confabulate. On the basis of my analysis of confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias, I argue that such explanations have the potential for epistemic innocence. I conclude that epistemic evaluation of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias ought to tell a richer story, one which takes into account the context in which the explanation occurs.

The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions.

Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, motivated delusions also have potential epistemic benefits for agents who have faced adversities, undergone physical or psychological trauma, or are subject to negative emotions and low self-esteem. To account for the epistemic status of motivated delusions, costly and beneficial at the same time, I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence. A delusion is epistemically innocent when adopting it delivers a significant epistemic benefit, and the benefit could not be attained if the delusion were not adopted. The analysis leads to a novel account of the status of delusions by inviting a reflection on the relationship between psychological and epistemic benefits.

Democratic Reason, Democratic Faith, and the Problem of Expertise

ABSTRACTHélène Landemore's Democratic Reason develops one important line of research in political epistemology, which we can define as the study of the ways in which distributed knowledge is put together for the purposes of making political decisions. Landemore argues for the epistemic benefits of cognitive diversity in political decision procedures in a condition of epistemic equality—where there are no experts. Given this omission, her approach has undeveloped potential for a second line of research in political epistemology, on the problem of aggregating asymmetrically distributed knowledge, i.e., integrating democratic reason with expertise.

Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge

Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge

At What Cost?: Blind Testing, Eyewitness Identification, and the Question of What Can and Cannot Be Counted as a Cost of Reducing Information Available for Decision

One theme of the conference for which this piece was written is “When does less information result in better decisions?” In keeping with that theme, I am taking up an issue which raises a central question concerning what we mean by “information,” and what counts as “less information” and “better decisions.” In what follows, I will dissent, at least in part, from the position of the prominent eyewitness identification researcher Steven Clark, set forth in a recent article in the journal Perspectives on Psychological Science, who appears to hold that in evaluating reforms in eyewitness identification procedures, all losses of selections that are in fact true perpetrator selections must be counted as costs of the proposed reform in evaluating the wisdom of the reform. I will take the position that this is clearly not true in regard to the administration of such line-ups “double blind,” that is, their administration in such a way that the person conducting the procedure has no knowledge of the target of the lineup (or at least of the target’s position in the lineup array), and therefore cannot cue the witness, consciously or unconsciously, about the hoped-for selection. Ultimately, however, I will support Professor Clark’s position that losses of accurate identifications may properly be counted as costs in evaluating some other proposed reforms of eyewitness identification procedures, particularly sequential presentation, but I will conclude that in that case, based on the knowledge currently available, that the epistemic and moral benefits of sequential presentation outweigh such costs.