Abstract
Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, motivated delusions also have potential epistemic benefits for agents who have faced adversities, undergone physical or psychological trauma, or are subject to negative emotions and low self-esteem. To account for the epistemic status of motivated delusions, costly and beneficial at the same time, I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence. A delusion is epistemically innocent when adopting it delivers a significant epistemic benefit, and the benefit could not be attained if the delusion were not adopted. The analysis leads to a novel account of the status of delusions by inviting a reflection on the relationship between psychological and epistemic benefits.
Highlights
In this paper, I ask whether delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function have epistemic benefits
In this paper I have argued that the psychological benefits of motivated delusions can convert into epistemic ones
Motivated delusions have the potential for epistemic innocence, where epistemic innocence is characterised as the epistemic status of those cognitions that have obvious epistemic costs and have a significant epistemic benefit that would be otherwise unattainable
Summary
I ask whether delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function have epistemic benefits. Without denying that delusions are typically false and irrational, and that they compromise good functioning to a considerable extent, my goal here is to establish whether the psychological benefits attributed to those delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function can translate into epistemic benefits. Thinking about delusions in terms of potential epistemic benefits leads to a more balanced view of the role of delusions in a person’s cognitive and affective life and invites a reflection on the relevance of contextual factors in epistemic evaluation. I argue that motivated delusions have the potential for satisfying the two conditions for epistemic innocence and I offer an illustration from anosognosia to support this claim.
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