Empirical ethicists occupy an uncomfortable place in the field of practical ethics. Although much has been written about the ‘‘empirical turn’’ in ethics, those researchers who see value in using empirical data to inform the ethical analysis of practical dilemmas face a barrage of criticisms. On one flank, moral philosophers, well armed with three centuries worth of arguments about the fact-value distinction, target the validity of empirical ethics research and critique what they see as the empirical ethicists’ untenable efforts to develop prescriptive conclusions from descriptive evidence. On the opposing flank, social scientists (and others) attack the distinctiveness of empirical ethics research, with criticisms ranging from empirical ethicists’ naive appropriation of the complex methodologies and methods developed from within their disciplines, to their apparent ignorance of social scientists’ own attempts to account for the ways in which social practices are laden with judgments of moral value. Yet, notwithstanding these ongoing battles, empirical ethics continues to flourish. What is to be made of this? Our starting point here is twofold. First, empirical ethics, when elucidated carefully, can be a valid and distinctive enterprise, and, second, when deployed as a catchall term to describe each and every approach to using empirical data within ethical analysis, it can lose both its validity and distinctiveness. This, we believe, is because empirical ethics has failed to shore up its defenses against the criticisms posed by moral philosophers and social scientists, and we propose that these failings threaten the long-term viability of the empirical ethics project. Such criticisms raise important challenges to the theoretical and methodological foundations of empirical ethics research and cannot be dismissed or sidelined. In the first part of this article, we establish our defense to these challenges by justifying a narrow account of empirical ethics research that is built on a particular claim about the character of ethical and empirical argument. In so doing, we tease out what is distinctive about empirical ethics research, and how such research can develop and implement justified and practically useful normative claims. In the second part of the article, we consider methodological strategies for integrating the empirical and the ethical and show how these come up short in providing adequate responses to the criticisms outlined previously. Instead, we argue, from our claim in the first part of the article, that, in order to fulfill its aims, empirical ethics requires innovative methodological practices that are tailored to bring the traditions of philosophical and social scientific inquiry together in new ways. In the final part of the article, we take the first steps in outlining what such methodologies might be.